

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Appendix 1 – Supreme Court of Nevada Panel Opinion (February 02, 2024)	001a-016a
Appendix 2 – Supreme Court of Nevada En Banc Opinion (September 5, 2024)	017a-032a
Appendix 3 – Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Citizens Complaint (August 31, 1974)	033a-035a
Appendix 4 – Email from Regina Garcia Cano (February 02, 2018)	036a-037a
Appendix 5 – APNewsNow Article (February 02, 2018)	038a-039a
Appendix 6 – Clark County District Court Order (October 26, 2022)	040a-045a

APPENDIX 1


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

STEVE WYNN, AN INDIVIDUAL,
Appellant,
vs.
THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, A
FOREIGN CORPORATION; AND
REGINA GARCIA CANO, AN
INDIVIDUAL,
Respondents.

No. 85804

FILED

FEB 08 2024

ELIZABETH A. BROWN
CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
BY 
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK

Appeal from a district court order granting an anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Ronald J. Israel, Judge.

Affirmed.

Pisanelli Bice PLLC and Todd L. Bice, Jordan T. Smith, Emily A. Buchwald, and Daniel R. Brady, Las Vegas, for Appellant.

Ballard Spahr LLP and David Chavez, Las Vegas, and Jay Ward Brown and Chad R. Bowman, Washington, D.C., for Respondents.

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, HERNDON, LEE, and PARRAGUIRRE, JJ.

OPINION

By the Court, PARRAGUIRRE, J.:

In designing its anti-SLAPP statutes, Nevada recognized the essential role of the First Amendment rights to petition the government for a redress of grievances and to free speech, and the danger posed by civil claims aimed at chilling the valid exercise of those rights. 1997 Nev. Stat., ch. 387, at 1363-64 (preamble to bill enacting anti-SLAPP statutes). To limit that chilling effect, the statutes provide defendants with an opportunity—through a special motion to dismiss—to obtain an early and expeditious resolution of a meritless claim for relief that is based on protected activity. NRS 41.650; NRS 41.660(1)(a). District courts resolve such motions based on the two-prong framework laid out in NRS 41.660(3). Under the first prong, the court must “[d]etermine whether the moving party has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the claim is based upon a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern.” NRS 41.660(3)(a). If the moving party makes this initial showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff under the second prong to show “with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on the claim.” NRS 41.660(3)(b).

In this appeal, we consider the proper burden a public figure must carry to show a probability of prevailing on a defamation claim at the second prong of the anti-SLAPP framework. We clarify that, under the second prong, a public figure defamation plaintiff must provide sufficient evidence for a jury, by clear and convincing evidence, to reasonably infer that the publication was made with actual malice. Because respondents met their respective burden under prong one, and the public figure plaintiff

in the underlying defamation action failed to meet his burden under prong two, we affirm the district court's order granting respondents' renewed special motion to dismiss.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This appeal arises out of a defamation claim brought by appellant Steve Wynn—a prominent figure in Nevada gaming and politics—against respondents The Associated Press and one of its reporters, Regina Garcia Cano (collectively, AP Respondents).¹ Following national reports alleging years of misconduct by Wynn, Garcia Cano obtained from the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) redacted copies of two separate citizens' complaints alleging sexual assault by Wynn in the 1970s. She wrote an article describing the allegations in the complaints, one of which alleged that Steve Wynn had raped the complainant three times at her Chicago apartment between 1973 and 1974, resulting in a pregnancy and the birth of a child in a gas station bathroom under unusual circumstances (the Chicago complaint).² The Associated Press published the article.

Wynn filed a defamation complaint against AP Respondents, asserting that the allegations of sexual assault contained in the Chicago complaint were false and improbable on their face, and that AP

¹This case returns to us on appeal following our reversal of the district court's grant of AP Respondents' motion to dismiss based on the fair report privilege. *See generally Wynn v. The Associated Press*, 136 Nev. 611, 475 P.3d 44 (2020).

²Following a bench trial on a defamation claim brought by Wynn against the complainant, a district court found that the Chicago complaint allegations were, in fact, false. *Wynn v. The Associated Press*, No. A-18-772715-C (Nev. 8th Jud. Dist. Ct. Mar. 25, 2020) (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment).

Respondents published the article with actual malice. AP Respondents filed a special motion to dismiss pursuant to Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes. Following limited discovery on the issue of actual malice, the district court granted a renewed version of AP Respondents' special motion to dismiss, finding that the article was a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern and that Wynn failed to meet his burden of establishing a probability of prevailing on the merits of his claim. Wynn now appeals that decision. He argues that the district court erred in finding both that AP Respondents met their burden under the first prong and that he failed to meet his burden under the second prong. Specifically, he argues that the district court misapplied the actual malice standard relevant to public figures under the second prong.

DISCUSSION

"We review a decision to grant or deny an anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss de novo." *Smith v. Zilverberg*, 137 Nev. 65, 67, 481 P.3d 1222, 1226 (2021). As explained above, the anti-SLAPP framework demands a two-prong analysis when considering a special motion to dismiss. The first prong requires the court to "[d]etermine whether the moving party has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the claim is based upon a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern." NRS 41.660(3)(a). If the moving party makes this initial showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff under the second prong to show "with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on the claim." NRS 41.660(3)(b). Because Wynn challenges the district court's rulings under both prongs, we will discuss each in turn.

AP Respondents met their burden under the first prong

To meet the burden under the first prong, the defendant must show “that the comments at issue fall into one of the four categories . . . enumerated in NRS 41.637.” *Stark v. Lackey*, 136 Nev. 38, 40, 458 P.3d 342, 345 (2020). The relevant category here is found under NRS 41.637(4), which protects a “[c]ommunication made in direct connection with an issue of public interest in a place open to the public or in a public forum, which is truthful or is made without knowledge of its falsehood.” Wynn argues that the district court erred in concluding that the article by AP Respondents satisfies this category. Specifically, he asserts that the article does not discuss an issue of public interest and that it was not truthful or made without knowledge of its falsehood.

In *Shapiro v. Welt*, we adopted guidelines for district courts to consider in distinguishing issues of private and public interest.³ 133 Nev.

³Those guidelines are:

(1) “public interest” does not equate with mere curiosity;

(2) a matter of public interest should be something of concern to a substantial number of people; a matter of concern to a speaker and a relatively small specific audience is not a matter of public interest;

(3) there should be some degree of closeness between the challenged statements and the asserted public interest—the assertion of a broad and amorphous public interest is not sufficient;

(4) the focus of the speaker’s conduct should be the public interest rather than a mere effort to gather ammunition for another round of private controversy; and

35, 39, 389 P.3d 262, 268 (2017). Here, the article and its surrounding context point to an issue of clear public interest. The article discusses two new allegations of sexual misconduct by Wynn on the heels of national reports alleging a pattern of misconduct spanning decades. In the weeks preceding publication of this article, Wynn resigned as CEO of Wynn Resorts and as Finance Chair of the Republican National Committee due to the national reports of alleged misconduct; and contemporaneously, Wynn Casinos, the Nevada Gaming Control Board, and other regulators launched investigations into his conduct. The allegations undoubtedly affected his public business and political affairs, and additional reports of sexual misconduct would be of concern to a substantial number of people, including consumers, voters, and the business and governmental entities investigating precisely this kind of behavior. The public had an interest in understanding the history of misconduct alleged to have been committed by one of the most recognized figures in Nevada, and the article directly relates to that interest.

