SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TH	E UNITED STATES
	_
JANICE HUGHES BARNES, INDIVIDUALL	1Y)
AND AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE)
ESTATE OF ASHTIAN BARNES, DECEASE	ED,)
Petitioner,)
v.) No. 23-1239
ROBERTO FELIX, JR., ET AL.,)
Respondents.)

Pages: 1 through 92

Place: Washington, D.C.

Date: January 22, 2025

HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION

Official Reporters
1220 L Street, N.W., Suite 206
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 628-4888
www.hrccourtreporters.com

1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
2	
3	JANICE HUGHES BARNES, INDIVIDUALLY)
4	AND AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE)
5	ESTATE OF ASHTIAN BARNES, DECEASED,)
6	Petitioner,)
7	v.) No. 23-1239
8	ROBERTO FELIX, JR., ET AL.,)
9	Respondents.)
10	
11	
12	Washington, D.C.
13	Wednesday, January 22, 2025
14	
15	The above-entitled matter came on for
16	oral argument before the Supreme Court of the
17	United States at 10:04 a.m.
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

1	APPEARANCES:
2	NATHANIEL A.G. ZELINSKY, ESQUIRE, Washington, D.C.; on
3	behalf of the Petitioner.
4	ZOE A. JACOBY, Assistant to the Solicitor General,
5	Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for the
6	United States, as amicus curiae, supporting
7	vacatur and remand.
8	CHARLES L. McCLOUD, ESQUIRE, Washington, D.C.; on
9	behalf of the Respondents.
10	LANORA PETTIT, Principal Deputy Solicitor General,
11	Austin, Texas; for Texas, et al., as amici curiae,
12	supporting Respondent Felix.
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

1	CONTENTS	
2	ORAL ARGUMENT OF:	PAGE:
3	NATHANIEL A.G. ZELINSKY, ESQ.	
4	On behalf of the Petitioner	4
5	ORAL ARGUMENT OF:	
6	ZOE A. JACOBY, ESQ.	
7	For the United States, as amicus	
8	curiae, supporting vacatur and remand	28
9	ORAL ARGUMENT OF:	
10	CHARLES L. McCLOUD, ESQ.	
11	On behalf of the Respondents	52
12	ORAL ARGUMENT OF:	
13	LANORA PETTIT, ESQ.	
14	For Texas, et al., as amici curiae,	
15	supporting Respondent Felix	80
16	REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF:	
17	NATHANIEL A.G. ZELINSKY, ESQ.	
18	On behalf of the Petitioner	90
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

1	PROCEEDINGS	
2	(10:04 a.m.)	
3	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We'll hear	
4	argument first this morning in Case 23-1239,	
5	Barnes versus Felix.	
6	Mr. Zelinsky.	
7	ORAL ARGUMENT OF NATHANIEL A.G. ZELINSKY	
8	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER	
9	MR. ZELINSKY: Mr. Chief Justice, and	
10	may it please the Court:	
11	We are here today because Ashtian	
12	Barnes was shot and killed on the side of a	
13	Texas highway after being pulled over for unpaid	
14	tolls. The question before this Court is how to	
15	determine whether Ashtian's Fourth Amendment	
16	rights were violated.	
17	The Fourth Amendment prohibits	
18	unreasonable seizures. Justice Scalia was no	
19	fan of a totality-of-the-circumstances test,	
20	but, in Scott, Justice Scalia made clear that	
21	courts must "slosh through the fact-bound morass	
22	of reasonableness."	
23	In this case, the district court and	
24	the Fifth Circuit didn't do that. Instead, they	
25	applied the "moment of the threat" doctrine.	

- 1 According to the Fifth Circuit decision below,
- 2 "we may only ask whether Officer Felix was in
- danger at the moment of the threat, and any of
- 4 the officer's actions leading up to the shooting
- 5 are not relevant."
- 6 This kind of legal amnesia is
- 7 incompatible with precedent, conflicts with
- 8 common law, and defies common sense.
- 9 Until now, Respondents had embraced
- 10 the "moment of the threat" doctrine, but, before
- 11 this Court, Respondents have abruptly shifted
- 12 position. They now argue that courts should
- 13 look to what occurs before the moment of the
- 14 threat and apply the law of self-defense and
- 15 superseding cause.
- 16 Absolutely none of this appears in the
- 17 decision below. All of it confirms why the
- 18 "moment of the threat" doctrine is so wrong.
- 19 Finally, as Judge Higginbotham
- 20 underscored in his concurrence, the facts show
- 21 that Officer Felix acted unreasonably. But this
- 22 is a court of review, not of first view. The
- 23 Court should rule for Petitioner on the sole
- 24 guestion presented and remand for the lower
- 25 courts to apply the correct constitutional

- 1 standard.
- 2 I welcome this Court's questions.
- JUSTICE THOMAS: Under your approach,
- 4 what would that correct standard look like and
- 5 how would it be applied here?
- 6 MR. ZELINSKY: Justice Thomas, we
- 7 think the standard is the "totality of the
- 8 circumstances" standard that this Court
- 9 articulated in Graham and Garner, Scott, and
- 10 Plumhoff. In this particular case, it would
- 11 require looking at more than just the two
- 12 seconds in which Officer Felix was on the moving
- 13 vehicle. It would require asking was there a
- 14 reason for Officer Felix --
- 15 JUSTICE THOMAS: How much more than
- 16 the -- than the last two seconds?
- 17 MR. ZELINSKY: Justice Thomas, if you
- include an extra three seconds, then you would
- 19 look at the seizure in its totality.
- 20 I think that this Court shouldn't be
- 21 drawing bright-line rules on exactly how much of
- the seizure should or shouldn't come in. That's
- 23 what Justice Scalia underscored in Scott. There
- 24 are no rigid rules.
- 25 And courts can apply ordinary

- 1 principles of relevancy and proximate cause to
- 2 determine the -- the reasonableness of a
- 3 seizure.
- 4 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Was it reasonable
- 5 to -- for the officer to jump on the side of the
- 6 car?
- 7 MR. ZELINSKY: So, Just -- Justice
- 8 Kavanaugh, we don't think it was in this
- 9 particular case, but that's precisely the issue
- 10 that the lower courts couldn't evaluate because
- 11 they applied this legal amnesia and only look at
- 12 the fact that the officer was on the moving
- 13 vehicle. Judge Higginbotham, in his
- 14 concurrence, looked to the totality of the
- 15 circumstances and said: I think it was
- 16 unreasonable in this case.
- We want the opportunity for a court to
- 18 be able to look at that and for us to be able to
- 19 litigate that core claim.
- 20 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: What's an officer
- 21 supposed to do when at a traffic stop and
- 22 someone pulls away? Just let him go?
- MR. ZELINSKY: No, Justice Kavanaugh.
- I think there are a number of other options that
- 25 were available to Officer Felix that day. Let

- 1 me give you four.
- 2 First, the highway was a
- 3 camera-controlled highway. So you can monitor
- 4 all the cars by camera. That's, in fact, how
- 5 Ashtian Barnes was pulled over in the first
- 6 place. The cameras automatically identified his
- 7 car as one with unpaid tolls.
- 8 Second, he could have radioed to
- 9 somebody else on the road to follow Ashtian
- 10 Barnes.
- 11 Third, he could have gotten back into
- 12 his squad car and followed him.
- And, fourth, they also had the car's
- 14 license plate.
- So we're not suggesting that somebody
- 16 should just get away scot-free, but it is
- 17 unreasonable to use deadly force because what
- 18 happened was Officer Felix put himself in a
- 19 position where he had no alternative but to
- shoot the driver, and that's unreasonable, and
- 21 you have to look at the whole picture, not just
- the two seconds in which he's on the car.
- JUSTICE ALITO: Did the officer
- 24 violate the Fourth Amendment at any point prior
- 25 to the time when he used deadly force? If he

- 1 had not -- if he had not used deadly force, but
- 2 he had jumped on the side of the car and done
- 3 everything else he did prior to that moment,
- 4 would there be a violation of the Fourth
- 5 Amendment?
- 6 MR. ZELINSKY: So, Justice Alito, we
- 7 had brought a predicate claim below about the
- 8 drawing of the firearm. My friends on the other
- 9 side have suggested we should have brought a
- 10 predicate claim based on the jumping onto the
- 11 car. But, at the end of the day, I don't think
- that it matters whether there is a predicate
- 13 claim because, in the -- let me give you an
- 14 analogy. In the search context, you have an
- obligation to knock before you search. There's
- 16 no freestanding requirement under the Fourth
- 17 Amendment if you're an officer standing outside
- 18 a door to knock. But, if you are going to
- 19 engage in a search, we evaluate the
- 20 reasonableness of that search by looking a
- 21 couple seconds before, did you knock?
- JUSTICE ALITO: Well, my question --
- 23 MR. ZELINSKY: It's the same thing
- 24 here.
- 25 JUSTICE ALITO: The -- the reason for

- 1 the question is to probe whether you are using
- 2 the term "unreasonable" in a sense that's
- 3 different from the sense in which the Fourth
- 4 Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and
- 5 seizures. So "unreasonable" has a particular
- 6 meaning when the Court has to decide whether
- 7 there was a Fourth Amendment violation. But, in
- 8 lay speech, "unreasonable" could go to whether
- 9 the action was prudent, whether it was a
- 10 violation of best police practices or the
- 11 practices of a particular police department.
- 12 Those are not necessarily the same
- thing. In fact, it seems that they're probably
- 14 different. So you are eliding these two
- different meanings of "reasonable." Now maybe
- 16 that's -- maybe that's sound. Maybe that's
- 17 unsound.
- 18 MR. ZELINSKY: Justice Alito, what
- 19 we're asking for is the standard that this Court
- 20 has applied in Garner, Graham, and Scott and
- 21 Plumhoff, which is you have to look at the --
- the balance here. There's, on the one side, the
- 23 state interest in seizing someone in a
- 24 particular manner. On the other side, there is
- 25 the harm to the suspect, here, the ultimate

- 1 harm, the loss of his life.
- 2 The problem in this case is that the
- 3 Fifth Circuit couldn't engage in that core
- 4 balancing because it couldn't ask was there a
- 5 really pressing reason for an officer to jump
- 6 onto a car and give himself no other opportunity
- 7 but to shoot the driver.
- 8 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, would you be
- 9 satisfied with a narrow holding that it is wrong
- 10 to -- it is wrong for a court to look just at
- 11 the moment of the threat, that the court has to
- 12 judge the reasonableness of the alleged
- 13 unreasonable seizure based on -- taking into
- 14 account to whatever extent they are relevant the
- events that occurred before that? Would you be
- 16 satisfied if we just did that --
- 17 MR. ZELINSKY: I think we would,
- 18 Justice --
- 19 JUSTICE ALITO: -- and not get into
- these other, more difficult questions?
- 21 MR. ZELINSKY: One hundred percent. I
- 22 think it would be helpful if the Court makes
- 23 clear that that means that you can look at the
- jump in addition to the shoot, right? That's
- 25 the core issue that we want to be able to

- 1 litigate. But, yes, Justice Alito, we'd be
- 2 happy with a very narrow holding.
- JUSTICE JACKSON: So, Mr. --
- 4 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: You don't want to
- 5 limit it just to that, though. I mean, I
- 6 thought that the totality of the circumstances,
- 7 as we described it, has at least three factors:
- 8 the nature of the crime for which the stop
- 9 occurred, the circumstances, et cetera.
- The three minutes, are you starting
- 11 that from the moment that the stop occurred --
- MR. ZELINSKY: So --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- and the reason
- 14 for it, or are you stop -- or you want to do it
- just from when he jumped on the car?
- 16 MR. ZELINSKY: So we don't want to
- 17 look at it just from when he jumps on the car.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Right.
- 19 MR. ZELINSKY: I do think you have to
- 20 consider things like what he's stopped for. My
- 21 friends on the other side, by the way, agree on
- that, because they say all of that comes in
- 23 because it's part of the officer's mind.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I -- I know.
- MR. ZELINSKY: So --

```
1
               JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: We'll get to that
     with them, which is --
 2
               MR. ZELINSKY: Yeah. So --
 3
 4
               JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- they -- they --
 5
      they -- they want to make it a "totality of the
     circumstance" case, but that's not what the
 6
7
     Fifth Circuit said.
8
               MR. ZELINSKY: Totally.
9
               JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But I can ask
10
      those -- them that question.
11
               Having said that, there is a split of
12
      8 to 4 --
13
               MR. ZELINSKY: Mm-hmm.
14
               JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- on this
15
      question: whether the Court needs to look at
16
     the totality or just the moment of threat.
17
               Correct?
18
               MR. ZELINSKY: That's correct, Justice
19
      Sotomayor.
               JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So, if we do what
20
21
     Justice Alito has defined as a narrow approach,
22
     that's not really narrow. That's deciding a
23
     circuit split, correct?
24
               MR. ZELINSKY: Yes. Can I add a
```

"but" --

Τ	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: MM-NMM.
2	MR. ZELINSKY: to clarify my answer
3	to Justice Alito?
4	I think you could resolve this case by
5	saying: The "moment of the threat" doctrine is
6	wrong. It was too narrow. It didn't apply the
7	totality of the circumstances. And we, this
8	Court, are not going to try and delineate every
9	mete and bound in every case.
10	I think
11	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: You've given up in
12	your reply brief, I understood, that you're not
13	asking us to the the to address the
14	question of what an officer-created danger rule
15	is like?
16	MR. ZELINSKY: We're not asking for ar
17	officer-created danger test at all.
18	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And and that
19	wasn't even addressed below, correct?
20	MR. ZELINSKY: That's correct.
21	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Okay. Thank you.
22	JUSTICE JACKSON: Mr. Zelinsky
23	JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: You
24	JUSTICE BARRETT: So you're happy with
25	the you're happy with the narrow I'm going

- 1 to call it narrow in the sense that if we said
- 2 moment of the threat is wrong and we don't
- 3 articulate a precise standard, other than saying
- 4 our regular "totality of the circumstances" test
- 5 applies, as Justice Sotomayor said, that's
- 6 really what you're asking for?
- 7 MR. ZELINSKY: I think, in this case,
- 8 we're trying to be able to litigate the fact
- 9 that he jumped onto a car. And we have sharply
- 10 different views. My friend on the other side
- and I have sharply different views about whether
- it was reasonable to jump onto that car. That's
- 13 the issue we were not able to litigate.
- I think this Court doesn't need to go
- and say: In every case, here are the metes and
- 16 bounds.
- 17 I do think, Justice Barrett, if you
- want to put a little bit of flesh on the bones
- of that test, you could look to your decision in
- 20 Biegert for the Seventh Circuit, where you said
- an officer might act unreasonably where they're
- 22 primarily responsible for the danger.
- JUSTICE BARRETT: And you would be
- happy with that language?
- MR. ZELINSKY: We would be happy with

- 1 that language.
- 2 JUSTICE BARRETT: And you don't have a
- 3 position on whether a prior Fourth -- it kind of
- 4 goes to Justice Alito's point -- whether kind of
- 5 a predicate Fourth Amendment violation that's
- 6 unrelated to the excessive force necessarily
- 7 means that if the -- if the officer violated
- 8 constitutional rights -- let's imagine it's not
- 9 a car stop, let's imagine it's a home entry or
- 10 something like that -- you know, that then it's
- 11 off the table. After that, even if things
- 12 devolve --
- MR. ZELINSKY: No. And --
- 14 JUSTICE BARRETT: -- the officer put
- 15 himself in this situation?
- 16 MR. ZELINSKY: -- in fact -- well, I
- 17 have two answers to that.
- 18 The first is, in Mendez, this Court
- 19 already held that where the damages are the
- 20 foreseeable consequences of that predicate
- 21 violation --
- JUSTICE BARRETT: Yeah.
- MR. ZELINSKY: -- then they are on the
- table. I think that goes a long way toward
- 25 disproving the parade of horribles on the other

- 1 side because you are, in those cases, going to
- 2 look at preceding conduct.
- 3 But the second answer to your question
- 4 is that we, of course, agree, things like
- 5 superseding cause. Again, your decision in
- 6 Biegert for the Seventh Circuit is a great
- 7 example of that. Superseding cause comes into
- 8 play.
- 9 The Fifth Circuit couldn't apply those
- 10 kinds of tests because all it looks at is the
- 11 fact that Officer Felix is standing on that
- vehicle, and that's why it's so concerning. It
- prevents you from engaging in that core Fourth
- 14 Amendment balancing: What was the nature of the
- 15 government interest on the one hand? What was
- the harm to the individual on the other?
- 17 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Do you agree with
- 18 the language in the Seventh Circuit opinion that
- 19 said it applies when the officer created a
- 20 situation where deadly force became essentially
- 21 inevitable?
- MR. ZELINSKY: I think that is
- our view of this case, Justice Kavanaugh.
- 24 Once --
- 25 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: And are you asking

- 1 then -- I realize you're going to say this is
- 2 for the Fifth Circuit on remand, but I'm going
- 3 to ask it anyway. Are officers always
- 4 prohibited at traffic stops, when the car pulls
- 5 away, from jumping on the car?
- 6 MR. ZELINSKY: Absolutely not.
- 7 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Okay. When can
- 8 they and when can't they?
- 9 MR. ZELINSKY: Let me give you an
- 10 example when they can. Let's say they see an
- 11 abducted child in the back seat, and they know,
- if they don't jump onto the car then, something
- terrible might happen to that abducted child.
- 14 That's a -- a type of "totality of the
- 15 circumstances" inquiry that looks at: What's
- the nature of the government interest at play?
- 17 What's the harm to the individual?
- In this particular case, we're talking
- 19 about unpaid tolls. So we want to be able to
- 20 argue down the Fifth Circuit --
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Well, true. But,
- 22 obviously, you know, traffic stops sometimes
- identify people who are doing things that are
- 24 much worse. Oftentimes, major criminals are
- 25 apprehended for things like that, and I can give

- 1 you some historical examples that are obvious,
- 2 but -- so I don't know that an officer can
- 3 assume that's the only thing going on.
- 4 And if someone's pulling away, they
- 5 could be a danger to others on the road. Who
- 6 knows what's going on, right?
- 7 MR. ZELINSKY: So, Justice Kavanaugh,
- 8 that's precisely -- and -- and maybe this was
- 9 prefaced in your opening colloquy, but that's
- 10 precisely what the Fifth Circuit couldn't engage
- in in this case. And so -- so I agree that
- 12 there may be some circumstances --
- 13 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: And when an
- officer jumps on the car, the deadly force can
- 15 be avoided by -- by the driver too.
- MR. ZELINSKY: Well, in this
- 17 particular case, Officer Felix's own expert
- 18 testifies that Officer Felix shot so quickly,
- 19 Ashtian Barnes didn't have time to stop.
- 20 And -- and if I could, let me sketch
- out, Justice Kavanaugh, why it's so dangerous
- 22 for you to shoot a driver. In fact, there is --
- 23 I'm not aware of any police department that
- 24 recommends that its officers shoot drivers.
- 25 The high likelihood -- in this

- 1 particular case, Ashtian Barnes didn't
- 2 immediately die. He was able to brake the car
- 3 and put it into park. If he had been
- 4 immediately killed, that car could have careened
- 5 and crashed into the highway. Officer Felix put
- 6 other people on that highway in grave, very
- 7 serious danger that particular day.
- 8 So I don't think it's just a he's
- 9 jumping on to stop Ashtian from getting away.
- 10 He's also jumping on in a manner that is going
- 11 to put a lot of other people at risk.
- 12 JUSTICE JACKSON: Mr. Zelinsky, can I
- take you back to the question presented, which
- is whether or not it was correct for the Fifth
- 15 Circuit to apply the "moment of threat"
- 16 doctrine. What is your understanding of that
- 17 doctrine? I guess I was surprised that
- 18 Respondent in this case at this time sort of has
- 19 created now a conception of it that did not seem
- 20 to align with what the Fifth Circuit said.
- 21 So what is your view of the "moment of
- the threat doctrine?
- MR. ZELINSKY: So, Justice Jackson,
- 24 Judge Higginbotham was very clear in his
- 25 decision below. You cannot look at any of the

- 1 officer's actions prior to the moment of the
- 2 threat. He's joined in that decision by Judge
- 3 Elrod and Judge Smith. Respondents themselves
- 4 agreed below that you can't look at anything
- 5 prior to the moment.
- 6 JUSTICE JACKSON: And do you perceive
- 7 them now to be saying that you can look at some
- 8 things?
- 9 MR. ZELINSKY: Yes.
- 10 JUSTICE JACKSON: So that's a
- 11 different concept?
- 12 MR. ZELINSKY: A hundred percent.
- 13 And, Justice Jackson, they've gone so far as to
- say, if an officer jumps in front of a moving
- car and shoots the driver, that's unreasonable.
- Well, that's our view of this case.
- 17 And part of the problem is we weren't able to
- 18 have a lower court look at the totality of the
- 19 circumstances and decide was this like a case in
- which you jump in front of a car and immediately
- 21 shoot the driver.
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Do you agree with
- the language in the Solicitor General's brief
- 24 that says the circumstances at the moment that
- 25 force is used will generally have primary

- 1 significance in the analysis?
- 2 MR. ZELINSKY: So I think that there's
- 3 very little daylight between us and the
- 4 Solicitor General. I think that language,
- 5 Justice Kavanaugh, is descriptive. So it's
- 6 describing that in the vast majority of these
- 7 cases --
- 8 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Do you agree with
- 9 it?
- 10 MR. ZELINSKY: I do --
- 11 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Okay.
- 12 MR. ZELINSKY: -- in its descriptive
- 13 aspect.
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: And do you agree
- 15 with when the Solicitor General says the type of
- 16 situation that was described in Biegert will be
- 17 rare?
- 18 MR. ZELINSKY: I think that the --
- 19 there are a series of reoccurring fact patterns.
- 20 I think there are two of them. I think that the
- jumping in front of or onto car does occur with
- 22 some frequency. So we cited in our reply brief
- a study of 400 stops that found that there is a
- 24 routine problem of officers jumping in front of
- 25 cars -- in the article, it's described "in a

- 1 Hollywood style" -- and then shooting the
- 2 driver.
- 3 The other reoccurring fact pattern is
- 4 a pattern where officers fail to identify
- 5 themselves, and the suspect, exercising his or
- 6 her own Second Amendment rights to self-defense,
- 7 pulls out a firearm.
- 8 The Fifth Circuit alone has two cases
- 9 in which they apply the "moment of the threat"
- 10 doctrine. The cases are Cass and Royal, and
- 11 they say: We can't look at the fact that the
- officer failed to identify himself. We can only
- look at the fact that the officer faced a loaded
- 14 gun.
- And that, by the way, is just sharply
- 16 inconsistent with how the common law approached
- 17 the exact same circumstance. And that's a very
- 18 strong indication --
- 19 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: On the jumping in
- 20 front of the car, I think you said this earlier,
- 21 but sometimes it'll be reasonable and sometimes
- 22 not?
- MR. ZELINSKY: So, yeah, let me give
- 24 you an example maybe where it might be
- 25 reasonable just to help flesh it out.

