SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE	UNITED STATES
	_
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,)
CALIFORNIA,)
Petitioner,)
V.) No. 23-753
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,)
Respondent.)

Pages: 1 through 103

Place: Washington, D.C.

Date: October 16, 2024

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9		-
10		
11	Washington, D.C.	
12	Wednesday, October 16,	2024
13		
14	The above-entitled matter o	ame on for
15	oral argument before the Supreme C	Court of the
16	United States at 11:20 a.m.	
17		
18	APPEARANCES:	
19	TARA M. STEELEY, Deputy City Attor	ney, San Francisco,
20	California; on behalf of the P	etitioner.
21	FREDERICK LIU, Assistant to the Sc	olicitor General,
22	Department of Justice, Washing	ton, D.C.; on behalf
23	of the Respondent.	
24		
25		

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1	PROCEEDINGS
2	(11:20 a.m.)
3	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We'll hear
4	argument now in Case 23-753, the City and County
5	of San Francisco versus the Environmental
6	Protection Agency.
7	Ms. Steeley.
8	ORAL ARGUMENT OF TARA M. STEELEY
9	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
LO	MS. STEELEY: Mr. Chief Justice, and
L1	may it please the Court:
L2	Section 301(b)(1)(C) of the Clean
L3	Water Act assigns EPA the job of setting the
L4	effluent limitations necessary to meet and
L5	implement water quality standards. The water
L6	quality standards are not the limitations
L7	themselves. Instead, they set the goals for the
L8	water body. EPA must translate those goals into
L9	discharge limitations.
20	The Generic Prohibitions fail this
21	task. As Judge Collins explained below, the
22	Generic Prohibitions erase the distinction
23	between water quality standards and discharge
24	limitations, making them one and the same.
25	The Ceneric Drohibitions revive the

- very "cause or contribute" standard Congress
- 2 repealed. And they do not function as discharge
- 3 limitations. As the Second Circuit recognized,
- 4 they add nothing that tells a permitholder how
- 5 to control its discharges.
- 6 EPA claims it uses the Generic
- 7 Prohibitions as a backstop, an insurance policy
- 8 against changing circumstances. But the Clean
- 9 Water Act already gives EPA all the tools it
- 10 needs to address uncertainty. EPA can reopen,
- 11 modify, or terminate a permit when conditions
- 12 change, and it can exercise its statutory
- 13 authority to protect public welfare in
- 14 emergencies. What EPA cannot do is expose
- 15 permitholders to liability based on receiving
- 16 water conditions it cannot control.
- 17 The Generic Prohibitions are also
- inconsistent with the Act's permit shield. The
- 19 shield protects permitholders from liability as
- long as they comply with their permit terms.
- 21 But, by imposing indeterminate requirements, the
- 22 Generic Prohibitions prevent permitholders from
- 23 relying on the shield's protections.
- San Francisco is therefore exposed to
- 25 crushing criminal and civil penalties even when

1 it otherwise complies with its 300-page permit. 2 I welcome the Court's questions. JUSTICE THOMAS: In Phase -- in -- in 3 -- in your permit Phase I, doesn't that contain 4 a narrative limitation? 5 MS. STEELEY: So San Francisco's 6 7 permit is a Phase II permit, so we're not subject to the CSO policy for Phase I. 8 9 But Phase I describes a narrative 10 condition. The Generic Prohibition -- our --11 our concern about the Generic Prohibitions is 12 not that they are narrative. It's perfectly 13 fine for EPA to use conditions that are narrative, narrative water quality-based 14 15 effluent limitations. 16 And that's exactly what the CSO --17 sorry, the CSO control policy requires. It --18 in EPA's own guidance, it describes what's 19 required under Phase I, and it describes that as a narrative water quality-based effluent 20 21 limitation. 2.2 JUSTICE THOMAS: So what is -- with 23 this permit, what is at bottom the problem? MS. STEELEY: What at bottom is the 24

problem is that permitholders don't know what

- 1 they need to do to comply. We know how to
- 2 comply with the 300 pages of our permit, which
- 3 tells us our discharge limitations that we need
- 4 to achieve.
- 5 The problem with the Generic
- 6 Prohibitions is that they don't tell us what in
- 7 addition that we need to do. And if I could
- 8 provide an example of that. One of California's
- 9 water quality standards is no objectionable
- 10 algae bloom should form in the water body. San
- 11 Francisco doesn't know how it must control its
- 12 discharges to prevent that condition from
- 13 forming in the water body.
- 14 And we can't know because whether a
- 15 condition will form in the water body will
- 16 necessarily depend on what other permitholders
- or other non-point sources are adding to the
- 18 water body and the flow of the water itself.
- 19 What San Francisco can control is our
- 20 own discharges. We cannot control the receiving
- 21 water conditions.
- 22 JUSTICE JACKSON: Are the water
- 23 quality standards in state law? I -- I thought
- that the EPA permits were just incorporating
- obligations that already existed in state law.

- 1 Am I wrong about that?
- MS. STEELEY: I think that's not quite
- 3 correct, Your Honor. The water quality
- 4 standards set the goal for the water body, but
- 5 they aren't self-executing. They have to be put
- 6 into a permit. And what's -- what 301(b)(1)(C)
- 7 requires is that EPA meet and implement the
- 8 water quality standards, which means translating
- 9 them into a -- a permit limitation --
- 10 JUSTICE JACKSON: I know, but I --
- 11 MS. STEELEY: -- that permitholders
- 12 can follow.
- JUSTICE JACKSON: -- isn't EPA -- I
- 14 thought the statute allowed for any more
- 15 stringent limitation, including those necessary
- 16 to meet water quality standards, treatment
- 17 standards, or schedules of compliance
- 18 established pursuant to any state law.
- 19 MS. STEELEY: So --
- 20 JUSTICE JACKSON: So California has
- 21 established certain water quality standards.
- 22 Are those independently binding on the cities
- and municipalities in California?
- MS. STEELEY: They are not binding.
- 25 They are only binding as a permit limitation.

- 1 And that's the problem here, is that we don't --
- 2 they're only binding --
- 3 JUSTICE JACKSON: Do they -- do you
- 4 have to have permits under state law so that
- 5 they get bound -- you get bound through the
- 6 state permitting process then?
- 7 MS. STEELEY: The permit at issue here
- 8 is issued by --
- 9 JUSTICE JACKSON: No, I understand.
- 10 But I'm just --
- 11 MS. STEELEY: Yeah.
- 12 JUSTICE JACKSON: -- I guess my -- my
- big problem is that I'm trying to understand why
- 14 you find these permit provisions so onerous or
- 15 problematic when they seem to just incorporate
- 16 standards that already exist under state law
- 17 that you would have to follow anyway.
- MS. STEELEY: The standards are not
- 19 self-executing, so we don't have to follow them
- 20 anyway. They set the goals for the water body,
- 21 but they're not limitations on us themselves.
- JUSTICE KAGAN: So --
- MS. STEELEY: So they aren't -- they
- are not binding on us.
- 25 JUSTICE KAGAN: -- Ms. -- Ms. Steeley,

- 1 I mean, there are lots of different kinds of
- 2 regulations in the world. Some people like some
- 3 kinds; some people like other kinds. Some
- 4 regulations are really prescriptive, do this,
- 5 this, this, and this. And then, you know, some
- 6 people hate those kinds of regulations. They'd
- 7 rather have regulations that are less
- 8 prescriptive, that say here's the goal, you
- 9 decide how to meet it. That gives a party more
- 10 flexibility and so forth.
- 11 So, you know, some people, you know,
- 12 it's -- there's got to be something in this
- 13 statute that tells you that the agency can't
- 14 decide to go the less prescriptive, more
- 15 flexible "you decide how to meet it; this is the
- 16 goal" route, and I don't see anything in this
- 17 statute that does that.
- MS. STEELEY: So I disagree, Your
- 19 Honor, that this provides a flexible standard.
- 20 What --
- 21 JUSTICE KAGAN: Let's talk about the
- 22 statute. Like, what in the statute prevents the
- agency from saying, in addition to or instead of
- the highly prescriptive, you know, you can only
- discharge X amount, we want to set a goal, and

- 1 we want to tell you that you're obligated to not
- 2 contribute to violating that goal?
- 3 MS. STEELEY: So what the statute
- 4 provides is that EPA must meet and implement the
- 5 water quality standards. And those are
- 6 transitive verbs. They necessarily, in our
- 7 view, require taking concrete steps to meet --
- 8 to achieve the goal, right?
- 9 JUSTICE KAGAN: See, to me, this
- 10 regulation -- what does this regulation do? It
- 11 says go meet and implement the water quality
- 12 standards, because you were exactly right in
- 13 what you said to Justice Jackson, as without
- this regulation, or not this regulation but this
- 15 condition in the permit, you're not
- independently obligated to -- they're not
- 17 enforced -- those standards are not enforceable
- 18 against you.
- 19 It's the permit condition that makes
- those standards enforceable against you by the
- 21 EPA. So that's what this condition does. It --
- 22 it -- it -- it's -- it's prescribing that you
- 23 have to meet water quality standards. Like, how
- 24 more clearly could you meet this statutory
- 25 language than that?

1 MS. STEELEY: So the problem is, is 2 that it -- it can be used as grounds for enforcement afterwards, but it doesn't tell 3 permitholders in advance what we must do to 4 control our discharges. So, in that sense --5 6 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: The problem is 7 that there are discharges -- and we get a huge amount of them in the amici briefs -- of 8 9 discharges that weren't anticipated. You were fine at the time of the permit, and then, all of 10 11 a sudden, you've got chlorinated or potable 12 water into the waters. 13 So, if the water standards are not 14 self-executing, which you admit, if they're not 15 in the permit because they haven't been put into 16 the permit, then what you're saying is: Well, 17 you can't do anything immediately, EPA. have to start a review process that takes months 18 19 and sometimes years to amend the permit and do 20 something about it. 21 This, instead, says to San Francisco: 2.2 You should be monitoring the water. Don't let 23 it exceed the water quality standards that we 24 met and set together. Now you implement the 25 changes that you think are appropriate to stop

- 1 this unexpected discharge.
- MS. STEELEY: So I'm not --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I don't know why
- 4 that's the wrong way to look at this.
- 5 MS. STEELEY: I think it's the wrong
- 6 way to look at it, Your Honor, because, first of
- 7 all, we are not saying EPA cannot take immediate
- 8 action. The statutory scheme already provides
- 9 EPA with emergency powers. They can act
- immediately to protect public welfare under
- 11 Section -- sorry -- 1364.
- 12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: How can they do
- 13 that? They can't go to court unless there's a
- 14 permit violation.
- MS. STEELEY: They can go into court
- 16 under their emergency powers.
- 17 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Under their
- 18 emergency.
- MS. STEELEY: They can go into
- 20 court --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But we have to go
- 22 to that extreme. So how do we get San Francisco
- 23 to do something about its implementing -- its
- 24 monitoring obligations? It's supposed to
- 25 monitor and look at things and, if things are

- 1 getting out of control, figure out how to put
- 2 them back into control.
- 3 MS. STEELEY: So San Francisco's
- 4 permit requires monitoring of receiving water
- 5 conditions, as you've noted. You'll see that in
- 6 the Petition Appendix starting at page --
- 7 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So --
- 8 MS. STEELEY: -- 226.
- 9 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- in this permit,
- 10 this is not a permit involving entities --
- 11 multiple entities that are discharging into most
- 12 of these waters. So most of these water, it's
- one permitholder, the City of San Francisco.
- 14 It's combining sewage and rainwater runoff,
- 15 correct, so it knows all of the point sources
- 16 that contribute to that water quality have
- 17 effluent limitations because you can test those
- and see whether they're meeting standards.
- So, if something unexpected happens,
- 20 it's because one of those water sources has gone
- 21 awry, correct?
- MS. STEELEY: That is not correct,
- Your Honor, and I have two responses to that.
- 24 First of all, San Francisco is not the
- only discharger or contributor to the water

- 1 body. There are eight discharge points at issue
- 2 in this permit.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Those are the
- 4 point sources that it's supposed to be --
- 5 MS. STEELEY: Sorry, no. So
- 6 San Francisco has its own discharge points, and
- 7 there are eight of them. One of them is -- I
- 8 will concede is fairly far out into the ocean.
- 9 We are the only source for that one. But the
- 10 other seven have many other contributors to the
- 11 water body very close nearby.
- 12 And if I can give you an example.
- 13 Just a couple weeks ago, there was a bacteria
- spike near one of those discharge points. It's
- a point that we are not currently using, so we
- 16 know we did not cause that spike, but someone
- 17 else did.
- 18 Had we been contributing to the water,
- 19 had we been discharging at the time, we would
- 20 necessarily have been contributing to that
- 21 condition and we would be subject to liability.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But how about --
- 23 but my -- that's my point, which is it -- you
- 24 can't get past the obligation to meet the water
- 25 standards unless you put them into the permit.