Wynn further argues that, even if the article relates to an issue of public interest, the district court erred in concluding the communication was published without knowledge of its falsehood (i.e., that it was published in “good faith,” NRS 41.637; NRS 41.660(3)(a)). “[A]n affidavit stating that the defendant believed the communications to be truthful or made them without knowledge of their falsehood is sufficient to meet the defendant’s

(5) a person cannot turn otherwise private information into a matter of public interest simply by communicating it to a large number of people.

Shapiro, 133 Nev. at 39, 389 P.3d at 268 (quoting *Piping Rock Partners, Inc. v. David Lerner Assocs., Inc.*, 946 F. Supp. 2d 957, 968 (N.D. Cal. 2013)).

burden absent contradictory evidence in the record.” *Stark*, 136 Nev. at 43, 458 P.3d at 347. Here, AP Respondents filed such an affidavit.

In rebuttal, Wynn points to what he claims to be contradictory evidence in the record. Most notably, he asserts that the Chicago complaint was absurd on its face, and therefore, AP Respondents must have known it was false. He also points to a text sent by Garcia Cano to a coworker shortly after reviewing the complaint in which she wrote “[o]ne of [the complaints] is crazy.” However, we agree with the district court that this evidence is not sufficient to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that AP Respondents were aware of the complaint’s falsity. While the narrative contained in the complaint is unusual, it was not so unrealistic as to put AP Respondents on notice as to its falsity, and Garcia Cano’s characterization of the complaint as “crazy” is not persuasive evidence that she knew it to be false.⁴ Importantly, because the identifying information in the complaint received by Garcia Cano was redacted, it would have been fruitless for AP Respondents to investigate further at the time, and nothing in LVMPD’s response to the unredacted complaint would have put AP Respondents on notice that the story was false.

Therefore, we agree with the district court that the article was a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public importance. Because AP Respondents met their burden under the first prong, we now turn to the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, first discussing the burden required of a public figure plaintiff to establish actual malice.

⁴We have considered the additional evidence Wynn points to in this regard and are not persuaded that it demonstrates that AP Respondents knew the complaint was false.

A public figure plaintiff's burden under the second prong

As noted, under the second prong of the relevant framework, the court must determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on the claim. NRS 41.660(3)(b). Because Wynn is a public figure, to prevail at trial on his defamation claim, he must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the publication at issue was made with *actual malice*.⁵ *Pegasus v. Reno Newspapers, Inc.*, 118 Nev. 706, 719, 57 P.3d 82, 90 (2002). Wynn argues that his evidence of actual malice at this stage need not meet the clear and convincing standard in order to establish a probability of prevailing on his claim because prong two merely requires a “prima facie” probability of prevailing on the claim. AP Respondents, however, assert that Wynn’s evidence of actual malice must meet the clear and convincing standard. We have never directly discussed a plaintiff’s burden under the second prong when that prong requires “prima facie” evidence of success but the plaintiff’s claim requires “clear and convincing” evidence to prevail at trial.

We have described the second prong of an anti-SLAPP analysis as requiring the plaintiff to show that his claim has at least “minimal merit.” *Abrams v. Sanson*, 136 Nev. 83, 91, 458 P.3d 1062, 1069 (2020). Minimal merit exists when the plaintiff makes “a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.” *Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester*, 50 P.3d

⁵To prevail on his defamation claim, Wynn is also required to show “(1) a false and defamatory statement by [the] defendant concerning the plaintiff; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third person; (3) fault . . . ; and (4) actual or presumed damages.” *Pegasus v. Reno Newspapers, Inc.*, 118 Nev. 706, 718, 57 P.3d 82, 90 (2002). However, the only element reasonably in controversy on appeal is Wynn’s ability to establish actual malice.

733, 739 (Cal. 2002) (quoting *Matson v. Dvorak*, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 880, 886 (Ct. App. 1995)). But a favorable judgment in a public figure defamation claim may only be sustained if the evidence is sufficient for the jury, *by clear and convincing evidence*, to infer that the publication was made with actual malice. *Pegasus*, 118 Nev. at 721-22, 57 P.3d at 92.

The Legislature has declared that “[w]hen a plaintiff must demonstrate a probability of success of prevailing on a claim pursuant to NRS 41.660, . . . the plaintiff must meet the same burden of proof that a plaintiff has been required to meet pursuant to California’s [anti-SLAPP] law.” NRS 41.665(2). Thus, we turn to California law to resolve the issue at hand.

California caselaw regarding a plaintiff’s burden of putting forth prima facie evidence supports the conclusion that, under the second prong, a plaintiff must provide evidence that would be sufficient for a jury, *by clear and convincing evidence*, to reasonably infer that the publication was made with actual malice. *See, e.g., Padres L.P. v. Henderson*, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 584, 594 (Ct. App. 2003) (“The plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of facts that would be sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment under the applicable evidentiary standard.”); *Robertson v. Rodriguez*, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 470 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding that where an element of a claim must be proven by clear and convincing evidence at trial, the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s prima facie showing on an anti-SLAPP motion is determined with the higher standard of proof in mind); *Looney v. Superior Ct.*, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 182, 192-93 (Ct. App. 1993) (concluding that at the “summary judgment [stage] in a case where plaintiff’s ultimate burden of proof will be by clear and convincing evidence . . . the evidence and all

inferences which can reasonably be drawn therefrom must meet that higher standard” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

We therefore hold that to demonstrate by prima facie evidence a probability of success on the merits of a public figure defamation claim, the plaintiff’s evidence must be sufficient for a jury, by clear and convincing evidence, to reasonably infer that the publication was made with actual malice. In other words, while the plaintiff at this prong must prove only that their claim has minimal merit, a public figure defamation claim does not have minimal merit, as a matter of law, if the plaintiff’s evidence of actual malice would not be sufficient to sustain a favorable verdict under the clear and convincing standard. If a public figure plaintiff could prevail on an anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss by putting forth only minimal evidence of actual malice, the statutes’ mechanism for providing an early and expeditious resolution of meritless claims would be rendered ineffectual.