2.4

1 Take the tragic terrorist attack in 2 New Orleans. In that particular case, someone 3 used a car as a weapon of terror. If an officer had jumped in front of the car and shot the 4 driver, that officer would be a hero, and it's 5 because the state interest in that case in 6 7 seizing that terrorist is incredibly high. 8 Again, that's the type of balancing 9 that the Fifth Circuit just couldn't engage in in this case. 10 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, here, the stop 11 12 is for a failure to pay tolls. But we could 13 ratchet up very gradually the severity of the 14 reason for the stop, and at what point would 15 the -- would the offense become sufficiently 16 serious, if -- at what point, if any, would the 17 offense become sufficiently serious in your judgment to make it reasonable for the officer 18 19 to get on the sill of the car? 20 MR. ZELINSKY: So, Justice Alito, it's 21 a very difficult question to answer because, as 2.2 this Court has said, that it is a fact-specific 23 question that's going to depend in each given 24 case. And there are no magic rules. There's no 25 on/off switch. And that's Justice Scalia and

- 1 Scott. You can't just start drawing the lines
- 2 precisely because these cases are so numerous
- 3 and there are so many different permutations.
- 4 And so I think it would be very
- 5 dangerous to start drawing those lines.
- 6 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
- 7 counsel.
- 8 Justice Thomas, anything further?
- 9 Justice --
- 10 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: What do you do
- 11 with the cases cited by the other side where the
- 12 Fifth Circuit does appear not to apply the
- "moment of threat" docket -- doc -- doctrine and
- does take into account more of the totality of
- 15 circumstances?
- MR. ZELINSKY: So, Justice Sotomayor,
- 17 let me give you three responses.
- 18 First, there's never a Fifth Circuit
- 19 case where they actually look at the officer's
- 20 prior conduct and say that's part of the
- 21 calculus and it goes against the officer. So
- it's always it -- it -- whenever they might do
- it, it's only in the officer's benefit.
- 24 The second, the best case --
- 25 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Some of my

- 1 colleagues might agree with that. Why should we
- 2 not?
- 3 MR. ZELINSKY: Because you have to
- 4 look -- reasonableness. The framers gave us a
- 5 test of reasonableness, and that is a -- it's a
- 6 two-way street, not a one-way ratchet. And it
- 7 requires --
- 8 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: The common law --
- 9 you gave the prime example in the common law,
- 10 which is, if an officer -- a plain clothes
- officer doesn't announce he's an officer and
- 12 pulls out a gun --
- MR. ZELINSKY: Yes.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- under that
- 15 circumstance, the common law would say someone
- 16 can defend themselves and pull out a qun?
- 17 MR. ZELINSKY: Yes.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: All right.
- MR. ZELINSKY: Yes.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So -- okay. Go
- 21 ahead with your --
- MR. ZELINSKY: And then the other
- 23 response to your question -- and I -- and I have
- two more answers. The first is that there's
- just a wealth of Fifth Circuit cases that come

- 1 out in the other direction and are just
- 2 crystal-clear.
- 3 So I would just direct the Court to
- 4 the Harris v. Serpas case, and that's quoted by
- 5 Judge Higginbotham in his decision below. In
- 6 Harris, the Fifth Circuit goes out of its way to
- 7 say this Court has narrowed that test, and "that
- 8 test" is referring to the Graham test. So they
- 9 are self-consciously clear that they are
- 10 narrowing this Court's precedent.
- 11 And the court then goes on to say any
- of the officer's actions leading up to the
- shooting are not relevant for the purposes of an
- 14 excessive force inquiry in this circuit. So
- 15 that's a categorical bar.
- And then the third point is that in
- this case, you don't just have Judge
- 18 Higginbotham who's describing the split or
- 19 the -- the "moment of the threat" doctrine; you
- 20 also have Judge Elrod and Judge Smith who sign
- 21 on to that panel decision, and all of them agree
- this is how the doctrine operates in the Fifth
- 23 Circuit.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Thank you.
- 25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice --

1	Justice Kavanaugh?
2	Justice Barrett?
3	Justice Jackson?
4	Thank you, counsel.
5	Ms. Jacoby.
6	ORAL ARGUMENT OF ZOE A. JACOBY
7	FOR THE UNITED STATES, AS AMICUS CURIAE,
8	SUPPORTING VACATUR AND REMAND
9	MS. JACOBY: Mr. Chief Justice, and
LO	may it please the Court:
L1	The Fifth Circuit analyzed this case
L2	by examining only the so-called moment of the
L3	threat and categorically ignoring all prior
L4	events. None of the parties defends that
L5	approach. That is because reasonableness is
L6	assessed under the totality of the circumstances
L7	and pre-force events can be critical to that
L8	assessment.
L9	Prior events often show that the force
20	was reasonable. For example, police may have
21	issued warnings or attempted deescalation, all
22	of which a split-second "moment of the threat"
23	doctrine misses. Of course, when officers face
24	a moment of danger, that is by far the most
25	important factor under Graham. But. in rare

- 1 cases, a moment of danger doesn't tell the whole
- 2 story. If the danger was manufactured entirely
- 3 by police conduct outside the bounds of
- 4 reasonable behavior and not by the suspect's
- 5 intervening apparent misconduct, it is
- 6 unreasonable to use force in the moment.
- 7 The panel's approach fails to provide
- 8 a constitutional backstop in those cases, and it
- 9 disregards context that may show that force was
- 10 reasonable in others.
- I welcome the Court's questions.
- 12 JUSTICE THOMAS: Would that also
- include -- those circumstances also include the
- 14 conduct of the victim that preceded the
- 15 shooting?
- MS. JACOBY: Absolutely. And, as we
- 17 explained in our brief, the officer's conduct
- and the suspect's conduct are often intertwined.
- 19 It's how the suspect reacted to what the officer
- 20 did. And that can be very important in the
- 21 reasonableness assessment.
- JUSTICE THOMAS: And the other way,
- 23 how the officer reacted to the victim?
- MS. JACOBY: Exactly. It -- it's
- 25 truly a "totality of the circumstances"

- 1 approach, and the Fifth Circuit's narrow,
- 2 cramped reasoning didn't allow for any of that
- 3 to be considered.
- 4 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Is there --
- JUSTICE BARRETT: Ms. Jacoby, what do
- 6 you -- oh, sorry, Chief.
- 7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I just
- 8 wondered, is there any area where you disagree
- 9 with the Petitioner?
- 10 MS. JACOBY: No. I -- I think that
- 11 what Petitioner's just articulated aligns well
- 12 with -- with our view, and I'm glad to hear that
- 13 he endorses some of the statements in our -- in
- our brief. We agree this Court doesn't need to
- 15 go further than just saying that the Fifth
- 16 Circuit's approach here was wrong because it
- focused only on a narrow two-second snippet of
- 18 the encounter rather than looking at the
- entirety, and the Court probably doesn't need to
- 20 go further and delineate the precise bounds of
- 21 when force will be sort of reasonable or not.
- 22 And -- and so I think we don't have a
- lot of daylight. To be honest, I don't think we
- have a lot of daylight between us and
- 25 Respondents either because Respondent also seems

- 1 to agree now that pre-force circumstances
- 2 matter. And I think Respondent also agrees that
- 3 a moment of danger doesn't tell the whole story
- 4 because, at page 33 and 34 of his brief, he
- 5 agrees there are circumstances where there can
- 6 be an imminent danger to the officer and the use
- 7 of force can still be reasonable.
- 8 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: What do you tell
- 9 an officer who pulls someone over for a traffic
- 10 violation, but, as often, or not often, but
- 11 sometimes happens, that person has done or is
- 12 planning to do something more serious and, you
- know, driving away is one potential indicator of
- 14 that? An officer does not get the time we've
- spent here today to make the decision, do I let
- it go knowing that this person could do serious
- 17 harm or has done and we'll never catch the
- 18 person, or do I jump on the car? And they have
- 19 to make that decision in about -- what do you
- 20 tell them?
- 21 MS. JACOBY: So, Justice Kavanaugh, we
- 22 completely agree that the -- the Graham inquiry
- has to be very sensitive and deferential to the
- officer's need for -- for split-second
- 25 decision-making. I think the training, the

- 1 quidance we would have officers be given is one
- 2 that officers are already trained under, as
- 3 Petitioner points out at page 41 of -- of her
- 4 brief. Basically, you may use force to respond
- 5 to a danger to yourself or the public, but don't
- 6 manufacture a situation where the use of force
- 7 becomes essentially inevitable. And I think
- 8 that kind of quidance would be helpful to
- 9 officers.
- 10 When they are in a split-second moment
- in a traffic stop, as you're discussing, it may
- often be reasonable to use force to stop the --
- 13 the vehicle. A vehicle can be a dangerous
- 14 weapon, as this Court has recognized. But
- that's not true in every single case, and the
- 16 Graham inquiry has to be case-sensitive to that
- 17 also.
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Well, I think the
- officers are going to want to know do I let him
- go or do I not let him go as a general
- 21 proposition when someone pulls away from a
- 22 traffic stop, or do I try to jump on the car,
- jump in front of the car. And I don't know that
- 24 your -- and I realize we're not going to flesh
- 25 all this out in this case, but officers are

- 1 presumably paying attention to this, and they
- 2 have to make those decisions all the time. I'm
- 3 curious, let him go or not?
- 4 MS. JACOBY: Of course. I think it's
- 5 going to depend on what you've pulled them over
- for: if you know or suspect them to be armed;
- 7 how they are behaving in your interaction with
- 8 them; if you're getting the sense that, as they
- 9 pull away, they're going to pose right away a
- 10 big danger to people on the road.
- 11 And Respondent says that that was the
- 12 case here, and it may well have been, and it may
- 13 well have been reasonable to -- to use force to
- stop the officer or to jump on the car to -- to
- 15 stop Barnes from getting away. But the Fifth
- 16 Circuit just didn't consider any of that, and
- that's what we think is wrong.
- 18 JUSTICE KAGAN: I assume --
- 19 JUSTICE BARRETT: Ms. Jacoby --
- 20 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Is this an
- 21 objective or subjective inquiry in terms of what
- 22 type of conduct is going to create the danger?
- 23 I mean, it's like -- what about in sort of the
- 24 equivalent of an eggshell plaintiff? I mean, is
- 25 the officer subject to varieties in terms of

- 1 reaction from people that he pulls over?
- MS. JACOBY: Mr. Chief Justice,
- 3 it's -- the Fourth Amendment test is always an
- 4 objective reasonableness test. We're not
- 5 looking into the subjective state of mind of the
- 6 officer to see if he was acting in good faith or
- 7 being particularly sensitive or something like
- 8 that. It's whether he acted objectively
- 9 reasonably. I do want to briefly --
- 10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I'm thinking
- 11 more of the -- of the perpetrator in the
- officer's mind. I mean, maybe somebody is --
- 13 really -- really views something as -- as a
- 14 serious danger, and the officer doesn't know
- 15 that. Is that at all pertinent?
- 16 MS. JACOBY: I think the officer
- 17 should take into account sort of the imminence
- of the threat he perceives. And he may perceive
- 19 that the suspect is about to -- you know, has a
- 20 bad motivation, is about to do something
- 21 dangerous, and -- and that does matter. But the
- 22 ultimate inquiry is the reasonableness of the
- officer's perception that there was an imminent
- 24 threat and it was reasonable to use force.
- I do want to just briefly address --

- on the subject of objective versus subjective
- 2 standards. I think Texas argues in its amicus
- 3 brief, and we haven't had a chance to respond,
- 4 that we are sort of improperly inserting a
- 5 subjective element into the qualified immunity
- 6 inquiry because we say that reasonableness is
- 7 assessed based on the actual facts that the
- 8 officer knew.
- 9 That's not correct. Our test is an
- 10 objective reasonableness one. And this Court
- 11 has actually rejected that precise argument that
- 12 Texas makes in Anderson versus Creighton, which
- is a case that Texas cites in its brief. If I
- could quote from page 641 of the U.S. Reports
- there, the Court says that the qualified
- 16 immunity inquiry "will often require examination
- of the information possessed by the searching
- 18 officials. But, contrary to the Creightons'
- 19 assertion, this does not reintroduce into
- 20 qualified immunity analysis the inquiry into
- 21 official subjective intent that Harlow sought to
- 22 minimize." So this really is an objective test.
- Of course, the -- the officer will be
- 24 making perceptions about whether the subject
- 25 that he's engaging with is acting in bad faith

- or about to do something dangerous. But -- but
- 2 the ultimate inquiry is objective.
- JUSTICE KAGAN: I assume -- tell me if
- 4 I'm wrong, but I assume that you would want us
- 5 to write an opinion that doesn't say anything
- 6 about the weight to be given to the officer
- 7 himself creating the danger.
- 8 But I'm -- I'm trying to think of --
- 9 of -- given the facts of this case, how an
- 10 opinion that you would want us to write avoids
- 11 that question entirely.
- MS. JACOBY: I think the narrowest
- opinion this Court could write would just be to
- 14 say: Prior circums matter -- circumstances
- 15 matter. They're part of the totality of the
- 16 circumstances. The Fifth Circuit didn't
- 17 recognize that.
- If the Court wants to put more meat on
- 19 the bones, I think it could say, as we've said
- 20 in our brief: The circumstances at the moment
- 21 of the threat are going to have prime
- 22 importance, and it's going to be a rare case in
- 23 which an officer is experiencing a moment of
- danger and it's nevertheless unreasonable to use
- 25 force.

1	And it's going to be the types of
2	cases where we're talking about and of the
3	sort that Justice Barrett recognized in her
4	Biegert opinion, where the officer has done
5	something outside the bounds of reasonable
6	behavior that essentially makes the use of force
7	almost inevitable. There's really no
8	intervening misconduct by the suspect.
9	JUSTICE GORSUCH: Why would we do
LO	that? Why would we put a thumb on the scale
L1	that way and and say that it's almost
L2	impossible to make out a Fourth Amendment claim
L3	in those circumstances given the varied nature
L4	of encounters between police officers and
L5	citizens across the country, the standard
L6	we've always said reasonableness is the totality
L7	of the circumstances.
L8	And, at common law, these are all
L9	questions for the jury. And you also have
20	layered on top of the Fourth Amendment qualified
21	immunity to protect the officers in these cases.
22	Why would we why would we start creating a
23	new jurisprudence of exceptional circumstances?
24	MS. JACOBY: I don't think it would be
5	a a new jurisprudence or a thumb on the scale

- 1 so much as a reflection that when balancing the
- 2 Fourth Amendment interests of the individual and
- 3 the government, the government has a very strong
- 4 interest when there is an imminent danger to
- 5 himself or to the public.
- But you're right, of course, it is a
- 7 "totality of the circumstances" inquiry. And we
- 8 wouldn't be asking for a departure of that.
- 9 I think the reason the Court might
- 10 want to go further and -- and say it's going to
- 11 be rare when there truly is a moment of danger
- 12 is because you want to avoid a situation where
- 13 courts are taking this as license to do some
- 14 kind of officer-created danger rule, where
- merely getting into a bad circumstance, making a
- 16 bad stop, means that the later use of force is
- 17 automatically unreasonable.
- 18 I think that would be what we're
- 19 trying to guard against, Justice Gorsuch.
- JUSTICE JACKSON: But wouldn't we --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: That's nice, but
- 22 this is not the issue before this Court,
- 23 correct?
- 24 MS. JACOBY: Correct. This Court does
- 25 not need to go -- to go any further than to say

- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And Justice Scalia
 was very clear in his Scott writings that we
- 4 shouldn't be trying to do black-line rules here.
- 5 MS. JACOBY: Certainly. We're --
- 6 we're not asking for -- for black-line rules. I
- 7 think just, if the Court wanted to give more --
- 8 more color, it could say, as Justice Barrett
- 9 said in the Biegert opinion: We think, you
- 10 know, when there's a moment of danger, that's --
- 11 that's very often going to be dispositive but
- 12 not -- but not always --

that in this case --

- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, why don't we
- just say it's important, just as everything is
- important, but it's important? You're putting a
- 16 scale on it. By the words you use, you're
- 17 putting a thumb on it.
- 18 MS. JACOBY: This Court certainly
- 19 doesn't need to -- to say anything further
- 20 than -- than the narrow opinion that -- that
- 21 Justice Alito sketched out with my friend.
- But I do think, given that the
- 23 question is the reasonableness of the use of
- force in the moment, the circumstances in the
- 25 moment and the presence of a danger in the

1 moment will have to be quite important. 2 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, 3 counsel. Justice Thomas? 4 Justice Alito? 5 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, it's fine to 6 7 tell someone, a court or anybody else: Take into account the totality of the circumstances. 8 9 But that's fairly meaningless unless you also 10 tell that person what -- what you are examining 11 the totality of the circumstances to determine. 12 And that's really the -- the difficult 13 question here. Are you examining the totality 14 of the circumstances to determine whether the 15 act that forms the gravamen of the Fourth 16 Amendment claim -- let's say it is the -- the 17 use -- the allegedly unreasonable use of deadly 18 force -- is unreasonable? 19 Or are you asking the court or the 20 jury to determine whether the whole course of conduct in which the officer is engaged was 21 2.2 unreasonable, in part in the sense that it 23 wasn't prudent, it was in violation of perhaps 24 departmental policies or the best practices that 25 had been established for police department --

- 1 that -- that some people think should be
- 2 followed by police departments around the
- 3 country?
- 4 That -- that's really the difficult
- 5 question, and what -- what would you say to
- 6 that?
- 7 MS. JACOBY: I would say, Justice
- 8 Alito, the former. The question is: Was the
- 9 use of force, the seizure, reasonable in the
- 10 moment? That's what we're trying to get at when
- 11 we look at the totality of circumstances.
- We're not doing some sort of
- 13 freewheeling inquiry into whether the officer
- overall, over the course of five minutes, acted
- 15 reasonably. So -- so that is why we think the
- 16 circumstances in the moment do have prime
- 17 importance. But that does not mean that courts
- have a license to ignore everything before that
- 19 moment, as the Fifth Circuit did here.
- JUSTICE ALITO: Well, would it be --
- 21 would a court hearing this case be obligated to
- 22 admit expert testimony by various individuals
- 23 who have a view about what are good police
- 24 practices and what are not good police
- 25 practices? Would the -- would that be what the

1 jury's determination would boil down to? 2 MS. JACOBY: So the ultimate determination here about whether the officer 3 acted reasonably is, according to Scott, a pure 4 question of law. The jury's not deciding that. 5 6 The jury could be making factual 7 determinations about what actually happened, you know, when the officer jumped and -- and all the 8 9 rest. 10 As the Court is examining whether that 11 initial thing that the officer did here, jumping 12 on the car, was outside the bounds of reasonable behavior, I do think it's appropriate to look at 13 14 training manuals and the like. That can't 15 resolve the question, but that could provide 16 helpful quidance. 17 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, there are 18 federal -- there are some federal law 19 enforcement officers who make vehicle stops. So 20 what is the -- the teaching? Do you know? 21 What -- what are they taught about placing 2.2 themselves in front of the car or in a position 23 where they could be killed or injured if the driver decides to try to drive away? 24 25 MS. JACOBY: I don't know across the

1	board a rule for stepping in front of cars. I
2	know that federal officers are trained to use
3	force to respond to danger but not to enter into
4	situations where the use of force becomes sort
5	of inevitable. That's like the DHS manual that
6	my friend points to at page 41 of her brief.
7	I think, again, we don't really train
8	officers to go right up to the constitutional
9	line. We often will train officers to not enter
LO	in these situations to begin with even if, if
L1	they ultimately do so, it could end up being not
L2	a Fourth Amendment violation. So I suspect we
L3	would train officers not to you know, to
L4	frequently avoid using force on roads and
L5	whatnot, even if it would be permissible under
L6	the circumstances to do so, because we just want
L7	to to train them more cautiously, I suspect.
L8	JUSTICE ALITO: Thank you.
L9	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
20	Sotomayor?
21	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: No. Thank you.
22	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice Kagan?
23	Justice Gorsuch?
24	Justice Kavanaugh?
2.5	JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: I just am curious.