1 MS. STEELEY: So the way that EPA can 2 achieve its goals here is to set a discharge 3 limitation in the permit. And if I can perhaps just under --4 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Oh, so they should 5 6 take each -- I see in the water standards 7 they're very detailed on any number of -- of 8 discharges. You can only have X amount of feces 9 in the water, X amount -- or Y amount of 10 bacteria. Pages and pages of measurements. 11 You want them to write all of those --12 take the water standards, and instead of 13 cross-referencing them and telling you to meet 14 those standards, you want them to write each 15 amount? 16 MS. STEELEY: So, Your Honor, EPA's 17 own regulations require it to set an effluent 18 limitation whenever there is a reasonable 19 potential that a discharge will cause or 20 contribute to a water -- water body --21 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, that --2.2 that's the point I'm making. It does that. 23 Where there's -- where they're exceeding the 24 limitation, it tells it what technology to put 25 into place to reduce it.

1 But, if they're not exceeding it right 2 now, how do they take care of the -- the 3 unexpected situations? MS. STEELEY: The permit limitations 4 are set in advance, so they're anticipating what 5 the discharge will do to the water body. 6 7 But, if I can correct, I think, what maybe -- what maybe is a misunderstanding. We 8 9 don't have real-time monitoring of receiving water conditions. Under our permit, we monitor 10 11 bacteria on a once-a-week basis. And other 12 things, including effects on animals, sediment, we monitor on a yearly basis, and it takes about 13 nine months for the results to come back. 14 15 So San Francisco cannot shift on a 16 dime. We don't have the information necessary 17 to know --18 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I'm sorry, no 19 one's asking you to shift on a dime. 20 they're asking you to do is to become 21 responsible for doing what's necessary, not on a 2.2 dime, but -- nothing in the EPA works on a dime 23 -- but to take the steps necessary to control 24 situations that develop.

MS. STEELEY: So if I can provide

```
1
      another example of how this runs amuck, the --
 2
                JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: By the way, I do
 3
      accept that there are some provisions of the
      water standards that are, charitably, a little
 4
      amorphous. You know, control for the color of
 5
 6
      the water. But I think that's an as-applied
7
      challenge.
                JUSTICE KAGAN: Yeah, could I just
 8
      piggyback on that if you'll -- if you'll let me,
 9
10
      Justice Sotomayor?
11
                JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Yeah, sure.
12
                JUSTICE KAGAN: Is -- is, when I hear
13
     you speaking, I hear one of two things.
14
                One is that to the extent that you
15
     have objections to particular ones of these
16
     water quality standards -- they're too
17
     confusing, they're too vague, we can't figure it
      out, how can you tell between us and other
18
19
     dischargers -- I mean, that does seem like a
20
     classic arbitrary and capricious question. So
21
     you would go and make an arbitrary and
2.2
      capricious standard as to those particular
23
      standards that are in the permit.
24
                I mean, the second way I hear you,
```

honestly, is -- is you're making a policy

- 1 argument to either the agency or to Congress.
- 2 You're making a policy argument to the agency,
- 3 essentially: Don't take advantage of your
- 4 statutory authority in this way because it's
- 5 very confusing to us, the regulated party. Or
- 6 you're making a policy argument to Congress: Go
- 7 fix this statute so that the EPA can't do this.
- 8 But what I don't hear you telling me
- 9 is, like, what in the statute prevents the EPA
- 10 from doing this. And, you know, as I said in
- 11 the -- in my -- in my first intervention here,
- 12 the policy arguments, they cut both ways. Some
- 13 people like these kinds of standards. These
- 14 kinds of standards -- if the EPA couldn't do
- these standards, presumably, they would do
- 16 something else, which might be more
- 17 prescriptive, which some parties might really
- 18 hate.
- 19 So -- so that's such a policy argument
- that we can't figure out what in the statute
- 21 prevents the EPA from doing this.
- MS. STEELEY: So, again, I would
- 23 point -- I would point you to the requirement to
- 24 meet and implement the water quality standards.
- As you noted, Justice Sotomayor, some

- of the standards are not -- they don't translate
- 2 easily into a discharge limitation for
- 3 San Francisco.
- 4 And I don't agree that it's a policy
- 5 argument. We simply want to know what we have
- 6 to do --
- 7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I --
- 8 JUSTICE KAGAN: I feel as though
- 9 it's -- when you say "meet and implement," I
- 10 feel that those statutory words, they're
- 11 practically a description of these permit
- 12 conditions.
- You know, they -- they basically say:
- 14 If -- if -- you -- you don't have to do the --
- just the standard effluent limitations if you
- 16 think that a regulation is -- you know, further
- 17 conditions are necessary to achieve the water
- 18 quality standards.
- 19 And the EPA is saying at the very
- 20 least this: We have to obligate you and other
- 21 entities with permits to comply with those water
- 22 quality standards. And that's -- that's
- 23 actually exactly what this statute allows the
- 24 EPA to do.
- 25 MS. STEELEY: So I don't agree that

- 1 you can meet and implement the water quality
- 2 standards by simply sticking a term in the
- 3 permit that says: Do not cause or contribute to
- 4 the violation of water quality standards.
- 5 They might as well have said: Do not
- 6 violate the Clean Water Act. It doesn't tell us
- 7 anything --
- 8 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: I thought -- I
- 9 thought --
- 10 MS. STEELEY: -- about how to
- 11 control --
- 12 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I thought
- 13 the -- I thought the whole reason we have the
- water permit system is because the water quality
- 15 system was a failure?
- MS. STEELEY: That's exactly --
- 17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Because it
- didn't tell people in any predictable way what
- 19 they can and cannot do.
- MS. STEELEY: That's exactly right.
- 21 And Congress repealed that system. It replaced
- 22 that system.
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: And -- and the --
- 24 and -- I'm sorry, keep going.
- MS. STEELEY: Oh, no. It replaced

2.1

- 1 that with a system where EPA is supposed to tell
- 2 us our discharge obligations in advance. That
- 3 was the entire basis for the Clean Water Act.
- 4 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: And I thought the
- 5 statutory hook that you were relying on in
- 6 (b)(1)(C), 301(b)(1)(C), was the phrase "any
- 7 more stringent limitation necessary to meet
- 8 water quality standards." And you read "any
- 9 more stringent limitation" to refer back and
- 10 mean effluent limitation.
- Is that your statutory hook?
- 12 MS. STEELEY: That's true, Your Honor.
- 13 I would also point you to -- Section 301(a) sets
- 14 the table for what the rest of Section 301(b) is
- 15 going to accomplish.
- 16 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Absolutely.
- 17 301(a) sets effluent limitations, and then, when
- it says "any more stringent limitation," you say
- 19 the fact that the word "effluent" is not there
- is -- in context, it's obviously referring to
- 21 "effluent limitations" and then "meet water
- 22 quality standards, "right?
- MS. STEELEY: That's correct, Your
- 24 Honor. What --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I'm sorry. But

2.2

- 1 you -- you say narrative is okay. And that's
- 2 not an effluent limitation. We also have our
- 3 own case that says it doesn't have to be an
- 4 effluent limitation. And I still don't
- 5 understand how you didn't forfeit this argument.
- 6 MS. STEELEY: So --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: First of all, it
- 8 wasn't raised before the Ninth Circuit. It was
- 9 mentioned in the dissent, but, when you filed
- 10 for certiorari, you didn't make this argument.
- 11 And you now raise it -- I was quite
- 12 surprised when I read the question presented and
- 13 started your brief and thought to myself this is
- 14 a new theory.
- 15 How is that argument not forfeited?
- MS. STEELEY: So, Your Honor, we do
- 17 not object to narrative water quality-based
- 18 effluent limitations, and an effluent limitation
- 19 can be narrative. What an effluent limitation
- 20 is is a --
- 21 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Just answer my
- 22 question. Why didn't you forfeit this argument?
- MS. STEELEY: Okay. We did not
- 24 forfeit this argument because we've argued
- 25 throughout this case, including, you'll see, at

- 1 pages 24 to 34 of our opening brief, that our
- 2 theory --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I'm asking about
- 4 how you didn't forfeit it in your cert petition.
- 5 MS. STEELEY: So what we are
- 6 challenging here is the Generic Prohibitions.
- 7 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And how did you
- 8 not forfeit it in the court below by not raising
- 9 it?
- MS. STEELEY: We did raise --
- 11 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: We're not a court
- 12 of first impression.
- MS. STEELEY: We did raise it in the
- 14 court below, Your Honor. You'll see that at
- 15 pages --
- 16 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: The Ninth Circuit
- 17 didn't -- didn't think so. I looked at your
- 18 briefs from there. I don't think so either.
- MS. STEELEY: The Ninth Circuit held
- that 301(b)(1)(C) is not limited to effluent
- 21 limitations, which are restrictions on
- 22 discharges. It did reach that holding. You'll
- see that at pages 32 to 33 of the Ninth
- 24 Circuit's decision. And we argued this to the
- 25 Ninth Circuit.

1	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: All right.
2	MS. STEELEY: So I I don't
3	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: On the "more
4	stringent" area question, if it's a different
5	limitation, it's more stringent, isn't it?
6	Meaning you're defining "more stringent" as
7	being more hardship on me than the effluent
8	limitation. But doesn't that answer Justice
9	Kagan's point, which is anytime you have another
LO	obligation, it's more stringent?
L1	MS. STEELEY: We don't agree that
L2	"more stringent" just means additional. I
L3	think, if Congress had meant that, it would have
L4	said so. And I think that's actually an
L5	important part of the statutory
L6	JUSTICE KAGAN: I'm not sure I
L7	understand that. I mean, these do impose
L8	obligations on you above and beyond what the
L9	technology-based limits do, isn't that right?
20	You have to do more?
21	MS. STEELEY: I don't agree, Your
22	Honor, and that's because we cannot tell. It
23	does not tell us in advance how to control our
24	discharges. But
25	JUSTICE KAGAN: Well either you have

- 1 to do only what the technology-based limits tell
- 2 you to do or you have to do more.
- 3 MS. STEELEY: But this does not tell
- 4 us what more we would have to do.
- 5 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, for example,
- 6 suppose a technology-based condition says, you
- 7 know, don't discharge more than 75 gallons of
- 8 sewage. And now, in addition to that, a water
- 9 quality-based condition says don't cause or
- 10 contribute to meaningful discoloration.
- Isn't it more stringent than the first
- 12 condition standing alone because, on a
- 13 particular day, you might have to cut your
- 14 discharges more to 60 gallons of -- per day?
- MS. STEELEY: So we --
- 16 JUSTICE KAGAN: That is more
- 17 stringent. Now it's 60 gallons per day because
- 18 that's what's necessary to prevent
- 19 discoloration.
- 20 MS. STEELEY: So I have two arguments
- 21 to that, Your Honor.
- One is this doesn't tell us how to
- control our discharges, so, in our view, it's
- 24 not more stringent.
- 25 And the second is, is that we judge

- 1 permit terms at the time that they are set.
- When they are set, we cannot tell if it's a more
- 3 stringent requirement or not because, depending
- 4 on conditions in the water body, it can be
- 5 either more or less stringent at that moment in
- 6 time, and so, therefore, it's not a more
- 7 stringent restriction.
- 8 JUSTICE JACKSON: But isn't that the
- 9 point? I mean, do -- do you dispute that
- 10 Congress was attempting to have a backstop with
- 11 respect to requiring or allowing for any more
- 12 stringent limitation?
- I mean, the word "any" in here also,
- it seems to me, does work to suggest that we
- don't have to stay within the world of effluent
- limitations. So how do you account for that?
- 17 And isn't the point of having this that Congress
- understood that the (1)(A) effluent limitations
- 19 might not be sufficient, so the authority was
- 20 given to prescribe any more stringent
- 21 limitation?
- MS. STEELEY: So I think you have to
- 23 read "any" in context. I think my friends on
- the other side read 301(b)(1)(C) as meaning any
- 25 limitation. That cannot be right. They've rest