Wynn argues that requiring him to meet a clear and convincing evidence standard at this stage of the proceedings would violate his constitutional right to a civil jury trial. *See Leiendecker v. Asian Women United of Minn.*, 895 N.W.2d 623, 635 (Minn. 2017) (holding that a portion of Minnesota’s anti-SLAPP law violated the constitutional right to a jury trial because it required the nonmoving party to produce “clear and convincing [evidence] . . . that the moving party’s acts are not immune” (internal quotation marks omitted)). To be sure, in *Taylor v. Colon*, we previously upheld the second prong of Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statutes as constitutional, partly because the prima facie standard does not interfere with a jury’s fact-finding abilities. 136 Nev. 434, 439, 482 P.3d 1212, 1216

(2020).⁶ But importantly, “whether the evidence in the record in a defamation case is sufficient to support a finding of actual malice is a question of law.” *Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton*, 491 U.S. 657, 685 (1989). And even outside of the anti-SLAPP context, “[t]he question of actual malice goes to the jury *only* if there is sufficient evidence for the jury, *by clear and convincing evidence*, to reasonably infer that the publication was made with actual malice.” *Pegasus*, 118 Nev. at 721-22, 57 P.3d at 92 (emphases added). Because actual malice is a question that does not go to a jury unless the evidence is sufficient to meet the clear and convincing standard, requiring the plaintiff’s evidence to meet that standard at the second prong of an anti-SLAPP analysis does not deny a plaintiff their constitutional right to a civil jury trial. Our holding in *Taylor* did not preclude a requirement that when an element of a particular claim requires the plaintiff to satisfy a clear and convincing evidence standard before the claim goes to a jury, the plaintiff’s evidence at the second prong must satisfy that standard. In holding today that such a requirement exists, we do not replace the prima facie evidence standard; rather, the requirement that evidence of actual malice meet the clear and convincing standard is merely a part of the plaintiff’s prima facie showing.

⁶In a previous version of NRS 41.660, plaintiffs bore a clear and convincing burden of proof standard at the second prong. The Legislature amended that statute in 2015 to require only prima facie evidence. 2015 Nev. Stat., ch. 428, § 13, at 2455. Our holding does not rewrite the statute to return the plaintiff’s burden of proof to a clear and convincing standard; it merely recognizes that evidence of actual malice must meet the clear and convincing standard to sufficiently demonstrate with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on this type of claim.

Wynn failed to meet his burden under the second prong

“[A]ctual malice is proven when a statement is published with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for its veracity.” *Pegasus*, 118 Nev. at 722, 57 P.3d at 92. “Reckless disregard for the truth may be found when the ‘defendant entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statement, but published it anyway.’” *Id.* (quoting *Posadas v. City of Reno*, 109 Nev. 448, 454, 851 P.2d 438, 443 (1993)).

This court has routinely looked to California courts for guidance in the area of anti-SLAPP law. *Coker v. Sassone*, 135 Nev. 8, 11, 432 P.3d 746, 749 (2019). California courts treat this prong as they do a motion for summary judgment; thus, under comparable Nevada law regarding motions for summary judgment, “the evidence, and any reasonable inferences drawn from it, must be viewed in [the] light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” *Wood v. Safeway, Inc.*, 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005).⁷ Here, even when the evidence is considered in the light most favorable to him, Wynn has failed to establish actual malice by sufficient evidence to sustain a favorable verdict. His attempts to establish AP Respondents’ knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the veracity of the complaint fall short of the heightened clear and convincing standard. *See Gruber v. Baker*, 20 Nev. 453, 477, 23 P. 858, 865 (1890) (describing

⁷We note that prior to 2013, NRS 41.660 required the district court to treat a special motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. *See* 2013 Nev. Stat., ch. 176, § 3, at 623. Though the Legislature removed this language in 2013, subsequent amendments in 2015 restructured the statute in a way that once again tracks the procedural standards that apply to a motion for summary judgment. *See Coker*, 135 Nev. at 10, 432 P.3d at 748 (recognizing that “[a]s amended, the special motion to dismiss again functions like a summary judgment motion procedurally”).

clear and convincing evidence as satisfactory proof that is “so strong and cogent as to satisfy the mind and conscience of a common man”).

Similar to his arguments under prong one, Wynn argues that the Chicago complaint was implausible and points to the failure by AP Respondents to investigate further before publishing as evidence of actual malice. Again, while the complaint contained unusual elements, that does not mean that the gist of the allegations reported by AP Respondents—that Wynn sexually assaulted a woman in Chicago in the 1970s—was untrue or that AP Respondents should have held serious doubt about those allegations. As explained, because all identifying information in the complaint was redacted, it was not possible to meaningfully investigate further as long as that information was unknown. Wynn again points to Garcia Cano’s text describing the complaint as “crazy” to establish her subjective doubt. But calling the complaint “crazy” is not clear and convincing evidence that Garcia Cano believed it to be false or that she recklessly disregarded whether it was true.⁸ Wynn also attempts to establish reckless disregard by highlighting AP Respondents’ motivation to publish the story quickly. But news organizations often have a motivation to publish stories before their competitors, and in the absence of serious doubt regarding the veracity of the statement, such a desire does not

⁸Looking at Wynn’s evidence in the light most favorable to him does not require us to assume that by “crazy” Garcia Cano meant “not believable” or “unreliable.” A more reasonable inference from her characterization is that she believed the complaint to be “shocking,” “disturbing,” or, as Garcia Cano put it in her testimony, “explosive and impactful.”

establish a reckless disregard for the truth.⁹ *Pegasus*, 118 Nev. at 722, 57 P.3d at 92.

This evidence would not be sufficient for a jury to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that AP Respondents published the story with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for its truth.¹⁰ Because Wynn did not produce sufficient evidence of actual malice, he failed to establish with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on his claim, requiring dismissal.


CONCLUSION

Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes were designed to limit precisely the type of claim at issue here, which involves a news organization publishing an article in a good faith effort to inform their readers regarding an issue of clear public interest. AP Respondents met their burden under the first prong to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that their article was a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern. Wynn, on the other hand, did not establish with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on the merits of his defamation claim because he failed to meet the clear and convincing evidence standard under the second prong that is

⁹At most, the evidence shows that AP Respondents may have held *some* doubt as to the veracity of the complaint. But that is not enough to meet the standard; the defendant must hold *serious* doubt. See *Wynn v. Smith*, 117 Nev. 6, 17, 16 P.3d 424, 431 (2001) (reversing a jury verdict finding actual malice because the jury instructions omitted "serious" before "doubt," leading the jury to apply a lower standard).


¹⁰Wynn points to some additional evidence of actual malice not discussed in this opinion, but we are not convinced that it is sufficient to meet his burden under this prong.

applicable to his public figure defamation claim. We therefore affirm the district court's order granting the renewed special motion to dismiss the complaint.

 J.
Farraguirre

We concur:

 J.
Herndon

 J.
Lee

APPENDIX 2


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

STEVE WYNN, AN INDIVIDUAL,
Appellant,
vs.
THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, A
FOREIGN CORPORATION; AND
REGINA GARCIA CANO, AN
INDIVIDUAL,
Respondents.

No. 85804

FILED

SEP 05 2024

ELIZABETH A. BROWN
CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
BY 
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK

Appeal from a district court order granting an anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Ronald J. Israel, Judge.

Affirmed.

Pisanelli Bice PLLC and Todd L. Bice, Jordan T. Smith, Emily A. Buchwald, and Daniel R. Brady, Las Vegas, for Appellant.

