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FOR PUBLICATION

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT**

VENTURA CONTENT, LTD.,
an Anguilla corporation,

*Plaintiff-Appellant/
Cross-Appellee,*

v.

MOTHERLESS, INC., a New
York corporation; JOSHUA
LANGE, an individual,

*Defendants-Appellees/
Cross-Appellants.*

Nos. 13-56332
13-56970

D.C. No.
2:11-cv-05912-
SVW-FMO

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted October 19, 2015
Pasadena, California

Filed March 14, 2018

Before: Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Johnnie B. Rawlinson
and Jacqueline H. Nguyen, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Kleinfeld;
Dissent by Judge Rawlinson

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COUNSEL

Peter R. Afraiasabi (argued), Christopher Arledge, and John Tehranian, One LLP, Newport Beach, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

David S. Richman (argued), Theodora Oringer PC, Los Angeles, California, for Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

OPINION

KLEINFELD, Senior Circuit Judge:

We address the safe harbor provision in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act¹ and conclude that the defendants are entitled to safe harbor.

FACTS

This case was decided on summary judgment. Joshua Lange, the named defendant, owns, operates, and is the sole employee of his internet site, Motherless.com. The site contains over 12.6 million mostly pornographic pictures and video clips. The content generally has been uploaded by the site's users, and the uploaders may or may not have created the material. Motherless stores the content on servers that Lange owns. In 2011, the website had nearly 750,000 active users and about 611,000 visits daily.

¹ Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 202, 112 Stat. 2860, 2877–86 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)–(d)).

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No one has to pay Motherless or Lange anything to look at the pictures or watch the videos on his site. A “premium” subscription is available for viewers willing to pay in exchange for avoiding advertisements and enabling downloading, but only two in a thousand active users buy premium subscriptions. Motherless makes about 15% of its income from subscriptions, T-shirts, coffee mugs, and the like. The remaining 85% comes from advertisements.

When Lange started Motherless, he uploaded around 700,000 pictures and videos that users had uploaded to a site he previously owned, Hidebehind.com. Since that initial upload, Motherless has gotten all of its pictures and videos from its users. It does not have any licensing deals with content producers. Motherless does not pay users for the pictures and clips they upload. Early on, members and premium members who uploaded a great deal of material got “credits” which they could exchange for premium subscriptions, T-shirts, and such. Motherless later expanded its award system so that members could also exchange credits for money, with each credit worth a nickel. One of the biggest uploaders, who uploaded over 300,000 videos and pictures, testified at his deposition that he made about \$200 after Motherless allowed him to exchange credits for money. A user forfeits all his credits if he uploads a picture or video that violates the website’s Terms of Use.

Users can upload up to 999 pictures and videos at a time. Each time that a user uploads a file, he receives a warning on his computer screen that says “Anyone

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uploading illegal images/videos will be reported to the authorities. Your IP address . . . has been recorded. Any images/videos violating our Terms of Use will be deleted.” After the user has uploaded content, he can add a title and tag to it. Tags are words for which Motherless’s search software will look when a user searches for particular content. Motherless does not edit, review, or approve file names, titles, or tags. It does maintain links to certain classes of content, such as “Most Viewed” and “Most Popular.”

The Terms of Use posted on the site provide a “partial list of content that is illegal or prohibited,” such as child pornography, bestiality, and copyright-infringing material. The Terms prohibit posting copyrighted material without the prior written consent of the copyright owner, and they invite takedown notices for infringing material. The website gives directions for emailing takedown notices. Motherless also uses a software program that provides copyright owners with a link and password so that they can directly delete infringing material themselves, without having to send a takedown notice to Lange.

Lange explained at his deposition that he and an independent contractor review all the pictures and videos before they are displayed on the site. Lange uses software that generates a thumbnail of each picture, and five thumbnails of each video clip at the 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, and 100% time points in the clip (*e.g.*, for a two minute clip, at 24, 48, 72, 96, and 120 seconds into the clip). Lange or his contractor look at each thumbnail for “obvious signs of child pornography, copyright

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notices, watermarks, and any other information that would indicate that the [material] contains illegal content or violates” the Terms of Use. Lange spends three to six hours a day, seven days a week, looking at the uploads, and he estimates that he reviews between 30,000 to 40,000 images per day. He looks at about 80 thumbnails per minute to keep up with the volume of uploads. He deletes any violating material that he or his contractor spot. Whenever he finds child pornography, he contacts the National Organization of Missing and Exploited Children so that criminal action can be instigated against the uploader.

Lange personally examines all copyright infringement notices, whether DMCA-compliant or not, and deletes any infringing content that he can find. He locates infringing content using the URL, that is, the web address that appears at the top of the screen when an image or clip is on the screen. The complainant identifies the material by the URL and Lange deletes it as quickly as he can, ordinarily within a day or two. He also sends an email to the user who uploaded the video or picture, notifying him that the uploaded material has been deleted. Motherless uses software to prevent users from re-uploading previously deleted material. Since 2008, Motherless has received over 3,500 takedown notices. Lange has deleted over 4.5 million pictures and videos for violating Motherless’s Terms of Use and estimates that 4% to 6% of the deleted files were for copyright infringement.

Motherless does not have a written policy instructing its employees on when to expel repeat infringers;

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there are no employees to instruct. Lange personally terminates repeat infringers; the independent contractor does not terminate repeat infringers. Termination is a matter of Lange's judgment. He considers the following factors in deciding whether to terminate a repeat infringer: (1) the volume of complaints; (2) the amount of linked content in the complaints; (3) the timespan between notices; (4) the length of time the alleged infringer's account had been active; (5) the amount of total content the account has; (6) whether the user is maliciously and intentionally uploading infringing content or uploading content without knowing the source; and (7) whether the takedown notices were DMCA-compliant. Between 2008 and 2011, Lange terminated over 33,000 user accounts for violating the website's Terms of Use. Lange estimated that he terminated about 4% to 6% of these users for possible copyright infringement, which would be between 1,320 and 1,980 users.

Ventura Content, the plaintiff, creates and distributes pornographic movies. Ventura found 33 clips on Motherless from movies it had created and had not licensed to Motherless. The infringing clips were anywhere from 20 seconds to 46 minutes long, mostly 15 minutes or longer. It is undisputed that the clips infringed on Ventura's copyright.

All the infringing clips were segments of Ventura movies, not merely pictures, and not the full movie. None of the clips contained anything to indicate that Ventura owned the copyright. A few had watermarks naming other websites, which appear to be other

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pornography aggregators, but there were no Ventura watermarks, credits, or other pieces of information suggesting in any way that Ventura owned the copyright. These clips were visited 31,400 times during the 20 months they were posted on Motherless. During this time, Motherless received about 600,000 visits per day, so the views of the Ventura clips were a minuscule proportion of the total views on Motherless.

Eight users uploaded the 33 infringing clips. Lange terminated two of these users by 2012 (after this litigation began), one for repeat copyright infringement. There is no evidence to show that whoever uploaded the Ventura material got any credits or other compensation for these uploads. Lange does not remember reviewing any of these videos. Ventura did not send DMCA notices or any other sort of takedown notice for the infringing material. Nor did Ventura remove the material itself, as Motherless's software link enabled it to do. Ventura's first notice of infringement to Motherless was this lawsuit.

After Lange was served with the complaint in this case, he asked Ventura to send him the URLs for the infringing clips so that he could delete them. Ventura did not respond the first time Lange asked for the URLs, so Lange asked again. Ventura answered his follow-up request. On the day that Ventura gave Lange the URLs, Lange deleted the infringing clips.

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Ventura sued Motherless and Lange for copyright infringement under federal law² and for unfair business practices under California law.³ Ventura sought damages and an injunction, but the injunction claim became moot when Lange deleted all the infringing clips. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Motherless and Lange on the federal copyright claim. It dismissed the state law claim without prejudice, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over it. Motherless then moved for attorney's fees under 17 U.S.C. § 505, but the district court denied Motherless's motion.

ANALYSIS

The Digital Millennium Copyright Act contains several "safe harbor" provisions that protect certain categories of copyright infringers if they meet the statutory conditions.⁴ The short title for this statutory portion is the "Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act."⁵ The central issue in this case is whether Motherless met the safe harbor conditions.

Ventura contends that (1) the district court erred in granting partial summary judgment to Motherless on its safe harbor defense and (2) abused its discretion by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

² 17 U.S.C. § 501 *et seq.*

³ Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 *et seq.*

⁴ *A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.*, 239 F.3d 1004, 1025 (9th Cir. 2001); *see* 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)–(d).

⁵ Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 202, 112 Stat. 2860, 2877 (1998).

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its state-law claim. Motherless (1) cross-appeals the district court's determination that it directly infringed on Ventura's copyrights and (2) separately appeals the district court's denial of attorney's fees. All but the first issue may be addressed summarily. With regard to the summary judgment on safe harbor, we review de novo, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Ventura.⁶ Most of the material facts are undisputed. We assume without deciding that Ventura established direct infringement, because it is unnecessary to reach that issue. We review for abuse of discretion the district court's decisions not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Ventura's state-law claim and to deny Motherless attorney's fees under the Copyright Act.⁷

Much of Ventura's briefing draws our attention to the lurid sexual material on Motherless. And Ventura is suing to protect its own pornographic creations from infringement. But federal copyright law does not distinguish between pornographic and non-pornographic works, so the nature of the sexual material that Ventura creates and Motherless hosts is irrelevant.

⁶ *Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co.*, 952 F.2d 262, 265 (9th Cir. 1991).

⁷ *Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc.*, 246 F.3d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir. 2001) (supplemental jurisdiction); *Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc.*, 725 F.3d 1170, 1180 (9th Cir. 2013) (attorney's fees); *see also* 17 U.S.C. § 505 (allowing the court "in its discretion" to award attorney's fees as part of costs).

I. Safe Harbor

The Digital Millennium Copyright Act places the burden of policing copyright infringement on the copyright owner, not on the person or firm storing and hosting the material.⁸ It is undisputed that Ventura owned the copyrights to the 33 clips that were stored and displayed by Motherless.

The safe harbor clause at issue in this case, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c), provides as follows:

(1) IN GENERAL.—A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief . . . for infringement of copyright *by reason of the storage at the direction of a user* of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider, if the service provider—

(A) (i) does not have *actual knowledge* that the material or an activity using the material on the system or network is infringing;

(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is *apparent*; or

(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, *acts expeditiously to remove*, or disable access to, the material;

⁸ See *Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC*, 488 F.3d 1102, 1114 (9th Cir. 2007).

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(B) *does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity; and*

(C) *upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3), responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity.*⁹

Thus for a service provider to get safe harbor protection despite its infringement, it must not know of the infringement, and the infringement cannot be apparent. It must also take down or prevent access to the infringing material as soon as it learns about it or receives a DMCA notice. And it must not directly benefit financially from the infringement in situations when it can control the activity.

There is an additional condition on safe harbor eligibility: the service provider must have a policy to terminate users who repeatedly infringe on copyrights, and it must implement that policy reasonably. The statute setting this condition, 17 U.S.C. § 512(i), reads as follows:

CONDITIONS FOR ELIGIBILITY.—

(1) ACCOMMODATION OF TECHNOLOGY.—The limitations on liability established by this

⁹ 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1) (emphasis added). The added emphasis is to highlight language that Ventura has put at issue.

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section shall apply to a service provider only if the service provider—

(A) has adopted and reasonably implemented, and informs subscribers and account holders of the service provider's system or network of, a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service provider's system or network who are repeat infringers; and

(B) accommodates and does not interfere with standard technical measures.

The overall scheme is plain enough at a superficial level. A service provider must delete or disable access to known or apparent infringing material, as well as material for which he receives a statutorily compliant takedown notice. He must also terminate repeat infringers when appropriate. The copyright owner, not the service provider, has the burden of policing infringement. But the service provider, to maintain its shield, must respond expeditiously and effectively to the policing. If these conditions are met, the service provider will not be financially liable for infringing material on his website. The details, of course, get complicated, and we must address those complications.

A. “By reason of the storage at the direction of a user”

Section 512(c) says that, subject to additional conditions discussed below, a service provider will not be

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liable “for infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider.”¹⁰ Ventura points out that Lange uploaded 700,000 files from his old site, screens uploads for illegal material before putting them on the site, and has his software categorize material into classes (such as “Most Popular”). Ventura would therefore have us conclude that the Motherless material was stored and made available “at the direction of” Motherless, not the users. We do not agree.

Lange did upload thousands of pictures and videos from his old site, Hidebehind.com, when he first established Motherless in 2008. However, those uploads amount to only 6% of what the site now carries. He has not uploaded any material to the site since he started it with his old material. Lange and his contractors did not upload any of the 33 clips over which Ventura claims copyright ownership. There is no evidence that any of the Hidebehind.com tranche infringed on anyone’s copyright. That material therefore does not establish liability here.

Ventura also argues that Lange is not entirely passive because he screens out child pornography, bestiality, and copyright infringement that he spots. The argument is that by screening out this material, Motherless effectively directs what is posted instead of enabling posting “at the direction of a user.” But Ventura cites no authority for the unlikely proposition that

¹⁰ 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1).

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screening out illegal material eliminates the safe harbor shield. Indeed, section 512(m) says that the law should not be construed to eliminate the safe harbor because a service provider monitors for infringement or disables access to material where the conduct depicted is prohibited by law.¹¹ Motherless screens out child pornography because it is prohibited by law. It screens out bestiality because a few European countries prohibit bestiality pornography by law, and some of Lange's European advertisers voiced concerns about this content. We find it counterintuitive, to put it mildly, to imagine that Congress intended to deprive a website of the safe harbor because it screened out child pornography and bestiality rather than displaying it. Instead, we read section 512(m) to say that Congress expressly provided that such screening does not deprive a website of safe harbor protection.