- 1 out -- they've read out the rest of the words of
- 2 that section. But I think I -- I want to -- I
- don't believe that 301(b)(1)(C) is meant to be,
- 4 you know, an all-encompassing backstop. I don't
- 5 agree with that. In fact --
- 6 JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, what is it
- 7 doing? I mean, we already have a provision that
- 8 allows for or authorizes effluent limitations.
- 9 And then we get to this one that says you can
- 10 put in a permit any more stringent limitation.
- 11 And -- and speaking of reading out the words, it
- 12 says "including those necessary."
- So it's not even clear that "those
- 14 necessary" is the sum total of the limitations.
- 15 It says "any more stringent limitations." So
- isn't -- doesn't that just on its textual
- 17 reading suggest we're beyond the effluent
- 18 limitations that were previously authorized?
- MS. STEELEY: So a couple responses
- that I'd like to give you if I may.
- JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, please.
- MS. STEELEY: The first is that what
- 23 an effluent limitation is, is a restriction on
- 24 discharges of pollutants. We know from Section
- 25 301 that the entire section is about a

- 1 restriction on the discharges of pollutants. So
- 2 we believe 301(b)(1)(C) is also about an
- 3 effluent limitation, but it's necessarily narrow
- 4 in scope, and if I can explain why.
- 5 So technology-based effluent
- 6 limitations, which are set under Section
- 7 301(b)(1)(A) and (B), are effluent limitations
- 8 that require controls using the best practicable
- 9 technology that's economically feasible.
- 10 What Section 301(b)(1)(C) -- sorry --
- 11 Section 301(b)(1)(C) allows is additional
- 12 controls regardless of their economic
- 13 feasibility, regardless of cost. So those are
- 14 necessarily a limited thing. They are used only
- when more stringent, only when necessary to meet
- 16 and implement. They're not a catch-all.
- 17 JUSTICE JACKSON: Right. I understand
- 18 that point.
- MS. STEELEY: They're not used all the
- 20 time.
- 21 JUSTICE JACKSON: I understand that
- 22 point, but what -- what do we do with the fact
- that Congress chose, I think, to codify the
- 24 EPA's interpretation of this -- of this -- the
- 25 CSO control policy, and that policy, it's my

- 1 understanding, explicitly endorsed the kind of
- 2 permit provisions at issue here, those that
- 3 regulate sewage treatment that incorporate water
- 4 quality standards beyond effluent limitations?
- Is -- do you -- do you dispute that
- 6 Congress endorsed the kinds of permit provisions
- 7 that exist here?
- 8 MS. STEELEY: Absolutely. We
- 9 absolutely --
- 10 JUSTICE JACKSON: Okay.
- MS. STEELEY: -- dispute that. So my
- 12 friends on the other side are not relying on the
- 13 CSO policy as their source of authority and
- 14 wisely so because the CSO policy does not give
- them the permission to put in conditions like
- 16 the Generic Prohibitions.
- We are a Phase II permit, which
- 18 expressly requires water quality-based effluent
- 19 limitations. Even under Phase I, Phase I allows
- 20 narrative water quality-based effluent
- 21 limitations. There's nothing in the CSO policy
- 22 that suggests that Congress -- that EPA could
- 23 simply impose something like the Generic
- 24 Prohibitions, leave San Francisco to figure out
- 25 its discharge obligations on its own.

1	Congress there's nothing suggesting
2	that Congress had that in mind or blessed that
3	system. In fact, when Congress was asked, you
4	know, do we want to leave permitholders to
5	figure it out for themselves or assign EPA as
6	the agency to set limitations, it chose the
7	latter approach.
8	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
9	counsel.
LO	Justice Thomas, anything further?
L1	JUSTICE THOMAS: Are there not in
L2	your case, but are there any provisions is
L3	there any prohibition in 1311 against E EPA
L4	having the generic limitations in a in a plan
L5	for someone else? Just generically, not you.
L6	MS. STEELEY: Is there a prohibition?
L7	JUSTICE THOMAS: Yeah. Are they
L8	precluded from having generic limitations?
L9	MS. STEELEY: I don't think there's
20	anything expressly precluding them, but
21	except that they are not authorized to do so,
22	right? EPA only has authority when authorized.
23	And so I think Section 301 is silent about
24	Generic Prohibitions. It doesn't authorize
25	them.

1 JUSTICE THOMAS: Well, let me ask it 2 differently. Can EPA impose generic limitations 3 on anyone? 4 MS. STEELEY: No. JUSTICE THOMAS: Why? 5 6 MS. STEELEY: Because they point to 7 Section 301(b)(1)(C) as their only source of authority to impose Generic Prohibitions. 8 9 JUSTICE THOMAS: Yeah. 10 MS. STEELEY: And that provision does 11 not allow it. 12 JUSTICE THOMAS: And why is that? 13 MS. STEELEY: Because what can be 14 imposed under Section 301(b)(1)(C) is 15 limitations on discharges. Those are effluent 16 limitations. They need to tell permitholders 17 their obligations. That's the entire point of 18 that section and its requirements. 19 So, by imposing a Generic Prohibition, 20 they're simply telling us to figure it out for 21 ourselves, which we think is contrary to the 2.2 statutory scheme. 23 JUSTICE THOMAS: So would you have a 24 -- an arbitrary and capricious claim if you did

not bring this as a statutory claim?

1	MS. STEELEY: Yes.
2	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice Alito?
3	JUSTICE ALITO: The government says
4	that there are no other significant point or
5	non-point sources of pollution around the
6	Southwest Ocean Outfall.
7	Assuming for the sake of argument that
8	that is true I heard you to dispute it
9	earlier in your argument, but assuming for the
10	sake of argument that it is true, why couldn't
11	you then figure out what is necessary for you to
12	do to comply with the water quality standards?
13	MS. STEELEY: So, if I can just
14	clarify first, there are eight outfalls at
15	issue. So they're saying at one of them that is
16	true. They don't contest that the other seven,
17	that is not true.
18	But the reason is, first of all,
19	Congress assigned EPA this task, not us. But
20	the practical answer is, is that we can't know
21	what we can discharge without knowing in real
22	time, minute by minute, what the conditions are
23	in the receiving waters. That will include the
24	water flow, its currents, and also what others
25	have added to the water body.

1 For instance, if we're trying to meet 2 a --JUSTICE ALITO: Well, it sounds like 3 what you're saying there is not that you object 4 to the fact that EPA hasn't told you what you 5 6 need to do but that there is really no 7 practicable way of specifying in advance what you are required to do, and, therefore, you can 8 continue to have these combined sewer overflow 9 10 events where you're discharging raw sewage into 11 the Pacific Ocean. 12 MS. STEELEY: There is a way to tell us in advance. And EPA has done so. It has set 13 14 effluent limitations in our permit. 15 What EPA hasn't told us is what 16 additional we need to do under the Generic Prohibitions. 17 18 JUSTICE ALITO: All right. Thank you. 19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice 20 Sotomayor? 21 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And you haven't 22 told me what you do with unanticipated 23 discharges. You ignore them until the permit is 24 amended? Is that your answer?

MS. STEELEY: So, if a discharge is

- 1 not anticipated, if it wasn't disclosed to the
- 2 agency, then it's an unauthorized discharge.
- 3 It's simply prohibited under Section 301 --
- 4 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: No, it's not,
- 5 because the permit tells you what you can or
- 6 cannot discharge. That's based on what -- and
- 7 how much. And that's based on what we know
- 8 you're doing.
- 9 If you're okay on day one in
- discharges, we're not going to tell you not to
- 11 do more. We're giving you permission --
- MS. STEELEY: So what I'm --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- to discharge.
- MS. STEELEY: Right. So, if -- if --
- if something is not grant -- if you have not
- been given the authority to discharge a certain,
- 17 you know, something --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: The way the permit
- 19 --
- 20 MS. STEELEY: -- a certain
- 21 constituent --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- the permit --
- 23 the way the permit operates is, with the permit,
- 24 you can discharge anything that the permit tells
- you you can't. It works in reverse. It tells

- 1 you, you can't do this thing more than that
- 2 amount. If it doesn't tell you you can't do
- 3 this thing, you can continue doing this thing
- 4 until the permit tells you you can't.
- 5 MS. STEELEY: So the -- the way it
- 6 works is that the permitholder goes to EPA and
- 7 says: This is what we plan to discharge. And
- 8 then, if you have disclosed that to EPA, then
- 9 they set the limitations, and that's the scope
- of your ability. That doesn't allow you to then
- 11 --
- 12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So what they
- should do is what you told me earlier not to do:
- 14 Come in and tell you, using the technology
- you're using now, ensure yourself that you're
- 16 not doing more than X amount of feces in the
- 17 water? Would that be an okay limitation?
- MS. STEELEY: Certainly. EPA can say
- 19 this is the limit that you can discharge.
- 20 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So rewrite the
- 21 water quality standards. Just bring them all
- into the permit instead of cross-referencing
- 23 them and say: You can't have at this point
- source more than X amount of feces discharge.
- 25 I suspect that Justice Kagan is right

- 1 that if they start doing something -- because
- 2 computers now can make that a very easy task --
- 3 then you'll come in and say the permit is not
- 4 comprehensible because it's so long and
- 5 convoluted.
- 6 MS. STEELEY: So our -- our permit is
- 7 already quite extensive, and I -- I don't --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well -- well,
- 9 you're just ask -- asking to add more.
- MS. STEELEY: I'm not asking -- I'm --
- I'm not asking for EPA to add more. What I'm
- 12 asking is for clear guidance to permitholders
- about what we have to do to comply with our
- 14 permit.
- And I will say that I'm not sure that
- 16 it is true that others like this. The
- 17 regulatory community has lined up in the amicus
- 18 supporting San Francisco.
- But, in terms of what EPA can do, EPA
- 20 can reopen the permit. It can modify a permit.
- 21 But --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Months and years.
- 23 MS. STEELEY: If it -- if it has -- if
- it has any reasonable basis for concern, even
- 25 anticipatory, right, if it anticipates that

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1
      there may be a problem causing or contributing
 2
 3
               JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Months and years.
               MS. STEELEY: I'm sorry?
 4
               JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Months and years.
 5
               MS. STEELEY: I mean, it can take as
 6
 7
      little as six weeks to three months --
 8
               JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Only if you're
 9
      cooperating. All right.
10
               MS. STEELEY: I'm not sure --
11
               JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Thank you. That's
12
      fine, counsel.
13
               CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice Kagan?
14
               JUSTICE KAGAN: If I understood your
      response to Justice Thomas, Justice Thomas said:
15
16
     What prevents the EPA from doing this? You
17
      said: 1311(b)(1)(C) doesn't authorize it
18
     because this is not an effluent limitation.
19
               But, of course, (1)(C) does not talk
     about effluent limitations. (1)(C) just talks
20
21
     about limitations. (1)(A) talks about effluent
2.2
      limitations. (1)(B) talks about effluent
23
      limitations. You were adding a word to (1)(C)
24
      to get effluent limitations there, weren't you?
25
               MS. STEELEY: No. I disagree that
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- we're adding a word. So Section --
- JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, you're
- definitely adding a word because there's only
- 4 "limitation" there.
- 5 MS. STEELEY: So Congress used
- 6 "limitation" as a shorthand for effluent
- 7 limitations throughout this section.
- 8 And if I can explain. So Section
- 9 301(a), not 301(b)(1)(A) but 301(a), tells us
- 10 that the universe of Section 301 is about
- 11 restrictions on discharge of a pollutant.
- 12 That's the very definition of an
- 13 effluent limitation. So we believe that the
- 14 limitations throughout -- and the title also
- 15 suggests that the limitations throughout Section
- 16 301 are limitations on discharge.
- 17 JUSTICE KAGAN: And throughout the
- 18 statute, it says effluent and other limitations.
- 19 And then, in this particular section, it says
- 20 effluent limitations, effluent limitations. And
- 21 then, when it gets to this kind of backstop
- 22 provision of something else is necessary, it
- 23 just says limitations.
- 24 Okay. I have another question for
- 25 you, which is, you know, you spend a lot of your

- 1 brief talking about this legislative history of
- 2 the statute and suggesting that what the statute
- 3 was designed to do was to go from a
- 4 water-quality-based system to an effluent -- to
- 5 a technology-based effluent limitation system.
- 6 And that's -- you know, I suppose, if
- 7 you really wanted to write the picture broadly,
- 8 you might say that. But there are plenty of
- 9 places in this statute where water quality makes
- 10 an appearance.
- 11 And, indeed, it makes an appearance in
- 12 this very provision, which is the source of
- authority for what the EPA did here. You know,
- it says, well, if the effluent limitations
- aren't doing enough, EPA can do other
- limitations that are necessary to meet water
- 17 quality standards.
- 18 That's what the text says. We usually
- don't look at, like, the broadest possible
- 20 reading of legislative history to do something
- 21 that's exactly counter to what the relevant
- 22 textual provision says.
- MS. STEELEY: It's absolutely true
- that Congress preserved water quality standards,
- but they preserved them as a basis for setting