- 1 after this case gets resolved on remand, if it
- 2 goes back on remand, what the rule will be for
- 3 officers and what those training manuals will
- 4 say. You know, put aside the abducted child
- 5 example.
- 6 Someone's pulling away, it might be
- 7 they just don't feel like they want to be
- 8 hassled for a traffic violation, but they could
- 9 be, you know, about to drive down the street in
- 10 New Orleans. You don't know. Or they might be
- on drugs and about to kill someone else who's,
- 12 you know, on a bike on the side of the road.
- 13 And I don't know what we want officers
- to do, and I don't know how that's going to get
- 15 fleshed out. But I'm not -- you know, officers,
- if they're held liable for jumping on cars, for
- 17 anything that happens thereafter, are just going
- 18 to let cars go. And maybe that's the rule that
- 19 the United States thinks is appropriate. I
- 20 don't know.
- MS. JACOBY: That's not the rule the
- 22 United States thinks is appropriate. I do think
- that it is sometimes appropriate to use force to
- 24 stop a car from -- from pulling away from a
- 25 stop. I think Brosseau is good guidance on

- 1 that.
- 2 But Brosseau also says that the use of
- 3 force to stop a vehicular flight is necessarily
- 4 a context-specific thing. I think it says in
- 5 Brosseau that that is an area that depends very
- 6 much on the facts of each case.
- 7 So I recognize that can be
- 8 unsatisfying. In giving guidance to officers,
- 9 police departments may well say: You know,
- don't jump on the car no matter what, unless you
- 11 see a weapon or something like that.
- 12 That -- again, they may train them not
- to go all the way up to the Fourth Amendment
- 14 line, but we don't think that --
- 15 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Well, an
- 16 individual officer too would be --
- 17 MS. JACOBY: -- there is at a point
- 18 until they can't --
- 19 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: -- an individual
- 20 officer would be -- who would -- would be --
- 21 who's risk-averse on being held liable for
- 22 something like this is just not going to do it.
- But anyway, I'll -- I'll stop there.
- 24 Thank you.
- 25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice

1	Barrett?
2	JUSTICE BARRETT: Ms. Jacoby, to to
3	this point, there is a split on this. So what
4	about in the circuits that don't take the
5	"moment of threat" approach, these questions
6	that Justice Kavanaugh is asking about guidance
7	for police officers? I'm just wondering what
8	your view is of how courts are handling these
9	kinds of cases in that circuit in ways that
10	might affect police behavior.
11	MS. JACOBY: So I do think, actually,
12	the split is maybe not so much a two-sided split
13	as a three-sided. I do think there have been
14	some courts that veer a little bit towards an
15	officer-created danger rule, where they seem to
16	say that almost suggest that the use of force
17	is automatically unreasonable if earlier in the
18	sequence the officer did anything unreasonable.
19	And we don't think that's correct, and
20	we do think that would be bad guidance for
21	officers and would lead them to police less
22	aggressively than they need to be able to.
23	But I think, in a in a court that
24	appropriately takes into account the totality of
25	the circumstances, officers will have good

- 1 quidance to use force when necessary, when --
- when there's a danger and they need to protect
- 3 themselves or the public, but to avoid
- 4 situations, as I said, where, you know -- to
- 5 avoid manufacturing a situation where the use of
- 6 force effectively becomes inevitable. That's,
- 7 you know, jumping in front of the car, that type
- 8 of thing.
- 9 Again, obviously, Respondent disputes
- 10 that's what he's done here. Petitioner thinks
- 11 it is. That's what they'll sort of hash out
- 12 below. But I think quidance that says you can
- use force to respond to danger, don't
- 14 manufacture a dangerous situation, would --
- 15 would go a long way.
- JUSTICE BARRETT: So you say -- you
- 17 said it's a three-sided split and you're kind of
- 18 saying Fifth Circuit on one side and then these,
- 19 you know, officer-fabricated or officer-caused
- 20 dangers on the other side. What about those
- 21 circuits in the middle and this concern that,
- 22 you know, Justice Kavanaugh is correctly
- 23 expressing about what cops do in the moment?
- 24 And in that -- in those circuits that take the
- 25 more middle approach, I take it that's what the

1 United States is supporting? 2 MS. JACOBY: Correct. Correct. 3 JUSTICE BARRETT: And this isn't a problem in those circuits or -- or it is? 4 MS. JACOBY: I don't think so. I 5 mean, we have amicus briefs on the other side 6 7 from, for example, the law enforcement officers from Wisconsin, which is in the Seventh Circuit, 8 which does take this kind of more 9 10 middle-of-the-road approach, and I don't see in 11 their brief something saying that they have a 12 uniquely difficult time policing. I think they 13 are, of course, going to have to make 14 split-second decisions, and very often, in the 15 cases where a court sort of ultimately decides 16 that the decision they made was on the wrong 17 side of the line, they'll still be protected by 18 qualified immunity. 19 So, of course, we are definitely very 20 concerned as the United States about officers 21 not being able to engage in aggressive-enough 2.2 policing. They need to be able to. But -- but 23 we don't think that a "totality of the circumstances" approach, which is what Graham 24 25 cautions, what Scott cautions, what this Court

- 1 has endorsed over and over again, would lead
- 2 down that path.
- JUSTICE BARRETT: And last question.
- 4 What's the deal -- you know, in Respondents'
- 5 brief at Footnote 3, it says, "United States
- 6 questions whether Sergeant Felix jumped onto the
- 7 door sill shortly before or shortly after. But
- 8 the parties agree it was after." What's the
- 9 deal with that factual dispute?
- 10 MS. JACOBY: I think it's a dispute
- 11 about where -- the way the district court
- 12 phrased its opinion. It seems to suggest a
- 13 distinction between the moment that the car
- 14 started moving forward and a moment of
- 15 acceleration. So it seems now everyone agrees
- that the officer stepped on the car after it
- 17 started moving forward.
- 18 There is that passage that we quoted
- 19 from the district court opinion that says it's
- 20 not clear if it's before or after the
- 21 acceleration. I think that may be where the
- 22 confusion comes from. The fact that there is
- 23 some confusion about this matter of timing,
- 24 which could go to the -- to the question whether
- 25 the decision to jump on the sill was -- was

- 1 reasonable or not, to me seems like further
- 2 reason to -- to vacate and remand and send it
- 3 back to the Fifth Circuit.
- 4 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
- 5 Jackson?
- 6 JUSTICE JACKSON: Yeah. Just to
- 7 follow up on Justice Barrett's questions, it --
- 8 it's the majority of circuits that use a
- 9 totality test, is that correct?
- 10 MS. JACOBY: Yes, I think that's
- 11 correct.
- 12 JUSTICE JACKSON: And is there any
- indication in those circuits that there is
- 14 confusion or concern about the application of
- that test either on the part of the courts or on
- the part of the officers who do their jobs in
- 17 that context?
- MS. JACOBY: Not to my knowledge. I
- do think that, again, a feature of the sort of
- 20 "totality of the circumstances" approach that
- 21 applies to the Fourth Amendment across the board
- is that it doesn't always provide perfect
- 23 guidance to officers. That's why we do have the
- 24 backstop of the "clearly established" prong of
- 25 the qualified immunity analysis, to make sure

- 1 that officers are not held liable for things
- 2 that they sort of weren't on notice were on the
- 3 wrong side of the line.
- 4 But I'm not aware of a problem in the
- 5 circuits that are correctly applying a "totality
- of the circumstances" approach.
- 7 JUSTICE JACKSON: And is it the case
- 8 that in those circuits that are correctly
- 9 applying the test, officers are regularly found
- 10 to have engaged in using reasonable force?
- 11 We're not talking about the application of a
- 12 test that necessarily results in officer
- 13 liability, right?
- MS. JACOBY: Absolutely. Obviously,
- the United States would not endorse such a test.
- 16 Of course.
- 17 JUSTICE JACKSON: And can I just
- 18 clarify that the United States is not taking a
- 19 position on the facts of this case and whether
- or not Officer Felix used reasonable force, and,
- 21 in fact, you would be satisfied with just a
- 22 clarification that "moment of the threat"
- doctrine is not what courts should be using, and
- then sending it back to the Fifth Circuit for
- 25 the Fourth Amendment analysis in this situation?

1	MS. JACOBY: That's absolutely
2	correct. Our interest in this dispute is a
3	narrow one. We're really just interested in
4	correcting the Fifth Circuit's legal error.
5	And and we have no position on the facts of
6	this case.
7	JUSTICE JACKSON: Thank you.
8	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
9	counsel.
10	Mr. McCloud.
11	ORAL ARGUMENT OF CHARLES L. McCLOUD
12	ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS
13	MR. McCLOUD: Thank you, Mr. Chief
14	Justice, and may it please the Court:
15	When an officer doing his duty
16	confronts a threat to his safety or the safety
17	of others, it is reasonable for that officer to
18	use force to end that threat. That's the
19	conclusion this Court has consistently reached,
20	and that's what the Fifth Circuit correctly held
21	below.
22	At the moment Sergeant Felix used
23	force, he was clinging to the side of a fleeing
24	suspect's car, and Felix reasonably believed
25	that his life was in imminent danger. That

- 1 conclusion should end this case.
- 2 Petitioner's contrary argument attacks
- 3 a strawman. Let me be very clear. We are
- 4 defending the decision below and the "moment of
- 5 threat doctrine as it actually exists. The
- 6 core premise of that doctrine is that an officer
- 7 doesn't lose his right to defend himself just
- 8 because he made a mistake at an earlier point in
- 9 time.
- 10 But applying that rule does not
- 11 require courts to ignore everything that
- occurred prior to the use of force. Like other
- 13 circuits, the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly held
- 14 that preceding events are relevant to the extent
- they inform the officer's perception of the
- danger that he faced. The panel decision below
- 17 repeatedly cited to and quoted from those very
- 18 precedents. The panel did not and could not
- 19 overrule them sub silentio.
- 20 Petitioner asked the Court to create a
- 21 new breed of constitutional tort under which an
- 22 officer facing the barrel of a gun loses his
- 23 right to defend himself if he previously used
- 24 bad tactics or poor planning.
- 25 That's contrary to precedent and

- 1 common sense. Graham asks only whether an
- 2 officer's use of force was reasonable in the
- 3 particular circumstances he faced. It requires
- 4 courts to put themselves in the shoes of the
- 5 officer who used force, not to second-guess
- 6 every decision the officer made in some of the
- 7 most stressful circumstances imaginable.
- 8 And Plumhoff and Mendez rejected
- 9 similar officer-created danger theories as
- 10 illogical, unwarranted, and inconsistent with
- 11 precedent. The Court should reject the theory
- again in this case and affirm the judgment of
- 13 the court of appeals.
- I welcome the Court's questions.
- 15 JUSTICE THOMAS: How would you assess
- the difference between the Fifth Circuit's
- 17 approach, what you -- as you see it, and the
- 18 "totality of the circumstances" approach, as we
- 19 heard it this morning?
- 20 MR. McCLOUD: So I don't think that
- 21 there is any difference between what the Fifth
- 22 Circuit does and what Graham directs. Both --
- JUSTICE THOMAS: No, I mean, as --
- 24 what the Solicitor General and Petitioner, as
- 25 they see the totality of the circumstances, not

- 1 so much Graham.
- MR. McCLOUD: So the difference, I
- 3 think, between our position and -- and somewhat
- 4 the government's position is they want to
- 5 include within the totality of the circumstances
- 6 arguments that the officer escalated the danger
- 7 or created the danger.
- 8 And we think that is not a
- 9 relevant consideration under Graham and under
- 10 the Fourth Amendment. In those cases, the
- 11 question is: Was there a legitimate threat that
- 12 the officer is responding to?
- 13 JUSTICE THOMAS: Were they arguing
- 14 that this morning?
- MR. McCLOUD: That was exactly their
- 16 argument that I heard this morning. He -- he
- 17 said that -- Mr. Zelinsky said that Sergeant
- 18 Felix created a dangerous situation by jumping
- 19 onto the car.
- 20 JUSTICE THOMAS: But I thought he said
- 21 he wants to argue that later, when he -- when it
- 22 goes back.
- MR. McCLOUD: Well, that was the
- 24 argument that they tried to advance in the Fifth
- 25 Circuit. And this is, I think, the one thing I

- 1 agree with in Judge Higginbotham's solo
- 2 concurrence. At 15a of the Petition Appendix,
- 3 he says that argument is foreclosed under Fifth
- 4 Circuit law.
- 5 And that is the actual issue that
- 6 divides the circuits. There is no split on the
- 7 question of whether you can consider preceding
- 8 events. Every court in the country considers
- 9 preceding events. The question is whether you
- 10 can use those preceding events as a basis for
- 11 making an argument that the officer made a
- 12 mistake or used poor planning --
- JUSTICE JACKSON: But, Mr. McCloud,
- that's not what you argued before, and I'm very,
- 15 very confused now. I mean, it -- it seems as
- though the "moment of the threat" doctrine, as
- 17 it exists and as everybody has understood it, is
- about evidence essentially. It's what can you
- 19 look at to prove the alleged Fourth Amendment
- 20 excessive force claim. Can you look at anything
- 21 that occurred outside of the moment of the
- 22 threat, anything that occurred previously?
- 23 You seem to be now suggesting that it
- 24 is about liability. You said that they are
- 25 creating a new breed of constitutional tort and

- 1 this is about, you know, whether or not the
- 2 police officer can be held liable for his own
- 3 negligence in the time preceding.
- I haven't seen that concept anywhere.
- 5 MR. McCLOUD: That -- that was the
- 6 argument that was made below. Issue Number 1 in
- 7 Petitioner's Fifth Circuit brief was that
- 8 Sergeant Felix escalated the danger and was
- 9 negligent in jumping onto the car, and that is
- 10 the issue that actually divides the circuits.
- 11 The Fifth Circuit has never adopted a
- 12 rule that you can't ever look to anything that
- 13 happened prior to the use of the force --
- JUSTICE JACKSON: Did -- is it true
- 15 that --
- MR. McCLOUD: -- and the best example
- 17 I can give --
- 18 JUSTICE JACKSON: -- isn't it true
- 19 that in your bio, you stated the Fifth Circuit's
- 20 approach involves reviewing only the events
- 21 immediately prior to the use of deadly force as
- 22 opposed to other prior conduct?
- MR. McCLOUD: The other prior conduct
- that was being referred to there is conduct that
- is alleged to have created the danger.

1 JUSTICE JACKSON: That might be what 2 you're saying is referred to now. I -- the 3 sentence suggests that the dividing line is between looking only at the events immediately 4 prior to the use of deadly force as opposed to 5 6 other prior conduct. 7 MR. McCLOUD: No, Your Honor, and on page 33 of the bio, we said there was no circuit 8 split on that issue. We said that every court 9 considers prior events. So --10 11 JUSTICE KAGAN: Whatever you said or 12 you didn't say, Mr. McCloud, I think it's pretty clear that if you look at the court below, the 13 14 court below said: We're only looking at the 15 prior two seconds and we're not going to look at 16 anything before that. 17 And -- and so, again, even if there's 18 some kind of intra-circuit confusion going on in 19 the Fifth Circuit -- there might be. It wouldn't be surprising if, on an issue like 20 21 this, there were some -- but we have two 2.2 opinions below, actually, both the circuit court 23 and the district court, who expressed a desire to look beyond two seconds but said: 24 25 only look at the prior two seconds.

1 And -- and you seem to be saying: 2 Well, that is wrong. I mean, you -- you can 3 look back beyond the prior two seconds. So that suggests to me that there's an 4 easy way of just, you know, vacating and 5 remanding and giving it back to the courts below 6 7 to address, okay, once we look behind -- beyond the two seconds and we have a fuller scope of 8 evidence, then we'll make our reasonableness 9 inquiry, hopefully without our putting a thumb 10 11 on the scales either way. 12 MR. McCLOUD: So I have a couple of 13 responses on that. 14 First, I don't think that that's the 15 best reading of the panel decision. 16 understand that that's what Judge Higginbotham 17 asserted in his solo concurrence, but that is 18 not the law, and he doesn't get to make the law 19 for the Fifth Circuit by just asserting things 20 in a solo opinion. 21 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Okay. Fair enough. 2.2 I understand you read the opinion differently 23 than Justice Kagan does or maybe Justice --Judge Higginbotham did, but what's wrong with 24 25 proceeding on that understanding?

- 1 MR. McCLOUD: Well, I think there are
- 2 a number of things wrong.
- 3 The first thing I would say is, to the
- 4 extent you are concerned about the breadth of
- 5 the statements in the panel decision, I think
- 6 the better course of action is to affirm the
- 7 judgment, which is clearly correct.
- 8 JUSTICE GORSUCH: If the only thing
- 9 we're concerned with is this two-minute -- this
- 10 two-second rule, whether it's there or not,
- 11 Mr. McCloud, and we just clarify that is not the
- 12 law, send it back, any objections to that?
- MR. McCLOUD: Yes, because then you
- would be sending it back for a remand that is
- 15 going to be pointless.
- 16 As I said before, the argument that
- 17 Petitioner wants to make on remand --
- 18 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Mr. McCloud, the
- 19 number of remands from this Court that lawyers
- 20 tell us are pointless --
- 21 (Laughter.)
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- could fill
- 23 volumes.
- 24 MR. McCLOUD: Well, in this case, it's
- 25 not --

1 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Any other -- any 2 other -- any other objection besides your view 3 that it would be pointless? MR. McCLOUD: Yes. My other objection 4 is it would be creating, I think, a dangerous 5 precedent because it could be seen as endorsing 6 7 the sort of officer-created danger argument that Petitioner wants to make. 8 And, as Justice Barrett alluded to in 9 some of her questioning earlier --10 JUSTICE GORSUCH: If we -- fine. 11 That -- that's a --12 MR. McCLOUD: -- there is a --13 14 JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- that's --Mr. McCloud, that's a fair concern. But we've 15 16 also talked about putting that aside and 17 bracketing that and making clear, as we did in Men -- Mendez, I believe? 18 19 MR. McCLOUD: Mendez. 20 JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- Mendez, that 21 footnote in Mendez reserved the question, we'd 22 reserve it again, possibly, possibly. Any -- if 23 we do that, any other objections? MR. McCLOUD: So I quess, if I -- if I 24

could ask, if you do that, to do one additional

- 1 thing, which is to make clear that the standard
- 2 would have to be high, and mere negligence alone
- 3 would not be enough to satisfy this
- 4 officer-created --
- 5 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Well, now negligence
- 6 involves mens rea, and that's subjective. And
- 7 we've said in the Fourth Amendment it's an
- 8 objective test. So I -- I -- that one, I -- up
- 9 until then, you had me. But now you -- now I'm
- 10 afraid I'm getting off the train.
- 11 MR. McCLOUD: Well, I -- I think the
- 12 problem is -- I completely agree that negligence
- is not a relevant consideration, and that's why
- 14 we object to that test.
- 15 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Okay. Good. All
- 16 right. Thank you.
- 17 MR. McCLOUD: But that is the test
- 18 that courts of appeals are applying in the
- 19 country right now. I don't think there's any
- 20 question about --
- 21 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Do you want a
- 22 negligence test or do you not want a negligence
- 23 test?
- MR. McCLOUD: I do not want a
- 25 negligence test.

- 1 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Okay. All right. 2 All right. 3 MR. McCLOUD: I want a test that says: 4 You only look at conduct that actually is --5 JUSTICE GORSUCH: You look at the --MR. McCLOUD: -- regulated by the 6 7 Fourth Amendment. That's searches and seizures. And so --8 9 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Yes. And it's an 10 objective inquiry looking at the totality of the 11 circumstances, right? 12 MR. McCLOUD: It is an objective 13 inquiry that looks at the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the officer 14 15 genuinely believed there was a threat. 16 You do not look at the totality to 17 determine, well, did the officer make a mistake 18 and should he have gotten himself in that 19 circumstance. JUSTICE GORSUCH: No, whether he 20 genuinely believes or whether there was an 21 2.2 excessive use of force. I thought -- I thought 23 the latter was the question.
- MR. McCLOUD: And this Court has
 consistently said that when an officer confronts

- 1 a genuine threat, it is not excessive to use
- 2 force. And I would be very concerned about an
- 3 opinion --
- 4 JUSTICE GORSUCH: That -- that's an
- 5 objective inquiry, though, isn't it?
- 6 MR. McCLOUD: That is an objective
- 7 inquiry, yes, sir.
- 8 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Okay. All right.
- 9 Thank you.
- 10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: How broad is
- 11 the totality of circumstances under your view?
- 12 Do you get to put in: This is the training
- 13 record of the officer, and, look, he got D
- 14 minuses in all the -- the excessive force parts
- 15 of it?
- MR. McCLOUD: No.
- 17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I mean, is
- 18 that part of the totality as you view it?
- MR. McCLOUD: No, Your Honor. We
- 20 don't view that as relevant. I think Whren says
- 21 that very clearly. Those sorts of policies
- 22 and -- and procedures do not inform the
- 23 reasonableness question that is being asked by
- the Fourth Amendment.
- 25 And Justice Alito's questioning

- 1 alluded to this before. The Fourth Amendment is
- 2 not a regulation on the reasonableness in a
- 3 general sense of everything that officers do.
- 4 It is a regulation of very specific conduct,
- 5 searches and seizures. And this Court has
- 6 established clear guidelines for determining
- 7 when searches and seizures are reasonable.
- 8 The problem with the other side's
- 9 position is they want to take literally anything
- 10 that an officer does and say: If a jury,
- 11 through the lens of hindsight, could say that
- was a bad call, or if an expert could come in
- and say I wouldn't have done that if I were in
- 14 the officer's shoes, that could be the basis for
- 15 a Fourth Amendment claim.
- 16 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So it could be
- 17 that when this goes down below, the Fifth
- 18 Circuit will actually address that question.
- 19 But it didn't. It repeatedly said: We can't
- look at any event ever.
- You concede in your own brief that
- there could be situations in which an officer is
- 23 the aggressor. Page 34, I think, is the page of
- your brief. You admit that an officer could be
- an aggressor and act unlawfully in doing so,

- 1 correct?
- 2 MR. McCLOUD: Yes. If an officer
- 3 comes up to mug someone --
- 4 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But your
- 5 articulation of this rule is just trying to get
- 6 us to draw lines that haven't even been
- 7 addressed by the court below.
- 8 MR. McCLOUD: I think they have been,
- 9 Your Honor, respectfully. If you look at the
- 10 cases --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: No, the --
- 12 respectfully, Mr. McCloud, the court repeatedly
- 13 said: We can only look at the actions in the
- 14 two minutes before the moment of threat.
- 15 If your answer had been -- if he had
- 16 walked up in an unmarked car, in plain clothes,
- 17 with a gun drawn, and this person -- and he
- 18 walked up to the car and this person took off
- 19 and/or accelerated slightly, and he jumped on
- 20 and shot blindly, do you think that's
- 21 reasonable?
- MR. McCLOUD: I think that would not
- 23 be reasonable for a number of reasons.
- 24 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: All right. So
- you've given the game away because, at that

- 1 point, you have to look at what the officer did.
- 2 MR. McCLOUD: And, Your Honor, we
- 3 agree that you can look at what the officer did.
- 4 And the Fifth Circuit does look at what the
- 5 officer did. The best example I can give you --
- 6 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: It didn't in this
- 7 case.
- 8 MR. McCLOUD: In this case, that's
- 9 because the only argument that Petitioner made
- 10 below, the only action she said you should look
- 11 at, was an action based on officer-created
- 12 danger.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And we have three
- judges who said we shouldn't be limited in this
- 15 way in the mine-run of cases, and we -- and so
- 16 we're stuck with this. We think the -- the
- judgment is right, but it wasn't addressed at
- 18 all. Officer-created danger wasn't addressed.
- 19 And the other side says clearly it's
- 20 not raising it here.
- 21 MR. McCLOUD: It is going to raise it
- 22 on remand. And I think it was addressed --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Then you want
- 24 an -- and you want an intense -- an anticipatory
- 25 ruling from us.