Ballard Spahr LLP and David Chavez, Las Vegas, and Jay Ward Brown and Chad R. Bowman, Washington, D.C., for Respondents.

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, EN BANC.

OPINION¹

By the Court, PARRAGUIRRE, J.:

In designing its anti-SLAPP statutes, Nevada recognized the essential role of the First Amendment rights to petition the government for a redress of grievances and to free speech, and the danger posed by civil claims aimed at chilling the valid exercise of those rights. 1997 Nev. Stat., ch. 387, at 1363-64 (preamble to bill enacting anti-SLAPP statutes). To limit that chilling effect, the statutes provide defendants with an opportunity—through a special motion to dismiss—to obtain an early and expeditious resolution of a meritless claim for relief that is based on protected activity. NRS 41.650; NRS 41.660(1)(a). District courts resolve such motions based on the two-prong framework laid out in NRS 41.660(3). Under the first prong, the court must “[d]etermine whether the moving party has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the claim is based upon a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern.” NRS 41.660(3)(a). If the moving party makes this initial showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff under the second prong to show “with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on the claim.” NRS 41.660(3)(b).

In this appeal, we consider the proper burden a public figure must carry to show a probability of prevailing on a defamation claim at the

¹Having considered the petition for en banc reconsideration in this matter, as well as the response thereto, we have determined that reconsideration is warranted. See NRAP 40A(a). Accordingly, the petition for en banc reconsideration is granted. This court’s previous opinion in this matter, *Wynn v. Associated Press*, 140 Nev., Adv. Op No. 6, 542 P.3d 751 (Feb. 8, 2024), is hereby withdrawn.

second prong of the anti-SLAPP framework. We clarify that, under the second prong, a public figure defamation plaintiff must provide sufficient evidence for a jury, by clear and convincing evidence, to reasonably infer that the publication was made with actual malice. Because respondents met their respective burden under prong one, and the public figure plaintiff in the underlying defamation action failed to meet his burden under prong two, we affirm the district court's order granting respondents' renewed special motion to dismiss.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This appeal arises out of a defamation claim brought by appellant Steve Wynn—a prominent figure in Nevada gaming and politics—against respondents the Associated Press and one of its reporters, Regina Garcia Cano (collectively, AP Respondents).² Following national reports alleging years of misconduct by Wynn, Garcia Cano obtained from the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) redacted copies of two separate citizens' complaints alleging sexual assault by Wynn in the 1970s. She wrote an article describing the allegations in the complaints, one of which alleged that Steve Wynn had raped the complainant three times at her Chicago apartment between 1973 and 1974, resulting in a pregnancy and the birth of a child in a gas station bathroom under unusual

²This case returns to us on appeal following our reversal of the district court's grant of AP Respondents' motion to dismiss based on the fair report privilege. *See generally Wynn v. Associated Press*, 136 Nev. 611, 475 P.3d 44 (2020).

circumstances (the Chicago complaint).³ The Associated Press published the article.

Wynn filed a defamation complaint against AP Respondents, asserting that the allegations of sexual assault contained in the Chicago complaint were false and improbable on their face, and that AP Respondents published the article with actual malice. AP Respondents filed a special motion to dismiss pursuant to Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes. Following limited discovery on the issue of actual malice, the district court granted a renewed version of AP Respondents' special motion to dismiss, finding that the article was a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern and that Wynn failed to meet his burden of establishing a probability of prevailing on the merits of his claim. Wynn now appeals that decision. He argues that the district court erred in finding both that AP Respondents met their burden under the first prong and that he failed to meet his burden under the second prong. Specifically, he argues that the district court misapplied the actual malice standard relevant to public figures under the second prong.

DISCUSSION

"We review a decision to grant or deny an anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss de novo." *Smith v. Zilverberg*, 137 Nev. 65, 67, 481 P.3d 1222, 1226 (2021). As explained above, the anti-SLAPP framework demands a two-prong analysis when considering a special motion to

³Following a bench trial on a defamation claim brought by Wynn against the complainant, a district court found that the Chicago complaint allegations were, in fact, false. *Wynn v. Associated Press*, No. A-18-772715-C (Nev. 8th Jud. Dist. Ct. Mar. 25, 2020) (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment).

dismiss. The first prong requires the court to “[d]etermine whether the moving party has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the claim is based upon a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern.” NRS 41.660(3)(a). If the moving party makes this initial showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff under the second prong to show “with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on the claim.” NRS 41.660(3)(b). Because Wynn challenges the district court’s rulings under both prongs, we will discuss each in turn.

AP Respondents met their burden under the first prong

To meet the burden under the first prong, the defendant must show “that the comments at issue fall into one of the four categories . . . enumerated in NRS 41.637.” *Stark v. Lackey*, 136 Nev. 38, 40, 458 P.3d 342, 345 (2020). The relevant category here is found under NRS 41.637(4), which protects a “[c]ommunication made in direct connection with an issue of public interest in a place open to the public or in a public forum, which is truthful or is made without knowledge of its falsehood.” Wynn argues that the district court erred in concluding that the article by AP Respondents satisfies this category. Specifically, he asserts that the article does not discuss an issue of public interest and that it was not truthful or made without knowledge of its falsehood.

In *Shapiro v. Welt*, we adopted guidelines for district courts to consider in distinguishing issues of private and public interest.⁴ 133 Nev.

⁴Those guidelines are:

- (1) “public interest” does not equate with mere curiosity;

35, 39, 389 P.3d 262, 268 (2017). Here, the article and its surrounding context point to an issue of clear public interest. The article discusses two new allegations of sexual misconduct by Wynn on the heels of national reports alleging a pattern of misconduct spanning decades. In the weeks preceding publication of this article, Wynn resigned as CEO of Wynn Resorts and as Finance Chair of the Republican National Committee due to the national reports of alleged misconduct; and contemporaneously, Wynn Casinos, the Nevada Gaming Control Board, and other regulators launched investigations into his conduct. The allegations undoubtedly affected his public business and political affairs, and additional reports of sexual misconduct would be of concern to a substantial number of people, including consumers, voters, and the business and governmental entities investigating precisely this kind of behavior. The public had an interest in

(2) a matter of public interest should be something of concern to a substantial number of people; a matter of concern to a speaker and a relatively small specific audience is not a matter of public interest;

(3) there should be some degree of closeness between the challenged statements and the asserted public interest—the assertion of a broad and amorphous public interest is not sufficient;

(4) the focus of the speaker’s conduct should be the public interest rather than a mere effort to gather ammunition for another round of private controversy; and

(5) a person cannot turn otherwise private information into a matter of public interest simply by communicating it to a large number of people.

Shapiro, 133 Nev. at 39, 389 P.3d at 268 (quoting *Piping Rock Partners, Inc. v. David Lerner Assocs., Inc.*, 946 F. Supp. 2d 957, 968 (N.D. Cal. 2013)).

understanding the history of misconduct alleged to have been committed by one of the most recognized figures in Nevada, and the article directly relates to that interest.