- 1 discharge limitations.
- 2 So it's -- it's -- there's no conflict
- 3 between preserving water quality standards and
- 4 setting discharge limitations. In fact, that's
- 5 the way that you preserve the environment.
- 6 That's the way you protect water quality
- 7 standards, is you tell permitholders in advance
- 8 what we must do to control our discharges.
- 9 But the question presented here is
- 10 about the --
- JUSTICE KAGAN: Thank you,
- 12 Ms. Steeley.
- 13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
- 14 Gorsuch?
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Ms. Steeley, as I
- 16 understand your argument -- I just want to make
- 17 sure I understand it -- there are -- there are
- two arguments. One is that (b)(1)(C) should be
- 19 read to regard effluent limitations. That's
- 20 your primary argument.
- I had thought in the briefs that there
- 22 was a backup argument that, nonetheless,
- 23 whatever it has to be, it has to be a limitation
- on your discharges given that that's what
- 25 1311(a) is all about, the discharge of any

- 1 pollutant by a person, except -- except as
- 2 specified here, is unlawful and that whatever
- 3 limitation is, it can't be the applicable water
- 4 quality standard itself because that -- that is
- 5 used in contradistinction with limitations
- 6 throughout this statute.
- 7 Is that -- is that correct?
- MS. STEELEY: That is correct. I
- 9 would only quibble with the idea that if there's
- 10 a primary and secondary argument, what a
- 11 restrictional discharges are is an effluent
- 12 limitation. So I think those arguments are one
- 13 and the same.
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: But --
- MS. STEELEY: But yes --
- 16 JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- but if we -- if
- 17 we disagree on that or at least don't want to
- 18 reach it --
- MS. STEELEY: Mm-hmm.
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- the point, the
- 21 secondary point remains.
- MS. STEELEY: Absolutely.
- 23 JUSTICE GORSUCH: That we have to deal
- 24 with.
- MS. STEELEY: Absolutely, that's

- 1 correct. I mean, the question presented here is
- 2 about the -- is the -- whether the Generic
- 3 Prohibitions are authorized by law. And those
- 4 Generic Prohibitions re-create the test -- the
- 5 statutory scheme Congress rejected, so we think
- 6 they are not.
- 7 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Thank you.
- 8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
- 9 Kavanaugh?
- 10 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: A few questions.
- 11 Just to pick up on Justice Thomas's question
- when he asked if anything prohibits, your
- 13 response, and I just want to make sure I have
- 14 this clear, was nothing in the statute
- 15 authorizes something like the generic
- 16 limitations, correct?
- 17 MS. STEELEY: That's correct.
- 18 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: And that -- and
- 19 your point about water quality standards, I want
- to make sure, I think with Justice Gorsuch, the
- 21 water quality standards are the goal or the end,
- 22 that the statutory means to that end that are
- 23 authorized by the statute are the effluent
- 24 limitations?
- MS. STEELEY: That's exactly correct.

1 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: And when you say narrative effluent limitations, I think footnote 2 3 22 of your brief talks about that and you've mentioned it at oral argument. 4 Can you -- and Justice Sotomayor 5 6 picked up on that. Can you just describe 7 briefly what you mean there? MS. STEELEY: Sure, and maybe an 8 9 example would be helpful. 10 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Yes. 11 MS. STEELEY: In San Francisco's 12 permit, for instance, we have a narrative water quality-based effluent limitation that requires 13 14 San Francisco to increase its rate of pumping 15 when wet weather is expected. So if there's a 16 30 percent chance of rain, we have to clear 17 capacity in the facility so that we are able to 18 absorb the capacity of stormwater. 19 That's a narrative water quality-based effluent limitation. It tells us about the rate 20 of our discharge, so it's squarely within the 21 2.2 definition of effluent limitation, but it's 23 simply a narrative form. And we don't object to that. It's -- it's perfectly fine to use words 24 25 or numbers. We just want to know how to control

- 1 our discharges and not have our compliance
- 2 determined based on conditions in the receiving
- 3 water.
- 4 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: And then the
- 5 practical way this works, to pick up on Justice
- 6 Alito and Justice Sotomayor's questions, let's
- 7 say there are ten different entities discharging
- 8 at a particular source. If the water quality is
- 9 not good in that area, EPA can go back to one or
- 10 more of the ten and tighten up the effluent
- limitations in the permits, which may take some
- 12 time, as Justice Sotomayor points out, and you
- quibble with that, but, in any event, that's the
- 14 means for EPA to do this, right?
- MS. STEELEY: That's exactly correct.
- 16 I mean, that tells permitholders their -- the
- obligations they need to meet, so it -- it --
- 18 yes, that's exactly how this statute is --
- 19 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Okay. And the
- overarching problem, I think, but you haven't
- 21 gotten to this, so I'm going to give you -- you
- 22 know, in terms of how this all works is you
- don't know what your obligations are ahead of
- time and yet you're on the hook for millions of
- dollars and potential prison time even though

- 1 you didn't know what your obligations were ahead
- of time, which strikes at least me as more -- as
- 3 definitely a policy problem but one that's
- 4 rooted in the statute. You don't know what your
- 5 obligations are and you can go to prison.
- 6 MS. STEELEY: Exactly, right. I mean,
- 7 it's hard to imagine --
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: What are -- what
- 9 are you on the hook for? There's an EPA suit
- 10 against you. What is the amount San Francisco
- is on the hook for, for something they didn't
- 12 know they needed to do? At least that's your
- 13 claim. What's the amount?
- 14 MS. STEELEY: What's the amount? So
- the statutory penalties are 66,000 per day per
- 16 violation. So that can add up quite fast. In
- 17 the --
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: They're seeking
- 19 how much from you?
- 20 MS. STEELEY: I think it's in the --
- 21 it's in the millions. It's over ten years of --
- of penalties that can add up quite quickly.
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Yeah. Okay.
- 24 Thank you.
- 25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice

- 1 Barrett?
- 2 JUSTICE BARRETT: No.
- 3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
- 4 Jackson?
- 5 JUSTICE JACKSON: So I understand that
- 6 you say that the issue here is whether the
- 7 Generic Prohibitions are authorized by law. Is
- 8 that right?
- 9 MS. STEELEY: That's correct.
- 10 JUSTICE JACKSON: And that's the core
- of your argument, and that you say that Congress
- did not contemplate this, having this general
- 13 prohibition -- Generic Prohibition. But I guess
- I can't square that with 33-1342(q)(1), which is
- the 2000 amendment in which Congress appears to
- 16 be saying that each permit for a discharge
- 17 "shall conform to the Combined Sewer Overflow
- 18 Control Policy" signed by the agency. And then
- when you look at the control sewer overflow
- 20 control policy -- or the Combined Sewer Overflow
- 21 Control Policy, that policy, I think, the
- long-standing policy of the agency was to
- 23 include these generic kinds of -- what you call
- 24 generic kinds of limitations.
- I mean, it's very explicit in the

- 1 policy. It says the authority should at least
- 2 require permitees to comply with the applicable
- 3 water quality standards. And, apparently, EPA
- 4 had guidance that said it didn't matter whether
- 5 this was Phase I or Phase II; these kinds of
- 6 permitting conditions we're going to put in our
- 7 permits.
- 8 So how -- how can it be, given the
- 9 amendment here, that Congress did not intend for
- 10 these kinds of provisions to exist in permits?
- MS. STEELEY: So there's nothing in
- 12 the policy that authorizes the Generic
- 13 Prohibitions. What Congress was authorizing is
- that EPA set limitations in a permit that
- 15 require our compliance with water quality
- 16 standards. They can do that through effluent
- 17 limitations. Our -- you know --
- JUSTICE JACKSON: No, no. Congress
- 19 was very specific. It said we are requiring the
- 20 permits to "conform to the," capital, "Combined
- 21 Sewer Overflow Control Policy." It was
- 22 referencing a particular policy that had been
- 23 established by the administration that included
- 24 the Generic Prohibitions that you say Congress
- did not consider, endorse, or whatnot.

1 MS. STEELEY: Right. 2 JUSTICE JACKSON: And I don't 3 understand how that's possible. MS. STEELEY: So there's nothing in 4 5 the policy itself that says, EPA, impose 6 restrictions on causing or contributing to a 7 violation of water quality standards alone. 8 That's what -- that's not what the policy says. 9 For -- as we've discussed, for Phase II permits, the policy expressly requires --10 11 JUSTICE JACKSON: Was it EPA's --12 MS. STEELEY: -- water quality-based 13 effluent --14 JUSTICE JACKSON: Was it EPA's 15 guidance and weren't they saying this is what 16 you have to do pursuant to our policy? It would 17 -- EPA has never taken the position, I think, that their own policy did not require these. 18 MS. STEELEY: EPA's policy, not --19 20 sorry, EPA's guidance --21 JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. 2.2 MS. STEELEY: -- not the policy 23 itself, but EPA's guidance says conflicting 24 things. It sometimes says for both Phase I and 25 for Phase II permits, that both require effluent

- 1 limitations. Other times, it gives something
- 2 that looks like the Generic Prohibitions as an
- 3 example of what to do. I think that just simply
- 4 reflects the confusion.
- 5 But what Congress actually blessed or
- 6 required is compliance with the policy. And the
- 7 policy does not require or authorize anything
- 8 that looks like the Generic --
- 9 JUSTICE JACKSON: One final thing.
- 10 Did you -- did you waive an arbitrary and
- 11 capricious claim? I know Justice Thomas was
- 12 talking about -- with you about having an
- 13 arbitrary and capricious claim. But I thought
- 14 you had waived that.
- MS. STEELEY: Our argument before this
- 16 Court is that the condition -- the Generic
- 17 Prohibitions are not authorized by law.
- JUSTICE JACKSON: Thank you.
- 19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
- 20 counsel.
- 21 Mr. Liu.
- 22 ORAL ARGUMENT OF FREDERICK LIU
- 23 ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
- MR. LIU: Mr. Chief Justice, and may
- 25 it please the Court:

1	San Francisco's opening brief makes
2	one and only one argument, that Section
3	1311(b)(1)(C) authorizes only effluent
4	limitations. This Court, however, already
5	rejected that argument in National Association
6	of Manufacturers. And, in any event, the
7	statutory text and history make clear that
8	Section 1311(b)(1)(C) also authorizes other
9	limitations. San San Francisco is therefore
10	wrong to argue that limitations like the ones
11	challenged here are never okay.
12	But that does not mean that they are
13	always okay. Under the statute, EPA may rely on
14	limitations like the ones here only when EPA
15	lacks assurance that the permit's effluent
16	limitations alone are insufficient to protect
17	water quality. Even then, EPA may rely on
18	limitations like the ones here only when EPA
19	lacks the information necessary to develop more
20	tailored limitations. And, finally, EPA may not
21	impose limitations of any kind that are
22	unconstitutionally vague.
23	San Francisco pressed each of those
24	limiting principles below. But the court of
25	appeals rejected each of San Francisco's

- 1 case-specific challenges. The court held, at
- 2 Petition Appendix 40, that the permit's effluent
- 3 limitations alone would be insufficient to
- 4 protect water quality. The court held, at
- 5 Petition Appendix 46 to 47, that San Francisco
- 6 had failed to update its long-term control plan,
- 7 thus, depriving EPA of the information necessary
- 8 to develop more tailored limitations.
- 9 And the court at Petition Appendix 32
- 10 rejected San Francisco's vagueness challenge.
- 11 San Francisco did not seek this Court's review
- of any of those parts of the decision below.
- 13 Rather than pursue an individualized challenge
- 14 to the limitations in this case, San Francisco
- 15 has put before this Court only a facial
- 16 challenge: That all limitations that prohibit
- 17 discharges based on their effects on water
- 18 quality are invalid on their face because they
- don't fit the statutory definition of effluent
- 20 limitation.
- 21 Because that argument can't be squared
- 22 with this Court's precedents or the statute
- 23 itself, this Court should affirm. I welcome the
- 24 Court's questions.
- 25 JUSTICE THOMAS: Mr. Liu, do you agree

- 1 that 1311 seems to focus primarily on effluents
- 2 and discharge?
- 3 MR. LIU: I think most -- basically
- 4 all of the provisions of 1311, except for
- 5 1311(b)(1)(C), focus on effluent limitations.
- 6 JUSTICE THOMAS: Okay. Now, that
- 7 provision, (C), talks about limitations,
- 8 including those necessary to meet water quality
- 9 standards, and it also talks -- mentions "or
- 10 required to implement any applicable water
- 11 quality standards."
- 12 How exactly does the generic
- 13 limitation do that?
- 14 MR. LIU: It does in two sentences.
- We think that phrase "necessary to meet or
- implement water quality standards" imposes two
- 17 limitations on our authority.
- One, we can invoke (b)(1)(C) only when
- 19 we lack assurance that the other limitations in
- 20 the permit are insufficient to protect water
- 21 quality. We think we've satisfied that
- 22 condition here. The court of appeals so found,
- and San Francisco hasn't sought review of that.
- We think that language imposes a
- 25 second limit, which is that for a limitation

- 1 like this to be necessary, it needs to be
- 2 necessary in the sense that EPA lacked the
- 3 information necessary to develop a more -- more
- 4 tailored information. And here that's satisfied
- 5 too.
- I want to be clear about the sort of
- 7 information that we're missing that made it
- 8 impossible for us to impose anything other than
- 9 these generic limitations. It's not information
- 10 about the water. It's information about San
- 11 Francisco's own sewer system.
- 12 We're talking about where do the flows
- go? What's the conditions of the pipes and the
- 14 pumping stations? How does the system respond
- to wet weather events? That's the information
- that we've been lacking for the past ten years
- 17 and that we asked San Francisco to provide as
- 18 part of the long-term control update.
- 19 Without that information, we're
- 20 basically flying blind as to how we're going to
- 21 tell exactly what San Francisco should do to
- 22 protect water quality.
- JUSTICE THOMAS: Well --
- 24 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Counsel -- I'm
- 25 sorry.