Finally, Ventura argues that because Motherless groups together the tagged videos and pictures so that users can find what they want, it is Motherless, rather

¹¹ 17 U.S.C. § 512(m) reads as follows:

(m) Protection of Privacy.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to condition the applicability of subsections (a) through (d) on—

(1) a service provider monitoring its service or affirmatively seeking facts indicating infringing activity, except to the extent consistent with a standard technical measure complying with the provisions of subsection (i); or

(2) a service provider gaining access to, removing, or disabling access to material in cases in which such conduct is prohibited by law.

than the user, who directs the “storage.” But Lange testified, and Ventura does not dispute, that his editorial principle is as announced on the site: “anything legal stays.” Ventura merely argues that this case can be distinguished from opinions which applied the safe harbor to sites that screen and alter content.

Our controlling case is *UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, LLC*.¹² There, we addressed whether a website that enabled sharing music videos, some of which turned out to be infringing, was entitled to safe harbor.¹³ The videos in *UMG* were not just stored, as one might store family photographs on a “cloud” service such as iCloud, Dropbox, or Google Drive. Users uploaded material and watched and listened to videos and songs.¹⁴ Some of the music was infringing.¹⁵ We held in *UMG* that the phrase “by reason of the storage at the direction of a user” covers more than “mere electronic storage lockers.”¹⁶ It allows service providers to perform access-facilitating processes such as breaking up the files for faster viewing and converting them to a Flash format.¹⁷

As in *UMG*, Motherless’s users, not the website, decide what to upload and what file names and tags to

¹² 718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013).

¹³ *Id.* at 1011–12.

¹⁴ *Id.*

¹⁵ *Id.* at 1013.

¹⁶ *Id.* at 1016 (quoting *UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc.*, 620 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2008)).

¹⁷ *See id.*

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use.¹⁸ Our holding in *UMG* disposes of the argument that altering the file format to make it accessible before posting, and enabling users to apply search tags to uploads, takes the posting of the content out of the “at the direction of a user” definition. It also disposes of the argument that being anything more than an electronic storage locker, such as by facilitating user access to files that other users posted, deprives the website of safe harbor protection.

Ventura argues that by using software to highlight the “Most Popular” material, and by giving credits to users who post the most popular material, Motherless is posting at its own direction rather than hosting material posted at the direction of the user. This argument is inconsistent with our holding in *UMG*.¹⁹ It is also inconsistent with the meaning of the words “at the direction of the user.” The users post what they post, popular or not. Motherless does not screen out material for relatively low popularity, and of course most postings do not fall within the “Most Popular” category. Yet there they are, up on the site, because the users put them there. We do not see how the Motherless incentive program, which makes credits usable to buy coffee mugs and T-shirts and such for high volume uploaders, makes “storage” at the direction of Motherless rather than “at the direction of a user.” Whether the uploader does so for the glory of the thing (Motherless’s biggest uploader testified that he wanted his name on the

¹⁸ See *id.* at 1012.

¹⁹ See *id.* at 1016, 1019 & n.10.

leaderboard for big uploaders) or for a coffee mug, his craving for such fame and fortune as was available does not mean that the specific content he uploaded was directed by Motherless, rather than “by the user.”

We recently addressed the phrase “by reason of storage at the direction of the user” in *Mavrix Photographs, LLC v. LiveJournal, Inc.*²⁰ The website in *Mavrix* was not entitled to summary judgment on the safe harbor issue because there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether the storage of material on the site was at the direction of the site or at the direction of its users.²¹ The *Mavrix* website used moderators to review user submissions for substance. It published only those submissions that, in the moderators’ judgment, were “relevant to new and exciting celebrity news.”²² We remanded because genuine issues of material fact remained as to “whether the moderators were LiveJournal’s agents.”²³ We restated in *Mavrix* what we had held in *UMG*: “Infringing material is stored at the direction of the user if the service provider played no role in making that infringing material accessible on its site or if the service provider carried out activities that were ‘narrowly directed’ towards enhancing the accessibility of the posts.”²⁴ And we further noted that

²⁰ 873 F.3d 1045, 1052–57 (9th Cir. 2017).

²¹ *Id.* at 1056–57.

²² *Id.* at 1050.

²³ *Id.* at 1057.

²⁴ *Id.* at 1056 (quoting *UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc.*, 620 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2008)) (citing *UMG*

section 512(m) of the statute expressly provided that deleting unlawful material did not deprive the site of safe harbor protection.²⁵

The case before us falls within *UMG*, not *Mavrix*. The moderators in *Mavrix* directed posting only if they thought the user-submitted material was “new and exciting celebrity news.”²⁶ Lange and his contractor do not review whether the pornography submitted by users is “new and exciting” or meets any other discretionary standards. The Motherless rule is “anything legal stays.” Lange does not exercise judgment in what to host. His editing is limited to the kind protected by section 512(m), screening out illegal material.

Perhaps if Lange’s site were flooded with pictures and videos of kittens playing with yarn, he would change his rule and exercise judgment about whether the material was pornographic enough to host, but that is speculation. We have been directed to nothing in the record that establishes a factual dispute about whether Lange actually exercises judgment about what to host beyond his screening out child pornography, bestiality, and infringing material. Though Motherless has groups, posts need not be placed into a group to be stored on the website. None of Ventura’s infringing clips were selected or listed under any of Motherless’s groups, but all of them were posted anyway.

Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1018 (9th Cir. 2013)).

²⁵ *Id.*

²⁶ *Id.* at 1050.

Although *UMG* compels our holding, we also note that our sister circuits agree with the critical point that “storage at the direction of a user” affords safe harbor protection to sites where users can look at other users’ uploads, not just to what *UMG* called “electronic storage lockers.”²⁷ The Second Circuit ruled in *Viacom International, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.*²⁸ that YouTube was entitled to safe harbor—even though it converted user-submitted videos into a standard display format and used an algorithm to suggest related videos—because “to exclude these automated functions from the safe harbor would eviscerate the protection afforded to service providers by § 512(c).” Likewise, the Fourth Circuit held in *CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc.*²⁹ that a real estate listing website that allowed subscribers to post listings was not liable for copyright infringement even though an employee cursorily reviewed the photographs for infringing material. The *CoStar* majority analogized the service provider to an owner of a traditional copy machine “who has stationed a guard by the door to turn away customers who are attempting to duplicate clearly copyrighted works.”³⁰ And the Tenth Circuit held in *BWP Media USA, Inc. v. Clarity Digital Group, LLC*³¹ that a news site that relied on user-generated content was entitled to safe harbor even

²⁷ *UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, LLC*, 718 F.3d 1006, 1016 (9th Cir. 2013).

²⁸ 676 F.3d 19, 39 (2d Cir. 2012).

²⁹ 373 F.3d 544, 546–47 (4th Cir. 2004).

³⁰ *Id.* at 556.

³¹ 820 F.3d 1175, 1181 (10th Cir. 2016).

though it instructed users on topics to write about and suggested that users include pictures or slide shows with their articles. Citing to *UMG*, the Tenth Circuit explained that “if the infringing content has merely gone through a screening or automated process, the [service provider] will generally benefit from the safe harbor’s protection.”³²

Because the users, not Motherless, decided what to post—except for Lange’s exclusion of illegal material and his original upload when he created the website—the material, including Ventura’s, was “posted at the direction of users.”

B. Knowledge and Expedious Takedown

Though the statutory scheme places the burden of policing infringement on the copyright owner, the scheme does not allow a website owner to avoid responsibility for knowingly selling pirated material by deleting a particular posting only when he gets caught. Instead, the statute excludes blatant pirates from the safe harbor by requiring that a service provider:

- (i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material on the system or network is infringing;
- (ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or

³² *Id.* (citing *UMG*, 718 F.3d at 1020).

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(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material.³³

If the website provider actually knows that the material for which relief is sought is infringing, or if the infringement is “apparent,” he remains liable if he does not expeditiously remove the material upon gaining knowledge.

i. Actual Knowledge

Ventura and its expert argue that Lange must have had actual knowledge that the Ventura clips infringed on its copyright because they appeared to be professionally produced and because a few had watermarks. That argument is unavailing.

According to Ventura, because Lange reviewed all of the material that users submitted, he would have seen that four of the 33 clips had watermarks. But none of the watermarks establish actual knowledge of infringement because Ventura did not watermark its clips. The watermarks on the four clips said “videosz.com” and “monstercockbabes.com,” suggesting the clips came from pornography aggregators rather than copyright owners. The watermarks gave no hint that Ventura owned the material, and they do not establish a genuine issue of fact about whether Motherless knew the material was infringing.

³³ 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A).

Ventura also argues that Motherless had to know the clips were infringing because, it claims, the high quality of the videos showed professional production. But the conclusion does not follow from the premise. Professionally created work often is posted online to publicize and attract business for the creator. Amateurs often do professional quality work in artistic endeavors, and amateurs are no less entitled to copyright protection than professionals, so it is not apparent why professionalism matters. And digital cameras have become so good and so easy to use that even home movies of children's birthday parties can look professionally done.

Nor do we see what on the Ventura videos distinguishes them from amateur creations. Many of the clips include shaky camera footage and poor lighting. One starts with a camera bouncing around taking pictures of the interior of a car, has a voiceover saying "figured out how to finally turn this thing [the camera] on," and so forth. We have no idea how it would be possible to recognize "professionals" from amateurs on the videos, and Ventura has not provided any factual information to help us. It is hard to see what distinguishes Ventura's videos from homemade work uploaded to the internet by the rightful owner, and it is even harder to see why it would be obvious that the Ventura videos were infringing. An ordinary person who had not studied movie-making and personally made movies would likely be oblivious to the professionalism that the expert report identifies. This is not to criticize the quality of Ventura's videos. The apparent amateurism may be

a skilled professional means of giving them an appearance of authenticity. But nothing about their professionalism would inform Motherless that they were infringing or would make infringement apparent.

Ventura could have indicated its ownership by watermarking its videos as copyrighted, but it did not. And Ventura could have notified Motherless that the clips infringed on its copyright when it discovered them on Motherless’s site, but it did not. Ventura’s “decision to forgo the DMCA notice protocol ‘stripped it of the most powerful evidence of a service provider’s knowledge—actual notice of infringement from the copyright holder.’”³⁴ If Ventura had notified Motherless about these 33 infringing videos before filing this lawsuit and Motherless had not taken them down, then Motherless would have lost its safe harbor. On the facts of this record, however, Ventura did not establish a genuine issue of fact as to actual knowledge. The statutory phrase “actual knowledge” means what it says: knowledge that is actual, not merely a possible inference from ambiguous circumstances.

ii. Apparent Knowledge

Actual knowledge is not necessary to deprive an infringer of safe harbor. Motherless would also lose its

³⁴ *UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, LLC*, 718 F.3d 1006, 1020 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting *Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1107 (W.D. Wash. 2004)) (citing *Io Grp., Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc.*, 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1148 (N.D. Cal. 2008)); see also 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12B.04[A][3], at 12B-94 (rev. ed. 2017) (“NIMMER”).

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safe harbor if it was “aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent” and did not “act[] expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material.”³⁵ This is different from actual knowledge because instead of looking at subjective thoughts, we look at objective facts and circumstances from which the specific infringement would be obvious to a reasonable person.³⁶ The statutory term “apparent” is often described, in the cases and secondary literature, as “red flag” knowledge.³⁷ The sports metaphor is no more helpful than the statutory word “apparent,” and we use the words interchangeably.

Ventura’s arguments for “apparent” awareness are similar to its arguments for actual knowledge. And the same reasons for absence of knowledge apply. There is nothing about the Ventura clips that would make infringement apparent. That is not to say that Motherless did not know that infringement was probably occurring on its website. It is hard to imagine that a site with 12.6 million pictures and video clips uploaded by users would not contain some material that users had uploaded without authorization. It is also hard to imagine that Lange and his contractor would have spotted all the infringing videos with the few seconds of viewing they gave to each one.

³⁵ 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii)–(iii).

³⁶ *UMG*, 718 F.3d at 1025–26; *Io Grp.*, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1148.

³⁷ *See, e.g.*, NIMMER § 12B.04[A][1][b], at 12B-52 (explaining that this form of knowledge can be best described as a red flag test).

Nevertheless, we held in *UMG* that hosting material capable of copyright protection, with the general knowledge that the site could be used to share infringing material, is not enough to impute knowledge.³⁸ The material in *UMG* was much more likely to arouse awareness of infringement than the material in this case, because it included music videos by well-known celebrities like 50 Cent, Avril Lavigne, and Britney Spears.³⁹ We held that this sort of knowledge was not enough to amount to red flag knowledge.⁴⁰

Similarly, in *Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC*,⁴¹ the Second Circuit addressed whether a service provider may be found to have apparent knowledge because it relies on mass uploading by users. Its reasoning is instructive. The service provider in *Capitol Records* was Vimeo, which operates a website that enables members to post videos that they created.⁴² As of 2012, Vimeo had more than 31 million videos and 12.3 million registered users.⁴³ Nearly 43,000 videos were uploaded to Vimeo daily.⁴⁴ Capitol Records sued Vimeo for copyright infringement because 199 videos on the website contained recordings to which Capitol Records held the copyright.⁴⁵ The Second Circuit explained that

³⁸ *UMG*, 718 F.3d at 1022.

³⁹ *Id.* at 1023.

⁴⁰ *Id.*

⁴¹ 826 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2016).

⁴² *Id.* at 81.

⁴³ *Id.* at 84.