1	MR. McCLOUD: No, Your Honor. I think
2	it was addressed, and the best evidence I can
3	give you of that are the cases that the Fifth
4	Circuit itself cited for the proposition that we
5	don't look at the action of the officer.
6	All of those are cases in which the
7	argument that was being made was the argument
8	that they made below, that the officer created a
9	dangerous situation and that was the basis for
10	liability.
11	So that is the argument the Fifth
12	Circuit said it's not considering. And that's
13	what Judge Higginbotham said he wanted to
14	consider. He said
15	JUSTICE JACKSON: Mr. McCloud, did the
16	plaintiff argue that the court should be looking
17	at the totality of the circumstances?
18	MR. McCLOUD: Yes.
19	JUSTICE JACKSON: And did you object
20	to that as being the test that the court should
21	apply when it decided what it was going to look
22	at to make this determination?
23	MR. McCLOUD: No. Our objection was
24	that you should not be adopting this
25	officer-created danger theory in considering

- 1 whether Sargeant Felix escalated the situation.
- 2 That was our --
- JUSTICE JACKSON: So you did not say
- 4 the "moment of the threat" doctrine is the --
- 5 the test in the Fifth Circuit, and that's only
- 6 what you should be looking at, you should not be
- 7 looking at circumstances and facts and things
- 8 that happened before the moment of the threat?
- 9 MR. McCLOUD: In --
- 10 JUSTICE JACKSON: If I look at the
- 11 record, I'll find that you're arguing that
- 12 below?
- MR. McCLOUD: So, in the Fifth Circuit
- 14 briefing, I don't believe we did because the
- 15 labeled "moment of the threat" doctrine didn't
- 16 come up until Judge Higginbotham's opinion in
- 17 this case. That was not a label that had been
- 18 recognized prior to that.
- 19 If you look in Westlaw for "moment of
- 20 the threat doctrine," I think there are four
- 21 hits for that, and this is the -- the one that
- 22 really originated that term.
- So that was not our argument below.
- 24 Our argument below was whether Sergeant Felix
- 25 escalated the danger was irrelevant. And that's

- 1 consistent with Fifth Circuit precedent. That's
- what Judge Higginbotham objected to.
- JUSTICE JACKSON: All right. But do
- 4 you concede that that's not what the Fifth
- 5 Circuit held in this case, that it was
- 6 irrelevant whether or not he accelerated the
- 7 danger or he contributed to it? That's not
- 8 their holding in this case --
- 9 MR. McCLOUD: That is -- I believe
- 10 that is their holding. And that is what Judge
- 11 Higginbotham objected to.
- 12 So, if you look at page 15a of the
- 13 Petition Appendix, Judge Higginbotham says: I
- would come out differently because I believe we
- 15 should consider the fact that Sergeant Felix
- 16 escalated the danger of the situation.
- 17 That was the argument that they made,
- 18 that he wanted them to consider, and that is the
- 19 whole basis for the disagreement between us and
- 20 the court of appeals and the disagreement that
- 21 actually divides the circuit courts on this
- 22 question.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Counsel, can I
- read you three sentences from this opinion?
- MR. McCLOUD: Certainly.

1	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: This is the
2	majority: We may only ask whether Officer Felix
3	was in danger at the moment of the threat that
4	caused him to use deadly force against Barnes.
5	It said its inquiry was "confined to
6	whether the officers or other persons who were
7	in danger at the moment of the threat resulted
8	in a" "in a officer's use of deadly force."
9	And it stated: Any of the officer's
LO	actions leading up to the shooting are not
L1	relevant for the purposes of an excessive force
L2	inquiry in this circuit. So Higginbotham did
L3	not make up the "moment of the threat" doctrine.
L4	It's been used, it's been cited repeatedly by
L5	other circuits. It's well-known by that name.
L6	This is not a made-up theory.
L7	MR. McCLOUD: Well, Your Honor
L8	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Now let me
L9	finish. If you concede in page 34 that if
20	the that if the officer was the aggressor,
21	then there are circumstances you don't think
22	this is one of them but there are
23	circumstances in which the officer's actions are
24	relevant, correct?
25	MR. McCLOUD: We agree that the

- officer's actions are relevant. And the Fifth
- 2 Circuit considers officer actions. Cole versus
- 3 Carson is an en banc decision --
- 4 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: You just said the
- officer's actions leading up to the shooting are
- 6 not relevant. That -- I -- I can't -- I don't
- 7 see how I can read that any other way.
- 8 MR. McCLOUD: So, Your Honor, I think
- 9 you have to read the --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Again, they didn't
- 11 say they're not relevant in this case. They
- 12 said they're never relevant.
- MR. McCLOUD: And, Your Honor, I think
- 14 you have to read the opinion that's being cited
- 15 there. That's Harris versus Serpas. And that
- is a case that says we apply totality of the
- 17 circumstances. And then, when it makes the
- 18 statement that we don't consider the officer's
- 19 actions, it's referring to --
- 20 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Totality of the
- 21 circumstances were not used by this court,
- 22 correct, in this opinion?
- 23 MR. McCLOUD: It was. They considered
- 24 the totality of the circumstances. What they
- did not consider was Petitioner's argument that

- 1 Sergeant Felix created the danger.
- 2 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Can you point me
- 3 to a place in the opinion where it used the
- 4 words "totality of the circumstances?"
- 5 MR. McCLOUD: I -- I cannot, but that
- 6 was the argument that was made below.
- 7 JUSTICE JACKSON: Can you explain
- 8 Judge Higginbotham's concurrence sentence, "I
- 9 write separately to express my concern with this
- 10 Circuit's 'moment of the threat' doctrine as it
- 11 counters the Supreme Court's instruction to look
- 12 to the totality of the circumstances when
- assessing the reasonableness of an officer's use
- of deadly force?"
- MR. McCLOUD: Yes. He is wrong about
- that, and the best evidence I can give you of
- 17 that is Cole versus Carson.
- 18 JUSTICE JACKSON: I'm asking you, did
- 19 he believe that there was such a thing as the
- 20 "moment of threat" doctrine and that it was in
- 21 opposition to the "totality of the
- 22 circumstances" test, which is what he was hoping
- that the court would be able to apply?
- MR. McCLOUD: I don't know how he
- could reasonably believe that given that he

- 1 wrote Cole versus Carson, which is an en banc
- 2 decision of the Fifth Circuit that is all about
- 3 pre-shooting facts. In that case, the entire --
- 4 JUSTICE KAGAN: But, I mean, he did
- 5 believe it, and that belief produced the
- 6 decision below.
- 7 MR. McCLOUD: Well, I don't think that
- 8 you should attribute his statements in a solo
- 9 concurrence that others didn't join to the other
- 10 members of the panel. I -- I think you should
- 11 read the cases that they cited.
- 12 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, he wrote both
- and he was telling you exactly why he wrote the
- 14 majority opinion the way he did, because he felt
- 15 constrained to. And I understand that you think
- 16 he was not so constrained, but we're supposed to
- 17 be reviewing this decision, and he was telling
- 18 us: I, the majority opinion writer, felt that I
- was constrained to do nothing more than look at
- 20 the prior two seconds.
- 21 And you don't say that that's the
- 22 right rule, so it seems as though we should kick
- 23 it back and let you guys fight it out as to the
- 24 relevance of anything that happened beyond the
- 25 prior two seconds.

1 MR. McCLOUD: So I guess I would 2 encourage the Court, if it does end up 3 remanding, to say a little more than simply do it again, Fifth Circuit. I think it is 4 important to say something about this issue of 5 officer-created danger because it has divided 6 7 the circuits for a number of years. And the Court has gotten a number of 8 cases that present that issue. Mendez is one. 9 The Bond versus City of Talequah case from a few 10 11 term ago that was summarily reversed was 12 another. And so it is lurking in the background of many of these excessive force cases, and it 13 14 is doing real harm in the circuits that apply 15 that, the -- the Ninth Circuit, the Tenth 16 Circuit. That is the reason we have amici from California that say this standard makes it 17 18 impossible for us to train officers and give 19 them clear quidance. So I think it's incumbent on the Court 20 to offer a little more clarity on that in an 21 2.2 opinion even if it does remand. 23 JUSTICE BARRETT: And you want to -just to make sure I have it, what -- what 24 25 clarity would you want us to give?

MR. McCLOUD: So, if the Court is 1 2 going to offer or accept some version of 3 officer-created danger perhaps along the lines that Your Honor's Biegert opinion suggested, I 4 think you would want to make clear that 5 6 something like negligence alone is not going to 7 be enough. It's going to be an extraordinary case in which an officer's creation of the 8 danger is the basis for a Fourth Amendment 9 10 claim. 11 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, 12 counsel. 13 Justice Thomas? 14 JUSTICE THOMAS: As I understand you, you're saying that it isn't so much that the --15 16 a difference between whether to use the totality 17 of the circumstances but, rather, what evidence 18 would be available or could be used in that 19 analysis. And, here, you say the 20 officer-created danger should -- that the Fifth 21 Circuit said it could not -- it would not permit 2.2 that assessment --23 MR. McCLOUD: That's correct. JUSTICE THOMAS: -- within the context 24 25 of totality of circumstances?

1	MR. McCLOUD: Exactly.
2	JUSTICE THOMAS: So it's a subcategory
3	of the totality of circumstance as I hear you.
4	MR. McCLOUD: It is a particular
5	argument that is off limits in the Fifth Circuit
6	and in the majority of the circuits when you're
7	considering the totality of the circumstances.
8	So you can still look to things that the officer
9	did prior to using force, but you cannot blame
10	the officer for creating a bad situation and
11	and second-guess all of the decisions he made.
12	JUSTICE THOMAS: Thank you.
13	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice Alito?
14	Justice Sotomayor?
15	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I go back, you do
16	believe there are situations you admitted it
17	to me earlier where an officer's actions can
18	be considered to have created a danger
19	unreasonably?
20	MR. McCLOUD: I don't agree with that
21	framing. I agree that you can consider an
22	officer's actions, and I agree that an officer's
23	actions can make the use of force less
24	reasonable.
25	Again the Cole werging Cargon example

1 is -- is one that's instructive on that. 2 is a case where the majority of the Fifth Circuit en banc said things that the officers 3 did prior to using force made it unreasonable 4 for them to use force at a later point. 5 6 But what they did not do is say, well, 7 did they violate policies or could I have made a better decision? And that is the fundamental 8 difference between my approach and Petitioner's 9

10

21

2.2

23

24

25

approach.

11 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice Kagan? 12 JUSTICE KAGAN: So the question presented that we took certiorari on is whether 13 14 courts should apply the "moment of the threat" 15 doctrine when evaluating an excessive force 16 claim. So, to me, what that means is "moment of the threat" doctrine, do you just look at the 17 18 second or two before, or do you widen the --19 your scope to look at other things beyond that. What we did not take cert on is the 20

question that you're raising, a very important question, probably one on which there is some confusion, wouldn't be a surprise to me, but definitely not the question in this case, the question of what weight to give the fact that or

- 1 the possibility that the officer created the
- 2 danger in the reasonableness inquiry.
- 3 That's a completely different
- 4 question, which we didn't take cert on, which,
- 5 you know, it does not seem to me we're
- 6 well-positioned in this case to discuss.
- 7 MR. McCLOUD: So, if I can just
- 8 respectfully push back on that, I think, in
- 9 order to answer the question presented as
- 10 Petitioner framed it, you have to understand
- 11 what the "moment of threat" doctrine is.
- 12 And for all of the reasons we explain
- in our brief, it is absolutely not a doctrine
- 14 that says prior events are off limits. There is
- 15 no court in the country that is applying that
- 16 version of the standard.
- 17 The dispute between the courts and --
- and what divides us in this case is whether,
- 19 when looking at those prior events, you can
- 20 identify something the officers did that was
- 21 unreasonable in a sort of general cosmic sense
- 22 and say that contributed to the danger. And
- even though that is not itself a violation of
- 24 the Fourth Amendment, it is the basis for your
- 25 Fourth Amendment excessive force claim.

1	That's that's the nub of the issue.
2	JUSTICE KAGAN: Thank you.
3	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
4	Gorsuch?
5	Justice Kavanaugh?
6	Justice Barrett?
7	Justice Jackson?
8	Thank you, counsel.
9	MR. McCLOUD: Thank you.
LO	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Ms. Pettit.
L1	ORAL ARGUMENT OF LANORA PETTIT
L2	FOR TEXAS, ET AL., AS AMICUS CURIAE,
L3	SUPPORTING RESPONDENT FELIX
L4	MS. PETTIT: Thank you, Mr. Chief
L5	Justice, and may it please the Court:
L6	In the last 15 years, this Court has
L7	rejected at least three times that an officer's
L8	otherwise liable conduct violates the Fourth
L9	Amendment because an earlier split-second
20	decision made a confrontation more likely.
21	Properly understood, what Judge
22	Higginbotham dubbed the "moment of threat"
23	doctrine merely applies that rule. As this
24	Court recognized in cases like Mendez and
25	Sheehan, it is necessary because the Fourth

- 1 Amendment must be applied by thousands of real
- 2 cops in the real world without, in the words of
- 3 Kentucky against King, an unacceptable degree of
- 4 unpredictability.
- 5 The moment -- the officer-created risk
- 6 theory which Petitioners have continuously
- 7 pressed at least until the reply brief in this
- 8 Court is antithetical to that proposition
- 9 because it invites an open-ended subjective
- inquiry into the officer's intent that cannot be
- 11 conducted without the benefit of hindsight. It
- 12 also, as Mendez recognized, involves tricky
- 13 questions and fuzzy standards of causation that
- 14 cannot be easily be applied.
- Because the Fifth Circuit has properly
- 16 rejected that proposition, its judgment should
- 17 be affirmed.
- 18 And I welcome the Court's questions.
- 19 JUSTICE THOMAS: Would you articulate
- for us what you think the district court and the
- 21 court of appeals held?
- MS. PETTIT: I think that the district
- 23 court held -- and I would point Your Honor to
- 24 Pet. App. page 17a and 24a, Footnote 2 -- under
- 25 the Fifth Circuit precedent that prior actions

- 1 that created a risk were not relevant under the
- 2 Fifth Circuit's test because that is the
- 3 argument that Petitioner was pursuing at that
- 4 time.
- 5 And to Justice Sotomayor's questions
- 6 earlier, the statements that she is referring to
- 7 have to be read in light of those arguments
- 8 because that is what the Fifth Circuit was
- 9 rejecting when it said the prior actions were
- 10 irrelevant.
- JUSTICE JACKSON: I'm sorry, you're
- 12 saying the statements that the Fifth Circuit
- made in its opinion regarding what its holding
- was have to be read in light of the arguments
- 15 that were before it?
- 16 MS. PETTIT: I believe that's what
- 17 they're referring to when they say these actions
- 18 that you're talking to are irrelevant.
- 19 JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, what is --
- 20 what is Judge Higginbotham saying when he says
- 21 in his concurrence: I write separately to
- 22 express my concern with the circuit's "moment of
- 23 the threat doctrine. And then he doesn't
- 24 define it in the way that you have. He says:
- 25 This doctrine counters the Supreme Court's

- 1 instructions to look at the totality of the
- 2 circumstances.
- 3 MS. PETTIT: Your Honor, I would point
- 4 your -- to -- you to page 15a of his opinion,
- 5 where he also says that: In our reasonableness
- 6 analysis, references to our supposed obligation
- 7 to consider the totality of circumstances are
- 8 merely performative.
- 9 So the dispute here appears to be not
- 10 the formulation of the rule as I articulated it
- 11 but its application.
- 12 JUSTICE JACKSON: No, he says it's
- 13 performative -- you didn't read the first part
- 14 of the sentence -- if the moment of the threat
- is the sole determinative factor in our
- 16 reasonableness analysis.
- 17 So he says: We have a "moment of the
- 18 threat" doctrine that tells us we only look at
- 19 this moment. And what that does is it makes any
- 20 references to totality merely performative
- 21 because we're not looking at the totality, we're
- 22 just looking at the moment of the threat.
- So do you dispute that at least he
- 24 conceptualized the doc -- the doctrine in the
- 25 way that I'm describing and the way that

1 Petitioners have put it forward? 2 MS. PETTIT: There are certainly 3 statements to that effect. He has, for -however, created a very similar concurrence in a 4 case called Mason against Lafayette City from 5 2015 --6 7 JUSTICE JACKSON: No, I'm talking about this case. So let me -- let me -- let me 8 9 tell you what I think is happening, and I just 10 want to get your reaction and then I'll be done. 11 It seems as though the question presented here is asking us to decide which test 12 13 the courts should apply, and it sees the "moment 14 of the threat doctrine as different, distinct, 15 from the totality of the circumstances. 16 Which test? The Fifth Circuit applied 17 moment of the threat. Is that right or wrong? 18 It seems now that you are arguing 19 which circumstances, assuming totality, is it 20 okay to include or consider the circumstance of 21 the officer's own conduct. You know, if courts 2.2 are doing that, is that a problem? 23 That is a separate question that is 24 not, I think, properly within the scope of the

question presented, which just asks us which

- 1 test.
- 2 So can you help me to understand why
- 3 we would get into whether or not the particular
- 4 circumstance you've identified is one that
- 5 courts should be looking at or not?
- 6 MS. PETTIT: Because I agree with
- 7 my -- my colleague that it is difficult to
- 8 answer the question -- the question presented
- 9 without getting into that.
- 10 And I would point this Court to pages
- 11 15, 23, 28, 32, and 41 to 42 of the Petitioner's
- 12 opening brief in which they are discussing
- 13 precisely this type of question.
- So, while they claim to disclaim it,
- they actually are talking about creation of the
- 16 risk. In fact, in responding to guestions from
- 17 Justice Alito and Justice Thomas to articulate
- 18 their test, I heard them say at least twice that
- 19 they're asking why was he jumping up on the car.
- 20 I also heard from the United States
- 21 multiple times manufacturing the risk.
- That is conflating the two questions
- 23 because they are quite related. In fact, they
- 24 are -- that is the source of the dispute between
- 25 the -- amongst the circuit courts. The Ninth

- 1 and the Tenth Circuit say: Intentional and
- 2 deliberate conduct can -- creating the risk can
- 3 obviate the officer's ability to defend himself.
- 4 The Fifth Circuit says that's not the rule.
- 5 That's the nature of the dispute. And
- 6 so trying to take it out of that context and say
- 7 just are you considering two seconds or are you
- 8 considering 30 gets into the point where there's
- 9 not a circuit split, as my colleague mentioned.
- 10 They -- the Fifth Circuit is looking at those
- 11 issues.
- In fact, I would point this Court to
- 13 Singleton against Casanova, in which Judge
- 14 Higginbotham joined an opinion six months after
- 15 this one and which -- like Cole v. Carson, which
- 16 he wrote three years earlier. The Fifth Circuit
- 17 was describing all pre-force conduct.
- 18 So the Fifth Circuit is not applying
- 19 the "moment of the threat" doctrine,
- 20 notwithstanding some of the comments in Judge
- 21 Higginbotham's opinion.
- 22 And this Court ultimately reviews
- judgments, not -- not statements and opinions.
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Counsel, I -- I
- 25 appreciate that -- that what happened below may

- 1 be different than what's happening here. At
- 2 least that's your view.
- 3 But we did take a question presented
- 4 about the "moment of threat" doctrine. I
- 5 understand you think it's not a thing. But
- 6 what's wrong with resolving just the question
- 7 presented? And putting aside your -- your
- 8 record-based concerns, it is a question. We
- 9 granted cert on it. I think everybody agrees
- 10 it's wrong.
- 11 Why -- what's the harm of saying that?
- MS. PETTIT: As long as Your Honor is
- 13 very clear that you are not endorsing the
- creation of the risk theory adopted by the Ninth
- and Tenth Circuit, then I don't think there's
- 16 anything necessarily wrong.
- 17 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Okay.
- MS. PETTIT: I agree with my colleague
- 19 that it is unnecessary, and the reason I say
- that is I point the Court to page 5a of the Pet.
- 21 App, which the district court -- the -- sorry,
- 22 the Fifth Circuit quoted at length a district
- 23 court opinion that looked at those earlier
- 24 circumstances.
- So I don't think it's necessary. As

1 long as the Court is clear that we are not 2 adopting the creation-of-the-risk theory, we 3 have no quarrel with such an action. JUSTICE GORSUCH: Thank you. 4 MS. PETTIT: Going to the nature of 5 6 the questions here for just a minute, I would 7 point out that the inquiry here is -- I heard a lot of concerns about line-drawing, and I find 8 that interesting because the Petitioner's 9 10 argument here was that they just wanted to 11 consider the jump as well as the shoot. 12 That itself is a line-drawing question, and it -- and it's very deliberate 13 14 because they have actually litigated whether 15 everything up until the jump was reasonable, and 16 the district court concluded that it was, 17 because, again, courts below are not considering 18 just the two seconds. Instead, they are 19 considering the totality of the circumstances. 20 And to the question from the United 21 States about the subjective nature of the test, 2.2 this goes, again, to the arguments that had been

raised up until the -- the reply brief, which

brief, in which the Petitioner was endorsing the

was after our argument, in which -- or our

23

24

_	view of the Nillth and Tenth Circuit, which this
2	Court in Mendez expressly acknowledged was
3	subjective and therefore inconsistent with the
4	Fourth Amendment, which, again, is why we think
5	this Court, if it is going to remand, which,
6	again, is unnecessary, makes very clear that it
7	is not adopting that view because it would be a
8	fundamental shift in the Fourth Amendment.
9	And it also is a shift that, going to
LO	Justice Kavanaugh's questions earlier, would
L1	create an impossibility for for law
L2	enforcement agencies to train their officers for
L3	the reasons described in the California
L4	Sheriffs' Association's brief.
L5	If there are no further questions,
L6	we I request that you affirm.
L7	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
L8	counsel.
L9	Justice Thomas?
20	Justice Sotomayor?
21	Justice Kagan?
22	Justice Gorsuch?
23	Justice Kavanaugh?
24	Justice Barrett?
2.5	Justice Jackson?