1	JUSTICE THOMAS: Oh, I'm sorry. Go
2	ahead.
3	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: The I don't
4	understand, you know, the bad old days is when
5	we had water quality standards, right, people
6	didn't know what they were supposed to do, how
7	it was going to be allocated, sort of a problem
8	with the the comments. And they put in the
9	permit system.
10	And I think the danger here is that
11	you're going back to the other system because
12	it, one, gives more power to you because you
13	don't have to tell the people who are
14	discharging what they have to do or not, you can
15	sit back, and then and also you don't even
16	have to allocate among many different polluters
17	who's responsible for for what.
18	So what prevents you I know you
19	touched on a couple of things in response to
20	Justice Thomas, but I'm not sure that was
21	significant limitations from saying, as you are
22	doing here, we're going to go with water quality
23	standards because that's maybe harder for the
24	people with effluent, but it's a lot easier for
25	us.

1 MR. LIU: No, it's not easier for us. 2 In our ideal world, we would have perfect 3 information about how San Francisco's system works. 4 And based on that information, we 5 6 would be telling San Francisco things like: 7 Reroute flows from X to Y. Upgrade your pumping station at Sea Cliff. Increase the storage 8 9 capacity of your Westside storage facility. 10 We were unable to include limitations 11 of that tailoring in this permit because San 12 Francisco deprived us of the very information we would need to do that. So we don't --13 14 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: How do you-15 MR. LIU: We have no interest in 16 putting in generic provisions like this when we 17 have the information available to supply more 18 tailored -- more tailored limitations. And 19 that's why -- it's precisely because it's so much easier to enforce a more tailored 20 21 limitation. These limitations --2.2 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: What do you do 23 with multiple people discharging effluent and 24 you have a water quality standard. There are 25 eight different industries, ten different water

- 1 districts, whatever. They're all doing it. And
- 2 you look at the water quality and you say
- 3 there's too much of this.
- 4 MR. LIU: Yeah.
- 5 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: What do you do
- 6 then?
- 7 MR. LIU: Well --
- 8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: How do you
- 9 allocate -- this was the problem that led to the
- 10 permit system. I mean, how do you allocate
- 11 responsibility for that?
- 12 MR. LIU: There are provisions in this
- 13 statute that authorize states in their
- 14 development of water quality standards to
- 15 apportion pollutant loads to different
- 16 polluters. 1313(d) is an example of this.
- 17 But I don't think that concern about
- 18 multiple dischargers is any reason to throw out
- 19 all of the receiving water limitations in this
- 20 case. That sort of situation might be the basis
- 21 for an individualized sort of as-applied type of
- 22 challenge to a provision like --
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Oh, no --
- 24 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: How would an
- as-applied challenge work in that case?

- 1 Somebody is supposed to come and say: Well, you
- 2 put this much on me. I think you should put
- 3 different amounts on other three because I think
- 4 they're doing more or they can afford more or
- 5 they have more modern plants. And you're just
- 6 going to go back and say: Well, this is how we
- 7 -- we want to allocate?
- 8 MR. LIU: Oh, no, the statute supplies
- 9 plenty of tools to address the problem of an
- 10 overpolluted water body. The state can -- can
- 11 grant a variance or an exception from its
- 12 standards, as we've actually granted San
- 13 Francisco --
- 14 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I'm talking
- 15 about the specific question about allocating
- 16 responsibility for the water quality to
- 17 different point sources.
- 18 MR. LIU: Oh, well, one way to do it
- is for the state to say: Look, we recognize
- 20 this water body is overpolluted. Let's grant a
- variance to certain of the dischargers so they
- 22 can continue doing their business.
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: But do -- keep
- 24 going.
- MR. LIU: I just want to make this

- 1 point. Their rule isn't going to fix the
- 2 problem of the overpolluted water body. If a --
- 3 if a water body is, in fact, overpolluted, thus
- 4 leaving no room for anyone else to pollute, the
- 5 appropriate effluent limitation in that case is
- 6 going to be zero.
- 7 It's not as if Petitioner's rule is
- 8 going to magically allow dischargers and
- 9 petitioners --
- 10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I don't
- 11 understand that answer, it could be zero, but it
- may not have to be zero across the board. It
- may be 20 percent in each of the point sources.
- 14 It may be 10 percent in the antiquated system
- that can't do any better, but 30 percent in
- 16 someone else.
- 17 And I'm saying what the permit system
- 18 was designed to do was give some notice to the
- 19 different dischargers about what was going to be
- 20 required of them. Your water quality system
- 21 gives you complete discretion in which -- who's
- going to bear the burden and who's not.
- MR. LIU: I don't think that's right.
- 24 Like -- like I said, there are multiple tools in
- 25 the statute that address that problem.

1 There are variances that the states 2 can -- can provide. There are schedules of 3 compliance that EPA can provide in issuing the -- the standards. The CSO control policy 4 discusses apportioning pollutant loads, so as --5 6 so each discharger can stay within the loads. 7 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: But the problem is you can go after an individual entity, like the 8 City of San Francisco, based on the past when 9 they didn't know what the relevant limitation on 10 11 them was and seek retroactively, without 12 fairness, huge penalties, including criminal 13 punishment, based on something that was -- they 14 didn't know what they could discharge or not 15 discharge, correct? 16 MR. LIU: I don't --17 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: A lot of what you're talking about in response to the Chief 18 19 Justice is here's things that could help going 20 forward. 21 MR. LIU: Right. 2.2 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: You're suing San 23 Francisco separately for a lot of money, based 24 on a standard that they had no idea -- you know, 25 at least that's the theory --

Τ	MR. LIU: No. I mean
2	JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: That's the theory
3	And your position your position would allow
4	that.
5	MR. LIU: I don't I don't think so
6	JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Yes, it would.
7	MR. LIU: I mean, the Bayside
8	complaint is Exhibit A for why what you said is
9	not going to be true. The standards that are
LO	violated in those cases are numeric water
L1	quality criteria.
L2	JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: The standards, the
L3	generic limitations contain water quality
L4	standards that you don't know as an individual
L5	entity what you need to do to comply with that.
L6	MR. LIU: You know, San Francisco has
L7	not pointed to any instance of that. The best
L8	shot they gave at pointing to a limitation that
L9	they said they didn't know what the meaning was
20	was a standard that said marine communities
21	can't be degraded. Well, if you look at
22	Petition Appendix 143, there's a definition of
23	degrade in Attachment A to the permit.
24	That definition spells out exactly how
25	one goes about figuring out how marine

- 1 communities --
- 2 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: They talked about
- 3 the algae just now. They talked about the
- 4 natural taste, odor, and color of fish.
- 5 MR. LIU: Yeah. And you can look at
- 6 footnote 2 of their cert reply brief. And it
- 7 says San Francisco did not challenge the clarity
- 8 of any water quality standard below.
- 9 And, you know, we're talking about
- 10 quality for the first --
- 11 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: That's because
- they say, as an antecedent matter, you don't
- have the authority under the statute to do so.
- 14 They would have, if you did have the authority,
- 15 separate arbitrary and capricious challenges.
- MR. LIU: And my point is -- my point
- 17 is there's no reason to invalidate all of these
- 18 on their face. San Francisco --
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Yeah, no. That --
- 20 the facial challenge thing's a total
- 21 distraction. The question is whether the
- 22 statute authorizes these kinds of generic
- 23 limitations.
- 24 It really comes down to what Justice
- 25 Kagan was talking about, how you read that

- 1 precise sentence in 301.
- 2 MR. LIU: And if -- and if Congress
- 3 had wanted to do away with these standards as
- 4 limits entirely, it would have simply adopted
- 5 the Senate version of the bill that was before
- 6 it. The Senate version accomplished exactly
- 7 what San Francisco is urging here.
- 8 It very meticulously put the word
- 9 "effluent" into 1311(b)(1)(C) and then
- 10 meticulously, in all the other provisions that
- 11 cross-reference 1311, deleted "or other."
- 12 JUSTICE KAGAN: May I ask, Mr. Liu, is
- 13 this a multiple discharge situation? There
- seems to be some conflict between the
- 15 government's position and San Francisco's
- 16 position on that. As I understood Ms. Steeley,
- she said that's true of one, would you say, but
- 18 it's not true of all eight.
- 19 What's the situation there?
- 20 MR. LIU: It's -- so there's no
- 21 dispute, it's true of the one, and the one is
- the only outfall at issue here because the one
- 23 is the only federal outfall. There's a division
- of jurisdiction here between the federal
- 25 government and the states. The states are the

- 1 permitting authority for all the near shore
- 2 outfalls. That's the seven outfalls that my
- 3 friend mentioned.
- 4 But the only Respondent here is the
- 5 federal government. We are responsible for
- 6 permitting the -- the southwest ocean outfall,
- 7 which is 3.3 miles into the Pacific Ocean.
- 8 JUSTICE KAGAN: I see. And if -- this
- 9 issue of, like, we don't know what we're
- 10 supposed to do, it's horribly unfair, and -- and
- 11 you think, well, they've really not come up with
- 12 any particular way in which that's true, I mean,
- 13 I thought that most of these were something like
- 14 this: There's a California water quality
- 15 standard that says waters shall not contain
- 16 floating material in concentrations that
- 17 adversely affect fishing and swimming.
- 18 And it turns out EPA says that,
- 19 notwithstanding that standard, San Francisco has
- left lots of toilet paper floating in Mission
- 21 Creek. I mean, that's not a "we don't know what
- 22 to do" issue. Like, we know you're not supposed
- to leave toilet paper floating in Mission Creek,
- 24 don't we?
- 25 MR. LIU: That's right. And -- and --

1 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: And that's one 2 example. There are plenty of others. 3 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, but this --4 there -- I mean, there might be examples where they don't know something, although they haven't 5 6 come up with any --7 MR. LIU: They haven't. JUSTICE KAGAN: -- but there are 8 9 plenty of examples. I could go on and on. 10 There are plenty of examples where it's obvious. 11 You know, don't, like -- like, spew the kind of 12 chemicals that discolor the water. 13 MR. LIU: It would be --14 JUSTICE KAGAN: When you have brown 15 water --16 MR. LIU: It would be strange if 17 concerns that are individualized to other types of limitations that may or may not be vague 18 19 cause the court to throw out the whole set of 20 these types of limitations. 21 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So --2.2 JUSTICE BARRETT: Mr. Liu --23 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: -- we should -- so we could limit the decision to items like 24 that, but in terms of particular concentrations

- of chemicals that you cannot see floating in the
- 2 water, we would have -- we could reserve that
- decision because that interferes with the permit
- 4 system in a way that the others may not?
- 5 MR. LIU: We would certainly
- 6 appreciate a decision from this Court that was
- 7 tailored to the particular concerns that may be
- 8 motivating Petitioner's position.
- 9 But to be clear, we understand
- 10 Petitioner's legal argument in this Court, the
- 11 textual hook on which they've hung their entire
- 12 presentation, to be a facial challenge to these
- 13 limitations --
- JUSTICE BARRETT: Can you agree --
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: It's just a --
- it's just an argument that the statute doesn't
- 17 authorize these kinds of -- of conditions.
- 18 MR. LIU: And that --
- 19 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: And the answer is
- just yes or no for us.
- MR. LIU: And I don't think there's
- 22 anything in 1311(b)(1)(C) that says --
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: I -- I get that.
- 24 MR. LIU: -- San Francisco can -- EPA
- 25 can include a standard that says don't cause