⁴⁴ *Id.*

⁴⁵ *Id.* at 86.

the copyright holder must demonstrate that the service provider had actual knowledge of facts “that would make the *specific infringement claimed* objectively obvious to a reasonable person.”⁴⁶ *Capitol Records* further explained that “suspicion of infringement” is not the same as “facts making infringement obvious.”⁴⁷ Requiring service providers to investigate potential copyright infringement whenever they were suspicious would undermine “an important part of the compromise embodied in the safe harbor.”⁴⁸

We agree. The copyright owner must show knowledge, actual or red flag, for the videos that infringed its copyright and are the subject of its claim. And for red flag knowledge, infringement must be apparent, not merely suspicious. Congress used the word “apparent,” not “suspicious” or some equivalent. Ventura, not Lange, is in charge of policing Motherless for its copyrighted material. Congress could have put the burden of policing infringement in suspicious circumstances on the provider, but it instead put it on the copyright holder.

Because the facts and circumstances from which a reasonable person might suspect infringement were much more substantial in *UMG* than in this case, and because there we held that the infringement was not “apparent,” we must reach the same conclusion here.

⁴⁶ *Id.* at 93 (emphasis added) (citing *Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.*, 676 F.3d 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2012)).

⁴⁷ *Id.* at 98.

⁴⁸ *Id.*

As *UMG* implies,⁴⁹ and as the Second Circuit in *Capitol Records* expressly stated,⁵⁰ even if it were obvious to a reasonable person that some of the material on the site must be infringing, that is not enough to lose the safe harbor. It must be obvious that the particular material that is the subject of the claim is infringing. Here, it would not be obvious to a reasonable person that the clips excerpted from Ventura movies were infringing.

Ventura argues that we should infer apparent knowledge under *Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Fung*.⁵¹ Fung’s website used a peer-to-peer file sharing protocol.⁵² That means the content was not on the website’s server, but rather on the hard drives of the users. Clicking on a URL on the website enabled the user to get into the shared material on another user’s hard drive. Fung’s website enabled users to download popular movies and television shows, not just clips but entire movies.⁵³ For example, users downloaded over 1.5 million copies of the James Bond movie *Casino Royale*.⁵⁴ The website included categories such as “Top 20 TV Shows” and “Top 20 Movies,”⁵⁵ so it was obvious

⁴⁹ See *UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, LLC*, 718 F.3d 1006, 1022 (9th Cir. 2013); see also *Mavrix Photographs, LLC v. LiveJournal, Inc.*, 873 F.3d 1045, 1057 (9th Cir. 2017).

⁵⁰ 826 F.3d at 93 (citing *Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.*, 676 F.3d 19, 30–31 (2d Cir. 2012)).

⁵¹ 710 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2013).

⁵² *Id.* at 1024.

⁵³ *Id.* at 1028–29.

⁵⁴ *Id.* at 1029.

⁵⁵ *Id.*

that using it would enable the user to get this obviously infringing content in its entirety. Fung solicited users to upload and download copyrighted material and assisted those seeking to watch copyrighted material, including helping downloaders burn DVDs of the infringing material.⁵⁶ We held that Fung had apparent knowledge, because “[t]he material in question was sufficiently current and well-known that it would have been objectively obvious to a reasonable person that the material solicited and assisted was both copyrighted and not licensed to random members of the public.”⁵⁷

This case is very much like *UMG* and not at all similar to *Fung*. In *Fung*, the site marketed itself as a pirate site for free access to feature movies and top television shows, and no one could mistake the material on it for anything but infringing material. Fung had complete, long movies, but *Motherless* limited uploads to 500 megabytes, which would be around half or three-quarters of an hour at standard density, and much less at high density. The Ventura clips had no indication that Ventura owned the copyright—or was associated with the videos at all. Fung had “current and well-known” material, like *Casino Royale*.⁵⁸ Whoever the actors in the Ventura material may have been, they are not as famous as the actors who have played James Bond. No one could mistake *Casino Royale* for a couple

⁵⁶ *Id.* at 1043.

⁵⁷ *Id.*

⁵⁸ *Id.*

of amateurs filming their own activities and purposely posting them for exhibition, but an ordinary person could mistake the Ventura clips for just that.

In *Fung*, we noted that “the record is replete with instances of Fung actively encouraging infringement, by urging his users to both upload and download particular copyrighted works.”⁵⁹ Lange did not do that. His posted Terms of Use prohibited posting copyrighted material without prior written consent from the copyright owner, and he invited takedown notices for infringing material. While such posted notices language could be merely for appearances sake if it were not followed by action, Lange estimates that he has deleted over 180,000 videos and pictures for copyright infringement. He has removed an estimated 1,320 to 1,980 users from the site for repeated copyrighted infringement. His software stops users from re-uploading previously deleted material. Fung’s was fairly explicitly a pirate website. Motherless, though, appears to be managing the website to make money while avoiding legal trouble from users posting child pornography, bestiality, or copyright infringing material.

Lastly, Ventura makes the policy argument that “[i]t is exceedingly difficult for [Ventura]—or any adult Web site, for that matter—to convince customers to pay for content that is readily available for free on the adult tube sites” such as Motherless. That may be so,

⁵⁹ *Id.*

but Congress, not judges, makes the policy decision on whether to offer a safe harbor from suit.

iii. Expeditious Takedown

An additional requirement for the accidental infringer’s safe harbor relief is expeditious removal of the infringing material once there is actual or red flag notice of the infringement. The statutory wording is that “upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness,” the service provider must “act[] expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material.”⁶⁰ To trigger the expeditious removal requirement, a copyright owner’s notification must substantially comply with the requirements of subsection (c)(3)(A) of the safe harbor statute.⁶¹ Among other things, the notification must identify the infringing material with “information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the material.”⁶²

In this case, the infringing videos had no Ventura identification, and the site had more than a half-million videos, so as a practical matter what Motherless needed to remove them was a URL for each. Ventura did not send Motherless a statutory

⁶⁰ 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii).

⁶¹ *Id.* § 512(c)(3)(B).

⁶² *Id.* § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii). This part of the statute provides that notice is effective only if it includes: “Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled, and information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the material.”

notification before filing suit. When Lange was served with Ventura’s complaint, he asked Ventura to provide him with the URLs to the infringing clips so that he could delete them. Ventura did not initially respond. Subsequently, Ventura provided the URLs after Lange followed up on his initial request. Lange deleted the 33 infringing clips the same day. That satisfied the “responds expeditiously to remove” requirement.

C. Right and Ability to Control

Even if subsection (c)(1)(A) is satisfied (no actual or red flag knowledge, expeditious removal), a service provider still loses its safe harbor under subsection (c)(1)(B) if it receives “a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity.”⁶³ This raises two questions: did Motherless have “the right and ability to control” the infringing activity, and if so, did it receive a financial benefit “directly attributable to the infringing activity”?

Motherless certainly had the physical ability to control any and all infringing activity. Lange could take down all of Motherless’s content, infringing or not, and bar any uploads, infringing or not. We have held, however, that the “[r]ight and ability to control” involves ‘something more than the ability to remove or block access to materials posted on a service provider’s

⁶³ *Id.* § 512(c)(1)(B).

website.’”⁶⁴ To have the right and ability to control, a service provider must be able to exert “substantial influence” on its users’ activities.⁶⁵

We held in *UMG* that the service provider did not have the “ability to control.”⁶⁶ In *Fung*, it did.⁶⁷ This case is like *UMG* and not like *Fung*. Nothing in the record suggests that Motherless told its users what to upload. Its homepage welcomed users to “a moral free zone where anything legal stays.” It did not curate uploaded content in any meaningful way, nor did it reject unpopular groups or content. Motherless deleted only user-created groups that contained little or no content, and it started deleting bestiality content due to legality issues raised by European advertisers.

Motherless rewarded uploaders of the most popular content with points redeemable for items of negligible value, such as coffee mugs and t-shirts, but that does not amount to encouraging uploads of infringing material. Even after Motherless started letting users exchange points for cash, the payouts were nominal. One of the most prolific Motherless users (he uploaded over 300,000 files) testified that he made just \$200. Except for Motherless’s screening out of child pornography,

⁶⁴ *Mavrix Photographs, LLC v. LiveJournal, Inc.*, 873 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting *UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, LLC*, 718 F.3d 1006, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013)).

⁶⁵ *UMG*, 718 F.3d at 1030 (quoting *Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.*, 676 F.3d 19, 38 (2d Cir. 2012)).

⁶⁶ *Id.*

⁶⁷ *Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung*, 710 F.3d 1020, 1046 (9th Cir. 2013).

bestiality pornography, and apparent infringing material, the uploaders, not Motherless, controlled what was uploaded. Such censoring by Motherless could not enable it to control uploads of non-obvious infringing material,⁶⁸ and there was nothing in the uploaded video clips to identify their infringing nature.

Nor was there any evidence that Motherless received “a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity.” Unlike the site in *Fung*, Motherless did not advertise itself as a place to get pirated materials. Of course, the more pornography Motherless had, the more users it would attract, and more views would lead to more advertising revenue. The words “the” and “directly” in the statute, though, must mean that some revenue has to be distinctly attributable to the infringing material at issue. There is no evidence that Motherless made any money directly from the Ventura clips.

D. Repeat Infringer Termination

So far, we have examined the specifics of the safe harbor as applied to Ventura’s movie clips. Ventura did not submit cognizable evidence establishing a genuine issue of fact as to whether Motherless was entitled to safe harbor.⁶⁹ The evidence is uncontradicted that Motherless did not know, nor was it apparent, that its site included infringing Ventura clips. Motherless

⁶⁸ See *UMG*, 718 F.3d at 1027–28; *Io Grp., Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc.*, 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1151 (N.D. Cal. 2008).

⁶⁹ See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

immediately removed them on the day that Ventura gave Motherless enough information to do so. And Motherless did not control what users uploaded. These conditions are necessary to enjoy the safe harbor. However, they are not sufficient.

Basically, subsection (c) of the safe harbor provision aims at individual infringements, not the service as a whole. It uses the phrase “the material”—that is, the material for which an infringement remedy is sought—in the context of setting out what a service provider needs to do to avoid liability for the infringement of the copyrighted material at issue. Our sister circuit and we both read it this way.⁷⁰ If subsection (c) were read to apply to all the material on the website, instead of the material for which a remedy was sought by the victim of infringement, then no large site would be protected by the safe harbor. It is unimaginable that any website with hundreds of thousands or millions of user uploads could successfully screen out all of the copyright infringing uploads, or even all of the uploads where infringement was apparent.

But Congress promulgated subsection (i) to limit the eligibility for safe harbor treatment. Even if a website deletes infringing material as soon as it learns about it, the safe harbor is unavailable unless the site has a policy of excluding repeat infringers. This

⁷⁰ See *UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC*, 718 F.3d 1006, 1021–22 (9th Cir. 2013); *Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC*, 826 F.3d 78, 93 (2d Cir. 2016); *Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.*, 676 F.3d 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2012).

ineligibility provision “is a prophylactic against future acts of infringement by actors whose past conduct renders them suspect.”⁷¹

This repeat infringer policy requirement does not focus on the particular infringement at issue. Instead, subsection (i) bars use of the subsection (c) safe harbor unless the service provider adopts and “reasonably” implements a policy of terminating repeat infringers in “appropriate” circumstances:

(1) ACCOMMODATION OF TECHNOLOGY.—The limitations on liability established by this section shall apply to a service provider only if the service provider—

(A) has adopted and reasonably implemented, and informs subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or network of, a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or network who are repeat infringers; and

(B) accommodates and does not interfere with standard technical measures.

Unlike subsection (c), subsection (i) addresses how the site is generally managed, not just how the site responds to notice of a particular infringement. Without subsection (i), an unscrupulous website might take down infringing material as soon as it received a proper takedown notice identifying it, yet still operate

⁷¹ NIMMER § 12B.10[A][2], at 12B-168.7.

as a pirate site. Subsection (i) obliges the provider to exclude repeat infringers, subject to its qualifications: “reasonably” and “in appropriate circumstances.” In this case, subsection (i) means that if Motherless did not reasonably implement a policy of terminating in appropriate circumstances users who were repeat infringers, then innocence in hosting Ventura’s works and promptness in removing them once notified would not shield Motherless from infringement remedies.

The “standard technical measures” referenced in subsection (i)(1)(B) enable copyright owners to establish some technical means so that service providers can spot and exclude infringing material without substantial expense.⁷² One can imagine a digital version of the old c in a circle (©) automatically triggering the uploading software to exclude material so marked by the copyright owner. But subsection (i)(1)(B) is not at issue in this case. The evidence establishes, without any genuine issue of fact, that Ventura did not in any way

⁷² “Standard technical measures” is defined in 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2), which states:

DEFINITION.—As used in this subsection, the term “standard technical measures” means technical measures that are used by copyright owners to identify or protect copyrighted works and—

- (A) have been developed pursuant to a broad consensus of copyright owners and service providers in an open, fair, voluntary, multi-industry standards process;
- (B) are available to any person on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms; and
- (C) do not impose substantial costs on service providers or substantial burdens on their systems or networks.

mark its material so that infringement could be spotted and the material excluded by some standard technical measure.

However, the inapplicability of subsection (B) to this case does not free Motherless from the burden of subsection (A). The service provider must satisfy both. Motherless has a written policy of excluding infringing material, stated on its membership sign-up page:

- In connection with User-Submitted Content, you affirm, represent, and/or warrant that: you own or have the necessary licenses, rights, consents and permissions to use and authorize [Motherless] to use all . . . copyright . . . rights in and to any and all User-Submitted Content to enable inclusion and use of the User-Submitted Content in the manner contemplated by the [Motherless] website and these Terms of Use.
- [Motherless] and its administrators reserve the right (but not the obligation) in their sole discretion to refuse, delete, move or edit any and all Content that it deems is in violation of the law (including . . . copyright law). . . .
- A partial list of content that is illegal or prohibited includes content that . . . Promotes an illegal or unauthorized copy of another's copyrighted work, such as pirated computer programs or links to them, or providing information to circumvent manufacturer-installed copy-protect

devices, or providing pirated music or links to pirated music files. . . .