1	Okay. Thank you, counsel.
2	Rebuttal, Mr. Zelinsky.
3	REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF NATHANIEL A.G.
4	ZELINSKY ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
5	MR. ZELINSKY: I have five very brief
6	points.
7	First, Justice Jackson, you asked my
8	friend on the other side when they argued for
9	the test that was applied below. Listen to
LO	minutes 28 and 29 of oral argument. Then you'll
L1	hear that there.
L2	Justice Sotomayor, you noted that my
L3	friends on the other side agree in many cases
L4	that the jump-in-front-of-car case, you need to
L5	look at the whole picture of what the officer
L6	did, the jump and the shoot. It is there is
L7	no rule that they can't distinguish that case
L8	from this case.
L9	Third, Justice Kavanaugh, you had some
20	practical questions about how this is going to
21	impact effective policing. Officers receive
22	qualified immunity. As the Cato brief
23	discusses, 99-plus percent of the time they are
24	also indemnified by the municipality.
2.5	You have a brief of 22 former

- 1 high-ranking police chiefs who are in front of
- 2 you saying that you should rule for Petitioner
- 3 and it will not hamper but promote good
- 4 policing.
- 5 And then, third, the DHS rule is a
- 6 great example of why this is not going to harm
- 7 effective policing.
- 8 Fourth, Justice Alito, I want to be
- 9 very clear, we are not saying that every single
- 10 mistake is going to result in liability. What
- 11 we are saying is you have to look at the whole
- 12 picture, and, here, that's more than just two
- 13 seconds.
- 14 Finally, Justice Gorsuch, we agree
- wholeheartedly this rule is inconsistent with
- 16 the common law. If you rule and adopt the
- 17 "moment of the threat" doctrine, you will
- 18 essentially enact a hereto unprecedented rule
- 19 permitting the killing of fleeing misdemeanants.
- 20 You should not do that. You should vacate and
- 21 remand.
- Thank you.
- 23 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
- 24 counsel.
- The case is submitted.

1			(Whereupon,	at	11:21	a.m.,	the	case	in
2	was	submit	tted.)						
3									
4									
5									
6									
7									
8									
9									
LO									
L1									
L2									
L3									
L4									
L5									
L6									
L7									
L8									
L9									
20									
21									
22									
23									
24									
2.5									

	Offic acknowledged [1] 89:2
1	across [3] 37:15 42:25 50:
1 [1] 57:6	21
10:04 [2] 1: 17 4: 2 11:21 [1] 92: 1	act
15 [2] 80 :16 85 :11	acted [4] 5:21 34:8 41:14
15a [3] 56:2 70:12 83:4	42:4
17a [1] 81:24	acting [2] 34:6 35:25
2	action 6 10:9 60:6 67:10,
	actions [16] 5:4 21:1 27:12
2 [1] 81:24	66 :13 71 :10,23 72 :1,2,5,19
2015 [1] 84: 6 2025 [1] 1: 13	77 :17,22,23 81 :25 82 :9,17
2025 [1] 1. 13 22 [2] 1 : 13 90 : 25	actual [2] 35:7 56:5
23 [1] 85: 11	actually [12] 25:19 35:11
23-1239 [1] 4 :4	42 :7 46 :11 53 :5 57 :10 58 :
24a [1] 81: 24	22 63 :4 65 :18 70 :21 85 :15
28 [3] 3: 8 85: 11 90: 10	88:14
29 [1] 90 :10	add [1] 13:24 addition [1] 11:24
3	additional [1] 61:25
3 [1] 49: 5	address [4] 14:13 34:25
30 [1] 86: 8	59 :7 65 :18
32 [1] 85: 11	addressed [6] 14:19 66:7
33 [2] 31: 4 58: 8	67 :17,18,22 68 :2
34 [3] 31 :4 65 :23 71 :19	admit [2] 41:22 65:24
4	admitted [1] 77:16
4 [2] 3 :4 13 :12	adopt [1] 91:16 adopted [2] 57:11 87:14
400 [1] 22: 23	adopting [3] 68:24 88:2 89:
41 [3] 32: 3 43: 6 85: 11	7
42 [1] 85:11	advance [1] 55:24
5	affect [1] 46:10
52 [1] 3:11	affirm [3] 54:12 60:6 89:16
5a [1] 87: 20	affirmed [1] 81:17
6	afraid [1] 62:10 agencies [1] 89:12
641 [1] 35 :14	aggressive-enough [1]
	48:21
8	aggressively [1] 46:22
8 [1] 13 :12	aggressor [3] 65:23,25 71:
80 [1] 3:15	20
9	ago [1] 75:11
90 [1] 3:18	agree [24] 12:21 17:4,17 19: 11 21:22 22:8,14 26:1 27:
99-plus [1] 90:23	21 30 :14 31 :1,22 49 :8 56 :
	1 62 :12 67 :3 71 :25 77 :20,
A.G [5] 2:2 3:3,17 4:7 90:3	21,22 85 :6 87 :18 90 :13 91 :
a.m [3] 1:17 4:2 92:1	14
abducted । । 18:11,13 44:	agreed [1] 21:4
4	agrees [4] 31:2,5 49:15 87:
ability [1] 86:3	9
able [12] 7:18,18 11:25 15:	ahead [1] 26:21 AL [4] 1:8 2:11 3:14 80:12
8,13 18 :19 20 :2 21 :17 46 :	align [1] 20:20
22 48: 21,22 73: 23 above-entitled [1] 1: 15	aligns [1] 30:11
above-entitled (111:15)	ALITO [22] 8:23 9:6,22,25
Absolutely [6] 5:16 18:6	10 :18 11 :8,19 12 :1 13 :21
29 :16 51 :14 52 :1 79 :13	14 :3 24 :11,20 39 :21 40 :5,
accelerated [2] 66:19 70:6	6 41 :8,20 42 :17 43 :18 77 :
acceleration [2] 49:15,21	13 85 :17 91 :8
accept [1] 76:2	Alito's [2] 16:4 64:25
According [2] 5:1 42:4	alleged (3) 11:12 56:19 57: 25
2000 unt [5] 44:44 25:44	I ZU

allegedly [1] 40:17

allow [1] 30:2 alluded [2] 61:9 65:1 almost [3] 37:7,11 46:16 alone [3] 23:8 62:2 76:6 already [2] 16:19 32:2 alternative [1] 8:19 Amendment [33] 4:15,17 8:24 9:5.17 10:4.7 16:5 17: 14 **23**:6 **34**:3 **37**:12.20 **38**: 2 40:16 43:12 45:13 50:21 **72:**1.2.5.19 **51**:25 **55**:10 **56**:19 **62**:7 **63**: 7 **64**:24 **65**:1.15 **76**:9 **79**: 24,25 80:19 81:1 89:4,8 amici [3] 2:11 3:14 75:16 amicus [6] 2:6 3:7 28:7 35: 2 48:6 80:12 amnesia [2] 5:6 7:11 amongst [1] 85:25 analogy [1] 9:14 analysis [7] 22:1 35:20 50: 25 **51:**25 **76:**19 **83:**6,16 analyzed [1] 28:11 and/or [1] 66:19 Anderson [1] 35:12 announce [1] 26:11 another [1] 75:12 answer [6] 14:2 17:3 24:21 **66:**15 **79:**9 **85:**8 24 88:2 89: answers [2] 16:17 26:24 anticipatory [1] 67:24 antithetical [1] 81:8 anybody [1] 40:7 anyway [2] 18:3 45:23 App [2] 81:24 87:21 apparent [1] 29:5 appeals [4] 54:13 62:18 70: assessment [3] 28:18 29: 20 81:21 appear [1] 25:12 APPEARANCES [1] 2:1 appears [2] 5:16 83:9 Appendix [2] 56:2 70:13 application [3] 50:14 51: 11 83:11 applied [8] 4:25 6:5 7:11 10:20 81:1,14 84:16 90:9 applies [4] 15:5 17:19 50: 8 **90**:13 **91**: 21 80:23 apply [14] 5:14.25 6:25 14: 6 **17**:9 **20**:15 **23**:9 **25**:12 **68**:21 **72**:16 **73**:23 **75**:14 78:14 84:13 applying [6] 51:5,9 53:10 62:18 79:15 86:18 appreciate [1] 86:25 apprehended [1] 18:25 approach [17] 6:3 13:21 28:15 29:7 30:1,16 46:5 47:25 48:10.24 50:20 51:6 **54**:17,18 **57**:20 **78**:9,10 approached [1] 23:16 appropriate [4] 42:13 44: 19.22.23 appropriately [1] 46:24 area [2] 30:8 45:5

argue [4] 5:12 18:20 55:21 **68**·16 argued [2] 56:14 90:8 argues [1] 35:2 arguing [3] 55:13 69:11 84: argument [35] 1:16 3:2,5,9, 12.16 4:4.7 28:6 35:11 52: 11 **53:**2 **55:**16.24 **56:**3.11 **57**:6 **60**:16 **61**:7 **67**:9 **68**:7. 7.11 69:23.24 70:17 72:25 73:6 77:5 80:11 82:3 88: 10.24 90:3.10 arguments [4] 55:6 82:7, 14 88:22 armed [1] 33:6 around [1] 41:2 article [1] 22:25 articulate [3] 15:3 81:19 85:17 articulated [3] 6:9 30:11 83:10 articulation [1] 66:5 ASHTIAN [7] 1:5 4:11 8:5. 9 19:19 20:1.9 Ashtian's [1] 4:15 aside [3] 44:4 61:16 87:7 asks [2] 54:1 84:25 aspect [1] 22:13 asserted [1] 59:17 asserting [1] 59:19 assertion [1] 35:19 assess [1] 54:15 assessed [2] 28:16 35:7 assessing [1] 73:13 21 76:22 Assistant [1] 2:4 Association's [1] 89:14 assume [4] 19:3 33:18 36: 34 assuming [1] 84:19 attack [1] 24:1 attacks [1] 53:2 attempted [1] 28:21 attention [1] 33:1 attribute [1] 74:8 Austin [1] 2:11 automatically [3] 8:6 38: 17 46:17 available [2] 7:25 76:18 avoid [4] 38:12 43:14 47:3, avoided [1] 19:15 avoids [1] 36:10 aware [2] 19:23 51:4 away [14] 7:22 8:16 18:5 19:4 20:9 31:13 32:21 33: 9,9,15 42:24 44:6,24 66:25 В back [14] 8:11 18:11 20:13 44:2 50:3 51:24 55:22 59: 3,6 60:12,14 74:23 77:15

background [1] 75:12 backstop [2] 29:8 50:24 bad [8] 34:20 35:25 38:15, 16 **46**:20 **53**:24 **65**:12 **77**: balance [1] 10:22 balancing [4] 11:4 17:14 24.8 38.1 banc [3] 72:3 74:1 78:3 bar [1] 27:15 BARNES [10] 1:3.5 4:5.12 8:5.10 19:19 20:1 33:15 71:4 barrel [1] 53:22 BARRETT [20] 14:24 15: 17,23 16:2,14,22 28:2 30:5 **33**:19 **37**:3 **39**:8 **46**:1,2 **47**: 16 **48**:3 **49**:3 **61**:9 **75**:23 80:6 89:24 Barrett's [1] 50:7 based [4] 9:10 11:13 35:7 67:11 Basically [1] 32:4 basis [6] 56:10 65:14 68:9 70:19 76:9 79:24 became [1] 17:20 become [2] 24:15,17 becomes [3] 32:7 43:4 47: begin [1] 43:10 behalf [8] 2:3,9 3:4,11,18 4: 8 52:12 90:4 behaving [1] 33:7 behavior [4] 29:4 37:6 42: 13 46:10 behind [1] 59:7 belief [1] 74:5 believe [9] 61:18 69:14 70: 9,14 73:19,25 74:5 77:16 82:16 believed [2] 52:24 63:15 believes [1] 63:21 below [28] 5:1,17 9:7 14:19 **20**:25 **21**:4 **27**:5 **47**:12 **52**: 21 53:4.16 57:6 58:13.14. 22 59:6 65:17 66:7 67:10 **68**:8 **69**:12 23 24 **73**:6 **74**: 6 86:25 88:17 90:9 benefit [2] 25:23 81:11 besides [1] 61:2 best [8] 10:10 25:24 40:24 **57**:16 **59**:15 **67**:5 **68**:2 **73**: 16 better [2] 60:6 78:8 between [13] 22:3 30:24 **37:**14 **49:**13 **54:**16,21 **55:**3 **58**:4 **70**:19 **76**:16 **78**:9 **79**: 17 85:24 beyond [5] 58:24 59:3,7 74: 24 78:19 Biegert [6] 15:20 17:6 22: 16 37:4 39:9 76:4 big [1] 33:10

account [5] 11:14 25:14

34:17 40:8 46:24

bike [1] 44:12 bio [2] 57:19 58:8 bit [2] 15:18 46:14 black-line [2] 39:4.6 blame [1] 77:9 blindly [1] 66:20 board [2] 43:1 50:21 boil [1] 42:1 Bond [1] 75:10 bones [2] 15:18 36:19 Both [3] 54:22 58:22 74:12 bound [1] 14:9 bounds [5] 15:16 29:3 30: 20 37:5 42:12 bracketing [1] 61:17 brake [1] 20:2 breadth [1] 60:4 breed [2] 53:21 56:25 brief [25] 14:12 21:23 22:22 29:17 30:14 31:4 32:4 35: 3.13 36:20 43:6 48:11 49: 5 **57**:7 **65**:21.24 **79**:13 **81**: 7 85:12 88:23,25 89:14 90: 5.22.25 briefing [1] 69:14 briefly [2] 34:9,25 briefs [1] 48:6 bright-line [1] 6:21 broad [1] 64:10 Brosseau [3] 44:25 45:2.5 brought [2] 9:7,9

calculus [1] 25:21 California [2] 75:17 89:13 call [2] 15:1 65:12 called [1] 84:5 came [1] 1:15 camera [1] 8:4 camera-controlled [1] 8: cameras [1] 8:6 cannot [5] 20:25 73:5 77:9 81:10,14 car [42] 7:6 8:7,12,22 9:2, 11 **11**:6 **12**:15,17 **15**:9,12 16:9 18:4,5,12 19:14 20:2, 4 21:15,20 22:21 23:20 24: 3,4,19 **31:**18 **32:**22,23 **33:** 14 **42**:12.22 **44**:24 **45**:10 47:7 49:13.16 52:24 55:19 **57:**9 **66:**16.18 **85:**19 car's [1] 8:13 careened [1] 20:4 cars [5] 8:4 22:25 43:1 44: 16,18 Carson [5] 72:3 73:17 74:1 77:25 86:15 Casanova [1] 86:13 Case [65] 4:4,23 6:10 7:9, 16 **11:**2 **13:**6 **14:**4,9 **15:**7, 15 17:23 18:18 19:11.17 20:1,18 21:16,19 24:2,6,10,

24 25:19,24 27:4,17 28:11

32:15,25 33:12 35:13 36:9, 22 39:1 41:21 44:1 45:6 **51**:7,19 **52**:6 **53**:1 **54**:12 **60**:24 **67**:7,8 **69**:17 **70**:5,8 **72**:11,16 **74**:3 **75**:10 **76**:8 **78:**2,24 **79:**6,18 **84:**5,8 **90:** 14,17,18 91:25 92:1 case-sensitive [1] 32:16 cases [23] 17:1 22:7 23:8. 10 25:2.11 26:25 29:1.8 37:2.21 46:9 48:15 55:10 66:10 67:15 68:3.6 74:11 **75**:9.13 **80**:24 **90**:13 Cass [1] 23:10 catch [1] 31:17 categorical [1] 27:15 categorically [1] 28:13 Cato [1] 90:22 causation [1] 81:13 cause [4] 5:15 7:1 17:5.7 caused [1] 71:4 cautions [2] 48:25.25 cautiously [1] 43:17 cert [3] 78:20 79:4 87:9 Certainly [4] 39:5,18 70:25 84:2 certiorari [1] 78:13 cetera [1] 12:9 chance [1] 35:3 CHARLES [3] 2:8 3:10 52: CHIEF [28] 4:3,9 25:6 27: 25 28:9 30:4,6,7 33:20 34: 2.10 40:2 43:19.22 45:25 **50**:4 **52**:8.13 **64**:10.17 **76**: 11 77:13 78:11 80:3.10.14 89:17 91:23 chiefs [1] 91:1 child [3] 18:11,13 44:4 Circuit [75] 4:24 5:1 11:3 13:7,23 15:20 17:6,9,18 **18**:2,20 **19**:10 **20**:15,20 **23**: 8 **24**:9 **25**:12,18 **26**:25 **27**: 6,14,23 28:11 33:16 36:16 **41**:19 **46**:9 **47**:18 **48**:8 **50**: 3 **51**:24 **52**:20 **53**:13 **54**:22 **55:**25 **56:**4 **57:**7.11 **58:**8. 19.22 59:19 65:18 67:4 68: 4.12 **69**:5.13 **70**:1.5.21 **71**: 12 72:2 74:2 75:4,15,16 76:21 77:5 78:3 81:15.25 82:8,12 84:16 85:25 86:1, 4,9,10,16,18 87:15,22 89:1 Circuit's [8] 30:1,16 52:4 **54**:16 **57**:19 **73**:10 **82**:2,22 circuits [15] 46:4 47:21,24 **48**:4 **50**:8,13 **51**:5,8 **53**:13 56:6 57:10 71:15 75:7.14 77:6 circums [1] 36:14 circumstance [8] 13:6 23: 17 **26**:15 **38**:15 **63**:19 **77**:3

84:20 85:4

circumstances [61] 6:8 7:

15 **12**:6,9 **14**:7 **15**:4 **18**:15 **19**:12 **21**:19,24 **25**:15 **28**: 16 29:13,25 31:1,5 36:14, 16,20 37:13,17,23 38:7 39: 24 40:8,11,14 41:11,16 43: 16 46:25 48:24 50:20 51:6 **54**:3,7,18,25 **55**:5 **63**:11,14 **64**:11 **68**:17 **69**:7 **71**:21,23 72:17,21,24 73:4,12,22 76: 17.25 77:7 83:2.7 84:15.19 87:24 88:19 cited [7] 22:22 25:11 53:17 **68**:4 **71**:14 **72**:14 **74**:11 cites [1] 35:13 citizens [1] 37:15 City [2] 75:10 84:5 claim [12] 7:19 9:7,10,13 **37**:12 **40**:16 **56**:20 **65**:15 76:10 78:16 79:25 85:14 clarification [1] 51:22 clarify [3] 14:2 51:18 60:11 clarity [2] 75:21,25 clear [17] 4:20 11:23 20:24 **27**:9 **39**:3 **49**:20 **53**:3 **58**: 13 **61**:17 **62**:1 **65**:6 **75**:19 76:5 87:13 88:1 89:6 91:9 clearly [4] 50:24 60:7 64: 21 67:19 clinging [1] 52:23 clothes [2] 26:10 66:16 Cole [5] 72:2 73:17 74:1 77: 25 86:15 colleague [3] 85:7 86:9 87: colleagues [1] 26:1 colloguy [1] 19:9 color [1] 39:8 come [5] 6:22 26:25 65:12 69:16 70:14 comes [4] 12:22 17:7 49: 22 66:3 comments [1] 86:20 common [9] 5:8,8 23:16 **26**:8,9,15 **37**:18 **54**:1 **91**: completely [3] 31:22 62: 12 79:3 concede [3] 65:21 70:4 71: concept [2] 21:11 57:4 conception [1] 20:19 conceptualized [1] 83:24 concern [5] 47:21 50:14 61:15 73:9 82:22

3,14,17,18 **33**:22 **40**:21 **57**: 22.23.24 58:6 63:4 65:4 80:18 84:21 86:2,17 conducted [1] 81:11 confined [1] 71:5 confirms [1] 5:17 conflating [1] 85:22 conflicts [1] 5:7 confrontation [1] 80:20 confronts [2] 52:16 63:25 confused [1] 56:15 confusion [5] 49:22.23 50: 14 58:18 78:23 consequences [1] 16:20 consider [12] 12:20 33:16 56:7 68:14 70:15,18 72:18, 25 77:21 83:7 84:20 88:11 consideration [2] 55:9 62: considered [3] 30:3 72:23 77:18 considering [7] 68:12,25 **77**:7 **86**:7 8 **88**:17 19 considers [3] 56:8 58:10 consistent [1] 70:1 consistently [2] 52:19 63: constitutional [6] 5:25 16: 8 29:8 43:8 53:21 56:25 constrained [3] 74:15,16, context [5] 9:14 29:9 50:17 76:24 86:6 context-specific [1] 45:4 continuously [1] 81:6 contrary [3] 35:18 53:2,25 contributed [2] 70:7 79:22 cops [2] 47:23 81:2 core [5] 7:19 11:3,25 17:13 53:6 correct [22] 5:25 6:4 13:17, 18,23 **14**:19,20 **20**:14 **35**:9 **38**:23,24 **46**:19 **48**:2,2 **50**: 9.11 52:2 60:7 66:1 71:24 **72**:22 **76**:23 correcting [1] 52:4 correctly [4] 47:22 51:5,8 cosmic [1] 79:21 couldn't [6] 7:10 11:3.4 17: 9 19:10 24:9 counsel [11] 25:7 28:4 40: 3 **52**:9 **70**:23 **76**:12 **80**:8 **86**:24 **89**:18 **90**:1 **91**:24 counters [2] 73:11 82:25 country [5] 37:15 41:3 56: 8 62:19 79:15 couple [2] 9:21 59:12 course [11] 17:4 28:23 33: 4 35:23 38:6 40:20 41:14 48:13.19 51:16 60:6 COURT [90] 1:1,16 4:10,14, 23 **5**:11,22,23 **6**:8,20 **7**:17