- 1 floatable materials to be in the water.
- 2 JUSTICE BARRETT: And you agree that
- 3 all of these concerns would make you vulnerable
- 4 to an arbitrary and capricious challenge. Let's
- 5 just assume they're all right. I know you're
- 6 disputing that they're vague --
- 7 MR. LIU: Absolutely.
- 8 JUSTICE BARRETT: -- or that they're
- 9 not on notice, but if they were, you would be
- 10 vulnerable to an arbitrary and capricious
- 11 challenge?
- MR. LIU: Yes. I mean, in this very
- case, San Francisco brought three variations of
- 14 that type of challenge. They said the existing
- 15 limitations in the permit are already
- 16 sufficient. You don't need to resort to
- 17 (b)(1)(C). They said these limitations are
- 18 vague. They said we gave you the information in
- 19 the -- we don't need to provide you more
- information via the updated long-term control
- 21 plan to -- to -- to create more tailored
- 22 limitations.
- JUSTICE BARRETT: How common are these
- 24 permits? These ones that are more generic,
- 25 narrative form, and they're getting at

- 1 non-effluent limitations.
- 2 MR. LIU: So I would separate the
- 3 universe into -- into two buckets. There are
- 4 individual permits like these, where we're
- 5 talking about an individual discharger. And
- 6 then there are general permits that we issue,
- 7 that cover a whole swath of -- of discharges
- 8 within a particular geographic area, like all
- 9 construction sites, for example.
- These types of limitations are pretty
- 11 common in the general permits. And the reason
- why is precisely because of this information
- 13 problem. The more information we have, the more
- 14 tailoring we can do. The less information we
- 15 have, the less tailoring we can do.
- 16 And the general permit context is one
- 17 where we -- and I think all the dischargers --
- value efficiency and very little administrative
- 19 burden. So we don't ask for a lot of
- information, and they don't give it.
- In exchange, we do include these type
- of, quote/unquote, "Generic Prohibitions." In
- 23 the individual permit context, it's -- it's --
- 24 it's as applied to the circumstances. It really
- depends on where we are in the development of a

1 permit. The --2 JUSTICE BARRETT: How often do you 3 seek criminal penalties? MR. LIU: We have never sought -- I am 4 not aware of any instance, and I have been told 5 6 we're not aware of any instance, in which we 7 have pursued criminal prosecution of a municipality that violated a condition like 8 this. 9 10 JUSTICE ALITO: Mr. --11 JUSTICE JACKSON: And if we --12 JUSTICE ALITO: Mr. Liu, you said at 13 one point that you lacked the information 14 necessary to provide a more specific provision 15 than the provisions that are in question here. 16 But is there anything that prevented you from 17 obtaining whatever information you thought you 18 needed? 19 MR. LIU: Yes, San Francisco. Under 20 this statute, San Francisco --21 (Laughter.) 2.2 JUSTICE ALITO: You have no -- you 23 have no ability and the state has no ability to 24 require them to produce any information that --25 MR. LIU: We did require them.

- issued information requests under 33 U.S.C.
- 2 1318(a). All of that resulted in San Francisco
- 3 coming up in 2018 with what it called a
- 4 long-term control plan synthesis.
- 5 That synthesis did not reflect current
- 6 conditions. Why? Because the most recent
- 7 document in that plan was dated in the 1990s.
- 8 JUSTICE ALITO: And do you have -- do
- 9 -- when a regulated party doesn't provide the
- information that you think you need, do you lack
- 11 tools to require that to be done?
- 12 MR. LIU: We -- no. We -- what we did
- here, because it had been five years since their
- last -- last permit had expired, the only way we
- 15 thought, the best way left to get the
- information was to put the requirement in the
- 17 next permit. And so in the instant permit, we
- 18 said as a condition of this very permit -- this
- is Petition Appendix 131 to 138 -- please
- 20 provide us with the information we need to
- 21 develop more tailored limitations.
- 22 And in that request, Pet. App. 135, we
- said, while you're at it, why don't you tell us
- 24 what additional control alternatives you think
- 25 makes sense, given your existing infrastructure

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 2
                JUSTICE ALITO: All right. So -- so
 3
               MR. LIU: -- and the cost.
 4
                JUSTICE ALITO: -- do you want us to
 5
 6
     hold -- and maybe this would be an appropriate
7
     disposition of this case -- that permit
      requirements like these are required -- are
 8
     permitted in the specific situation in which EPA
 9
10
      or the State has made every reasonable effort to
11
     get the necessary information from the regulated
12
     party and the regulated party has refused to
13
     provide the information?
                MR. LIU: We think that is --
14
15
                JUSTICE ALITO: In that limited
16
      situation, you can resort to this sort of permit
17
      condition?
18
               MR. LIU: We think -- our reading of
      the -- yes. Our reading of this statute is
19
20
      these -- to -- to satisfy the requirement that
21
      these be necessary to implement, they need to be
2.2
     necessary in the sense that we lack the
23
      information necessary to develop more tailored
24
      information.
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JUSTICE ALITO: Well, in that response

- and some of the other arguments that you've made
- 2 suggests that perhaps what you're saying is that
- 3 we never should have granted review in this case
- 4 to review the broad question that was presented
- 5 in the cert petition.
- 6 MR. LIU: I am saying that. I mean,
- 7 just track the shifting positions that we've
- 8 seen thus far. The -- the -- the cert petition
- 9 -- the certiorari petition focused on whether
- 10 these provisions were too vague or not specific
- 11 enough. We responded that -- to that in our
- 12 opposition. And the response we got on the cert
- -- in the cert reply was we're disclaiming any
- 14 argument that any standard or any limitation was
- too vague. We're shifting to an argument based
- on the meaning of effluent limitation and the
- 17 definition of it.
- 18 We get their opening brief. It's
- 19 consistent with the cert reply, but then page 3
- of their merits reply starts out by saying even
- 21 if this provision does authorize things other
- than effluent limitations, they're still
- 23 invalid.
- 24 JUSTICE ALITO: All right. Thank you.
- JUSTICE JACKSON: Mr. Liu, can I

- 1 invite you to go back to the text and comment on
- 2 the statutory interpretation question, which is
- 3 what I understood counsel on the other side to
- 4 say this all reduces to whether or not the
- 5 statute authorizes these kinds of generic
- 6 limitations?
- 7 Her argument -- I mean, the -- the way
- 8 I'm looking at the statute, we have (A), talking
- 9 about the discharge being unlawful and (B),
- 10 talking about the objectives. (b)(1)(A) is
- 11 specific to effluent limitations, and then there
- are some subsections about those. And then (C)
- says "any more stringent limitation, including
- those necessary," et cetera.
- So, on its, face it looks like "any
- 16 more stringent limitations" is taking us outside
- of effluent limitations because the "more" is
- 18 relevant to something or relative to something.
- But she suggests that (a)(1) is
- 20 setting effluent limitations with the best
- 21 practicable control technology requirement, and
- 22 the anymore stringent limitations is limited to
- 23 allowing -- well, is allowing -- is allowing for
- 24 effluent limitations that go beyond best
- 25 control.

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1
                Do you understand what I'm saying?
 2
      She suggests that it's still cabined by effluent
      limitations.
 3
                MR. LIU: She's --
 4
                JUSTICE JACKSON: And I guess I'm
 5
 6
      wondering what we do with anymore stringent
 7
      limitation. Doesn't that defeat her argument?
 8
      Or how does the government respond to that
     point?
 9
10
                MR. LIU: Yeah, I -- I -- I think
11
      the -- the short answer is: If Congress wanted
12
      to limit (b)(1)(C) to anymore stringent effluent
      limitation, Congress would have put in the word
13
      "effluent" there. After all, effluent
14
15
      limitation is a statutorily defined term.
16
                JUSTICE GORSUCH: Mr. Liu, I -- I -- I
17
      think that addresses the primary argument.
18
     haven't heard -- and I'd appreciate some
19
      response. I just want to hear what you have to
20
      say about the second -- what I understood, at
21
      least, to be the secondary argument, is even if
2.2
      (b)(1)(C) allows other limitations, it is
23
     necessary to meet a water quality standard.
24
      Which means they can't mean the same thing that
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you -- in other words, a limitation can't be the

- 1 water quality standard.
- 2 It has to be some restriction on
- 3 discharge. That's what 1311's all about, you
- 4 said. (A) says that. The title says that.
- 5 Some limitation on what they do, rather than
- 6 just saying -- creating a circle, that the
- 7 limitation is a water quality standard, that
- 8 there -- that Congress meant those two terms to
- 9 do different work.
- MR. LIU: Well, there -- there's --
- 11 under the statute, there is always a distinction
- between the limitations and the water quality
- 13 standards.
- 14 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Yes. And I'm
- wondering what remains of that when you say,
- 16 hypothetically, in a limitation: Do not violate
- 17 the water quality standards. Do not cause or
- 18 contribute to the violation of water quality
- 19 standards.
- 20 MR. LIU: Well, as my friend
- 21 acknowledged --
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Is -- is that -- is
- 23 that circular --
- 24 MR. LIU: I --
- 25 JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- or is there some

- 1 way to break the circle?
- 2 MR. LIU: I don't think it's circular.
- 3 As my friend acknowledged, the water quality
- 4 themselves are not self-executing. And so it's
- 5 natural to describe --
- 6 JUSTICE GORSUCH: For sure. For sure.
- 7 I get that. But -- but when you just say: Go
- 8 forth and do good, okay, right, and -- and --
- 9 and -- or, you know, do not create a nuisance,
- or, you know, don't -- what is it? One of them
- is -- do not cause aesthetically undesirable
- 12 dislocation -- discoloration of the ocean.
- 13 That's our water quality standard.
- 14 And you put that -- is that a limitation on what
- they do, on what they discharge, in any
- meaningful sense, or is that the water quality
- 17 standard itself?
- 18 MR. LIU: I -- I -- I think it is a
- 19 limitation on the discharge. It's -- it's
- 20 prohibiting an entire category of discharges,
- i.e., those that fit that description.
- 22 And if you look at the text of the
- 23 limitations themselves, they're written in terms
- of what the discharges can or cannot do.
- 25 JUSTICE JACKSON: Is that because --

1 JUSTICE GORSUCH: If that's the case, 2 then I -- I guess I -- I'm kind of circling back 3 to the Chief Justice's question. And, really, maybe administrative agencies generally. The 4 point was to -- to give people notice ex ante of 5 6 their legal obligations, rather than rely on 7 tort ex post, nuisance law. What -- what value added is there to 8 just an ex post tort nuisance law regime when 9 10 you say: Don't -- don't create a nuisance? MR. LIU: Well, as -- as I think the 11 12 prior discussion also revealed, a lot of these 13 water quality standards are not self-executing. 14 They are not independently enforceable. 15 And so the only way these standards 16 are applied to a discharger like San Francisco 17 is if we incorporate those standards in a 18 limitation. That's where the -- we -- we need 19 20 these limitations to bridge the gap between the existence of the standards, which merely specify 21 2.2 a desired condition of the -- of the waterway, 23 and the permitee's own responsibilities. JUSTICE GORSUCH: No, I understand 24

that. But -- but -- but does it add anything to

- 1 an ex post tort nuisance regime?
- 2 MR. LIU: I think it does. I mean --
- I mean, to be honest, these -- these standards
- 4 are much more specific than just a general tort
- 5 regime.
- 6 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Sure. I could call
- 7 an expert witness up, though, and say: Here is
- 8 what constitutes a nuisance. Or I can point
- 9 to --
- 10 MR. LIU: Yeah.
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- what EPA's water
- 12 quality standards are. And I'm not sure what
- 13 difference --
- 14 MR. LIU: I --
- 15 JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- as a practical
- 16 matter, it would make.
- 17 MR. LIU: I -- I just
- 18 think Congress -- I think Congress would -- the
- 19 Congress of 1972 would have vociferously
- 20 disagree. I mean, they thought water quality
- 21 standards were the linchpin on which the water
- of the United States would remain clean.
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: I agree with that.
- 24 Yeah.
- MR. LIU: And they