- You agree that you will not post, or otherwise distribute or facilitate distribution of any Content that . . . infringes on any . . . copyright . . . of any party. . . .
- You may not post, distribute, or reproduce in any way, any copyrighted material . . . without obtaining the prior written consent of the owner of such proprietary rights or otherwise have a valid basis under the law, including “fair use.”

And Motherless has a written policy of terminating repeat infringers. On its page entitled “DMCA Notice & Takedown Policy and Procedures,” Motherless said that “[it] is the firm policy of the [site] to terminate the account of repeat copyright infringers, when appropriate.”

The details of the termination policy are not written down. However, the statute does not say that the policy details must be written, just that the site must inform subscribers of “a policy” of terminating repeat infringers in appropriate circumstances. Motherless consists only of Lange and a few independent contractors, and Lange alone determines when to terminate repeat infringers.⁷³ A company might need a written

⁷³ The dissent conflates Lange’s screening of content for child pornography and bestiality before it is made available on the website, and his implementation of Motherless’s policy to terminate repeat infringers. Lange does only the former with the assistance of contractors.

policy to tell its employees or independent contractors what to do if there were a significant number of them, but Motherless is not such a firm. Small operations in many industries often do not have written policies because the owners who would formulate the policies are also the ones who execute it. There might not have been a need for anything in writing. So the lack of a detailed written policy is not by itself fatal to safe harbor eligibility. Neither is the fact that Motherless did not publicize its internal criteria.⁷⁴

Lange described how he applies Motherless’s repeat infringer policy in his deposition testimony. He testified that he excludes infringing material by looking for an identifying watermark in the corner, the usual way owners identify their copyrighted material. If he receives a DMCA takedown notice (the form designated in subsection (c)(3)(A)),⁷⁵ he also uses “hashing”

⁷⁴ See *Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1102 (W.D. Wash. 2004), *overruled on other grounds*, *Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp*, 606 F.3d 612 (9th Cir. 2010); NIMMER § 12B.10[F], at 12B-195 n.195.

⁷⁵ 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A) lists out the requirements for a notice of infringement. The subsection reads as follows:

ELEMENTS OF NOTIFICATION.—

(A) To be effective under this subsection, a notification of claimed infringement must be a written communication provided to the designated agent of a service provider that includes substantially the following:

- (i) A physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.
- (ii) Identification of the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed, or, if multiple copyrighted works

software so that copies of the image or clip will be removed and will be screened out if anyone tries to post them again. Ordinarily, he will not terminate a user because of one takedown notice, but he will if there are two or more, which is to say, “repeated” instances of infringement. He might make a “gut decision” to terminate a user after the first DMCA notice (that is, a user who is not a repeat infringer) if there are multiple infringing pictures or videos identified in the notice, though that is not his usual practice. Motherless has received over 3,000 DMCA takedown notices. Lange does not keep a written list of subscribers whose submissions generated DMCA notices, but he saves each of the takedown notices and can track the number of

at a single online site are covered by a single notification, a representative list of such works at that site.

(iii) Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled, and information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the material.

(iv) Information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to contact the complaining party, such as an address, telephone number, and, if available, an electronic mail address at which the complaining party may be contacted.

(v) A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law.

(vi) A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.

times each user's content has been deleted in response, as well as the date of and reason (e.g., copyright infringement, child pornography) for each deletion. In deciding to terminate a user, he considers the account's history, as well as his memory and judgment. He is especially careful to look for and screen out material from one producer who threatened to sue him for infringement.

Before removing a user, Lange considers multiple factors, as detailed above, including the number of complaints arising from the user's uploads, the amount of infringing content in the complaint he received, and whether he thinks the user had maliciously or intentionally uploaded infringing content. Lange testified at one point that Motherless had an automated system for removing repeat infringers, but he subsequently admitted that Motherless did not have such a system and may have confused it with Motherless's automatic removal of content when two or more people report it for violating the Terms of Use within a 24-hour period. Lange uses his judgment, not a mechanical test, to terminate infringers based on the volume, history, severity, and intentions behind a user's infringing content uploads. Ventura does not dispute this.

*Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC*⁷⁶ holds that "a service provider 'implements' a policy if it has a working notification system, a procedure for dealing with DMCA-compliant notifications, and if it does not actively prevent copyright owners from collecting information

⁷⁶ 488 F.3d 1102, 1109 (9th Cir. 2007).

needed to issue such notifications.” The “implementation is reasonable if, under ‘appropriate circumstances,’ the service provider terminates users who repeatedly or blatantly infringe copyright.”⁷⁷ A “substantial failure” to record alleged infringers may raise a genuine issue of material fact, but the maintenance of a DMCA log is adequate even if the log is not perfect.⁷⁸ (One page of the log was not fully filled out in *CCBill*, but the log was still adequate.⁷⁹) DMCA-compliant notices put the provider on notice of infringement, but unsworn, non-compliant complaints do not.⁸⁰ The service provider’s responses to DMCA notices from copyright holders other than the parties to the case are relevant to assessing the provider’s policy.⁸¹

Various factors may bear on whether a service provider has “adopted and reasonably implemented” its policy for terminating, “in appropriate circumstances,” repeat infringers. Certain factors work in favor of the service provider, including: a DMCA log, as discussed in *CCBill*; blocking a subscriber’s name and email address from uploads;⁸² putting email addresses from

⁷⁷ *Id.*

⁷⁸ *Id.* at 1110.

⁷⁹ *Id.*

⁸⁰ *Id.* at 1112–13.

⁸¹ *Id.* at 1113.

⁸² *See Io Grp., Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc.*, 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1143–44 (N.D. Cal. 2008).

terminated accounts on a banned list;⁸³ and prohibiting a banned user from reopening a terminated account.⁸⁴ Other factors cut against the service provider, including: changing the email address to which take-down notices are sent without providing notice of the change;⁸⁵ participating in copyright infringement;⁸⁶ allowing terminated users to rejoin the site;⁸⁷ and refusing to terminate known repeat infringers.⁸⁸ Congress did not require that, to be eligible for safe harbor, a provider must maintain a logbook of infringers which it consults whenever it receives a DMCA notice. Congress required that the provider reasonably implement a policy of terminating repeat infringers, and the use of such a logbook and procedure would be good evidence that it did.

We conclude that on this record, there was no triable issue of fact as to whether Motherless, when it infringed on Ventura’s copyrighted material, had “adopted and reasonably implemented” its policy of terminating repeat infringers “in appropriate circumstances.” No

⁸³ See *Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC*, 972 F. Supp. 2d 500, 514–16 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), *overruled in part on other grounds*, 826 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2016).

⁸⁴ *Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1103–04 (W.D. Wash. 2004).

⁸⁵ See *Ellison v. Robertson*, 357 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2004).

⁸⁶ See *EMI Christian Music Grp., Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC*, 844 F.3d 79, 90 (2d Cir. 2016).

⁸⁷ See *BMG Rights Mgmt. (US) LLC v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc.*, 149 F. Supp. 3d 634, 656–58 (E.D. Va. 2015).

⁸⁸ See *id.* at 659–62.

trier of fact could conclude from the evidence in the record that Motherless had failed to reasonably implement a repeat infringer policy.

As the district court pointed out, there is a paucity of proven failures to terminate. Safe harbor eligibility does not require perfection, just “reasonable” implementation of the policy “in appropriate circumstances.” Eligibility for the safe harbor is not lost just because some repeat infringers may have slipped through the provider’s net for screening them out and terminating their access. The evidence in the record shows that Motherless terminated between 1,320 and 1,980 users for alleged copyright infringement and that only nine alleged repeat infringers had slipped through. Of those nine, only six were before Ventura filed its lawsuit, and only four of the six had been the subject of more than one DMCA notice.⁸⁹ That suggests that less than one repeat infringer in 100,000 active users was missed. If that is the extent of failure, there could be no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Motherless “reasonably implemented” its termination policy. Congress used the word “reasonable” to modify “implemented,” so the phrase cannot be construed to require perfect implementation.⁹⁰

Ventura points out that one of Motherless’s biggest uploaders, Kristy7187, was not terminated until

⁸⁹ See NIMMER § 12B.10[C][1], at 12B-178 (defining “repeat infringer”).

⁹⁰ See *Io Grp., Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc.*, 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1144 (N.D. Cal. 2008); *Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1104 (W.D. Wash. 2004).

Motherless had received a fourth DMCA-compliant notice on a Kristy7187 upload. It may be hard to imagine how a site with so many subscribers and uploads could have so few repeat infringers, and how it could screen so effectively. Motherless does not even have an automated log of subscribers whose uploads generated DMCA notices. And since the policy is little more than Lange’s multifactor judgment based largely on his recollection of DMCA notices, it may be hard to imagine how it could work so well. It is tempting, perhaps, to say that a policy is not “reasonably” implemented if it does not include both a database of users whose uploads have generated DMCA notices and some automated means of catching them if they do it again. But the statute does not require that. It modifies the termination requirement with the phrase “appropriate circumstances” in addition to the word “reasonable.” And as the district court held, the evidence in the record allows for only one conclusion: that Motherless succeeded in reasonably implementing its policy of terminating repeated infringers. Although the dissent points out that anonymous users could also upload files, 85% of the uploads came from members, and the Ventura clips were not uploaded by anonymous users. The number of repeat infringers who escaped termination, at least as the record shows, is a tiny number and a minuscule percentage of users.

Doubt that Motherless really does have a “policy” of terminating repeat infringers that is “reasonably implemented” is unavoidable in light of unsystematic and casual implementation. But doubt is not evidence.

Ventura has presented no evidence to establish a genuine issue of fact as to whether Motherless failed to reasonably implement its policy. Motherless, however, has met its burden.⁹¹ The absence of any significant number of repeat infringers who escaped termination compels the conclusion that a trier of fact could not conclude, on the record before us, that Motherless failed to meet the repeat infringer eligibility requirement for safe harbor. Motherless and Lange are therefore entitled to claim the protection of the safe harbor.

II. Remaining Issues

Ventura Content argues that the district court abused its discretion in not exercising supplemental jurisdiction over its California state law claim for violation of California Business and Professional Code § 17200. The district court did not abuse its discretion.

Federal courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim if it shares a “common nucleus of operative fact” with a federal claim and if “the state and federal claims would normally be tried together.”⁹² Ventura’s state law claim is for unlawful business practices, a cause of action that “borrows violations of other laws” and makes them “independently

⁹¹ See *Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung*, 710 F.3d 1020, 1039 (9th Cir. 2013).

⁹² *Bahrampour v. Lampert*, 356 F.3d 969, 978 (9th Cir. 2004).

actionable.”⁹³ Specifically, Ventura alleges that Motherless is violating federal law by not creating and maintaining records of the performers on its site.⁹⁴ The district court held that this claim did not share a “common nucleus of operative fact” with the copyright infringement claim. That was not an abuse of discretion for the very reason that the district court gave: Motherless’s “failure to keep records has little, if anything, to do with the copyrighted material that appears on their system.”

Likewise, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying an award of attorney’s fees to Motherless. Among the factors bearing on the exercise of discretion are “(1) the degree of success obtained; (2) frivolousness; (3) motivation; (4) the objective unreasonableness of the losing party’s legal and factual arguments; and (5) the need, in particular circumstances, to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence.”⁹⁵

The district court noted that Ventura’s claim was neither objectively unreasonable nor frivolous because prior Ninth Circuit precedent had not directly addressed several arguments that Ventura raised. Ventura’s

⁹³ *Davis v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A.*, 691 F.3d 1152, 1168 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting *Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co.*, 973 P.2d 527, 539–40 (Cal. 1999)).

⁹⁴ See 18 U.S.C. § 2257(a) (requiring producers of media depicting sexually explicit conduct to “create and maintain individually identifiable records pertaining to every performer”).

⁹⁵ *Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc.*, 725 F.3d 1170, 1180–81 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing *Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.*, 510 U.S. 517, 534 n.1 (1994)).

motivation was not improper, nor was there a need to deter the claims that Ventura made. It had, after all, been the victim of copyright infringement and sued parties that played a role in the infringement. It was thwarted only because of the complexities of the safe harbor rules that had not yet been fully explicated in the case law.

CONCLUSION

The record and the law support the district court's decisions (1) granting summary judgment in favor of Motherless; (2) declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Ventura Content's state-law claim; and (3) denying Motherless's motion for attorney's fees.

AFFIRMED.

RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent from my colleagues' conclusion that Motherless, Inc. and Joshua Lange qualified for the safe harbor provided for in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (the Act).

It is important to remember that this case was resolved on summary judgment. Therefore, if a material issue of fact was raised by Ventura Content, Ltd. (Ventura), entry of summary judgment in favor of Motherless, Inc. and Lange was in error. *See Zetwick v. County of Yolo*, 850 F.3d 436, 441 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[W]here evidence is genuinely disputed . . . that issue

is inappropriate for resolution on summary judgment. The district court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants . . .”) (citations, alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, all evidence is to be construed in the light most favorable to Ventura. *See id.* at 440.

From my reading of the record, a gargantuan issue of fact was raised by Ventura regarding Motherless/Lange’s compliance with the requirement that the service provider adopt, implement, and inform subscribers and account holders of the policy providing for termination of repeat infringers to merit safe harbor protection from copyright infringement.