Wynn further argues that, even if the article relates to an issue of public interest, the district court erred in concluding the communication was published without knowledge of its falsehood (i.e., that it was published in “good faith,” NRS 41.637; NRS 41.660(3)(a)). “[A]n affidavit stating that the defendant believed the communications to be truthful or made them without knowledge of their falsehood is sufficient to meet the defendant’s burden absent contradictory evidence in the record.” *Stark*, 136 Nev. at 43, 458 P.3d at 347. Here, AP Respondents filed such an affidavit.

In rebuttal, Wynn points to what he claims to be contradictory evidence in the record. Most notably, he asserts that the Chicago complaint was absurd on its face, and therefore, AP Respondents must have known it was false. He also points to a text sent by Garcia Cano to a coworker shortly after reviewing the complaint in which she wrote “[o]ne of [the complaints] is crazy.” However, we agree with the district court that this evidence is not sufficient to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that AP Respondents were aware of the complaint’s falsity. While the narrative contained in the complaint is unusual, it was not so unrealistic as to put AP Respondents on notice as to its falsity, and Garcia Cano’s characterization of the complaint as “crazy” is not persuasive evidence that she knew it to be false.⁵ Importantly, because the identifying information in the complaint received by Garcia Cano was redacted, it would have been fruitless for AP

⁵We have considered the additional evidence Wynn points to in this regard and are not persuaded that it demonstrates that AP Respondents knew the complaint was false.

Respondents to investigate further at the time, and nothing in LVMPD's response to the unredacted complaint would have put AP Respondents on notice that the story was false.

Therefore, we agree with the district court that the article was a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public importance. Because AP Respondents met their burden under the first prong, we now turn to the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, first discussing the burden required of a public figure plaintiff to establish actual malice.

A public figure plaintiff's burden under the second prong

As noted, under the second prong of the relevant framework, the court must determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on the claim. NRS 41.660(3)(b). Because Wynn is a public figure, to prevail at trial on his defamation claim, he must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the publication at issue was made with *actual malice*.⁶ *Pegasus v. Reno Newspapers, Inc.*, 118 Nev. 706, 719, 57 P.3d 82, 90 (2002). Wynn argues that his evidence of actual malice at this stage need not meet the clear and convincing standard in order to establish a probability of prevailing on his claim because prong two merely requires a "prima facie" probability of prevailing on the claim. AP Respondents, however, assert that Wynn's evidence of actual malice must meet the clear and convincing standard. We

⁶To prevail on his defamation claim, Wynn is also required to show "(1) a false and defamatory statement by [the] defendant concerning the plaintiff; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third person; (3) fault . . . ; and (4) actual or presumed damages." *Pegasus v. Reno Newspapers, Inc.*, 118 Nev. 706, 718, 57 P.3d 82, 90 (2002). However, the only element reasonably in controversy on appeal is Wynn's ability to establish actual malice.

have never directly discussed a plaintiff's burden under the second prong when that prong requires "prima facie" evidence of success but the plaintiff's claim requires "clear and convincing" evidence to prevail at trial.

We have described the second prong of an anti-SLAPP analysis as requiring the plaintiff to show that his claim has at least "minimal merit." *Abrams v. Sanson*, 136 Nev. 83, 91, 458 P.3d 1062, 1069 (2020). Minimal merit exists when the plaintiff makes "a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited." *Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester*, 50 P.3d 733, 739 (Cal. 2002) (quoting *Matson v. Dvorak*, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 880, 886 (Ct. App. 1995)). But a favorable judgment in a public figure defamation claim may only be sustained if the evidence is sufficient for the jury, *by clear and convincing evidence*, to infer that the publication was made with actual malice. *Pegasus*, 118 Nev. at 721-22, 57 P.3d at 92.

The Legislature has declared that "[w]hen a plaintiff must demonstrate a probability of success of prevailing on a claim pursuant to NRS 41.660, . . . the plaintiff must meet the same burden of proof that a plaintiff has been required to meet pursuant to California's [anti-SLAPP] law." NRS 41.665(2). Thus, we turn to California law to resolve the issue at hand.

California caselaw regarding a plaintiff's burden of putting forth prima facie evidence supports the conclusion that, under the second prong, a plaintiff must provide evidence that would be sufficient for a jury, *by clear and convincing evidence*, to reasonably infer that the publication was made with actual malice. *See, e.g., Padres L.P. v. Henderson*, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 584, 594 (Ct. App. 2003) ("The plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of facts that would be sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment

under the applicable evidentiary standard.”); *Robertson v. Rodriguez*, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 470 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding that where an element of a claim must be proven by clear and convincing evidence at trial, the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s prima facie showing on an anti-SLAPP motion is determined with the higher standard of proof in mind); *Looney v. Superior Ct.*, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 182, 192-93 (Ct. App. 1993) (concluding that at the “summary judgment [stage] in a case where plaintiff’s ultimate burden of proof will be by clear and convincing evidence . . . the evidence and all inferences which can reasonably be drawn therefrom must meet that higher standard” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

We therefore hold that to demonstrate by prima facie evidence a probability of success on the merits of a public figure defamation claim, the plaintiff’s evidence must be sufficient for a jury, by clear and convincing evidence, to reasonably infer that the publication was made with actual malice. In other words, while the plaintiff at this prong must prove only that their claim has minimal merit, a public figure defamation claim does not have minimal merit, as a matter of law, if the plaintiff’s evidence of actual malice would not be sufficient—even if credited—to sustain a favorable verdict under the clear and convincing standard.

Wynn argues that requiring him to meet a clear and convincing evidence standard at this stage of the proceedings would violate his constitutional right to a civil jury trial. See *Leindecker v. Asian Women United of Minn.*, 895 N.W.2d 623, 635 (Minn. 2017) (holding that a portion of Minnesota’s anti-SLAPP law violated the constitutional right to a jury trial because it required the nonmoving party to produce “clear and convincing [evidence] . . . that the moving party’s acts are not immune” (internal quotation marks omitted)). To be sure, in *Taylor v. Colon*, we

previously upheld the second prong of Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statutes as constitutional, partly because the prima facie standard does not interfere with a jury’s fact-finding abilities. 136 Nev. 434, 439, 482 P.3d 1212, 1216 (2020).⁷ But importantly, “whether the evidence in the record in a defamation case is sufficient to support a finding of actual malice is a question of law.” *Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton*, 491 U.S. 657, 685 (1989). And even outside of the anti-SLAPP context, “[t]he question of actual malice goes to the jury *only* if there is sufficient evidence for the jury, *by clear and convincing evidence*, to reasonably infer that the publication was made with actual malice.” *Pegasus*, 118 Nev. at 721-22, 57 P.3d at 92 (emphases added). Because actual malice is a question that does not go to a jury unless the evidence is sufficient for a jury to conclude that it meets the clear and convincing standard, requiring the plaintiff’s evidence to satisfy that showing at the second prong of an anti-SLAPP analysis does not deny a plaintiff their constitutional right to a civil jury trial. Our holding in *Taylor* did not preclude a requirement that when an element of a particular claim requires the plaintiff to satisfy a clear and convincing evidence standard at trial, the plaintiff’s evidence at the second prong must be sufficient for a jury to conclude that standard has been satisfied if the evidence is credited. In holding today that such a requirement exists, we do not replace the prima facie evidence standard;

⁷In a previous version of NRS 41.660, plaintiffs bore a clear and convincing burden of proof standard at the second prong. The Legislature amended that statute in 2015 to require only prima facie evidence. 2015 Nev. Stat., ch. 428, § 13, at 2455. Our holding does not rewrite the statute to return the plaintiff’s burden of proof to a clear and convincing standard; it merely recognizes that evaluating whether plaintiff has presented prima facie evidence of actual malice must take into account the clear and convincing standard required to prevail on this type of claim.

rather, the requirement that evidence of actual malice if viewed favorably could meet the clear and convincing standard is merely a part of the plaintiff's prima facie showing.