- 1 didn't think relying --2 JUSTICE GORSUCH: No, I'm just asking as a practical matter. If -- if -- if we're 3 essentially saying don't create a nuisance, and 4 5 EPA sets the standard as opposed to an expert witness, what -- what value has been added? 6 7 MR. LIU: To be clear, it's the states that are set -- setting the standards. EPA is 8 9 merely issuing permits so that the state's own view of clean water --10 11 JUSTICE GORSUCH: So then --12 MR. LIU: -- is achieved. JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- that even begs 13 14 the question further, right? If -- if this is 15 just a circle, the state standard is the state 16 standard. That would be set in nuisance law, 17 too. And so what -- what --18 MR. LIU: And -- and this was 19 basically the arguments that the proponents of 20 the House bill made. They said: Why do we even need state water quality standards anymore? 21 2.2 Let's take out of the statute 33 U.S.C. 1313.
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Sure.

quality standard --

23

24

But the House bill retained the water

- 1 MR. LIU: -- provision.
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Because then you're
- 3 going to have an administrative agency ex ante
- 4 create limitations on what you can do as a
- 5 permitee in order to make sure that those water
- 6 quality standards were met.
- 7 But if you take that away, and there's
- 8 no ex ante limitation anymore on what you can
- 9 do, aren't we just sort of back to a state law
- 10 nuisance regime in which the state's setting the
- 11 standard of care?
- 12 MR. LIU: I -- I don't think so. I
- mean, these limitations incorporate much more
- 14 specific standards than just general state tort
- 15 law. They say things like: Don't cause
- 16 floatable materials to be in the water. Don't
- 17 cause the water to have --
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Okay. That would
- 19 be -- that would be pretty good evidence of the
- 20 duty in a nuisance suit, wouldn't it, the duty
- 21 of care?
- MR. LIU: It may -- it may well be; it
- 23 may not be. I think Congress -- one -- one of
- the problems with the prior regime wasn't that
- 25 enforcement of these standards was unfair, but

- 1 that it was nonexistent. And so Congress
- 2 actually wanted to up the ante --
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: You don't think
- 4 Congress wanted to -- to ensure advance notice
- 5 to permitees of their obligations under the law?
- 6 MR. LIU: I -- no.
- 7 JUSTICE GORSUCH: That wasn't part of
- 8 the purposes? You just --
- 9 MR. LIU: I think if permitees think
- 10 they lack -- they lack fair notice, they can
- 11 bring that sort of challenge. Again --
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- that's not --
- 13 Mr. Liu, my question was: Was part of what
- 14 Congress was trying to do is, as the Chief
- Justice indicated, try to provide some certainty
- on the ex ante, rather than just adjudicating
- 17 all this ex post in nuisance cases?
- 18 MR. LIU: Yeah, I -- I think San
- 19 Francisco actually knows well what it can do to
- 20 improve its own sewer system. I mean, San
- 21 Francisco is an outlier here. If you look --
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Okay, thank -- I got
- 23 it.
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Why -- you know,
- 25 some of these standards are not as specific:

- 1 Marine community shall not be degraded. The
- 2 odor of fish shall not be altered. It's hard
- 3 to --
- 4 MR. LIU: I mean, to take the first
- 5 example, Justice Kavanaugh --
- 6 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: It's just hard --
- 7 I'm not looking for comment on the specific
- 8 example. It's just hard to know in advance,
- 9 when multiple other people are also discharging
- into the same waters, when you're going to have
- 11 crossed the line, right?
- 12 MR. LIU: I don't think --
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Right?
- MR. LIU: -- that concern can justify
- throwing all of these out across the board,
- 16 because --
- 17 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Well, Justice
- 18 Gorsuch's question was, I think, and the Chief
- 19 Justice's, combining the water quality standards
- 20 and the effluent limitations. And part of what
- 21 we have to do is figure out how they fit
- 22 together in 30 -- 301 there, (b)(1)(C).
- 23 And it strikes me that the way
- 24 Congress ensured both more effectiveness and
- 25 fair notice was to say that the end is water

- 1 quality standards -- things like this,
- 2 discoloration of fish, marine communities,
- 3 et cetera -- but the means to the end were
- 4 effluent limitations, which would both be, as
- 5 the Chief Justice said, more effective, and as
- 6 Justice Gorsuch said, fair notice.
- 7 And if they're not tight enough, EPA
- 8 has mechanisms to tighten them up. What's wrong
- 9 with that reading of the two things together?
- 10 MR. LIU: I think it would read the
- 11 statute --
- 12 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: How does that hurt
- 13 EPA, if you want to say that -- if you want to
- 14 respond to that? How does that harm EPA's
- ability to regulate, if they have to do it that
- 16 way?
- MR. LIU: Oh, it's going to lead to
- 18 more permit denials, more permit delays as we
- 19 wait for the information to come in. It's going
- to lead to less flexibility and more burdens for
- 21 the dischargers.
- 22 Again, look at my -- look at the
- 23 context of general permits. These cover the
- 24 vast majority of NPDES dischargers. They are
- 25 covered by general permits. And the whole point

- of the general permit is that the dischargers
- 2 can get away with not providing us a lot of
- information. That's how you get a construction
- 4 site approved in 14 days.
- 5 You take away our ability to rely on
- 6 these sorts of prohibitions and we're going to
- 7 need to ask for more information, because it's
- 8 only with that information that we're going to
- 9 be -- be able to develop more tailored
- 10 limitations that assure us that water quality
- 11 standards are going to be achieved.
- 12 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Thank you.
- 13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
- 14 counsel.
- Justice Thomas, anything further?
- 16 Justice Alito?
- 17 JUSTICE ALITO: To what -- do we know
- 18 to what degree the problem with the water
- 19 quality in the affected body of water is the
- 20 result of water that the City is intentionally
- 21 discharging and to what degree it is the result
- of these sewer overflows?
- MR. LIU: Well, to be -- I mean, I
- 24 don't -- I don't think San Francisco is
- 25 intentionally discharging anything or --

```
1
                JUSTICE ALITO: Well, the water that
 2
      it treats.
 3
               MR. LIU: Oh.
               JUSTICE ALITO: It treats water, and
 4
 5
      some water --
 6
               MR. LIU: Yes.
 7
                JUSTICE ALITO: -- is -- some water
8
      flows out --
9
               MR. LIU: Right.
10
               JUSTICE ALITO: -- when there's an
11
     overflow.
12
               MR. LIU: Yeah. So the permit in
13
     Attachment E contains a long list of monitoring
14
     locations. And those locations help us
15
     disaggregate what's causing what.
16
                So there are monitoring locations that
17
      -- that sample the flow out of the treatment
18
      facility, and that tells us the quality of the
19
     discharge there. And then there are monitoring
20
      locations that sample the effluent coming out of
21
      the outflow at issue here, as well as along the
2.2
     shore and in the ocean.
```

JUSTICE ALITO: All right. Thank you.

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice

23

24

25

Sotomayor?

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Mr. Liu, maybe I 1 2 need to start from the beginning. When you're 3 obligated to give effluent limitations, could you give a permit that says just meet water 4 5 quality controls? 6 MR. LIU: No. 7 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Why not? 8 MR. LIU: Because the statute says 9 exhaust the technology-based effluent 10 limitations first. And we read "more stringent" 11 to mean resort to the (b)(1)(C) authority only 12 when those technology-based effluent limitations 13 aren't going to be enough. 14 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: You called this an 15 individual permit versus a general permit. 16 MR. LIU: Right. 17 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I'm not sure I 18 understand what each is. I know that this is a 19 permit that's issued to San Francisco --20 MR. LIU: Right. JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- for its 21 2.2 combined rainwater and -- or stormwater and 23 sewage systems. So it's individual in that 24 What does that mean as opposed to a 25 general permit?

1	MR. LIU: So you've exactly accurately					
2	described the individual permit here. A general					
3	permit, you know, the the prototypical one is					
4	our construction general permit, and what it					
5	says is all the people who want to engage in					
6	construction in a particular geographic area, i					
7	can be a whole state or a set of states, if you					
8	want to engage in construction, file with us a					
9	notice of intent to do that, and within 14 days,					
LO	you'll have authorization to do it.					
L1	And part of that authorization it's					
L2	basically an agreement that once you get that					
L3	authorization, you're going to abide by the					
L4	terms of that general permit. And the general					
L5	permit has a long list of conditions but					
L6	typically includes a provision like this.					
L7	And the reason why we don't we are					
L8	unable to provide a more tailored limitation in					
L9	the general permitting context is that everyone					
20	in that context agrees that the lack of					
21	information is a good thing. No constructor					
22	want no no one engaged in construction					
23	wants to take the six months to a year to apply					
24	for an individual permit. They want to be able					
25	to get that authorization quickly and					

- 1 efficiently.
- 2 But -- but the tradeoff between not
- 3 having that information about how their
- 4 individual site operates is that we have to rely
- 5 on a more general prohibition like this.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So that -- this
- 7 presumes a general permit, it presumes when it's
- 8 talking about a general category of industry,
- 9 that --
- MR. LIU: Yes.
- 11 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- certain
- 12 protocols are being followed.
- 13 MR. LIU: Right. There are some
- 14 protocols in the --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Those protocols
- 16 generally produce X amount or Y amount of
- 17 pollutant or effluents, and we're saying you can
- do that, but only if you're going to go over
- 19 those set limits are we going to require you to
- step in and do something else, correct?
- 21 MR. LIU: Yeah. Exactly. Those --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: That's what --
- that's what happens with a general permit.
- Now this individual permit, there was
- 25 a -- there was a concern by Justice -- the Chief

- 1 Justice that this individual permit, they have
- 2 many point sources of the sewerage coming in. I
- 3 mean, everybody's bathroom is a point source.
- 4 And they have -- yeah, that's what sewerage is,
- 5 isn't it? It's what goes into the sewer waters,
- 6 okay? And that unless they know -- unless they
- 7 have effluent limitations, they won't know how
- 8 to control those individual point sources or
- 9 figure out how to control who's the bad actor
- 10 here, what neighborhood's the bad actor.
- Does that matter in a situation like
- 12 this?
- MR. LIU: No, it doesn't matter in a
- 14 situation --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Explain why.
- MR. LIU: Well, because the one point
- source that's at issue here, the one that's
- 18 within the federal government's jurisdiction, is
- 19 the Southwest Ocean Outfall, and that outfall
- 20 discharges into the Pacific Ocean 3.3 miles away
- 21 from the coast. And there are no other
- 22 dischargers -- I think my friend acknowledged
- 23 this morning -- there are no other dischargers
- in the vicinity. So there's no possibility of
- 25 confusing San Francisco's contribution to water

- 1 quality versus anyone else's.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So your effluent
- 3 limitations are already telling it control all
- 4 these things that we know you can control and
- 5 control them in this way because there's better
- 6 technology you could put in?
- 7 MR. LIU: Yes. This permit exhausts
- 8 as far as we can exhaust the technology-based
- 9 effluent limitations.
- 10 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Now what you're
- 11 saying with respect to the other water standards
- that you're incorporating by reference is we
- can't tell that because -- whatever reasons?
- MR. LIU: Yeah. What -- here's what
- 15 we do know.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Mm-hmm.
- 17 MR. LIU: We do know that San
- 18 Francisco's system is resulting in 196 million
- 19 gallons of sewage poured onto San Francisco's
- 20 beaches. We know that it's leading to sewer
- 21 backups into homes and businesses. We know that
- 22 their infrastructure is aging and failing. We
- 23 know that the discharges are leading to
- 24 excessive concentrations of bacteria, copper,
- and other metals.

1 So we know that the limitations that 2 already exist in the permit are not enough to 3 protect water quality. Then the question is, how do we fill that gap? And we would like to 4 fill that gap with additional effluent 5 limitations. After all, they're more -- they're 6 7 easier for us to enforce. But I think the last thing San 8 Francisco wants us to do is to start telling 9 them what to do without the information of how 10 11 their system works. We could write into the 12 permit reroute flows from X to Y --13 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: That goes back to 14 Justice Alito's point, which is you don't mind 15 an opinion that says you can only do this if you 16 don't have enough information to issue. 17 MR. LIU: We don't mind an opinion 18 that says that. 19 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Okay. 20 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice Kagan, 21 anything further? 2.2 JUSTICE KAGAN: Yeah. So that's true 23 for the individualized permitholders. And then 24 you said, for the general permits that you

issue, if we took up this invitation to say that

- 1 this mechanism is just not authorized and you
- 2 could not write the general permits that you
- 3 write in the way that you do --
- 4 MR. LIU: Right.
- 5 JUSTICE KAGAN: -- what would you do
- 6 instead and who would suffer from that?
- 7 MR. LIU: All the small businesses,
- 8 small farmers that rely on the general permits.
- 9 These are permittees who don't have the huge
- 10 companies that are able to navigate what
- 11 admittedly can be a complicated individualized
- 12 permit system. They rely on the simple thing of
- filing a form with us and being able to engage
- in construction 14 days later.
- 15 And so saying we cannot across the
- 16 board rely on these provisions is going to
- 17 undermine the whole point of the general permit
- 18 system and, you know, affect the economy of --
- 19 of small business owners.
- 20 JUSTICE KAGAN: And one last question
- 21 is: How long have you been doing this for, in
- 22 either the individualized context or the general
- 23 context? You know, when did this start? Is
- 24 this a consistent practice that EPA has
- 25 developed?