It is important to set forth the obligations imposed upon the service provider Motherless/Lange under the Act. The Act provides that the safe harbor is available to a service provider “only if the service provider” “*has adopted and reasonably implemented and informs subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or network of, a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances . . . of repeat infringers.*” 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A) (emphasis added). The Act requires not only that the service provider have a policy, but that the policy be adopted and reasonably implemented. *See id.* The subscribers and account holders of the system must also be informed of the policy.

The majority concedes that Motherless/Lange has adopted no written or publicized policy that may be used to instruct regarding the expulsion of repeat

infringers. *See Majority Opinion*, pp. 7, 38–39. The majority excuses this deficiency by noting that “there are no employees to instruct.” *Id.*, p. 7. However, there is at least one independent contractor who, together with Lange, reviews all the photographs and videos before they are uploaded to the website. *See Majority Opinion*, p. 6. If, as the majority concedes, there is no written policy to instruct the independent contractor regarding repeat infringers, at a minimum a material issue of fact is raised regarding compliance with that requirement of the safe harbor provision.

The majority accuses me of “conflat[ing] Lange’s screening of content . . . and his implementation of Motherless’s policy to terminate repeat infringers.” *Majority Opinion*, p. 39 n.73. I beg to differ. I readily acknowledge that the screening precedes the implementation of the “policy” to terminate repeat infringers. But how would Lange know whom to terminate if the repeat offenders are not first identified by Lange or to Lange by the contractor? That question brings us back to the lack of guidance regarding the “appropriate circumstances” for terminating repeat infringers. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(1)(A). If the independent contractor has no guidance for determining when to refer screened material as from a potential repeat infringer, and Lange is the only one who actually terminates repeat offenders, a material issue of fact looms regarding the reasonableness of the Motherless/Lange system of identifying and terminating repeat infringers. *See id.*

Further supporting the existence of a material issue of fact regarding the establishment of a policy is

the failure of Lange to articulate a consistent approach to the termination of repeat infringers. At one point Lange stated the repeat infringer policy as: “If we receive more than one takedown notice, we terminate the account.” Lange even went so far as to describe this approach as “a written policy of Motherless.” At a different point, Lange described an “automated system for removing people” that he later acknowledged did not actually exist.

The majority has apparently settled on the third approach articulated by Lange, the “I delete any infringing content I can find” approach. *Majority Opinion*, p. 6. Lange described this approach as “look[ing] at about 80 thumbnails per minute” to weed out repeat infringers. What Lange is really saying is that he looks at each thumbnail for a fraction of a second to identify repeat infringers. Lange uses his “judgment” rather than a policy to make this determination. *Majority Opinion*, p. 7. And Lange never explains how, without a written policy, his “judgment” is transferred to the independent contractor who is also responsible for identifying repeat infringers. For instance, Lange might make a “gut decision” to terminate a user after the first takedown notice. *Majority Opinion*, p. 41. Who can say with a straight fact [sic] that a “gut decisionmaking process” constitutes a policy? I certainly can’t.

At a minimum, Lange’s inconsistent and inadequate articulation and application of the Motherless/Lange policy, such as it is, governing termination of repeat infringers precluded entry of summary judgment

in favor of Motherless/Lange. *See Zetwick*, 850 F.3d at 441.

The majority relies on “the paucity of proven failures to terminate” as evidence supporting satisfaction of the safe harbor requirements. *Majority Opinion*, p. 44. But this “evidence,” or more precisely, lack of evidence is singularly unpersuasive because it relies completely on the less than stellar, unautomated record-keeping system utilized by Motherless. The missing link is how many repeat infringers slipped through the massive cracks in the Motherless/Lange casual monitoring system. And as the majority concedes, there is evidence in the record that repeat infringers slipped through these cracks. *See id.* One of the biggest uploaders to the website was not terminated until after Motherless received a fourth takedown notice under the Act. *See id.*, p. 45. This circumstance raises a material issue of fact regarding the lack of implementation of one of Lange’s self-described policies of terminating an account “if [Motherless] receive[s] more than one takedown notice.” The failure to terminate the account of this admittedly repeat infringer certainly raised a material issue of fact regarding whether Motherless had “a policy that provides for the termination [of repeat infringers] in appropriate circumstances.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A); *see also Perfect 10 v. CCBill LLC*, 488 F.3d 1102, 1113 (9th Cir. 2007) (“A policy is unreasonable . . . if the service provider failed to respond when it had knowledge of the infringement. . . .”).

The majority admits that “it may be hard to imagine how a site with so many subscribers and uploads

could have so few repeat infringers, and how it could screen so effectively.” *Majority Opinion*, p. 45. But the majority can only reach the conclusion that there are few repeat infringers, and that Motherless screens effectively, by impermissibly viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Motherless rather than to Ventura. *See Zetwick*, 850 F.3d at 440. In addition to raising material issues of fact regarding the existence and implementation of the required policy, Ventura presented evidence that Motherless is completely unable to capture anonymous infringers. So how can the majority have confidence in the number of infringers who purportedly escaped termination if there is no way of knowing the actual number of infringers? This is a classic example of “garbage in, garbage out” evidence and should not permit Motherless to escape accountability under the Act for failing to adopt, disseminate, and reasonably implement a policy to terminate repeat infringers.

The safe harbor provision is basically an exception to the liability that otherwise applies under copyright law for those who harbor repeat copyright infringers. As with any other exception, its parameters should be construed narrowly. *See, e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation v. Abramson*, 465 U.S. 615, 636 n.5 (1982) (noting that exceptions to the Freedom of Information Act are to be narrowly construed). The majority concedes that Motherless’ policy is comprised primarily of “little more than Lange’s [unwritten] multifactor judgment based largely on his recollection of DMCA notices” and his glances at the uploads. *Majority Opinion*, p. 45. I

am not prepared to say as a matter of law that a “policy” that is unwritten, uncommunicated, and often unimplemented falls within the safe harbor provisions of the Act.

I agree with the majority that the district court acted within its discretion when it declined to exercise jurisdiction over Ventura’s California state law claim and when it denied an award of attorney’s fees to Motherless. However, I seriously disagree with the majority that the district court properly awarded summary judgment in favor of Motherless/Lange. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Ventura, material issues of fact remain regarding the existence of a policy as defined in the Act, and the reasonableness of actions taken by Motherless/Lange to terminate repeat infringers. I would reverse that portion of the district court’s ruling, and I respectfully dissent from the majority’s contrary ruling.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. 2:11-cv-5912-SVW-FMO Date July 3, 2013

Title Ventura Content, Ltd. v. Motherless, Inc. et al.

Present: The Honorable STEPHEN V. WILSON,
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

Paul M. Cruz N/A
Deputy Clerk Court Reporter / Recorder Tape No.

Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: N/A

Attorneys Present for Defendants: N/A

Proceedings: IN CHAMBERS ORDER Re MOTION
for Partial Summary Judgment [77]

I. INTRODUCTION

On July 11, 2011, Plaintiff Ventura Content, Ltd. (“Plaintiff”) filed its complaint in this Court against Defendants Motherless, Inc. (“Motherless”), a New York Corporation, and Motherless’ President Joshua Lange (together, “Defendants”). *See* Complaint (“Compl.”) (Dckt. 1). Plaintiff asserted two claims against Defendants: one for direct, vicarious, and contributory copyright infringement, and another for violations of unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business practices in violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200.

Defendants brought the instant motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s copyright claims,

arguing first that they had not infringed on Plaintiff’s copyrights, and second, that even if they had, they were entitled to the “safe harbor defense” of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), 17 U.S.C. § 512. For the reasons put forward in this Order, the Court finds that Defendants are entitled to Section 512’s safe harbor, and thus GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on that basis.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND¹

Motherless owns and operates a website named “Motherless.com.” SUF ¶¶ 8-11.² Motherless allows its users to upload pictures and videos onto Motherless.com; once this material has been uploaded onto Motherless.com, other users are permitted to view them. SUF ¶ 12. The pictures and videos are stored on servers owned by Lange, in a facility rented by Motherless, in Texas. SUF ¶ 41.³ The vast majority of content available at Motherless.com—between 85 and 90%—depicts sexually explicit content. SUF ¶ 14. Any

¹ This factual background includes only general facts as to the operation of the website and the activities giving rise to Plaintiff’s causes of action. Other facts—particularly those relevant to Defendants’ DMCA affirmative defense—are set forth below as needed.

² Lange is the sole shareholder and director of Motherless. SUF ¶ 3.

³ Motherless.com functions similar to YouTube: it permits users to “upload” and view video clips and pictures. *See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.*, 676 F.3d 19, 28 (2d Cir. 2012) (“The basic function of the YouTube website permits users to ‘upload’ and view video clips free of charge.”).

individual is permitted to become a user, and may upload and view content as he or she wishes. SUF ¶¶ 44-48. Presently, Motherless.com has approximately 728,269 active users. SUF ¶ 70.

Before uploading any content, a user must agree to Motherless.com's procedures and policies as set forth on its "Terms of Use" page. SUF ¶ 51, 67. Among other things, the Terms of Use requires users to affirm that they have "won or have the necessary licenses, rights, consents, and permission to use and authorize [Motherless] to use all . . . copyright . . . rights." SUF ¶ 72. It further provided that users agree not to "post, or otherwise distribute or facilitate distribution of any content that . . . infringes on any copyright right of any party." *Id.* The Terms of Use further informs users that Motherless will remove content that it deems to be illegal, include [sic] material that infringes on copyright. *Id.*

Motherless employs its own review process designed to ensure that uploaded content does not violate its terms of use. SUF ¶¶ 92-99. Motherless' review process uses a computer software to generate "thumbnails"—a two-inch by two-inch image of the material displayed—of each item of content uploaded. SUF ¶¶ 92-94. For every picture uploaded, a single thumbnail is created. SUF ¶ 93. For each video uploaded, Motherless' software creates five (5) thumbnails, one displaying the image contained at the "20 percent" point (that is, the image that appears one-fifth of the way into the video); the next at the "40 percent" point ; and the final three at the sixty, eighty, and 100 percent points. SUF ¶ 94. Within two to four days of a user

uploading a video or picture, a Motherless employee or representative briefly reviews each thumbnail for “obvious signs of child pornography, copyright notices, watermarks, and any other information that would indicate that the picture or video contains illegal content or violates” the Terms of Use, and deletes any material that does so. SUF ¶ 96. Defendants do not select the thumbnails to view, and they do not see any other portion of the video. SUF ¶ 94.

When a user uploads content, he or she has the option of adding a title and tying the content to a particular “group.” SUF ¶¶ 83-84. “Groups” are user-created categories that make it easier for other users to search for particular content. SUF ¶ 362. Thus, for example, a user might create a group named “Blondes,” and “tie” a video featuring blonde performers to that group. SUF ¶ 358. This allows future users to search for, and quickly locate, the desired content. *Id.* At least some of these groups are named for professional porn stars, celebrities, or copyright-protected movies or shows. SUF ¶ 365. In order for users to create a group, they must get approval from Defendants; moreover, Defendants remove unpopular groups or ones that violates their Terms of Use. SUF ¶¶ 363-364. Motherless also has an “awards” program, through which it recognizes the user who uploads the most viewed content, or who uploads the most content. SUF ¶¶ 196-197. Motherless also selects certain content to be “prominently featured” on the website. SUF ¶¶ 372.

Plaintiff is a leading distributor of sexually explicit films. SUF ¶ 20. Between May 2006 and March

2010, Plaintiff produced, and obtained copyright registrations, for the nineteen films at issue in this case. SUF ¶ 21. Between December 200 and July 2011, eight Motherless.com users uploaded various portions of these nineteen films—thirty three clips in total—onto Motherless.com. SUF ¶ 22. None of the thirty-three clips contained any indication that Plaintiff was the copyright owner; however, three of the clips contained a watermark, “videosz.com” and one contained the watermark “monstercockbabes.com”. SUF ¶¶ 276-279. Neither watermark has any connection to Plaintiff. SUF ¶¶ 277. Before Plaintiff filed the instant suit on July 19, 2011, Plaintiff had made no effort to inform Defendants that the thirty-three clips contained copyrighted material. SUF ¶ 300. On November 23, 2011, Plaintiff provided Defendants with the URLs of the thirty-three videos at issue; on the same day, Defendants deleted the videos from their content. SUF ¶¶ 304-305.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 56(c) requires summary judgment for the moving party when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); *Tarin v. Cnty. of L.A.*, 123 F.3d 1259, 1263 (9th Cir. 1997). “[I]n ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party’s evidence ‘is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [that party’s] favor.’” *Hunt v.*

Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999) (quoting *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). “A justifiable inference is not necessarily the most likely inference or the most persuasive inference. Rather, an inference as to another material fact may be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party . . . if it is rational or reasonable.” *United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp.*, 865 F.2d 1539, 1542 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. *See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). The moving party may satisfy its Rule 56(c) burden by “‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” *Id.* at 325. Once the moving party has met its initial burden, Rule 56(e) requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and identify specific facts that show a genuine issue for trial. *See id.* at 323-24; *Anderson*, 477 U.S. at 248. A scintilla of evidence or evidence that is merely colorable or not significantly probative does not present a genuine issue of material fact. *Addisu v. Fred Meyer*, 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). Only genuine disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law—*i.e.*, “where the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party”—will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. *See Anderson*, 477 U.S. at 248.