Wynn failed to meet his burden under the second prong

“[A]ctual malice is proven when a statement is published with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for its veracity.” *Pegasus*, 118 Nev. at 722, 57 P.3d at 92. “Reckless disregard for the truth may be found when the ‘defendant entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statement, but published it anyway.’” *Id.* (quoting *Posadas v. City of Reno*, 109 Nev. 448, 454, 851 P.2d 438, 443 (1993)).

This court has routinely looked to California courts for guidance in the area of anti-SLAPP law. *Coker v. Sassone*, 135 Nev. 8, 11, 432 P.3d 746, 749 (2019). California courts treat this prong as they do a motion for summary judgment; thus, under comparable Nevada law regarding motions for summary judgment, “the evidence, and any reasonable inferences drawn from it, must be viewed in [the] light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” *Wood v. Safeway, Inc.*, 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005).⁸ Here, even when the evidence is considered in the light most favorable to him, Wynn has failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain a favorable verdict finding actual malice. His attempts to establish AP Respondents’ knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the veracity of

⁸We note that prior to 2013, NRS 41.660 required the district court to treat a special motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. See 2013 Nev. Stat., ch. 176, § 3, at 623. Though the Legislature removed this language in 2013, subsequent amendments in 2015 restructured the statute in a way that once again tracks the procedural standards that apply to a motion for summary judgment. See *Coker*, 135 Nev. at 10, 432 P.3d at 748 (recognizing that “[a]s amended, the special motion to dismiss again functions like a summary judgment motion procedurally”).

the complaint fall short of a prima facie showing that could meet the heightened clear and convincing standard. *See Gruber v. Baker*, 20 Nev. 453, 477, 23 P. 858, 865 (1890) (describing clear and convincing evidence as satisfactory proof that is “so strong and cogent as to satisfy the mind and conscience of a common man”).

Similar to his arguments under prong one, Wynn argues that the Chicago complaint was implausible and points to the failure by AP Respondents to investigate further before publishing as evidence of actual malice. Again, while the complaint contained unusual elements, that does not necessarily mean that the gist of the allegations reported by AP Respondents—that Wynn sexually assaulted a woman in Chicago in the 1970s—was untrue or that AP Respondents held serious doubt about those allegations. As explained, because all identifying information in the complaint was redacted, it was not possible to meaningfully investigate further as long as that information was unknown. Wynn again points to Garcia Cano’s text describing the complaint as “crazy” to establish her subjective doubt. But even considered in the light most favorable to Wynn, calling the complaint “crazy” could not meet the required clear and convincing standard that Garcia Cano believed the allegation to be false or that she recklessly disregarded whether it was true. Wynn also attempts to establish reckless disregard by highlighting AP Respondents’ motivation to publish the story quickly. But news organizations often have a motivation to publish stories before their competitors, and in the absence of serious doubt regarding the veracity of the statement, such a desire could

not establish a reckless disregard for the truth.⁹ *Pegasus*, 118 Nev. at 722, 57 P.3d at 92.

This evidence would not be sufficient for a jury to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that AP Respondents published the story with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for its truth.¹⁰ Because Wynn did not produce sufficient evidence of actual malice, he failed to establish with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on his claim, requiring dismissal.


CONCLUSION

Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes were designed to limit precisely the type of claim at issue here, which involves a news organization publishing an article in a good faith effort to inform their readers regarding an issue of clear public interest. AP Respondents met their burden under the first prong to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that their article was a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern. Wynn, on the other hand, did not establish with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on the merits of his defamation claim because he failed to meet the clear and convincing evidence standard under the second prong that is

⁹At most, the evidence could show that AP Respondents may have held *some* doubt as to the veracity of the complaint. But that does not constitute a prima facie showing for actual malice, which requires a finding the defendant held *serious* doubt. See *Wynn v. Smith*, 117 Nev. 6, 17, 16 P.3d 424, 431 (2001) (reversing a jury verdict finding actual malice because the jury instructions omitted "serious" before "doubt," leading the jury to apply a lower standard).


¹⁰Wynn points to some additional evidence of actual malice not discussed in this opinion, but we are not convinced that it is sufficient to meet his burden under this prong.

applicable to his public figure defamation claim. We therefore affirm the district court's order granting the renewed special motion to dismiss the complaint.



Parraguirre, J.


We concur:



Cadish, C.J.


Stiglich, J.


Pickering, J.


Herndon, J.


Lee, J.


Bell, J.

APPENDIX 3



Administrative

Location UNKNOWN ADDRESS CHICAGO Chicago, IL

Sector /Beat OJ - Other Jurisdiction

Occurred On (Date / Time) Friday 6/1/1973 12:00:00 AM
Reporting Officer 07027 - Chavez, Irma M
Entered By 07027 - Chavez, Irma M
Related Cases

Or Between (Date / Time) Saturday 8/31/1974 12:00:00 AM
Reported On 2/7/2018
Entered On 2/7/2018 11:26:37 AM
Jurisdiction Other Jurisdiction

Traffic Report No Place Type Accident Involved

Offenses:

Sex Assault(F)-NRS 200.366.2B

Completed Yes Domestic Violence No Hate/Bias Unknown (Offenders Motivation Not Known)
Entry Premises Entered Type Security Tools
Weapons None Location Type Residence/Home
Criminal Activities None/Unknown

Victims:

Name: [REDACTED]

Victim Type Individual Written Statement Yes Can ID Suspect Yes
Victim of 50095 - Sex Assault(F)-NRS 200.366.2B

DOB [REDACTED] Age 27 Sex Female Race White Ethnicity Unknown
Height 5' 0" Weight 115 Hair Color Blond Eye Color Green
Employer/School Occupation/Grade Work Schedule Injury Weapons None

Addresses

Residence [REDACTED]

Phones

Cellular [REDACTED]

Offender Relationships

S - Wynn, Stephan [REDACTED]

Notes:

The Use and Dissemination of this Record is Regulated by Law. Secondary Dissemination of any kind is Prohibited and could subject the offender to Criminal and Civil Liability.