10:6,19 **11**:10,11,22 **13**:15 14:8 15:14 16:18 21:18 24: 22 27:3,7,11 28:10 30:14, 19 **32**:14 **35**:10,15 **36**:13, 18 38:9,22,24 39:7,18 40:7, 19 **41**:21 **42**:10 **46**:23 **48**: 15,25 49:11,19 52:14,19 **53:**20 **54:**11,13 **56:**8 **58:**9, 13,14,22,23 60:19 63:24 **65**:5 **66**:7.12 **68**:16.20 **70**: 20 72:21 73:23 75:2.8.20 **76:1 79:15 80:15.16.24 81:** 8,20,21,23 85:10 86:12,22 **87:**20,21,23 **88:**1,16 **89:**2,5 Court's [7] 6:2 27:10 29:11 54:14 73:11 81:18 82:25 courts [23] 4:21 5:12,25 6: 25 7:10 38:13 41:17 46:8, 14 50:15 51:23 53:11 54:4 59:6 62:18 70:21 78:14 79: 17 **84**:13,21 **85**:5,25 **88**:17 cramped [1] 30:2 crashed [1] 20:5 create [3] 33:22 53:20 89: created [11] 17:19 20:19 **55**:7,18 **57**:25 **68**:8 **73**:1 77:18 79:1 82:1 84:4 creating [6] 36:7 37:22 56: 25 **61**:5 **77**:10 **86**:2 creation [3] 76:8 85:15 87: creation-of-the-risk [1] 88.2 Creighton [1] 35:12 Creightons' [1] 35:18 crime [1] 12:8 criminals [1] 18:24 critical [1] 28:17 crystal-clear [1] 27:2 curiae [6] 2:6,11 3:8,14 28: 7 80:12 curious [2] 33:3 43:25

D

D.C [4] **1**:12 **2**:2,5,8 damages [1] 16:19 danger [50] 5:3 14:14,17 15:22 19:5 20:7 28:24 29: 1.2 31:3.6 32:5 33:10.22 34:14 36:7.24 38:4.11.14 39:10.25 43:3 46:15 47:2. 13 **52**:25 **53**:16 **54**:9 **55**:6. 7 **57:**8.25 **61:**7 **67:**12.18 68:25 69:25 70:7,16 71:3, 7 **73**:1 **75**:6 **76**:3,9,20 **77**: 18 79:2,22 dangerous [9] 19:21 25:5 32:13 34:21 36:1 47:14 55: 18 **61**:5 **68**:9 dangers [1] 47:20 day [3] 7:25 9:11 20:7 daylight [3] 22:3 30:23,24 deadly [11] 8:17,25 9:1 17:

concerned [4] 48:20 60:4,

concerning [1] 17:12

concerns [2] 87:8 88:8

conclusion [2] 52:19 53:1

concurrence [8] 5:20 7:14

56:2 **59**:17 **73**:8 **74**:9 **82**:

concluded [1] 88:16

9 64:2

21 84:4

20 19:14 40:17 57:21 58:5 71:4.8 73:14 deal [2] 49:4.9 **DECEASED** [1] 1:5 decide [3] 10:6 21:19 84: 12 decided [1] 68:21 decides [2] 42:24 48:15 deciding [2] 13:22 42:5 decision [23] 5:1.17 15:19 17:5 20:25 21:2 27:5.21 31:15.19 48:16 49:25 53:4. 16 **54**:6 **59**:15 **60**:5 **72**:3 74:2,6,17 78:8 80:20 decision-making [1] 31: decisions [3] 33:2 48:14 77:11 deescalation [1] 28:21 defend [4] 26:16 53:7.23 defending [1] 53:4 defends [1] 28:14 deferential [1] 31:23 defies [1] 5:8 define [1] 82:24 defined [1] 13:21 definitely [2] 48:19 78:24 degree [1] 81:3 deliberate [2] 86:2 88:13 delineate [2] 14:8 30:20 Department [4] 2:5 10:11 19:23 40:25 departmental [1] 40:24 departments [2] 41:2 45:9 departure [1] 38:8 depend [2] 24:23 33:5 depends [1] 45:5 Deputy [1] 2:10 described [4] 12:7 22:16, 25 89:13 describing [4] 22:6 27:18 83:25 86:17 descriptive [2] 22:5,12 desire [1] 58:23 determination [3] 42:1 3 68:22 determinations [1] 42:7 determinative [1] 83:15 determine [7] 4:15 7:2 40: 11,14,20 63:14,17 determining [1] 65:6 devolve [1] 16:12 DHS [2] 43:5 91:5 die [1] 20:2 difference [5] 54:16.21 55: 2 76:16 78:9 different [10] 10:3.14.15 **15**:10.11 **21**:11 **25**:3 **79**:3 84:14 87:1 differently [2] 59:22 70:14 difficult [6] 11:20 24:21 40: 12 41:4 48:12 85:7 direct [1] 27:3

direction [1] 27:1 directs [1] 54:22 disagree [1] 30:8 disagreement [2] 70:19, disclaim [1] 85:14 discuss [1] 79:6 discusses [1] 90:23 discussing [2] 32:11 85: 12 dispositive [1] 39:11 disprovina [1] 16:25 dispute [8] 49:9,10 52:2 79: 17 83:9.23 85:24 86:5 disputes [1] 47:9 disregards [1] 29:9 distinct [1] 84:14 distinction [1] 49:13 distinguish [1] 90:17 district [9] 4:23 49:11,19 **58:**23 **81:**20,22 **87:**21,22 88:16 divided [1] 75:6 divides [4] 56:6 57:10 70: 21 79:18 dividing [1] 58:3 doc [2] 25:13 83:24 docket [1] 25:13 doctrine [35] 4:25 5:10,18 14:5 20:16,17,22 23:10 25: 13 27:19,22 28:23 51:23 **53:**5,6 **56:**16 **69:**4,15,20 71:13 73:10.20 78:15.17 **79**:11,13 **80**:23 **82**:23,25 83:18,24 84:14 86:19 87:4 91:17 doina [6] 18:23 41:12 52: 15 **65**:25 **75**:14 **84**:22 done [7] 9:2 31:11.17 37:4 **47**:10 **65**:13 **84**:10 door [2] 9:18 49:7 down [5] 18:20 42:1 44:9 49:2 65:17 draw [1] 66:6 drawing [4] 6:21 9:8 25:1, drawn [1] 66:17 drive [2] 42:24 44:9 driver [9] 8:20 11:7 19:15. 22 21:15.21 23:2 24:5 42: drivers [1] 19:24 driving [1] 31:13 drugs [1] 44:11 dubbed [1] 80:22 duty [1] 52:15

E each [2] 24:23 45:6 earlier [10] 23:20 46:17 53: 8 61:10 77:17 80:19 82:6 86:16 87:23 89:10 easily [1] 81:14 easy [1] 59:5

effect [1] 84:3 effective [2] 90:21 91:7 effectively [1] 47:6 eggshell [1] 33:24 either [3] 30:25 50:15 59: element [1] 35:5 eliding [1] 10:14 Elrod [2] 21:3 27:20 embraced [1] 5:9 en [3] 72:3 74:1 78:3 enact [1] 91:18 encounter [1] 30:18 encounters [1] 37:14 encourage [1] 75:2 end [5] 9:11 43:11 52:18 53: 1 75:2 endorse [1] 51:15 endorsed [1] 49:1

endorses [1] 30:13 endorsing [3] 61:6 87:13 88:25 enforcement [3] 42:19 48: engage 5 9:19 11:3 19:10

24:9 48:21 engaged [2] 40:21 51:10 engaging [2] 17:13 35:25 enough [3] 59:21 62:3 76:

enter [2] 43:3,9 entire [1] 74:3 entirely [2] 29:2 36:11 entirety [1] 30:19 entry [1] 16:9 equivalent [1] 33:24 error [1] 52:4 escalated [5] 55:6 57:8 69: 1.25 70:16

ESQ [5] **3:**3,6,10,13,17 **ESQUIRE** [2] 2:2,8 essentially [5] 17:20 32:7 37:6 56:18 91:18 established [3] 40:25 50: 24 65:6 **ESTATE** [1] 1:5

ET 5 1:8 2:11 3:14 12:9 80:12 evaluate [2] 7:10 9:19 evaluating [1] 78:15 even [8] 14:19 16:11 43:10.

15 **58**:17 **66**:6 **75**:22 **79**:23 event [1] 65:20 events [13] 11:15 28:14,17,

19 **53**:14 **56**:8,9,10 **57**:20 **58**:4,10 **79**:14,19 everybody [2] 56:17 87:9

everyone [1] 49:15 everything [6] 9:3 39:14 41:18 53:11 65:3 88:15 evidence [5] 56:18 59:9 68:

2 73:16 76:17 exact [1] 23:17 exactly [5] 6:21 29:24 55:

15 74:13 77:1 examination [1] 35:16 examining [4] 28:12 40:10, 13 **42**:10 example [11] 17:7 18:10 23:24 26:9 28:20 44:5 48: 7 **57**:16 **67**:5 **77**:25 **91**:6 examples [1] 19:1

exceptional [1] 37:23 excessive [10] 16:6 27:14 **56:**20 **63:**22 **64:**1.14 **71:**11 **75**:13 **78**:15 **79**:25 exercising [1] 23:5 exists [2] 53:5 56:17 experiencing [1] 36:23 expert [3] 19:17 41:22 65:

explain [2] 73:7 79:12 explained [1] 29:17 express [2] 73:9 82:22 expressed [1] 58:23 expressing [1] 47:23 expressly [1] 89:2 extent [3] 11:14 53:14 60:4 extra [1] 6:18

extraordinary [1] 76:7

face [1] 28:23 faced [3] 23:13 53:16 54:3 facing [1] 53:22 fact [18] 7:12 8:4 10:13 15: 8 16:16 17:11 19:22 22:19 23:3,11,13 49:22 51:21 70: 15 **78:**25 **85:**16,23 **86:**12 fact-bound [1] 4:21 fact-specific [1] 24:22 factor [2] 28:25 83:15 factors [1] 12:7 facts [8] 5:20 35:7 36:9 45: 6 **51**:19 **52**:5 **69**:7 **74**:3 factual [2] 42:6 49:9 fail [1] 23:4 failed [1] 23:12 fails [1] 29:7 failure [1] 24:12 Fair [2] 59:21 61:15 fairly [1] 40:9 faith [2] 34:6 35:25 fan [1] 4:19 far [2] 21:13 28:24 feature [1] 50:19 federal [3] 42:18.18 43:2 feel [1] 44:7 FELIX [25] 1:8 2:12 3:15 4: 5 5:2,21 6:12,14 7:25 8:18 **17**:11 **19**:18 **20**:5 **49**:6 **51**: 20 52:22,24 55:18 57:8 69: 1,24 70:15 71:2 73:1 80:

Felix's [1] 19:17

felt [2] 74:14.18

Fifth [63] 4:24 5:1 11:3 13:

few [1] 75:10

7 17:9 18:2.20 19:10 20: 14,20 23:8 24:9 25:12,18 26:25 27:6,22 28:11 30:1, 15 **33**:15 **36**:16 **41**:19 **47**: 18 **50**:3 **51**:24 **52**:4,20 **53**: 13 54:16,21 55:24 56:3 57: 7,11,19 58:19 59:19 65:17 67:4 68:3.11 69:5.13 70:1. 4 **72**:1 **74**:2 **75**:4 **76**:20 **77**: 5 **78:**2 **81:**15.25 **82:**2.8.12 **84:**16 **86:**4.10.16.18 **87:**22 fiaht [1] 74:23 fill [1] 60:22 Finally [2] 5:19 91:14 find [2] 69:11 88:8 fine [2] 40:6 61:11 finish [1] 71:19 firearm [2] 9:8 23:7 first [11] 4:4 5:22 8:2.5 16: 18 **25**:18 **26**:24 **59**:14 **60**:3 83:13 90:7 five [2] 41:14 90:5

fleshed [1] 44:15 flight [1] 45:3 focused [1] 30:17 follow [2] 8:9 50:7 followed [2] 8:12 41:2 Footnote 3 49:5 61:21 81:

force [58] 8:17,25 9:1 16:6

flesh [3] 15:18 23:25 32:24

fleeina [2] 52:23 91:19

17:20 19:14 21:25 27:14 28:19 29:6 9 30:21 31:7 32:4 6 12 33:13 34:24 36: 25 37:6 38:16 39:24 40:18 41:9 43:3.4.14 44:23 45:3 **46**:16 **47**:1.6.13 **51**:10.20 **52:**18.23 **53:**12 **54:**2.5 **56:** 20 57:13,21 58:5 63:22 64: 2,14 71:4,8,11 73:14 75:13 **77**:9,23 **78**:4,5,15 **79**:25 foreclosed [1] 56:3 foreseeable [1] 16:20 former [2] 41:8 90:25 forms [1] 40:15 formulation [1] 83:10 forward [3] 49:14 17 84:1 found [2] 22:23 51:9 four [2] 8:1 69:20 Fourth [35] 4:15.17 8:13.24 9:4,16 10:3,7 16:3,5 17:13 **34:**3 **37:**12,20 **38:**2 **40:**15 **43**:12 **45**:13 **50**:21 **51**:25 **55**:10 **56**:19 **62**:7 **63**:7 **64**:

80:18.25 89:4.8 91:8 framed [1] 79:10 framers [1] 26:4 framing [1] 77:21 freestanding [1] 9:16 freewheeling [1] 41:13 frequency [1] 22:22 frequently [1] 43:14

24 65:1,15 76:9 79:24,25

jury's [2] 42:1,5

Justice [252] 2:5 4:3,9,18,

Official - Subject to Final Review

friend [4] 15:10 39:21 43:6 90:8 friends [3] 9:8 12:21 90:13 front [11] 21:14,20 22:21, 24 23:20 24:4 32:23 42:22 43:1 47:7 91:1 fuller [1] 59:8 fundamental [2] 78:8 89:8 further [8] 25:8 30:15,20 38:10,25 39:19 50:1 89:15 fuzzy [1] 81:13

G

game [1] 66:25 Garner [2] 6:9 10:20 gave [2] 26:4.9 General [8] 2:4.10 22:4.15 32:20 54:24 65:3 79:21 General's [1] 21:23 generally [1] 21:25 genuine [1] 64:1 genuinely [2] 63:15,21 gets [2] 44:1 86:8 getting [6] 20:9 33:8,15 38: 15 **62**:10 **85**:9 give [15] 8:1 9:13 11:6 18:9, 25 23:23 25:17 39:7 57:17 67:5 68:3 73:16 75:18.25 78:25 given [9] 14:11 24:23 32:1 36:6,9 37:13 39:22 66:25 73:25 giving [2] 45:8 59:6 glad [1] 30:12 GORSUCH [26] 37:9 38:19 43:23 59:21 60:8,18,22 61: 1.11.14.20 62:5.15.21 63:1. 5.9.20 64:4.8 80:4 86:24 87:17 88:4 89:22 91:14 aot [1] 64:13 aotten [3] 8:11 63:18 75:8 government [4] 17:15 18: 16 38:3,3 government's [1] 55:4 gradually [1] 24:13 Graham [11] 6:9 10:20 27: 8 28:25 31:22 32:16 48:24 54:1,22 55:1,9 granted [1] 87:9 gravamen [1] 40:15 grave [1] 20:6 great [2] 17:6 91:6 quard [1] 38:19 guess [3] 20:17 61:24 75:1 guidance [11] 32:1,8 42:16 **44:**25 **45:**8 **46:**6,20 **47:**1, 12 50:23 75:19

Н

gun [5] 23:14 26:12,16 53:

hamper [1] 91:3

22 66:17

guys [1] 74:23

guidelines [1] 65:6

hand [1] 17:15 handling [1] 46:8 happen [1] 18:13 happened [6] 8:18 42:7 57: 13 69:8 74:24 86:25 happening [2] 84:9 87:1 happens [2] 31:11 44:17 happy [5] 12:2 14:24,25 15: 24,25 Harlow [1] 35:21 harm [8] 10:25 11:1 17:16

harm 8 10:25 11:1 17:16 18:17 31:17 75:14 87:11 91:6 Harris 3 27:4,6 72:15

hash [1] 47:11 hassled [1] 44:8 hear [4] 4:3 30:12 77:3 90: 11

heard 5 54:19 55:16 85: 18,20 88:7

hearing [1] 41:21 held [10] 16:19 44:16 45:21 51:1 52:20 53:13 57:2 70: 5 81:21,23

help [2] 23:25 85:2 helpful [3] 11:22 32:8 42:

hereto [1] 91:18 hero [1] 24:5 Higginbotham

Higginbotham [15] 5:19 7: 13 20:24 27:5,18 59:16,24 68:13 70:2,11,13 71:12 80: 22 82:20 86:14

Higginbotham's [4] 56:1 69:16 73:8 86:21 high [3] 19:25 24:7 62:2 high-ranking [1] 91:1

highway 5 4:13 8:2,3 20:

himself [10] 8:18 11:6 16: 15 23:12 36:7 38:5 53:7, 23 63:18 86:3

hindsight [2] 65:11 81:11 historical [1] 19:1 hits [1] 69:21

holding 5 **11:**9 **12:**2 **70:**8, 10 **82:**13

Hollywood [1] 23:1 home [1] 16:9 honest [1] 30:23 Honor [11] 58:7 64:19 66:9

Honor [11] 58:7 64:19 66: 67:2 68:1 71:17 72:8,13 81:23 83:3 87:12

Honor's [1] 76:4 hopefully [1] 59:10 hoping [1] 73:22 horribles [1] 16:25

horribles [1] 16:25 however [1] 84:4 HUGHES [1] 1:3

hundred [2] 11:21 21:12

identified [2] 8:6 85:4 identify [4] 18:23 23:4,12 ignore [2] 41:18 53:11 ignoring [1] 28:13 illogical [1] 54:10 imaginable [1] 54:7

imagine [2] 16:8,9 immediately [5] 20:2,4 21: 20 57:21 58:4

imminence [4] 34:17 imminent [4] 31:6 34:23 38:4 52:25

immunity [7] **35**:5,16,20 **37**:21 **48**:18 **50**:25 **90**:22 impact [1] **90**:21

importance [2] **36**:22 **41**: 17

important [8] 28:25 29:20 39:14,15,15 40:1 75:5 78: 21

impossibility [1] **89**:11 impossible [2] **37**:12 **75**: 18

improperly [1] 35:4 include [5] 6:18 29:13,13 55:5 84:20

incompatible [1] 5:7 inconsistent [4] 23:16 54: 10 89:3 91:15

incredibly [1] 24:7 incumbent [1] 75:20 indemnified [1] 90:24 indication [2] 23:18 50:13

indicator [1] 31:13 individual [5] 17:16 18:17 38:2 45:16 19

INDIVIDUALLY [1] 1:3 individuals [1] 41:22 inevitable [5] 17:21 32:7

37:7 **43**:5 **47**:6 inform [2] **53**:15 **64**:22 information [1] **35**:17

initial [1] **42**:11 injured [1] **42**:23

inquiry [22] 18:15 27:14 31: 22 32:16 33:21 34:22 35:6, 16,20 36:2 38:7 41:13 59: 10 63:10.13 64:5.7 71:5.12

79:2 81:10 88:7 inserting [1] 35:4 Instead [2] 4:24 88:18

instead (2) 4:24 88:18 instruction [4] 73:11 instructions [4] 83:1 instructive [4] 78:1

instructive [1] 78:1 intense [1] 67:24 intent [2] 35:21 81:10

Intentional [1] 86:1 interaction [1] 33:7

interest 6 10:23 17:15 18: 16 24:6 38:4 52:2 interested 1 52:3

interested [1] 52:3 interesting [1] 88:9 interests [1] 38:2 intertwined [1] 29:18

intertwined [1] **29:**18 intervening [2] **29:**5 **37:**8 intra-circuit [1] 58:18 invites [1] 81:9 involves [3] 57:20 62:6 81:

12

irrelevant [4] **69**:25 **70**:6 **82**:10,18

isn't [4] 48:3 57:18 64:5 76: 15

issue [12] 7:9 11:25 15:13 38:22 56:5 57:6,10 58:9, 20 75:5.9 80:1

issued [1] 28:21 issues [1] 86:11 it'll [1] 23:21

itself [3] 68:4 79:23 88:12

. 1

JACKSON [33] 12:3 14:22 20:12,23 21:6,10,13 28:3 38:20 50:5,6,12 51:7,17 52:7 56:13 57:14,18 58:1 68:15,19 69:3,10 70:3 73: 7,18 80:7 82:11,19 83:12 84:7 89:25 90:7 JACOBY [33] 2:4 3:6 28:5.