Under Local Rules 56-2 and 56-3, these triable issues of fact must be identified in the non-moving party's "Statement of Genuine Issues" and supported by "declaration or other written evidence." *See also Sullivan v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc.*, 623 F.3d 770, 779 (9th Cir. 2010) ("Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)(2) requires a party to 'set out *specific* facts showing a genuine issue for trial.'") (emphasis in original). If the non-moving party fails to identify the triable issues of fact, the court may treat the moving party's evidence as uncontroverted, so long as the facts are "adequately supported" by the moving party. Local Rule 56-3; *see also Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. Davis*, 476 U.S. 380, 398 n.14 (1986) ("[I]t is not [the Court's] task *sua sponte* to search the record for evidence to support the [parties'] claim[s]."); *Carmen v. San Francisco United Sch. Dist.*, 237 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001) ("A lawyer drafting an opposition to a summary judgment motion may easily show a judge, in the opposition, the evidence that the lawyer wants the judge to read. It is absurdly difficult for a judge to perform a search, unassisted by counsel, through the entire record, to look for such evidence.").

IV. PLAINTIFF'S PRIMA FACIE CASE

In its complaint, Plaintiff asserted three federal causes of action: direct, contributory, and vicarious copyright infringement. *See* Compl. ¶¶ 42-51. Defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff cannot, as a matter of law, establish a prima facie case as to each cause of action.

In order to make out a prima facie case of direct copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 106, Plaintiff must satisfy two elements: first, it must show that it owns the copyright of the allegedly infringed material; and second, it must demonstrate that Defendants reproduced, prepared derivative works from, distributed, performed, or displayed a copyrighted work without its authority. *See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, 508 F.3d 1146, 1159 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Plaintiffs must satisfy two requirements to present a prima facie case of direct infringement: (1) they must show ownership of the allegedly infringed material and (2) they must demonstrate that the alleged infringers violate at least one exclusive right granted to copyright holders under 17 U.S.C. § 106.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

It is undisputed that Plaintiff owns the copyright of the thirty-three clips at issue in this case. Moreover, by allowing users to upload the infringing videos onto its website, and subsequently allowing other users to access and view those stored images, Defendants infringed upon Plaintiff’s exclusive right to “display” them. *See Amazon.com*, 508 F.3d at 1160 (holding that a service provider infringed upon a copyright holder’s exclusive right to display its works because it was undisputed that the service provider’s “computers store thumbnail versions of [the copyright holder’s] copyrighted images and communicate copies of those thumbnails to [the service provider’s] users.”). At a minimum, Plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of direct copyright infringement. Because Defendants’

safe harbor defense applies equally to each of Plaintiff's three claims, the Court need not decide whether Plaintiff would also be able to make out a prima facie case of vicarious and/or contributory liability.

V. DEFENDANTS' SAFE HARBOR DEFENSE

A. Legal Background

“Difficult and controversial questions of copyright liability in the online world prompted Congress to enact Title II of the [“DMCA”], the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act (OCILLA). 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2003).” *Ellison v. Robertson*, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004). While recognizing that “in the ordinary course of their operations service providers must engage in all kinds of acts that expose them to potential copyright infringement liability[,]” Congress was nonetheless “loath to permit the specter of liability to chill innovation that could also serve substantial socially beneficial functions.” *UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC*, ___ F.3d ___, No. 09-55902, 2013 WL 1092793, at *5 (9th Cir. Mar. 14, 2013) (quoting S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 8 (1998) (alteration omitted)). In an effort to balance these competing concerns, Congress designed the OCILLA to “facilitate cooperation among Internet service providers and copyright owners ‘to detect and deal with copyright infringements that take place in the digital networked environment.’” *Ellison*, 357 F.3d at 1076

(quoting S. Rep. 105-190, at 20 (1998); H.R. Rep. 105-551, pt. 2, at 49 (1998)).

The two principal features of the DMCA, as amended by the OCILLA, reflect this balance. First, the DMCA created a “notice and takedown protocol,” through which a copyright owner who suspects that his or her copyright is being infringed may notify the service provider of potential infringing activity occurring on its network. *See Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am. Inc.*, 391 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir. 2004) (“When a copyright owner suspects his copyright is being infringed, he must follow the notice and takedown provisions set forth in § 512(c)(3) of the DMCA[.]”). The DMCA provides detailed specifications of what a copyright holder must include in its notice to the service provider. *See* 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3). Once a service provider receives a notice of copyright infringement that conforms to the statutory requirements detailed in Section 512(c)(3) (a “DMCA-compliant notice”), a service provider “must ‘respond expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing.’” *Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1098 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (quoting *Recording Industry Ass’n of America v. Verizon Internet Servs.*, 351 F.3d 1229, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (alteration omitted)). A service provider that fails to take down properly-noticed material exposes itself to copyright liability. *Corbis*, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1098. As this notice and takedown regime makes apparent, “a service provider need not affirmatively police its users for evidence of repeat infringement.” *Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC*, 488 F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th

Cir. 2007). Instead, as the Ninth Circuit observed, Congress made a “considered policy determination” to “place the burden of policing copyright infringement—identifying the potentially infringing material and adequately documenting infringement—squarely on the owners of the copyright.” *UMG Recordings*, 2013 WL 1092793, at *11.

The second pillar of the DMCA provides “four safe harbors that preclude imposing monetary liability on service providers for copyright infringement that occurs as a result of specified activities.” *UMG Recordings*, 2013 WL 1092793, at *5. These safe harbors are detailed in Section 512(a) through 512(d). *See* 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(a)-(d). Although the safe harbors “do not render a service provider immune from copyright infringement,” they do “protect eligible service providers from all monetary and most equitable relief that may arise from copyright liability.” *Corbis*, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1098-99. “Thus, even if a plaintiff can show that a safe harbor-eligible service provider has violated her copyright, the plaintiff will only be entitled to the limited injunctive relief set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 512(j).” *Id.* at 1099. Here, Defendants assert they are entitled to the safe harbor protection detailed in Section 512(c).

B. Section 512(c)

“There are a number of requirements that must be met for a ‘service provider’ like [Defendants] to receive § 512(c) safe harbor protection.” *UMG Recordings*,

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2013 WL 1092793, at *5.⁴ Section 512(c) provides, in relevant part:

(c) Information residing on systems or networks at direction of users.—

(1) In general.—A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, except as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider, if the service provider—

(A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material on the system or network is infringing;

(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or

⁴ The Court assumes, without deciding, that Motherless is a service provider within the meaning of Section 512(c), because Plaintiff has not contended otherwise. Other courts have found companies that provide services similar to that Motherless operates to be service providers within the meaning of Section 512(c). *See YouTube*, 676 F.3d at 30 (applying Section 512(c) to claims of copyright infringement against YouTube); *see also UMG Recordings*, 2013 WL 1092793, at *5 n.4 (assuming, without deciding that the owners of a publicly accessible website that allows users to view videos uploaded by other users was a service provider under Section 512(c)).

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(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material;

(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity; and

(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in [Section 512(c)(3)], responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity.

17 U.S.C. § 512(c). Moreover, to be eligible for Section 512(c)'s safe harbor, the service provider must designate an agent to receive DMCA-compliant notices sent by copyright holders. *See* 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2). Finally, the service provider “must meet the threshold conditions set out in [17 U.S.C.] § 512(i)[.]” *CCBill*, 488 F.3d at 1109. Section 512(i) requires a service provide to “adopt and reasonably implement” a repeat-infringer policy, and prohibits service providers for interfering with “standard technical measures” as defined in the statute. 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(i)(1)(A)-(B).

Plaintiff contends that four of these requirements have not been met by Defendants. First, Plaintiff argues that genuine issues of fact remain as to the “knowledge” and “expeditious take down” requirements of Section 512(c)(1)(A). Second, Plaintiff argues that infringement did not occur “by reason of the

storage at the direction of a user.” Third, Plaintiff argues that Defendants has the right and ability to control infringing activity, and receives a financial benefit directly attributable to, the infringing activity. Finally, Plaintiff argues that Defendants have not adopted and reasonably implemented a repeat-infringer policy as required by Section 512(i)(1)(A). The Court addresses each contention in turn.

C. Knowledge or Expeditious Take-Down

Section 512(c)’s protections apply only to service providers that “(i) do[] not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material on the system or network is infringing;” “(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, [are] not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or” “(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, act[] expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A). As the Ninth Circuit has explained, “to be coherent, the statute must be read to have an implicit ‘and’ between § 512(c)(1)(A)(i) and (ii).” *UMG Recordings*, 2013 WL 1092793, at *9 n.11. Thus, Section 512(c)’s protections apply only to those service providers that “either (1) have no actual knowledge *and* no awareness of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent *or* (2) expeditiously remove or disable access to infringing material of which it knows or is aware.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).

1. Actual Knowledge

A copyright holder’s decision to forgo the DMCA notice protocol “strip[s] it of the most powerful evidence of a service provider’s knowledge—actual notice of infringement from the copyright holder.” *UMG Recordings*, 2013 WL 1092793, at *10 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has rejected the contention that “actual knowledge” can be found if a service provider has a “general knowledge that its services could be used to post infringing material.” *Id.* Instead, the record must reflect that a service provider has “specific knowledge of particular infringing activity.” *Id.* at *11; *see also A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.*, 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[A]bsent any specific information which identifies infringing activity, a computer system operator cannot be liable for contributory infringement merely because the structure of the system allows for the exchange of copyrighted material.”).

It is undisputed that, until it filed the instant action, Plaintiff did not notify Defendants that its copyrighted material was available on Defendants’ system. SUF ¶¶ 306, 322-324. Plaintiff’s failure to do so “stripped it of the most powerful evidence of a service provider’s knowledge.” Plaintiff has offered no other evidence that Defendant had “specific knowledge of particular infringing material.” Moreover, it is undisputed that Defendants promptly removed the clips at issue in this suit from its website upon confirmation that they were infringing material. SUF ¶¶ 300-306. Thus, “there is no question on the record presented

that [Defendants] lacked actual knowledge of the alleged infringing activity at issue.” *Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc.*, 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1148 (N.D. Cal. 2008); *see also id.* (holding that defendant did not have actual knowledge of specific instances of infringement because it was “undisputed that, before it filed the instant action, plaintiff provided no notice to [the defendant service provider] of any claimed copyright infringement”).

2. Awareness of Facts or Circumstances that Indicated from Which Infringing Activity is Apparent

Defendants must also not have been “aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii). Under this so-called “red flag test,” the relevant inquiry is *not* whether the service provider *should* have known that the material was infringing, but whether the service provider “deliberately proceeded in the face of blatant factors of which it was aware.” 3 DAVID NIMMER AND MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12B.04[A][2] (Mathew Bender Rev. Ed., 2012); *see also Io Group*, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1148 (“In other words, apparent knowledge requires evidence that a service provider turned a blind eye to red flags of obvious infringement.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). As the Ninth Circuit has explained

“The difference between actual and red flag knowledge is . . . between a subjective and an objective standard. In other words, the actual

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knowledge provision turns on whether the provider actually or ‘subjectively’ knew of specific infringement, while the red flag provision turns on whether the provider was subjectively aware of facts that would have made the specific infringement ‘objectively’ obvious to a reasonable person.”

UMG Recordings, 2013 WL 1092793, at *15 (quoting *Viacom Int’l v. YouTube, Inc.*, 676 F.3d 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2012)). Moreover, like the actual knowledge requirement, the red flag test applies “‘only to specific instances of infringement.’” *UMG Recordings*, 2013 WL 1092793, at *15 (quoting *YouTube*, 676 F.3d at 31). In other words, to find that a service provider was aware “of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent,” the record must indicate that a service provider was subjectively aware of facts that would have made it objectively obvious to the service provider that the specific copyrights owned by the Plaintiff were being infringed.

The record here contains no such indication. Plaintiff has failed to produce *any evidence whatsoever* from which it might be inferred that Defendants were aware of “facts or circumstances” indicating that the clips at issue in this suit infringed upon Plaintiffs’ copyrights. See *CCBill*, 488 F.3d at 1114 (holding that a service provider did not have red flag knowledge, despite the fact that it provided services to websites named “illegal.net” and “stolencelebritypics.com,” reasoning that “when a website traffics in pictures that are titillating by nature, describing photographs as ‘illegal’ or ‘stolen’

may be an attempt to increase their salacious appeal, rather than an admission that the photographs are actually illegal or stolen”); *cf. YouTube*, 676 F.3d at 33-34 (holding that a report from a service provider’s employee that stated that “as of today, episodes and clips of the following well-known shows can still be found on Youtube. . . . we would benefit from preemptively removing content that is *blatantly illegal and likely to attract criticism*” and an e-mail exchange in which an employee noted that “there is a cnn clip of the shuttle clip on the site today, if the boys from Turner would come to the site, they might be pissed?” to which the service provider’s founder replied “we should just keep that stuff on the site. I really don’t see what will happen” raised a material issue of fact regarding the service provider’s actual or red-flag knowledge) (emphasis added).⁵

⁵ The Ninth Circuit has suggested—but not held—that a DMCA-compliant notification from a *third party* copyright holder might confer red flag knowledge upon a service provider. *See UMG Recordings*, 2013 WL 1092793, at *14 n.14 (refusing to consider whether a service provider’s apparent infringement of a third party copyright holder’s movies and television shows “would affect the availability of the § 512(c) safe harbor with regard to [the plaintiff’s] claims that the [defendant service provider] hosted unauthorized [material]”). *But see YouTube*, 676 F.3d at 34 (suggesting that a service provider only falls outside of Section 512(c)’s safe harbor if it has actual or red-flag knowledge of the “clips-in-suit” of the litigation); *see also* 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12B.04[B][5] (noting that there is “reason to doubt” that “non-party notices can serve to sacrifice the Section 512(c) safe harbor for storing material” based on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in *Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC*).