1 MR. LIU: So we -- in the CS -- CSO 2 context, it certainly has existed since the CSO 3 policy itself in 1994, which we understand as blessing this sort of condition. 4 JUSTICE KAGAN: So, in this particular 5 6 context, almost 30 years? 7 MR. LIU: That -- that -- that's 8 right. And -- and I quess what I would say is, again, it's our view of the statute that when we 9 10 are able to avoid relying on these, we should 11 avoid relying on these. Dischargers raise 12 concerns, but we have concerns too. 13 I mean, the Second Circuit case that 14 was alleged to be in conflict with the decision 15 below was a case brought by NRDC, and they said, 16 well, these are hard to enforce. And so 17 stepping into those shoes, they are, indeed, 18 harder to enforce. 19 In an ideal world, we would be able to 20 get perfect information and then use that 21 information to craft very tailored limitations 22 that are specific to a particular site and 23 particular discharges. It -- it's just, in the

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JUSTICE KAGAN: Thank you.

real world, we lack that information.

24

1	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice					
2	Gorsuch?					
3	Justice Kavanaugh?					
4	JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: I have a few					
5	questions.					
6	You just referenced farmers would be					
7	helped by the Farm Bureau Federation's in					
8	here representing 6 million farm families, along					
9	with an amicus brief that represents, as they					
LO	say, nearly ever business sector across the U.S.					
L1	economy. They're not happy with just leaving it					
L2	up to you to represent their interests, frankly,					
L3	and they say that your position will make it					
L4	impossible for many permittees to protect					
L5	themselves from unanticipated liability. They					
L6	say that their members, including the Farm					
L7	Bureau Federation, those farmers, and other					
L8	permittees are left exposed to the potentially					
L9	devastating and unnecessarily costly					
20	consequences of a government enforcement action					
21	or citizen suit.					
22	So they're not they're not happy					
23	with "trust us." Do you want to respond to the					
24	Farm Bureau Federation argument?					
25	MP IIII: Sure I think all regulated					

- 1 parties would prefer to essentially have their
- 2 cake and eat it too, to not have to give us the
- 3 information but also not have to face these
- 4 Generic Prohibitions.
- 5 So I think what that -- the message of
- 6 that brief is that in their ideal world, not
- 7 only would they not have to give us the
- 8 information, but they wouldn't have to meet the
- 9 more generalized prohibitions. The statute
- 10 takes that option off.
- 11 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Presumably,
- they're aware of that and filed the amicus brief
- with that in mind, but, in any event, on to the
- 14 next one.
- 15 On the -- what you said to Justice
- 16 Alito about what the opinion could say, and you
- 17 said when we should avoid relying on these, when
- 18 we can avoid relying on these. Would you be
- 19 okay with an opinion that said we must avoid
- 20 relying on these when we can avoid relying on
- 21 them?
- MR. LIU: Yeah, I want to be careful
- 23 here because of the general --
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Yeah, I thought
- 25 you would.

1 MR. LIU: -- because of the general 2 permitting context. 3 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Yeah. MR. LIU: I -- I -- I think this is a 4 -- a balance of priorities. And in some 5 6 contexts, like the general permitting context, 7 the lack of information is an affirmative good. It is something we want -- we don't 8 want to demand more information. And I don't 9 10 think any of the dischargers actually want to 11 have to go through the rigamarole of actually 12 providing it. And so, when there is good reason that we are not relying -- that we don't have 13 14 the information necessary, whether it's because 15 of resistance by a party like San Francisco or 16 because it just doesn't make sense to demand 17 more information, then I -- then I don't think 18 these -- these limitations should be 19 invalidated. JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: On the criminal 20 21 penalties point that Justice Barrett raised and 22 you said that hadn't been pursued, but, 23 obviously, civil and citizen suits are pursued. 24 And how much are you seeking from San Francisco? 25 MR. LIU: So we have not calculated

1 the damages, but --2 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Roughly? MR. LIU: I mean, it's -- it is -- I 3 4 don't have a rough even back-of-the-napkin 5 estimate. It is --6 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Tens of millions? 7 Hundreds of millions? MR. LIU: It may well be tens of 8 millions of dollars. I think what that reflects 9 10 is the over decades long failure of San 11 Francisco to update a system that it itself in 12 its own planning documents on CAER 947 admits 13 are aging and deteriorating. 14 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Thank you. 15 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice 16 Barrett? 17 JUSTICE BARRETT: Just a quick 18 follow-up to that. 19 I think, when I asked you that 20 question about criminal penalties, you cabined 21 your answer to municipalities. Have you pursued 22 them in the context in this general permitting 23 context, you know, on farmers or small

MR. LIU: So I don't think so. I -- I

24

25

businesses?

- 1 don't know for sure, but --
- 2 JUSTICE BARRETT: Is that why you
- 3 cabined your answer to municipalities?
- 4 MR. LIU: No. I think it is -- it is
- 5 only because I had an answer for municipalities.
- 6 (Laughter.)
- 7 MR. LIU: My answer for -- my answer
- 8 in the other context is I don't know. But
- 9 here's -- here's what I can tell you. We view
- 10 it as exceedingly difficult to obtain a criminal
- 11 conviction for violating a provision like this.
- 12 That's because of the mens rea requirements in
- 13 this statute, as well as the
- beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden of proof.
- 15 And the -- the other thing I would say
- is we have no interest in pursuing criminal
- 17 penalties because, when we have a situation -- a
- 18 situation like this, where the welfare of a
- 19 whole city is at stake, our main concern is
- 20 prospective injunctive relief.
- We're not look -- our main focus is
- 22 not to see that we can penalize and put in jail.
- Our main focus is how can we make this situation
- 24 better going forward. So our -- our main tool
- for rectifying a situation like this is to seek

- 1 civil prospective injunctive relief.
- JUSTICE BARRETT: Thank you.
- 3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
- 4 Jackson?
- 5 JUSTICE JACKSON: I'm a little
- 6 surprised by the suggestion that the goal of the
- 7 statutory permitting process here was fair
- 8 notice. I thought the goal was to ensure that
- 9 there were clean waters in the United States and
- 10 that that was not actually happening under the
- 11 previous regime, and so Congress was giving the
- 12 EPA additional tools to effectuate that result.
- MR. LIU: That -- that's correct. And
- 14 the problem with the pre-1972 regime was not
- 15 that it was unfair. It wasn't that enforcement
- under the pre -- the pre-1972 regime was -- was
- 17 unfair. It was that it was nonexistent.
- 18 JUSTICE JACKSON: Right. So we don't
- 19 have congressional findings, for example, that
- 20 the statute needs to be interpreted consistent
- 21 with an understanding of what would be most fair
- 22 to the polluters who are putting the sewage into
- 23 the water, is that correct?
- MR. LIU: I don't think -- well, I'll
- 25 say this. I think Congress struck a balance in

- 1 the statute between pursuing clean water and
- 2 protecting the prerogatives of -- of polluters.
- JUSTICE JACKSON: How so?
- 4 MR. LIU: If you look at 1319(d),
- 5 there is a statutory penalty provision that
- 6 says, when courts are crafting the correct
- 7 amount of statutory penalties, courts should
- 8 take into account things like the seriousness of
- 9 the violation, the economic impact of the
- 10 penalty on the violator.
- 11 JUSTICE JACKSON: I thought you were
- 12 going to say in terms of the -- the direct
- 13 statutory interpretation that you're putting
- 14 forward here. I hear the balance in your
- 15 statement that effluent limitations, it's clear
- 16 from the statute, are the first go-to --
- 17 MR. LIU: Yeah.
- 18 JUSTICE JACKSON: -- in trying to
- 19 ensure that the waters are clean but that what
- 20 (C) is doing is also allowing for other kinds of
- 21 limitations to potentially include generic
- 22 limitations when the effluent limitations don't
- 23 suffice.
- MR. LIU: Right.
- JUSTICE JACKSON: That's what I

_	chought your argument was.					
2	MR. LIU: Exactly. Congress didn't -					
3	JUSTICE JACKSON: And that's why I					
4	think it's not circular in any sort of real					
5	sense because these other limitations are be					
6	adjudged relative to the effectiveness of th					
7	effluent limitations, so they only come in a					
8	necessary to make sure that we reach the clear					
9	water standards when the effluent limitations					
10	aren't working.					
11	MR. LIU: Exactly. And San Francisco					
12	below made the argument that, well, these					
13	these limitations are not necessary because, in					
14	their view, the other limitations in the permit					
15	were already sufficient to protect water					
16	quality, and the Ninth Circuit rejected that					
17	argument and there was no cert petition on that					
18	issue.					
19	JUSTICE JACKSON: Thank you.					
20	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,					
21	counsel.					
22	Rebuttal, Ms. Steeley?					
23	REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF TARA M. STEELEY					
24	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER					
25	MS. STEELEY: San Francisco's ask in					

- 1 this case is simple. We simply want to
- 2 understand our permit limitations so that we can
- 3 comply with them.
- 4 My friends on the other side say they
- 5 use the Generic Prohibitions when they lack
- 6 information. That's simply inconsistent with
- 7 the way this has actually played out.
- 8 As we've noted in our reply brief,
- 9 certain divisions of EPA have put this in every
- 10 permit they issue. They've been very common in
- 11 San Francisco. But EPA already has tools that
- 12 address lack of information. They have an
- 13 entire regulatory guidance document for their
- 14 permit writers that tells them exactly how to do
- it, and it tells them to set water quality-based
- 16 effluent limitations with a reopener clause in
- 17 the permit that allows them to reopen the permit
- and impose additional limitations when they need
- 19 to.
- 20 And in San Francisco's particular
- 21 circumstance, we've been sending monitoring
- 22 information to EPA for decades about this
- 23 facility. It's a well-known facility to EPA.
- I'd like to correct a couple -- a
- 25 couple things. Justice Kavanaugh, I -- my

- 1 friends on the -- my colleagues here have
- 2 calculated the numbers for the amount sought in
- 3 the litigation for the Bayside permit and it
- 4 comes to \$10 billion. That's the statutory
- 5 penalties for the days at issue.
- And in terms of, like, what's covered
- 7 under our permit, all of the outfalls are
- 8 covered. You'll see that at Petition Appendix
- 9 page 428. There's one permit that governs the
- 10 entirety of the facility and all of its
- outfalls. That's joint by the state regional
- 12 board and EPA, but it's -- it's one system of
- obligations that covers all the outfalls.
- And then, finally, I'd like to explain
- 15 as another example of why this is such a
- 16 hardship for San Francisco, and I'll use our
- 17 friends in L.A. as an example.
- 18 Los Angeles versus NRDC on remand from
- 19 this Court, the Ninth Circuit considered a
- 20 cause-and-contribute requirement that's nearly
- 21 identical to the one before this Court.
- In that case, NRDC argued that
- 23 monitoring data alone, monitoring data showing
- 24 an exceedance of water quality standards, was
- 25 enough by itself to impose liability on Los

1	Angeles. Los Angeles said: No, look, there's					
2	80 other dischargers into this water. It's not					
3	just us. You need to show something about our					
4	own discharges in order to find liability.					
5	The Ninth Circuit said no. The Ninth					
6	Circuit said the monitoring data alone					
7	exclusively per se established a violation of					
8	law with no need to show anything about Los					
9	Angeles's own discharges.					
10	This is the problem here. With such					
11	broad standard, with such a broad basis for					
12	liability, cities like Los Angeles and like San					
13	Francisco can be subject to liability without					
14	any advance notice that anything about our					
15	discharges is going to cause a problem and					
16	and without the ability to prevent that					
17	liability.					
18	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,					
19	counsel. The case is submitted.					
20	(Whereupon at 12:58 p.m., the case was					
21	submitted.)					
22						
23						
24						
25						

Official - Subject to Final Review							
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