This Information Released To:
ASSIGNED RECD / LACRVA CARD
By: *[Signature]* Date: *2/27/18*
Las Vegas Metro Police Dept.

Suspects:

Name: Wynn, Stephan

Alias:

Scope ID DOB Age 76 Race White Ethnicity Not Hispanic or Latino
Sex Male Height 5' 6" Weight 145 Hair Color Brown Eye Color Brown
Employer/School Occupation/Grade

Addresses

Phones

Business/Work [REDACTED]

Notes:

Narrative

[REDACTED] came to NWAC to report that in 1973-1974, in Chicago, IL, she was exercising in her old apartment and when she stood up, Stephan Wynn was standing in front of her and said a word that she didn't understand, and then he pinned her up against the refrigerator and raped her as she was standing holding onto the refrigerator. Stephan then called someone for a few minutes then came and kiss her on her cheek and said he had to go and then added I call you later.

When he left she was still standing holding onto the refrigerator and looked at the window and saw her reflection, crying, and asking herself what just happened, what did he say?

A few days later, after her shower, she wrapped herself in the towel and was going to the bedroom and there was Stephan, sitting at the kitchen table. He got up and says some words, pinned her to the wall forcing himself on her then just like before, he called someone, kissed her on the cheek and said he would call her later and left. She was standing holding onto the wall and the towel was on the floor, and she was crying, saying to herself, why her, what did she do to be treated so badly, and why is he coming to her apartment. She didn't give him a key to her apartment. She remembers that Stephan said "you make me horny" then raped her twice.

She ended up pregnant. It was a hot steamy afternoon and she needed to go to the restroom. She saw a gas station and went in to the restroom. She was in pain standing by the wall and gave birth. The baby was laying on her feet inside the water bag. She slid down and said a doll is inside the water bag, the blood falling down, and she wanted to open, but the water bag was thick. She used her teeth to make a small opening then with her finger, opened the water bag and saw that the doll was purple. She started to blow on her and in a short time her cheeks were turning pink and she opened her eyes. She looked so much like her.

The gas station attendant opened the door to the restroom and when he saw her with a baby, he ran to the office and called an ambulance.

Her name is [REDACTED] and she lives in Las Vegas - Stephan and my child. [REDACTED] knows me as her mother and has her own family now.

Report taken per Det K. McCaffery, P#8731.

1/22/2018
11:44 AM

APPENDIX 4

Message

From: Garcia Cano, Regina [/O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=34E6E2B1DF7E4C348F36416870A8EE3C-GARCIA CANO]
Sent: 2/27/2018 8:07:02 PM
To: Garcia Cano, Regina [RGarciaCano@ap.org]; McCombs, Brady [BMcCombs@ap.org]
Subject: Conversation with Garcia Cano, Regina

Garcia Cano, Regina [12:50 PM]:

Hi, are you in the bureau and available for a phone call? I just got police records from Wynn assaults in the 70s.

McCombs, Brady [12:51 PM]:

no, i'm not.

Garcia Cano, Regina [12:51 PM]:

One of them is crazy

McCombs, Brady [12:51 PM]:

at the capitol waiting for romney
can you please reach out directly to anna jo?

Garcia Cano, Regina [12:51 PM]:

Oh true. Sorry
yes

McCombs, Brady [12:51 PM]:

how did you get those?
FOIA?

Garcia Cano, Regina [12:51 PM]:

FOIA

McCombs, Brady [12:51 PM]:

great. yeah, please reach out to Anna Jo.
i'll give a head's up.

McCombs, Brady [12:53 PM]:

fyi - I'm trying to put a NN out now while waiting for Romney on the immigration lawsuit. YOU can use that on the 1:30 digest.
anna jo says she's available to chat about Wynn. I briefed here.
her

Garcia Cano, Regina [12:54 PM]:

Lindsay is going to work on the Utah digest, I need to work on this.
I called the desk, Mona said Anna Jo will call me.

McCombs, Brady [12:55 PM]:

cool. sounds good.

037a

CONFIDENTIAL



AP0002946

APPENDIX 5

ITEMID: d74af8c7df2c4f70ae156b82207109ef

SLUG: US--Sexual Misconduct--Steve Wynn

BYLINE:

BYTITLE:

DATELINE: LAS VEGAS

EDSNOTE: Eds: APNewsNow. Will be expanded.

HEADLINE: APNewsBreak: Woman tells police Steve Wynn raped her in '70s

SUMMARY: A woman has told police she had a child with casino mogul Steve Wynn after he raped her, while another has reported she was forced to resign from a Las Vegas job after she refused to have sex with him. The Associated Press on Tuesday obtained copies of the police reports recently filed by the two women over allegations dating to the 1970s. Wynn has resigned from Wynn Resorts amid sexual misconduct allegations.

BODY:

LAS VEGAS (AP) — A woman has told police she had a child with casino mogul Steve Wynn after he raped her, while another has reported she was forced to resign from a Las Vegas job after she refused to have sex with him.

The Associated Press on Tuesday obtained copies of the police reports recently filed by the two women over allegations dating to the 1970s.

One report shows a woman told police she gave birth to a girl after Wynn raped her at her Chicago apartment around 1973 and 1974.

The other says she had consensual sex with Wynn while she worked as a casino dealer at the Golden Nugget but was fired when she told him no in summer 1976.

Wynn has resigned as chairman and CEO of Wynn Resorts amid sexual misconduct allegations.

—
PUBLISH SETTINGS:

URGENCY: Urgent

PLATFORM: Online,Print,Broadcast

AUDIENCE: North America,Nevada,United States

CATEGORY: Business,Arts and entertainment,General news

CONTENT TYPE: Spot Development

NAMED ITEM:

SOURCE: AP


LANGUAGE: en-us

039a



AP0003166

APPENDIX 6



CLERK OF THE COURT

1 **JUDGE RONALD J. ISRAEL**
2 **EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT**
3 **DEPARTMENT 28**
4 Regional Justice Center
5 200 Lewis Avenue, 15th Floor
6 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155

7 **DISTRICT COURT**
8 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

9 STEVE WYNN, an individual
10
11 Plaintiff,

Case No.: A-18-772715-C
Dept.: XXVIII

12 v.

13 THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, a foreign
14 corporation; REGINA GARCIA CANO,
15 an individual; and HALINA KUTA, an
16 individual; DOES I-X,
17 Defendants.

18 **ORDER GRANTING**
19 **DEFENDANTS THE**
20 **ASSOCIATED PRESS AND**
21 **REGINA GARCIA CANO'S**
22 **RENEWED SPECIAL MOTION**
23 **TO DISMISS**

24 **ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS THE ASSOCIATED PRESS AND**
25 **REGINA GARCIA CANO'S RENEWED SPECIAL MOTION TO DISMISS**

26 This matter came before the Court on Defendants The Associated Press (“AP”) and Regina Garcia Cano’s (“Garcia Cano”), and together with AP, the (“Defendants”) Renewed Special Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Steve Wynn’s (“Wynn”) Complaint pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. §41.660 (the “Renewed Motion”), filed July 1, 2022. On August 9, 2022, Wynn filed his Opposition to the Motion. Defendants filed their Reply in support of their Motion on August 23, 2022.