3. Plaintiff's Remaining Arguments

Plaintiff presents four arguments that it contends demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact remains as to either Defendants' actual or red flag knowledge. Each contention is without merit.

a. *Defendants' Business Model is Reliant on "Mass Infringement"*

Plaintiff first attempts to elide the specific knowledge requirement by contending that Defendants "must" have known that infringing material had been uploaded onto their website because their business model is "reliant on mass infringement." Plaintiff's argument

Here, Plaintiff has identified three instances in which Defendants took between ten to fifteen days to remove copyrighted material identified by a third party copyright holder in what appears to be DMCA-complaint notification. *SUF* ¶ 384. Even assuming that such third party notices can be considered in evaluating whether a service provider had red flag knowledge, and that fifteen days is not "expeditious" within the meaning of the DMCA, these occasional lapses do not alter the Court's conclusion that Defendants are entitled to Section 512(c)'s safe harbor. The undisputed facts demonstrate that Defendants expeditiously removed the vast majority of infringing material upon receiving DMCA-compliant (and non-DMCA-complaint) notices. Defendants have received over 3,500 notices of infringement since Motherless.com began operating in 2008, and have removed all infringing material identified in those notices. *SUF* ¶¶ 246, 264. Moreover, Plaintiff does not dispute that, in all but three instances (or more that 99.99% of the time), Defendants expeditiously removed the material identified in these notices. Defendants' occasional delay in removing material identified in DMCA-compliant notices does not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants are entitled to Section 512(c)'s safe harbor.

is specifically tailored to the pornography industry: according to Plaintiffs, pornography-only websites like Motherless.com attract visitors by holding a large amount of free pornography. Moreover, the only way to accumulate such large volumes of free pornography on its website is, according to Plaintiffs, to “get large volumes of professionally created-pornography.” Furthermore, Plaintiff argues, the only way professionally-created pornography could end up on Motherless.com is via the upload of copyrighted material by users who are not authorized to do so, or via a business relationship with pornography producers who authorize the uploading of clips in exchange for banners advertising their content on the website—relationships that, Defendants admit, they do not have. Lane Decl. ¶¶ 93-95. Therefore, according to Plaintiff, Defendants “must” know that a substantial portion of the material uploaded is copyrighted.

Even crediting Plaintiff’s chain of inferences as true, Plaintiff’s argument is premised on a misunderstanding of the applicable test. As the above discussion makes clear, the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that a service provider falls outside of Section 512(c)’s safe harbor only if the record contains evidence that a service provider failed to expeditiously remove material once it gained actual or red flag knowledge of *specific instances of infringement*. For the reasons laid out above, there is no genuine dispute of material fact that Defendants expeditiously removed infringing material upon gaining actual or red flag knowledge of specific instances of infringement.

Moreover, Plaintiff's argument that Defendants "must" have known of infringing activity was specifically rejected by the district court in *UMG Recordings*. See *UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc.*, 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1111 (C.D. Cal. 2009) *aff'd sub nom. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC*, 2013 WL 1092793 (9th Cir. Mar. 14, 2013) ("UMG nevertheless argues that Veoh is ineligible for the safe harbor because its founders, employees, and investors knew that widespread infringement was occurring on the Veoh system. *But even if this were true and undisputed, UMG cites no case holding that a provider's general awareness of infringement, without more, is enough to preclude application of section 512(c).*") (emphasis added). As that Court observed,

No doubt it is common knowledge that most websites that allow users to contribute material [that] contain infringing items. If such general awareness were enough to raise a "red flag," the DMCA safe harbor would not serve its purpose of "facilitating the robust development and world-wide expansion of electronic commerce, communications, research, development, and education in the digital age," and "balancing the interests of content owners, online and other service providers, and information users in a way that will foster the continued development of electronic commerce and the growth of the Internet."

Id. (quoting S. Rep. 105-190, at 1-2 (1998); H.R. Rep. 105-551(II), at 21) (alterations omitted). Indeed, the service provider at issue in *UMG Recordings* sought to

“build or create an audience” by having a “wide range of content on its system,” 665 F. Supp. at 1102 (quotation marks omitted), but this business model alone was insufficient to avoid Section 512(c)’s safe harbor. Plaintiff’s pornography-specific argument is nothing more than a re-articulation of the argument rejected by both the district court and the Ninth Circuit in *UMG Recordings*.

The Court recognizes the intuitive appeal of Plaintiff’s argument: unlike the service provider in *UMG Recordings*, Defendants have offered no evidence of content “subject to copyright protection but lawfully available” on its systems, such as videos “created by users [or] videos that [Defendants] provided pursuant to arrangements it reached with major copyright holders[.]” *UMG Recordings*, 2013 WL 1092793, at *10 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). However, Section 512(c)’s safe harbor does not require Defendants to offer such evidence. It requires only that Defendants demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they had actual or red flag knowledge of *specific instances of infringement*, which they have done here. To demand more would require Defendants to demonstrate that material on their website was *not* copyright-infringing, effectively undermining Congress’ “considered policy determination” of placing the “burden of policing copyright infringement . . . squarely on the owners of the copyright.” *Id.*, at *11; *see also id.*, at *10 (“[I]f merely hosting material that falls within a category of content capable of copyright protection, with the general

knowledge that one's services could be used to share unauthorized copies of copyrighted material, was sufficient to impute knowledge to service providers, the § 512(c) safe harbor would be rendered a dead letter[.]"); *YouTube*, 676 F.3d at 33 (holding that surveys estimating between fifty and eighty percent that YouTube streamed contained copyrighted material were "insufficient, standing alone, to create a triable issue of fact as to whether YouTube actually knew, or was aware of facts or circumstances that would indicate, the existence of particular instances of infringement"); *Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc.*, 600 F.3d 93, 110 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that although a website "concede[d] that it knew as a general matter that counterfeit Tiffany products were listed and sold through its website[.]" such knowledge alone was insufficient to support a finding that the website had been willfully blind to specific instances of infringement).

Finally, the intuition upon which Plaintiff relies is not supported by the facts of this case. Despite ample opportunity for discovery, Plaintiff has identified, at most, three instances in which copyright-protected material remained on Defendants' servers for a period of more than a few days. *See supra* note 5. If Defendants' business model was truly "reliant" on *mass* infringement, Plaintiff should have been able to unearth a substantial amount of copyright-protected content that remained on Defendants' website well after Defendants received DMCA-compliant notices that the content had been copyrighted during discovery. They have not.

b. *Features of Motherless.com*

Plaintiff further argues that specific features of the Motherless.com website demonstrate that Defendants are inducing their users to upload infringing material. Plaintiff focuses primarily on Motherless.com’s “group” function. According to Plaintiff, the groups named for professional porn stars, celebrities, or copyright-protected movies and shows “clearly encourage[] the uploading of infringing material.” However, the Ninth Circuit rejected almost the exact same argument in *UMG Recordings*. There, the copyright holder argued that a service provider’s actual or red flag knowledge of infringement could be found because the service provider allowed its users to “tag” uploaded content under a “music videos” category. *UMG Recordings*, 2013 WL 1092793, at *12. The Ninth Circuit found this evidence insufficient to support the inference that Defendant had actual or red flag knowledge of specific infringing activity. *Id.* Just as permitting users to “tag” their content to a group named “music videos” was insufficient to demonstrate actual or red flag knowledge in *UMG Recordings*, allowing users to “group” their content under the identified categories is insufficient to establish the required knowledge here. Moreover, the mere fact that users created groups based on particular celebrities, porn stars, or copyright-protected movies or TV shows does not demonstrate that Defendants had actual or red flag knowledge of specific instances of infringing activity; as the Ninth Circuit reasoned in *CCBill*, “when a website traffics in pictures that are titillating by nature,

describing photographs as ‘illegal’ or ‘stolen’ may be an attempt to increase their salacious appeal, rather than an admission that the photographs are actually illegal or stolen.” 488 F.3d at 1114. Indeed, Plaintiff has failed to offer evidence that the content tagged to a particular group actually displayed images of the celebrities, television shows, or porn stars for which the groups were named.⁶

Nor do the other features of Motherless.com highlighted by Plaintiff demonstrate that Defendants had actual or red flag knowledge of specific instances of infringement. The fact that Defendants give out rewards to those users who upload the most content, or the most popular content, does not demonstrate that Defendants had actual or red flag knowledge of specific instances of infringement; instead, it proves only that Defendants are encouraging uploading. Similarly, the

⁶ The Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in *Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Fung*, 710 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2013), does not compel a different result. In *Fung*, the copyright holder introduced a wealth of evidence that *Fung* had actively encouraged copyright infringement, “by urging his users to both upload and download *particular* copyrighted works, providing assistance to those seeking to watch copyrighted films, and helping his users burn copyrighted material onto DVDs.” *Id.* at 1043 (emphasis added). Moreover, there was evidence that the defendant himself personally used the technology he provided to download infringing material. *Id.* Perhaps most importantly, the copyright holder in *Fung* identified *specific files* that the defendant had downloaded or helped others download that contained infringing material. In contrast to the overwhelming evidence in *Fung*, Plaintiff here has produced no evidence that Defendants were aware of or should have been aware that the thirty-three clips *at issue in this suit* were copyrighted.

fact that Defendants place popular content where it is most likely to be seen, and choose certain content for prominent locations, demonstrates only that Defendants are attempting to increase their revenue, not that they knew that specific content highlighted was infringing.

c. *The Professional Nature of the Content on Motherless.com*

Next, Plaintiff argues that the professional nature of the content on Motherless.com demonstrates that Defendants knew or were aware of specific instances of infringement. According to Plaintiff, adult tube sites like Motherless.com attract visitors because they hold large amounts of free pornography. SUF ¶ 352. In order to obtain such large volumes, tube sites rely on professionally created pornography—it is impossible to generate such large quantities by relying solely on amateur content, as few people are willing to record and publicly post their own sex acts. SUF ¶ 353. Even assuming this to be true, “the professionally created nature of submitted content [does not] constitute[] a per se ‘red flag’ of infringement sufficient to impute the requisite level of knowledge or awareness to” Defendants. *Io Group*, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1132. Indeed, given the audio-visual equipment available to the general public today, “there may be little, if any, distinction between ‘professional’ and amateur productions.” *Id.*

d. *Defendants' Review Process*

Finally, Plaintiff argues that Defendants “must” have known that its users were uploading copyrighted material because Defendants’ employees “review and approve all uploads,” many of which contain “watermarks or other express indicia of ownership.” As an initial matter, the Court is skeptical that actual or red flag knowledge can be gained merely by reviewing content uploaded onto a website *for the express purpose of determining whether such content is infringing*. Doing so would, in effect, penalize a service provider for taking measures designed to prevent copyright infringement. Furthermore, it would have the impermissible effect of shifting the burden of determining whether specific content was illegal onto the service provider, a consequence that runs directly counter to Congress’s purpose in creating Section 512(c)’s safe harbor. *See CCBill*, 488 F.3d at 1114 (“We do not place the burden of determining *whether photographs are actually illegal* on a service provider.”) (emphasis added); *see also* 17 U.S.C. § 512(m) (stating that a service provider need *not* monitor its service, nor “affirmatively seek[] facts indicating infringing activity,” in order to receive Section 512(c)’s harbor); *UMG Recordings*, 2013 WL 1092793, at * 11 (“Congress made a considered policy determination that the [Section 512(c)’s] notification procedures would place the burden of policing copyright infringement—identifying the potentially infringing material and adequately documenting infringement—squarely on the owners of the copyright. In parsing § 512(c)(3), we have declined to shift

that substantial burden from the copyright owner to the provider.”) (internal citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted).

Even assuming that Defendants could glean actual or red flag knowledge of specific instances of infringement from their review process, the record contains no indication that Defendants did so in this case. In support of their assertion that Defendants “must” have gained such knowledge from their review process, Plaintiff submitted a declaration from their expert, Frederick Lane, who reviewed 996 clips uploaded onto Motherless.com over an eleven-hour span in November of 2012. According to Mr. Lane, 66.3% of these clips were “clearly watermarked or contained other information identifying the content producer,” and an additional 20.3% of the clips were “professional[ly] produced or obviously proprietary.” Lane Decl. ¶ 93. Moreover, it is undisputed that Defendants’ employees review each picture and video uploaded onto Motherless.com for “obvious signs of child pornography, copyright notices, watermarks and any other information” that would indicate the content uploaded is illegal or otherwise violates Motherless.com’s terms of use. Thus, according to Plaintiff, Defendants must have seen these watermarks and other indicia of ownership, and allowed such material to remain on the website.

Plaintiff’s reliance on Lane’s survey is misplaced for three reasons. First, Lane’s survey occurred *as users were uploading clips*. Lane Decl. ¶ 93. However, it is undisputed that Defendants’ employees do not

review uploaded content until two to four days *after* a clip or picture has been uploaded. SUF ¶ 96. Plaintiff has offered *no* evidence that Defendants allowed clips or pictures that contained “watermarks or other express indicia of ownership” to remain on Motherless.com after reviewing those clips—indeed, Lane’s study does not indicate how many of the 996 clips he viewed remained on the site after Defendants reviewed them

Moreover, Lane’s study failed to specify *where* the “watermarks or other indicia of ownership” appeared on each clip. This failure is fatal to Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendants saw watermarks and allowed material to remain on Motherless.com, in light of the undisputed fact Defendants only reviewed thumbnails that captured the images displayed at various intervals in the clips. *See* SUF ¶¶ 92-94. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the “watermarks or other indicia of ownership” appeared on the thumbnails Defendants reviewed, and thus has failed to demonstrate that Defendants were aware of, and chose to ignore, specific instances of infringement. *See Io Group*, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1132 (“Although one of the works did contain plaintiff’s trademark several minutes into the clip, there is no evidence from which it can be inferred that Veoh was aware of, but chose to ignore, it.”).