33:4,19 34:2,16 36:12 37: 24 38:24 39:5,10 31:21 33:4,19 34:2,16 36:12 37: 24 38:24 39:5,18 41:7 42: 2,25 44:21 45:17 46:2,11 48:2,5 49:10 50:10,18 51:

14 52:1 JANICE [1] 1:3 January [1] 1:13 jobs [1] 50:16 join [1] 74:9 joined [2] 21:2 86:14

JR [1] 1:8 Judge [23] 5:19 7:13 11:12 20:24 21:2,3 27:5,17,20,20 56:1 59:16,24 68:13 69:16 70:2.10.13 73:8 80:21 82:

20 **86**:13,20 judges [1] **67**:14 judgment [5] **24**:18 **54**:12

60:7 67:17 81:16 judgments [1] 86:23 jump [15] 7:5 11:5,24 15:12

18:12 **21**:20 **31**:18 **32**:22, 23 **33**:14 **45**:10 **49**:25 **88**: 11.15 **90**:16

jump-in-front-of-car [1] 90:14

jumped [7] 9:2 12:15 15:9 24:4 42:8 49:6 66:19 jumping [13] 9:10 18:5 20: 9,10 22:21,24 23:19 42:11 44:16 47:7 55:18 57:9 85:

jumps [3] 12:17 19:14 21:

jurisprudence [2] 37:23,

jury [4] **37**:19 **40**:20 **42**:6 **65**:

10

20 6:3,6,15,17,23 7:4,7,20, 23 **8**:23 **9**:6,22,25 **10**:18 **11:**8,18,19 **12:**1,3,4,13,18, 24 13:1,4,9,14,18,20,21 14: 1,3,11,18,21,22,23,24 15:5, 17,23 **16**:2,4,14,22 **17**:17, 23.25 18:7.21 19:7.13.21 **20**:12.23 **21**:6.10.13.22 **22**: 5.8.11.14 **23:**19 **24:**11.20. 25 **25**:6.8.9.10.16.25 **26**:8. 14,18,20 27:24,25,25 28:1, 2,3,9 29:12,22 30:4,5,7 31: 8,21 32:18 33:18,19,20 34: 2,10 36:3 37:3,9 38:19,20, 21 39:2,2,8,13,21 40:2,4,5, 6 **41**:7,20 **42**:17 **43**:18,19, 19,21,22,22,23,24,25 45: 15,19,25,25 46:2,6 47:16, 22 48:3 49:3 50:4.4.6.7.12 **51**:7,17 **52**:7,8,14 **54**:15,23 **55**:13.20 **56**:13 **57**:14.18 **58:**1.11 **59:**21.23.23 **60:**8. 18,22 61:1,9,11,14,20 62:5, 15,21 **63**:1,5,9,20 **64**:4,8, 10,17,25 65:16 66:4,11,24 **67:**6,13,23 **68:**15,19 **69:**3, 10 70:3,23 71:1,18 72:4,10,

K

12,19 91:8,14,23

20 73:2,7,18 74:4,12 75:23

76:11,13,14,24 77:2,12,13,

13,14,15 78:11,11,12 80:2,

3,3,5,6,7,10,15 81:19 82:5,

11,19 83:12 84:7 85:17,17

86:24 87:17 88:4 89:10.17.

19,20,21,22,23,24,25 90:7,

KAGAN [11] 33:18 36:3 43: 22 58:11 59:23 74:4,12 78: 11,12 80:2 89:21 KAVANAUGH [32] 7:4,8,

20,23 14:23 17:17,23,25 18:7,21 19:7,13,21 21:22 22:5,8,11,14 23:19 28:1 31:8,21 32:18 43:24,25 45: 15,19 46:6 47:22 80:5 89: 23 90:19

Kavanaugh's [1] 89:10 Kentucky [1] 81:3 kick [1] 74:22 kill [1] 44:11 killed [3] 4:12 20:4 42:23 killing [1] 91:19

kind [8] 5:6 16:3,4 32:8 38: 14 47:17 48:9 58:18 kinds [2] 17:10 46:9 King [1] 81:3

knock [3] 9:15,18,21 knowing [1] 31:16 knowledge [1] 50:18 knows [1] 19:6

label [1] 69:17 labeled [1] 69:15 Lafavette [1] 84:5 language [5] 15:24 16:1 **17**:18 **21**:23 **22**:4 LANORA [3] 2:10 3:13 80: last [3] 6:16 49:3 80:16 later [3] 38:16 55:21 78:5 latter [1] 63:23 Laughter [1] 60:21 law [16] 5:8.14 23:16 26:8.9. 15 **37**:18 **42**:5.18 **48**:7 **56**: 4 59:18.18 60:12 89:11 91: lawyers [1] 60:19 lay [1] 10:8 layered [1] 37:20 lead [2] 46:21 49:1 leading [4] 5:4 27:12 71:10 **72:**5 least [6] 12:7 80:17 81:7 **83**:23 **85**:18 **87**:2 legal [3] 5:6 7:11 52:4 legitimate [1] 55:11 lenath [1] 87:22 lens [1] 65:11 less [2] 46:21 77:23 liability [4] 51:13 56:24 68: 10 91:10 liable [5] 44:16 45:21 51:1 **57:2 80:18** license [3] 8:14 38:13 41: life [2] 11:1 52:25 light [2] 82:7,14 likelihood [1] 19:25 likely [1] 80:20 limit [1] 12:5 limited [1] 67:14 limits [2] 77:5 79:14 line [5] 43:9 45:14 48:17 51: 3 **58:**3 line-drawing [2] 88:8,12 lines [4] 25:1,5 66:6 76:3 Listen [1] 90:9 literally [1] 65:9 litigate [4] 7:19 12:1 15:8, litigated [1] 88:14 little [5] 15:18 22:3 46:14 **75**:3 21 loaded [1] 23:13 long [4] 16:24 47:15 87:12 88:1 look [57] 5:13 6:4,19 7:11, 18 8:21 10:21 11:10,23 12: 17 13:15 15:19 17:2 20:25 **21:**4,7,18 **23:**11,13 **25:**19 26:4 41:11 42:13 56:19,20 57:12 58:13.15.24.25 59:3. 7 **63**:4,5,16 **64**:13 **65**:20

66:9,13 67:1,3,4,10 68:5, 21 69:10,19 70:12 73:11 **74**:19 **77**:8 **78**:17,19 **83**:1, 18 **90**:15 **91**:11 looked [2] 7:14 87:23 looking [15] 6:11 9:20 30: 18 **34**:5 **58**:4,14 **63**:10 **68**: 16 **69**:6.7 **79**:19 **83**:21.22 85.5 86.10 looks [3] 17:10 18:15 63: 13 lose [1] 53:7 loses [1] 53:22 loss [1] 11:1 lot [4] 20:11 30:23,24 88:8 lower [3] 5:24 7:10 21:18 lurking [1] 75:12

made [16] 4:20 48:16 53:8

54:6 **56**:11 **57**:6 **67**:9 **68**:7, 8 70:17 73:6 77:11 78:4,7 80:20 82:13 made-up [1] 71:16 magic [1] 24:24 maior [1] 18:24 majority [7] 22:6 50:8 71:2 **74**:14.18 **77**:6 **78**:2 manner [2] 10:24 20:10 manual [1] 43:5 manuals [2] 42:14 44:3 manufacture [2] 32:6 47: manufactured [1] 29:2 manufacturing [2] 47:5 **85:**21 many [3] 25:3 75:13 90:13 Mason [1] 84:5 matter [7] 1:15 31:2 34:21 36:14.15 45:10 49:23 matters [1] 9:12 McCLOUD [68] 2:8 3:10 **52**:10,11,13 **54**:20 **55**:2,15, 23 56:13 57:5,16,23 58:7, 12 **59:**12 **60:**1,11,13,18,24 61:4,13,15,19,24 62:11,17, 24 63:3,6,12,24 64:6,16,19 **66**:2,8,12,22 **67**:2,8,21 **68**: 1,15,18,23 69:9,13 70:9,25 **71**:17.25 **72**:8.13.23 **73**:5. 15.24 74:7 75:1 76:1.23 **77**:1,4,20 **79**:7 **80**:9 mean [11] 12:5 33:23.24 34: 12 41:17 48:6 54:23 56:15 **59**:2 **64**:17 **74**:4 meaning [1] 10:6 meaningless [1] 40:9 meanings [1] 10:15 means [4] 11:23 16:7 38: 16 78:16 meat [1] 36:18 members [1] 74:10 Men [1] 61:18

Mendez [10] 16:18 54:8 61:

12 89:2 mens [1] 62:6 mentioned [1] 86:9 mere [1] 62:2 merely [4] 38:15 80:23 83: mete [1] 14:9 metes [1] 15:15 middle [2] 47:21.25 middle-of-the-road [1] 48: might [11] 15:21 18:13 23: 24 25:22 26:1 38:9 44:6. 10 46:10 58:1,19 mind [3] 12:23 34:5,12 mine-run [1] 67:15 minimize [1] 35:22 minuses [1] 64:14 minute [1] 88:6 minutes [4] 12:10 41:14 66:14 90:10 misconduct [2] 29:5 37:8 misdemeanants [1] 91:19 misses [1] 28:23 mistake [4] 53:8 56:12 63: 17 91:10 Mm-hmm [2] 13:13 14:1 moment [70] 4:25 5:3,10, 13,18 **9**:3 **11**:11 **12**:11 **13**: 16 **14**:5 **15**:2 **20**:15,21 **21**: 1,5,24 23:9 25:13 27:19 **28**:12,22,24 **29**:1,6 **31**:3 **32**:10 **36**:20,23 **38**:11 **39**: 10,24,25 40:1 41:10,16,19 46:5 47:23 49:13.14 51:22 **52**:22 **53**:4 **56**:16.21 **66**:14 **69**:4,8,15,19 **71**:3,7,13 **73**: 10,20 **78**:14,16 **79**:11 **80**: 22 81:5 82:22 83:14,17,19, 22 84:13,17 86:19 87:4 91: 17

monitor [1] 8:3 months [1] 86:14 morass [1] 4:21 morning [4] 4:4 54:19 55: 14 16 most [2] 28:24 54:7 motivation [1] 34:20

moving [5] 6:12 7:12 21:14 49:14.17 Ms [40] 28:5,9 29:16,24 30: 5,10 31:21 33:4,19 34:2,16 36:12 37:24 38:24 39:5,18 **41**:7 **42**:2,25 **44**:21 **45**:17 **46**:2,11 **48**:2,5 **49**:10 **50**:

10,18 51:14 52:1 80:10,14 **81**:22 **82**:16 **83**:3 **84**:2 **85**: 6 87.12 18 88.5 much [8] 6:15.21 18:24 38:

1 45:6 46:12 55:1 76:15 mua [1] 66:3 multiple [1] 85:21

municipality [1] 90:24

must [2] 4:21 81:1 Ν name [1] 71:15 narrow [11] 11:9 12:2 13: 21,22 14:6,25 15:1 30:1,17 39:20 52:3 narrowed [1] 27:7 narrowest [1] 36:12 narrowing [1] 27:10 NATHANIEL [5] 2:2 3:3,17 4.7 90.3 nature [7] 12:8 17:14 18:16 **37:**13 **86:**5 **88:**5.21 necessarily [5] 10:12 16:6 **45**:3 **51**:12 **87**:16 necessary [3] 47:1 80:25 87:25 need [10] 15:14 30:14,19 31:24 38:25 39:19 46:22 **47**:2 **48**:22 **90**:14 needs [1] 13:15 negligence [8] 57:3 62:2,5, 12,22,22,25 76:6 negligent [1] 57:9 never [4] 25:18 31:17 57: 11 72:12 nevertheless [1] 36:24 New [6] 24:2 37:23.25 44: 10 53:21 56:25 nice [1] 38:21 Ninth [4] 75:15 85:25 87:14 none [2] 5:16 28:14 noted [1] 90:12 nothing [1] 74:19 notice [1] 51:2 notwithstanding [1] 86: nub [1] 80:1 number [7] 7:24 57:6 60:2.

0

19 66:23 75:7.8

numerous [1] 25:2

object [2] 62:14 68:19 objected [2] **70**:2,11 objection [3] 61:2,4 68:23 objections [2] 60:12 61:23 objective [11] 33:21 34:4 **35**:1,10,22 **36**:2 **62**:8 **63**: 10,12 64:5,6 objectively [1] 34:8 obligated [1] 41:21 obligation [2] 9:15 83:6 obviate [1] 86:3 obvious [1] 19:1 obviously [3] 18:22 47:9 **51**:14 occur [1] 22:21 occurred [6] 11:15 12:9,11 53:12 56:21,22 occurs [1] 5:13 offense [2] 24:15,17

offer [2] 75:21 76:2 Officer [88] 5:2,21 6:12,14 7:5,12,20,25 8:18,23 9:17 11:5 15:21 16:7,14 17:11, 19 **19**:2,14,17,18 **20**:5 **21**: 14 **23**:12,13 **24**:3,5,18 **25**: 21 **26**:10,11,11 **29**:19,23 31:6,9,14 33:14,25 34:6,14, 16 **35**:8,23 **36**:6,23 **37**:4 **40**:21 **41**:13 **42**:3,8,11 **45**: 16.20 **46**:18 **49**:16 **51**:12. 20 52:15,17 53:6,22 54:5,6 **55**:6,12 **56**:11 **57**:2 **63**:14, 17,25 **64:**13 **65:**10,22,24 **66**:2 **67**:1,3,5 **68**:5,8 **71**:2, 20 72:2 77:8,10 79:1 90: officer's [28] 5:4 12:23 21:

1 25:19,23 27:12 29:17 31: 24 34:12,23 53:15 54:2 65: 14 **71**:8,9,23 **72**:1,5,18 **73**: 13 **76**:8 **77**:17,22,22 **80**:17 81:10 84:21 86:3 officer-caused [1] 47:19 officer-created [14] 14:14. 17 **38**:14 **46**:15 **54**:9 **61**:7 **62**:4 **67**:11,18 **68**:25 **75**:6 76:3,20 81:5 officer-fabricated [1] 47:

officers [37] 18:3 19:24 22: 24 23:4 28:23 32:1,2,9,19, 25 37:14,21 42:19 43:2,8,9, 13 44:3,13,15 45:8 46:7,21, 25 **48**:7,20 **50**:16,23 **51**:1,9 **65**:3 **71**:6 **75**:18 **78**:3 **79**: 20 89:12 90:21 official [1] 35:21 officials [1] 35:18 often [9] 28:19 29:18 31:10,

10 32:12 35:16 39:11 43:9 48.14 Oftentimes [1] 18:24

Okay [12] 14:21 18:7 22:11 **26**:20 **59**:7,21 **62**:15 **63**:1 64:8 84:20 87:17 90:1 on/off [1] 24:25 Once [2] 17:24 59:7 one [19] 8:7 10:22 11:21 17:

15 31:13 32:1 35:10 47:18 **52:**3 **55:**25 **61:**25 **62:**8 **69:** 21 71:22 75:9 78:1,22 85: 4 86:15

one-way [1] 26:6 only [20] 5:2 7:11 19:3 23: 12 25:23 28:12 30:17 54:1 **57:**20 **58:**4,14,25 **60:**8 **63:** 4 **66**:13 **67**:9,10 **69**:5 **71**:2

open-ended [1] 81:9 opening [2] 19:9 85:12 operates [1] 27:22 opinion [26] 17:18 36:5,10, 13 37:4 39:9,20 49:12,19

59:20.22 64:3 69:16 70:24 72:14,22 73:3 74:14,18 75: 22 76:4 82:13 83:4 86:14, 21 87:23 opinions [2] 58:22 86:23 opportunity [2] 7:17 11:6 opposed [2] 57:22 58:5 opposition [1] **73**:21 options [1] 7:24 oral [10] 1:16 3:2 5 9 12 4:7 28:6 52:11 80:11 90:10 order [1] 79:9 ordinary [1] 6:25 originated [1] 69:22 Orleans [2] 24:2 44:10 other [37] 7:24 9:8 10:24 **11**:6,20 **12**:21 **15**:3,10 **16**: 25 **17**:16 **20**:6,11 **23**:3 **25**: 11 26:22 27:1 29:22 47:20 48:6 53:12 57:22,23 58:6 **61**:1,2,2,4,23 **65**:8 **67**:19 **71**:6 15 **72**:7 **74**:9 **78**:19 90:8 13 others [4] 19:5 29:10 52:17 74.9 otherwise [1] 80:18 out [17] 19:21 23:7,25 26: 12,16 27:1,6 32:3,25 37:12 **39:**21 **44:**15 **47:**11 **70:**14 **74**:23 **86**:6 **88**:7 outside [5] 9:17 29:3 37:5 42:12 56:21 over [8] 4:13 8:5 31:9 33:5 34:1 41:14 49:1 1 overall [1] 41:14 overrule [1] 53:19 own [5] 19:17 23:6 57:2 65: 21 84:21

Р

PAGE [13] 3:2 31:4 32:3 35: 14 **43**:6 **58**:8 **65**:23.23 **70**: 12 71:19 81:24 83:4 87:20 pages [1] 85:10 panel [6] **27:**21 **53:**16,18 **59**:15 **60**:5 **74**:10 panel's [1] 29:7 parade [1] 16:25 park [1] 20:3 part [9] 12:23 21:17 25:20 36:15 40:22 50:15.16 64: 18 83:13 particular [13] 6:10 7:9 10: 5.11.24 18:18 19:17 20:1.7 **24**:2 **54**:3 **77**:4 **85**:3 particularly [1] 34:7 parties [2] 28:14 49:8 parts [1] 64:14 passage [1] 49:18 path [1] 49:2 pattern [2] 23:3,4 patterns [1] 22:19 pay [1] 24:12

people [6] 18:23 20:6,11 33:10 34:1 41:1 perceive [2] 21:6 34:18 perceives [1] 34:18 percent [3] 11:21 21:12 90: perception [2] 34:23 53: 15 perceptions [1] 35:24 perfect [1] 50:22 performative [3] 83:8.13. perhaps [2] 40:23 76:3 permissible [1] 43:15 permit [1] 76:21 permitting [1] 91:19 permutations [1] 25:3 perpetrator [1] 34:11 person [6] 31:11,16,18 40: 10 66:17.18 persons [1] 71:6 pertinent [1] 34:15 Pet [2] 81:24 87:20 Petition [2] 56:2 70:13 Petitioner [19] 1:6 2:3 3:4. 18 **4**:8 **5**:23 **30**:9 **32**:3 **47**: 10 53:20 54:24 60:17 61:8 67:9 79:10 82:3 88:25 90: 4 91.2 Petitioner's [7] 30:11 53:2 **57**:7 **72**:25 **78**:9 **85**:11 **88**: Petitioners [2] 81:6 84:1

PETTIT [13] 2:10 3:13 80: 10 11 14 81:22 82:16 83:3 84:2 85:6 87:12.18 88:5 phrased [1] 49:12 picture [3] 8:21 90:15 91: 12

place [2] 8:6 73:3 placing [1] 42:21 plain [2] 26:10 66:16 plaintiff [2] 33:24 68:16 planning [3] 31:12 53:24 56:12 nlate [1] 8:14 play [2] 17:8 18:16 please [4] 4:10 28:10 52: 14 80:15 Plumhoff [3] 6:10 10:21 point [18] 8:24 16:4 24:14, 16 **27**:16 **45**:17 **46**:3 **53**:8 67:1 73:2 78:5 81:23 83:3 **85**:10 **86**:8,12 **87**:20 **88**:7 pointless [3] 60:15,20 61: points [3] 32:3 43:6 90:6

police [16] 10:10 11 19:23 28:20 29:3 37:14 40:25 41: 2.23.24 45:9 46:7.10.21 57: proceeding [1] 59:25 2 91:1 prohibited [1] 18:4

policies [3] 40:24 64:21 78: 7

policing [5] 48:12,22 90:21 91:4.7 poor [2] 53:24 56:12 pose [1] **33:**9 position [9] 5:12 8:19 16:3 42:22 51:19 52:5 55:3.4 possessed [1] 35:17 possibility [1] 79:1 possibly [2] 61:22,22 potential [1] 31:13 practical [1] 90:20 practices [5] 10:10,11 40: 24 41:24.25 pre-force [3] 28:17 31:1 86:17 pre-shooting [1] 74:3 preceded [1] 29:14 precedent [7] 5:7 27:10 53 25 **54**:11 **61**:6 **70**:1 **81**:25 precedents [1] 53:18 preceding [6] 17:2 53:14 **56**:7.9.10 **57**:3 precise [3] 15:3 30:20 35: precisely [5] 7:9 19:8,10 25:2 85:13 predicate [5] 9:7,10,12 16: 5 20 prefaced [1] 19:9 premise [1] 53:6 presence [1] 39:25 present [1] 75:9 presented [9] 5:24 20:13 78:13 79:9 84:12.25 85:8 **87:**3.7 pressed [1] 81:7 pressing [1] 11:5 presumably [1] 33:1 pretty [1] 58:12 prevents [1] 17:13 previously [2] 53:23 56:22 primarily [1] 15:22 primary [1] 21:25 prime [3] 26:9 36:21 41:16 Principal [1] 2:10 principles [1] 7:1 prior [29] 8:24 9:3 16:3 21: 1.5 25:20 28:13.19 36:14 53:12 57:13.21.22.23 58:5. 6.10.15.25 59:3 69:18 74: 20,25 77:9 78:4 79:14,19 81:25 82:9

promote [1] 91:3 prong [1] 50:24 Properly [3] 80:21 81:15 84.24 proposition [4] 32:21 68:4 **81:**8.16 protect [2] 37:21 47:2 protected [1] 48:17 prove [1] 56:19 provide [3] 29:7 42:15 50: 22 proximate [1] 7:1 prudent [2] 10:9 40:23 public [3] 32:5 38:5 47:3 pull [2] 26:16 33:9 pulled [3] 4:13 8:5 33:5 pulling [3] 19:4 44:6,24 pulls [7] 7:22 18:4 23:7 26: 12 **31**:9 **32**:21 **34**:1 pure [1] 42:4 purposes [2] 27:13 71:11 pursuing [1] 82:3 push [1] 79:8 put [12] 8:18 15:18 16:14 20:3.5.11 36:18 37:10 44: 4 **54**:4 **64**:12 **84**:1 putting [5] 39:15,17 59:10 **61**:16 **87**:7 Q

qualified [7] 35:5,15,20 37: 20 **48**:18 **50**:25 **90**:22 quarrel [1] 88:3 question [48] 4:14 5:24 9: 22 **10**:1 **13**:10,15 **14**:14 **17**: 3 20:13 24:21,23 26:23 36: 11 **39:**23 **40:**13 **41:**5.8 **42:** 5.15 **49:**3.24 **55:**11 **56:**7.9 **61:**21 **62:**20 **63:**23 **64:**23 65:18 70:22 78:12.21.22. 24.25 79:4.9 84:11.23.25 85:8.8.13 87:3.6.8 88:13. questioning [2] 61:10 64: questions [17] 6:2 11:20 **29**:11 **37**:19 **46**:5 **49**:6 **50**: 7 **54**:14 **81**:13,18 **82**:5 **85**: 16,22 88:6 89:10,15 90:20 quickly [1] 19:18 quite [2] 40:1 85:23 auote [1] 35:14 quoted [4] 27:4 49:18 53:

R

17 **87**:22

radioed [1] 8:8 raise [1] 67:21 raised [1] 88:23 raising [2] 67:20 78:21 rare [4] 22:17 28:25 36:22 38:11 ratchet [2] 24:13 26:6 rather [2] 30:18 76:17

rea [1] 62:6 reached [1] 52:19 reacted [2] 29:19.23 reaction [2] 34:1 84:10 read [9] 59:22 70:24 72:7,9, 14 **74**:11 **82**:7,14 **83**:13 reading [1] 59:15 real [3] 75:14 81:1.2 realize [2] 18:1 32:24 really [12] 11:5 13:22 15:6 **34**:13.13 **35**:22 **37**:7 **40**:12 **41**:4 **43**:7 **52**:3 **69**:22 reason [9] 6:14 9:25 11:5 12:13 24:14 38:9 50:2 75: 16 87:19 reasonable [27] 7:4 10:15 **15**:12 **23**:21,25 **24**:18 **28**: 20 29:4.10 30:21 31:7 32: 12 33:13 34:24 37:5 41:9 **42**:12 **50**:1 **51**:10,20 **52**:17 **54**:2 **65**:7 **66**:21.23 **77**:24 88:15 reasonableness [21] 4:22 7:2 9:20 11:12 26:4.5 28: 15 **29**:21 **34**:4.22 **35**:6.10 37:16 39:23 59:9 64:23 65: 2 73:13 79:2 83:5,16 reasonably [5] 34:9 41:15 **42**:4 **52**:24 **73**:25 reasoning [1] 30:2 reasons [3] 66:23 79:12 89:13 REBUTTAL [3] 3:16 90:2. receive [1] 90:21 recognize [2] 36:17 45:7 recognized [5] 32:14 37:3 **69**:18 **80**:24 **81**:12 recommends [1] 19:24 record [2] 64:13 69:11 record-based [1] 87:8 references [2] 83:6,20 referred [2] 57:24 58:2 referring [4] 27:8 72:19 82: 6 17 reflection [1] 38:1 regarding [1] 82:13 regular [1] 15:4 regularly [1] 51:9 regulated [1] 63:6 regulation [2] 65:2,4 reintroduce [1] 35:19 reject [1] 54:11 rejected [4] 35:11 54:8 80: 17 81:16 rejecting [1] 82:9 related [1] 85:23 relevance [1] 74:24 relevancy [1] 7:1 relevant [14] 5:5 11:14 27: 13 53:14 55:9 62:13 64:20

probably [3] 10:13 30:19

problem [8] 11:2 21:17 22:

24 48:4 51:4 62:12 65:8

procedures [1] 64:22

prohibits [2] 4:17 10:4

produced [1] 74:5

78:22

84:22

probe [1] 10:1

paying [1] 33:1

71:11.24 72:1.6.11.12 82:1

remand [14] 2:7 3:8 5:24

18:2 28:8 44:1.2 50:2 60:

14,17 67:22 75:22 89:5 91: remanding [2] 59:6 75:3 remands [1] 60:19 reoccurring [2] 22:19 23:3 repeatedly [5] 53:13,17 65: 19 **66**:12 **71**:14 reply [4] 14:12 22:22 81:7 88:23 Reports [1] 35:14 **REPRESENTATIVE** [1] 1: request [1] 89:16 require [4] 6:11,13 35:16 53:11 requirement [1] 9:16 requires [2] 26:7 54:3 reserve [1] 61:22 reserved [1] 61:21 resolve [2] 14:4 42:15 resolved [1] 44:1 resolving [1] 87:6 respectfully [3] 66:9,12 79: respond [4] 32:4 35:3 43:3 **47:**13 Respondent [8] 2:12 3:15 20:18 30:25 31:2 33:11 47: 9 80:13 **Respondents** [8] 1:9 2:9 3:11 5:9,11 21:3 30:25 52: Respondents' [1] 49:4 responding [2] 55:12 85: response [1] 26:23 responses [2] 25:17 59:13 responsible [1] 15:22 rest [1] 42:9 result [1] 91:10 resulted [1] 71:7 results [1] 51:12 reversed [1] 75:11 review [1] 5:22 reviewing [2] 57:20 74:17 reviews [1] 86:22 rights [3] 4:16 16:8 23:6 rigid [1] 6:24 risk [7] 20:11 81:5 82:1 85: 16.21 86:2 87:14 risk-averse [1] 45:21 road [4] 8:9 19:5 33:10 44: 12 roads [1] 43:14 **ROBERTO** [1] 1:8 ROBERTS [22] 4:3 25:6 27: 25 30:4,7 33:20 34:10 40: 2 **43**:19.22 **45**:25 **50**:4 **52**: 8 **64:**10.17 **76:**11 **77:**13 **78:** 11 **80**:3.10 **89**:17 **91**:23 routine [1] 22:24 Roval [1] 23:10 rule [22] 5:23 14:14 38:14 43:1 44:2.18.21 46:15 53:

10 **57**:12 **60**:10 **66**:5 **74**:22 **80**:23 **83**:10 **86**:4 **90**:17 **91**: 2,5,15,16,18 rules [5] **6**:21,24 **24**:24 **39**: 4,6 ruling [1] **67**:25

ruling [1] 67:25 S safety [2] 52:16,16 same [3] 9:23 10:12 23:17 Sargeant [1] 69:1 satisfied [3] 11:9,16 51:21 satisfy [1] 62:3 saying [15] 14:5 15:3 21:7 30:15 47:18 48:11 58:2 59: 1 76:15 82:12.20 87:11 91: says [22] 21:24 22:15 33:11 **35:**15 **45:**2,4 **47:**12 **49:**5, 19 56:3 63:3 64:20 67:19 70:13 72:16 79:14 82:20, 24 83:5,12,17 86:4 scale [3] 37:10,25 39:16 scales [1] 59:11 Scalia [5] 4:18.20 6:23 24: 25 39.2 scope [3] 59:8 78:19 84:24 scot-free [1] 8:16 Scott [8] 4:20 6:9.23 10:20 25:1 39:3 42:4 48:25 search [4] 9:14,15,19,20 searches [4] 10:4 63:7 65: 5,7 searching [1] 35:17 seat [1] 18:11 Second [5] 8:8 17:3 23:6 **25**:24 **78**:18 second-guess [2] 54:5 77: seconds [15] 6:12.16.18 8: 22 9:21 58:15.24.25 59:3.8 74:20.25 86:7 88:18 91:13 see [7] 18:10 34:6 45:11 48: 10 **54**:17,25 **72**:7 seem [5] 20:19 46:15 56:23 59:1 79:5 seems [9] 10:13 30:25 49: 12,15 50:1 56:15 74:22 84: seen [2] 57:4 61:6 sees [1] 84:13 seizing [2] 10:23 24:7 seizure [5] 6:19.22 7:3 11: 13 41:9 seizures [5] 4:18 10:5 63:7 **65:**5,7 self-consciously [1] 27:9

self-defense [2] 5:14 23:6

sending [2] 51:24 60:14

sense [9] 5:8 10:2,3 15:1

33:8 40:22 54:1 65:3 79:

sensitive [2] 31:23 34:7

send [2] 50:2 60:12

sentence [3] 58:3 73:8 83: sentences [1] 70:24 separate [1] 84:23 separately [2] 73:9 82:21 sequence [1] 46:18 Sergeant [7] 49:6 52:22 55: 17 **57**:8 **69**:24 **70**:15 **73**:1 series [1] 22:19 serious [6] 20:7 24:16.17 31:12.16 34:14 Serpas [2] 27:4 72:15 Seventh [4] 15:20 17:6,18 48·8 severity [1] 24:13 sharply [3] 15:9,11 23:15 Sheehan [1] 80:25 Sheriffs' [1] 89:14 shift [2] 89:8.9 shifted [1] 5:11 shoes [2] 54:4 65:14 shoot [8] 8:20 11:7.24 19: 22.24 21:21 88:11 90:16 shooting [6] 5:4 23:1 27: 13 29:15 71:10 72:5 shoots [1] 21:15 shortly [2] 49:7,7 shot [4] 4:12 19:18 24:4 66: shouldn't [4] 6:20,22 39:4 67:14 show [3] 5:20 28:19 29:9 side [20] 4:12 7:5 9:2.9 10: 22.24 **12**:21 **15**:10 **17**:1 **25**: 11 44:12 47:18.20 48:6.17 **51:**3 **52:**23 **67:**19 **90:**8.13 side's [1] 65:8 sign [1] 27:20 significance [1] 22:1 silentio [1] 53:19 sill [3] 24:19 49:7,25 similar [2] 54:9 84:4 simply [1] 75:3 single [2] 32:15 91:9 Singleton [1] 86:13 sir [1] 64:7 situation [13] 16:15 17:20 22:16 32:6 38:12 47:5 14 **51**:25 **55**:18 **68**:9 **69**:1 **70**: 16 77:10 situations [5] 43:4.10 47:4 **65**:22 **77**:16 six [1] 86:14 sketch [1] 19:20 sketched [1] 39:21 slightly [1] 66:19 slosh [1] 4:21 Smith [2] 21:3 27:20 snippet [1] 30:17 so-called [1] 28:12 sole [2] 5:23 83:15 Solicitor [6] 2:4.10 21:23 **22:**4.15 **54:**24

somebody [3] 8:9,15 34: someone [9] 7:22 10:23 24:2 26:15 31:9 32:21 40: 7 44:11 66:3 someone's [2] 19:4 44:6 sometimes [5] 18:22 23: 21 21 31:11 44:23 somewhat [1] 55:3 sorry [3] 30:6 82:11 87:21 sort [14] 20:18 30:21 33:23 34:17 35:4 37:3 41:12 43: 4 **47**:11 **48**:15 **50**:19 **51**:2 61:7 79:21 sorts [1] 64:21 **SOTOMAYOR** [46] **12:**4,13, 18,24 **13**:1,4,9,14,19,20 **14**: 1,11,18,21 **15**:5 **25**:10,16, 25 **26**:8,14,18,20 **27**:24 **38**: 21 39:2,13 43:20,21 65:16 **66:**4.11.24 **67:**6.13.23 **70:** 23 71:1,18 72:4,10,20 73:2 77:14,15 89:20 90:12 Sotomayor's [1] 82:5 sought [1] 35:21 sound [1] 10:16 source [1] 85:24 specific [1] 65:4 speech [1] 10:8 spent [1] 31:15 split [10] 13:11,23 27:18 46: 3,12,12 47:17 56:6 58:9 split-second [5] 28:22 31: 24 32:10 48:14 80:19 squad [1] 8:12 standard [10] 6:1.4.7.8 10: 19 **15**:3 **37**:15 **62**:1 **75**:17 79:16 standards [2] 35:2 81:13 standing [2] 9:17 17:11 start [3] 25:1,5 37:22 started [2] 49:14,17 starting [1] 12:10 state [3] 10:23 24:6 34:5 stated [2] 57:19 71:9 statement [1] 72:18 statements [7] 30:13 60:5 **74:8 82:**6.12 **84:**3 **86:**23 STATES [14] 1:1.17 2:6 3:7 **28**:7 **44**:19,22 **48**:1,20 **49**: 5 **51**:15,18 **85**:20 **88**:21 stepped [1] 49:16 stepping [1] 43:1 still [3] 31:7 48:17 77:8 stop [19] 7:21 12:8,11,14 **16**:9 **19**:19 **20**:9 **24**:11,14 32:11.12.22 33:14.15 38: 16 **44:**24,25 **45:**3,23 stopped [1] 12:20 stops [4] 18:4,22 22:23 42: 19 story [2] 29:2 31:3 strawman [1] 53:3

street [2] 26:6 44:9 stressful [1] 54:7 strong [2] 23:18 38:3 stuck [1] 67:16 study [1] 22:23 style [1] 23:1 sub [1] 53:19 subcategory [1] 77:2 subject [3] 33:25 35:1,24 subjective [9] 33:21 34:5 35:1.5.21 62:6 81:9 88:21 89.3 submitted [2] 91:25 92:2 sufficiently [2] 24:15,17 suggest [2] 46:16 49:12 suggested [2] 9:9 76:4 suggesting [2] 8:15 56:23 suggests [2] 58:3 59:4 summarily [1] 75:11 superseding [3] 5:15 17:5, supporting [7] 2:6,12 3:8, 15 **28**:8 **48**:1 **80**:13 supposed [3] 7:21 74:16 83:6 **SUPREME** [4] **1**:1,16 **73**: 11 82:25 surprise [1] 78:23 surprised [1] 20:17 surprising [1] 58:20 suspect [8] 10:25 23:5 29: 19 33:6 34:19 37:8 43:12. suspect's [3] 29:4,18 52: switch [1] 24:25 Т table [2] 16:11.24 tactics [1] 53:24

Taleguah [1] 75:10 talked [1] 61:16 taught [1] 42:21 teaching [1] 42:20 tells [1] 83:18 Tenth [4] 75:15 86:1 87:15 term [3] 10:2 69:22 75:11 terms [2] 33:21,25 terrible [1] 18:13 terror [1] 24:3 terrorist [2] 24:1.7 test [34] 4:19 14:17 15:4.19 **26:**5 **27:**7.8.8 **34:**3.4 **35:**9. 22 50:9,15 51:9,12,15 62:8, 14,17,22,23,25 63:3 68:20 69:5 73:22 82:2 84:12,16 85:1,18 88:21 90:9 testifies [1] 19:18 testimony [1] 41:22 tests [1] 17:10 Texas [8] 2:11.11 3:14 4: 13 35:2.12.13 80:12

themselves [6] 21:3 23:5

26:16 42:22 47:3 54:4 theories [1] 54:9 theory [6] 54:11 68:25 71: 16 **81**:6 **87**:14 **88**:2 There's [14] 9:15 10:22 22: 2 **24**:24 **25**:18 **26**:24 **37**:7 39:10 47:2 58:17 59:4 62: 19 86.8 87.15 thereafter [1] 44:17 therefore [1] 89:3 they'll [2] 47:11 48:17 they've [1] 21:13 thinking [1] 34:10 thinks [3] 44:19,22 47:10 Third [4] 8:11 27:16 90:19 91.5 THOMAS [20] 6:3,6,15,17 **25**:8 **29**:12,22 **40**:4 **54**:15, 23 **55**:13,20 **76**:13,14,24 77:2,12 81:19 85:17 89:19 though 6 12:5 56:16 64:5 74:22 79:23 84:11 thousands [1] 81:1 threat [52] 4:25 5:3.10.14. 18 **11**:11 **13**:16 **14**:5 **15**:2 20:15,22 21:2 23:9 25:13 **27:**19 **28:**13,22 **34:**18,24 **36:**21 **46:**5 **51:**22 **52:**16,18 **53:**5 **55:**11 **56:**16,22 **63:**15 **64:**1 **66:**14 **69:**4,8,15,20 **71:**3,7,13 **73:**20 **78:**14,17 **79**:11 **80**:22 **82**:23 **83**:14, 18,22 84:14,17 86:19 87:4 91.17 threat' [1] 73:10 three [8] 6:18 12:7.10 25: 17 **67**:13 **70**:24 **80**:17 **86**: 16 three-sided [2] 46:13 47: thumb [4] 37:10,25 39:17 **59:**10 timing [1] 49:23 today [2] 4:11 31:15 tolls [4] 4:14 8:7 18:19 24: 12 took [2] 66:18 78:13 top [1] 37:20 tort [2] 53:21 56:25 totality [51] 6:7,19 7:14 12: 6 **13**:5,16 **14**:7 **15**:4 **18**:14 21:18 25:14 28:16 29:25 **36**:15 **37**:16 **38**:7 **40**:8,11, 13 41:11 46:24 48:23 50:9, 20 **51**:5 **54**:18,25 **55**:5 **63**: 10,13,16 **64:**11,18 **68:**17 72:16,20,24 73:4,12,21 76: 16,25 77:3,7 83:1,7,20,21 84:15.19 88:19 totality-of-the-circumst ances [1] 4:19 Totally [1] 13:8 toward [1] 16:24 towards [1] 46:14

traffic [7] 7:21 18:4,22 31:9 32:11,22 44:8 tragic [1] 24:1 train [8] 43:7,9,13,17 45:12 **62**:10 **75**:18 **89**:12 trained [2] 32:2 43:2 training [4] 31:25 42:14 44: 3 64:12 tricky [1] 81:12 tried [1] 55:24 true [4] 18:21 32:15 57:14. 18 truly [2] 29:25 38:11 try [3] 14:8 32:22 42:24 trying [7] 15:8 36:8 38:19 39:4 41:10 66:5 86:6 twice [1] 85:18 two [22] 6:11,16 8:22 10:14 16:17 22:20 23:8 26:24 58: 15,21,24,25 **59:**3,8 **66:**14 74:20.25 78:18 85:22 86:7 88:18 91:12 two-minute [1] 60:9 two-second [2] 30:17 60: two-sided [1] 46:12 two-way [1] 26:6 type [6] 18:14 22:15 24:8 33:22 47:7 85:13 types [1] 37:1

ultimate [4] 10:25 34:22

ultimately [3] 43:11 48:15

U.S [1] 35:14

36:2 **42**:2

86:22

unacceptable [1] 81:3 Under [14] 6:3 9:16 26:14 28:16.25 32:2 43:15 53:21 55:9.9 56:3 64:11 81:24 underscored [2] 5:20 6:23 understand [7] 59:16,22 74:15 76:14 79:10 85:2 87: understanding [2] 20:16 understood [3] 14:12 56: 17 80:21 uniquely [1] 48:12 UNITED [14] 1:1.17 2:6 3:7 28:7 44:19.22 48:1.20 49: 5 **51**:15.18 **85**:20 **88**:20 unlawfully [1] 65:25 unless [2] 40:9 45:10 unmarked [1] 66:16 unnecessary [2] 87:19 89:

unpaid [3] 4:13 8:7 18:19 unprecedented [1] 91:18 unpredictability [1] 81:4 unreasonable [20] 4:18 7: 16 **8**:17,20 **10**:2,4,5,8 **11**:

13 21:15 29:6 36:24 38:17 **40**:17,18,22 **46**:17,18 **78**:4 79:21 unreasonably [3] 5:21 15: 21 77:19 unrelated [1] 16:6 unsatisfying [1] 45:8 unsound [1] 10:17 Until [7] 5:9 45:18 62:9 69: 16 81:7 88:15 23 unwarranted [1] 54:10 up [20] 5:4 14:11 24:13 27: 12 **43**:8,11 **45**:13 **50**:7 **62**: 8 **66**:3,16,18 **69**:16 **71**:10, 13 **72**:5 **75**:2 **85**:19 **88**:15, using [6] 10:1 43:14 51:10, 23 77:9 78:4

vacate [2] 50:2 91:20 vacating [1] 59:5 vacatur [3] 2:7 3:8 28:8 varied [1] 37:13 varieties [1] 33:25 various [1] 41:22 vast [1] 22:6 veer [1] 46:14 vehicle [6] 6:13 7:13 17:12 32:13,13 42:19 vehicular [1] 45:3 version [2] 76:2 79:16 versus [9] 4:5 35:1,12 72:2 15 73:17 74:1 75:10 77:25 victim [2] 29:14,23 view [14] 5:22 17:23 20:21 21:16 30:12 41:23 46:8 61: 2 64:11.18.20 87:2 89:1.7 views [3] 15:10.11 34:13 violate [2] 8:24 78:7 violated [2] 4:16 16:7 violates [1] 80:18 violation [10] 9:4 10:7,10 16:5,21 31:10 40:23 43:12 44:8 79:23 volumes [1] 60:23

W

walked [2] 66:16,18 wanted [4] 39:7 68:13 70: 18 88:10 wants [4] 36:18 55:21 60: 17 **61:**8 warnings [1] 28:21 Washington [4] 1:12 2:2,5, way [17] 12:21 16:24 23:15 27:6 29:22 37:11 45:13 47: 15 **49**:11 **59**:5,11 **67**:15 **72**: 7 **74**:14 **82**:24 **83**:25,25 ways [1] 46:9 wealth [1] 26:25 weapon [3] 24:3 32:14 45:

Wednesday [1] 1:13 weight [2] 36:6 78:25 welcome [4] 6:2 29:11 54: 14 **81**·18 well-known [1] 71:15 well-positioned [1] 79:6 Westlaw [1] 69:19 whatever [2] 11:14 58:11 whatnot [1] 43:15 whenever [1] 25:22 Whereupon [1] 92:1 whether [40] 4:15 5:2 9:12 **10**:1,6,8,9 **13**:15 **15**:11 **16**: 3,4 **20**:14 **34**:8 **35**:24 **40**: 14,20 41:13 42:3,10 49:6, 24 51:19 54:1 56:7,9 57:1 60:10 63:14,20,21 69:1,24 **70**:6 **71**:2,6 **76**:16 **78**:13 **79**:18 **85**:3 **88**:14 who's [3] 27:18 44:11 45: whole [7] 8:21 29:1 31:3 **40**:20 **70**:19 **90**:15 **91**:11 wholeheartedly [1] 91:15 Whren [1] 64:20 widen [1] 78:18 will [13] 21:25 22:16 30:21 35:16,23 40:1 43:9 44:2,3 46:25 65:18 91:3,17 Wisconsin [1] 48:8 within [3] 55:5 76:24 84:24 without [4] 59:10 81:2,11 wondered [1] 30:8 wondering [1] 46:7 words [3] 39:16 73:4 81:2 world [1] 81:2 worse [1] 18:24 write [5] 36:5,10,13 73:9 **82**:21 writer [1] 74:18 writings [1] 39:3 wrote [4] 74:1,12,13 86:16

years [3] 75:7 80:16 86:16 yourself [1] 32:5

Ζ

ZELINSKY [58] 2:2 3:3,17 **4**:6,7,9 **6**:6,17 **7**:7,23 **9**:6, 23 10:18 11:17,21 12:12, 16,19,25 13:3,8,13,18,24 **14**:2,16,20,22 **15**:7,25 **16**: 13,16,23 17:22 18:6,9 19:7, 16 **20**:12,23 **21**:9,12 **22**:2, 10,12,18 **23**:23 **24**:20 **25**: 16 26:3,13,17,19,22 55:17 90:2.4.5 **ZOE** [3] 2:4 3:6 28:6