27 On September 8, 2022, the Court heard the matter in-chambers. Having considered the Motion, Opposition, and Reply, the Court hereby finds and orders as follows:

28 ///

JUDGE RONALD J. ISRAEL

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DEPARTMENT 28

1 **FACTS & PROCEDURE**

2 This case stems from an article published by the Associated Press and written
3 by Regina Garcia Cano on February 27, 2018. The AP article was based on the police
4 report entered on February 7, 2018, by two (2) individuals alleging prior conduct that
5 occurred in the 1970s by Plaintiff, Steve Wynn. A copy of the article was attached as
6 Exhibit # 3 to the complaint. Plaintiff filed a Complaint against AP, Regina Cano and
7 Halina Kuta alleging various causes of action including, Defamation by all parties.
8 The Article outlines the allegations made to the police by the two complainants,
9 including one made by Defendant Kuta against Plaintiff Wynn.

10 This matter originally came before this Court on Defendants The Associated
11 Press (“AP”) and Regina Garcia Cano’s (“Garcia Cano”), and together with AP, the
12 (“Defendants”) Special Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Steve Wynn’s (“Wynn”)
13 Complaint pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. §41.660 (the “Motion”), filed May 31, 2018.

14 On July 5, 2018, Wynn and Defendants entered into a Stipulation and Order
15 Regarding Defendants’ Special Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to N.R.S. 41.660 (the
16 “Stipulation”). The Stipulation included modifications both to this Court’s scheduling
17 for the hearing and to the Court’s consideration of the grounds argued by Defendants
18 in their Motion.

19 The Stipulation was entered between the parties prior to the Hearing
20 specifically setting forth that Defendants argued in their Motion “that N.R.S. §41.660
21 [the ‘Nevada Anti-SLAPP Statute’] applies and that Wynn cannot demonstrate a
22 likelihood of success, as required under the statute, for two separate reasons: first, that
23 the reporting by the Defendants is privileged; and second, that Wynn cannot
24 demonstrate fault.” Stipulation at 2 (citations omitted). Wynn and the Defendants
25 stipulated “that discovery is not necessary to resolve the first basis for the motion, i.e.,
26 whether the challenged news report is subject to the fair report privilege as a matter of
27 law.” Id. Wynn and the Defendants further stipulated and the Court ordered that, at
28 the hearing on the Motion (then set for July 31, 2018, but later moved to August 14,

1 2018), “the Court shall consider the fair report privilege under the Nevada Anti-
2 SLAPP Statute, a question of law.” *Id.* at 3. Wynn and the Defendants further
3 stipulated and the Court ordered that, “[i]f the Court finds the reporting in this case
4 not to be covered by the fair report privilege, the Court shall continue to a second
5 hearing to consider the issue of fault[.]” *Id.* (emphasis added).

6 On July 18, 2018, Wynn filed his Opposition to the Motion. Defendants filed
7 their Reply in support of their Motion on August 7, 2018. On August 14, 2018, the
8 Court heard oral argument on the Motion. L. Lin Wood, Esq. of L. Lin Wood, P.C.,
9 and Tamara Beatty Peterson, Esq., and Nikki L. Baker, Esq. of Peterson Baker, PLLC
10 appeared on behalf of Wynn; Jay Ward Brown, Esq. and Justin A. Shiroff, Esq. of
11 Ballard Spahr LLP appeared on behalf of Defendants.

12 This court issued an Order on August 23, 2018, granting the Motion and found
13 that the news article fairly reported information that was found in the police reports
14 filed by the two (2) complainants and that the article was a “[g]ood faith
15 communication in furtherance of . . . the right to free speech in direct connection with
16 an issue of public interest.” *See* Aug. 23, 2018 Order Granting Defendants’ Special
17 Mot. to Dismiss at 3.

18 Wynn appealed this Court’s ruling regarding the fair report privilege and the
19 Nevada Supreme Court addressed whether the filing of a report documenting
20 allegations to police constitutes an official action under the fair report privilege. The
21 Court held that the complainant’s statement did not fall within the fair report privilege
22 because it was a statement of facts about a case rather than an official action or
23 proceeding, such as an arrest or the bringing of charges. *Wynn v. Associated Press*,
24 136 Nev. 611, 617, 475 P.3d 44, 50 (2020). Ultimately, the Court found that while the
25 report privilege shields a defendant from liability for publication of defamatory
26 content, the district court erred by extending the fair report privilege to the AP article
27 because law enforcement did not take any official action concerning the allegations
28 and they were not investigated, evaluated, or pursued by law enforcement. *Id.* at 619.

1 Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for determination of application
2 of the Anti-SLAPP statute and “whether Wynn, as a public figure, could demonstrate
3 a probability of prevailing on his defamation claim.” *Id.* at 620. On remand, Wynn
4 was permitted to take written, document, and deposition discovery on the limited
5 issue of actual malice. That discovery period has ended and AP Defendants re-filed
6 the Motion as a Renewed Motion.

7 **FINDINGS OF FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ANALYSIS**

8 This Court finds Mr. Wynn was a public figure and the sexual assault
9 allegations are a matter of public concern given his ownership and title with Wynn
10 Casinos, as well as the prior ongoing investigation and claims concerning female
11 employees and other regarding inappropriate behavior. Wynn argued additional
12 information should have been included in the news article and a thorough
13 investigation by Defendants was needed to verify the police reports. However, Wynn
14 ignores the fact that the reporter used two redacted complaints and there was no way
15 to verify the truthfulness of the complaints.

16 This Court finds the news article clearly states that the information was
17 obtained from copies of recently filed police reports. While the article referred to two
18 complaints, the first complaint has never been addressed while the second
19 complainant was not disclosed in the AP report. Consequently, no additional
20 information could have been obtained through further investigation. It was only after
21 Metro police disclosed the alleged victim’s name that contact could be made with Ms.
22 Kuta and it became apparent her allegations were without merit. Defendants could not
23 have known that Ms. Kuta’s allegations were false when the article was published and
24 there’s nothing in the record to suggest that Defendants knew or should have known
25 that the allegations were false.

26 Further, the case was remanded to allow discovery for Wynn to substantiate
27 actual malice to prevail on his defamation claim. To prevail on the defamation claim,
28 the Plaintiff must show actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. Here, the


1 Plaintiff has not established a likelihood of prevailing on the merits and there is
2 nothing in the record to show Defendants published information knowing of its
3 falsehood or that it was established with reckless disregard of the truth and therefore
4 Wynn cannot prevail.

5 For the above reasons, Defendants’ Renewed Special Motion to Dismiss is
6 GRANTED.

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this 26th day of October, 2022



District Court Judge
Ronald J. Israel
Case No. ~~EF9970645F7C84~~ 18-1719-C
*Order Granting Defendant’s The Associated
Press And Regina Garcia Cano’s Renewed
Special Motion To Dismiss*