Finally, Lane does not identify what the “watermarks or other indicia of ownership” were, such that, had Defendants’ reviewed the clips, and seen the watermarks, it would have been “apparent” that the material was infringing. For example, three of the

thirty-three videos at issue in this suit contained the watermarks “videosz.com” and one contained a watermark “monstercockbabes.com,” entities completely unrelated to Plaintiff. SUF ¶ 277. The watermarks on Plaintiff’s clips—the only specific watermarks identified by Plaintiff⁷—did not make it “objectively obvious” to a reasonable person that Plaintiff owned the copyrights to the content at issue in this suit. *See CCBill*, 488 F.3d at 1114 (holding that a service provider did not have red flag knowledge, despite the fact that it provided services to websites named “illegal.net” and “stolencelebritypics.com,” reasoning that “when a website traffics in pictures that are titillating by nature, describing photographs as ‘illegal’ or ‘stolen’ may be an attempt to increase their salacious appeal, rather than an admission that the photographs are actually illegal or stolen”).

4. Willful Blindness

Finally, in evaluating the knowledge or expeditious take-down requirement of Section 512(c), the Ninth Circuit has held that a service provider may not “willfully bury its head in the sand to avoid obtaining” specific knowledge of infringing activity. *UMG Recordings*, 2013 WL 1092793, at *12. Although Plaintiff makes no argument that Defendants “willfully buried its head,” the Court concludes that the record contains

⁷ Lane’s study did not provide the clips he reviewed, and thus the Court is unable to discern whether they contained watermarks whose content would make it “objectively obvious” that the content infringed upon copyrights.

no evidence that Defendants acted in this manner. In this case, it is undisputed that Defendants has received over 3,500 take-down notices; and that in response to both complaint and non-compliant take down notices, Defendants automatically deletes the identified content. SUF ¶¶ 243, 246. Thus, as in *UMG Recordings*, “the evidence demonstrates that [Defendants] promptly removed infringing material when it became aware of specific instances of infringement.” 2013 WL 1092793, at *12; *see also Tiffany*, 600 F.3d at 110 (holding that although a website “concede[d] that it knew as a general matter that counterfeit Tiffany products were listed and sold through its website[,]” such knowledge alone was insufficient to support a finding that the website had been willfully blind to specific instances of infringement).

D. Infringement occurred “by reason of the storage at the direction of a user”

Section 512(c)’s protections apply only to service providers whose copyright infringement occurs “by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(c). Plaintiff argues that infringement occurs at *Defendants’*, rather than *users’*, direction, because Defendants encourage users to upload *infringing*

material.⁸ In support of this contention, Plaintiff points to the same features of Motherless.com—the “Groups,” the rewards program, and the placing of popular content in prominent locations on the website. Plaintiff’s argument is nothing more than a repackaging of their actual and red flag knowledge argument: that, because of these features, Defendants “must” have known infringing material was being uploaded onto their website, and therefore infringement occurred at Defendants’ “direction.” As discussed above, these features demonstrate, at most, that Defendants encouraged their users to upload *material*. Plaintiff’s contention that Defendants encouraged their users to upload *infringing* material finds no support in the record.

E. Right and Ability to Control

In order to receive Section 512(c)’s protections, a service provider must not “receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B). Plaintiff contends that genuine issues of fact remain as to whether Defendants receive a “financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity” and as to whether Defendants have the “right and ability to control such activity.” As the statute makes plain, these two elements are connected: a service provider need

⁸ Plaintiff does not dispute that infringement occurred “by reason of storage” by users.

only demonstrate that they do not receive a financial benefit “directly attributable to the infringing activity” *if* they have the “right and ability to control such activity.” Because there is no genuine issue of material fact that Defendants do *not* have the “right and ability to control” infringing activity on its system, the Court need not decide whether Defendants receive a financial benefit directly attributable to infringing activity.

A service provider does *not* have the “right and ability to control” infringing activity merely because it has the technological capacity to remove or block access to materials posted on its website or on its system; “something more” is required. *UMG Recordings*, 2013 WL 1092793, at *19. Specifically, “in order to have the ‘right and ability to control,’ the service provider must exert substantial influence on the activities of users.” *Id.* (internal citations, quotation marks, and alteration omitted). “Substantial influence” may include “high levels of control over activities of users,” or “purposeful conduct.” *Id.*; *see also YouTube*, 676 F.3d at 38 (noting that a showing of purposeful, culpable inducement of copyright infringement “might also rise to the level of control under Section 512(c)(1)(B)”) (citing *Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.*, 545 U.S. 913, 937 (2005); *Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc.*, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1181 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (finding that a service provider had the right and ability to control where the service providers instituted a monitoring program through which users received “detailed instructions regard[ing] issues of layout, appearance, and content” and forbade certain types of content and

refused access to users who failed to comply with its instructions).⁹

Here, the record lacks any evidence that Defendants exercised “substantial influence on the activities” of its users. At best, the facts here demonstrate that the infringing material resided on Defendants’ system and Defendants had the physical ability to remove the content. Plaintiff has failed to identify any other evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants exerted “substantial influence on the activities of its users.” The Ninth Circuit held similar allegations insufficient to support a finding that a service provider had the “right and ability to control” infringing activity in *UMG Recordings*. See *UMG Recordings*, 2013 WL 1092793, at *19 (holding that the service provider did not have the “right and ability to control” infringing activity where the record demonstrated that “(a) the allegedly infringing *material* resided on [the service provider’s] system; (b) [the service provider] had the ability to remove such material; (c) [the service provider] could have implemented, and did implement, filtering systems; and (d) [the service provider] could have searched for potentially infringing content.”). Moreover, the mere fact that Defendants had Terms of Use, and enforced its policy by removing

⁹ Plaintiff contends that the appropriate test for determining “right and ability to control” under Section 512(c)(1)(B) is the test for common-law vicarious liability set forth in *Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.*, 76 F.3d 259, 262-63 (9th Cir. 1996) and *A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.*, 239 F.3d 1004, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected this argument in *UMG Recordings*. See 2013 WL 1092793, at *16.

material and terminating users who violated those terms, does not remove Section 512(c)'s protections. *See Io Group*, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1150-51 (rejecting a copyright holders' argument that a service provider had the "right and ability to control" infringing activity because the service provider conducted occasional "spot checks" of videos uploaded onto its website for compliance with its policies).

F. Reasonably adopted and implemented, and informed its members of a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of members who are repeat infringers

Finally, to be entitled to Section 512(c)'s safe harbor, Defendants must satisfy the "threshold" requirements of Section 512(i). This element can be broken down into five sub-parts:

1. The service provider must adopt a termination policy;
2. The policy must provide for termination from the service provider's system or network of subscribers and account holders who qualify as "repeat infringers";
3. The service provider must inform its subscribers and account holders about the policy;
4. The termination need only occur in "appropriate circumstances"; and,

5. The service provider must reasonably implement the policy.

17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A). Plaintiff concedes that that Motherless has adopted an adequate termination policy and informs its subscribers of it, but argues that Plaintiff has not “reasonably implemented” that policy by failing to terminate repeat infringers in “appropriate circumstances.”

The “reasonable implementation” requirement of Section 512 consists of two sub-elements: “implementation” and “reasonableness.” *See CCBill*, 488 F.3d at 1109-1110. A service provider “implements” its termination policy if it has 1) a working notification system; 2) a procedure for dealing with DMCA-compliant notifications; and 3) does not actively prevent copyright owners from collecting information needed to issue such notifications. *Id.* at 1109. Moreover, a service provider must have in place some system to track DMCA-complaint notices of infringement, so that a service provider can identify “repeat infringers”—that is, users who post infringing material on multiple occasions. *See id.* at 1110 (“[A] substantial failure to record webmasters associated with allegedly infringing websites may raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the implementation of the service provider’s repeat infringer policy.”). As to the reasonableness prong, “[t]he [DMCA] permits service providers to implement a variety of procedures, but an implementation is reasonable if, under ‘appropriate circumstances,’ the service provider terminates users who repeatedly or blatantly infringe

copyright.” *Id.* at 1109-10 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 512(i); *Corbis*, 351 F.Supp.2d at 1102).

Plaintiff concedes that Defendants have implemented a policy by providing a working notification system, a procedure for dealing with DMCA-complaint notifications, and does not actively prevent copyright owners from collecting information needed to issue such notifications. *See* Lange Decl. ¶¶ 236-271. Moreover, Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendants sufficiently track users with a history in of infringing. *See* Lange Decl. ¶¶ 256-257. The gravamen of Plaintiff’s charge is that Motherless has not “reasonably” implemented that policy.

In support of Defendants’ contention that they have “reasonably” implemented their repeat infringer policy, Defendants submitted undisputed evidence that they have terminated between 1,300 and 2,000 users for alleged copyright infringement. *See* SUF ¶¶ 269-270. In response, Plaintiff identified nine users—the eight users who uploaded the thirty-three clips at issue in this suit, and one other user—it alleges are repeat infringers who should have been terminated, but were not.

Even assuming that Defendants should have terminated these nine users, Defendants’ failure to do so does not raise a triable issue of fact as to whether Defendants failed to “reasonably implement” their termination policy. The DMCA requires only that the policy be “reasonably”—not “perfectly”—implemented, and thus “occasional lapses are not fatal to the

service provider’s immunity.” 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12B.10[D][3]. Assuming Plaintiff’s best case—that Defendants identified, and terminated 1,300 repeat infringers—Defendants’ failure to terminate nine of these users (or less than .01% of recognized repeat infringers) is nothing more than an “occasional lapse” in the implementation of its policy.

Moreover, Defendant was not required to terminate at least eight of the nine users identified. As noted above, a service provider is only required to terminate a repeat infringer under “appropriate circumstances.” Although Section 512(i) “does not clarify when it is ‘appropriate’ for service providers to act[,]” *CCBill*, 488 F.3d at 1111, courts have consistently interpreted this phrase as requiring termination only when a service provider has sufficient evidence of a user’s “blatant, repeat infringement of a willful and commercial nature.” *Corbis*, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1104; *see also CCBill*, 488 F.3d at 1109 (“[I]mplementation is reasonable if, under ‘appropriate circumstances,’ the service provider terminates users who repeatedly or blatantly infringe copyright.”); *Costar Group Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc.*, 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 703 (D. Md. 2001) *aff’d sub nom. CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc.*, 373 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting that Section 512(i) “is designed so that *flagrant* repeat infringers, who *abuse* their access to the Internet through disrespect for the intellectual property rights of others should know there is a realistic threat of losing access.’”) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, Part 2, at 61) (alteration omitted) (emphasis added).

In this case, Defendants had no evidence that three of the nine users identified by Plaintiff had uploaded infringing content prior to the filing of the instant suit. SUF ¶¶ 287, 289, 291.¹⁰ By definition, these users cannot be classified as “repeat” infringers. Defendants did have evidence that three other users had infringed *once* before. SUF ¶¶ 284, 285, 288. Defendants also had evidence that one other user had infringed *twice* before. SUF ¶ 286. Although these four users were arguably “repeat” infringers, their infringement was in no way “blatant” or “flagrant,” thus excusing Defendants’ failure to terminate them.

As to the final two users (of the nine Plaintiff asserts are “repeat infringers”), Defendants only received one notice that one—BBQ69—had uploaded infringing material. SUF ¶ 386. Although the notice received by Defendants indicated that BBQ69 had uploaded twenty-one infringing works, a service provider’s failure to terminate users who upload multiple videos that are identified in a single DMCA notice does not remove Section 512(c)’s immunity. *See UMG Recordings.*, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1118 (“As to [the copyright holder’s] objection that [the service provider] terminates a user only after a second warning, even if the first warning was spurred by a DMCA notice identifying multiple infringements, [the copyright holder] points to nothing

¹⁰ Although Defendant had received take down notices related to content uploaded by one of these three users before the instant law suit, those notices were *not* DMCA-compliant. A non-compliant notice may *not* be used as evidence that a service provider knew of, and tolerated, a users’ repeated copyright infringement. *See CCBill*, 488 F.3d at 1113.

in the statute, legislative history, or case law establishing that such a policy is not reasonable or appropriate.”); *see also Corbis*, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1100-01 (“[T]he key term, repeat infringer, is not defined. . . . The fact that Congress chose not to adopt such specific provisions when defining a user policy indicates its intent to leave the policy requirements, and the subsequent obligations of the service providers, loosely defined.”).

Finally, Defendants received four DMCA-complaint notices related to content uploaded by the last user, Kristy7187, between February 8, 2011 and August 9, 2012. SUF ¶ 290. However, Defendants terminated Kristy 7187 in August of 2012. *Id.* Although Defendants perhaps should have terminated her earlier, their isolated failure to do so does not evidence a failure to “reasonably implement” their repeat infringer termination policy.¹¹

Plaintiff points to one other item of evidence in support of its assertion that Defendants did not reasonably implement their repeat infringer policy. In the

¹¹ Indeed, whether Kristy7187 should have been terminated is debatable. As a leading treatise has observed, “Courts have taken an *ad hoc* approach to deciding what makes an infringer a ‘repeat’ infringer, weighing both the number of infringements and the period of time that separates them.” 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 8.3.2 (2012) (citing *Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.*, 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) *aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded*, 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that a service provider had reasonably implemented its repeat infringer termination policy where a user was only removed after receiving *three separate* DMCA-complaint infringement notices)).

termination notice Lange sent to Kristy7187, Lange stated that “[t]he DMCA law clearly says we have to terminate repeat offenders. Your past DMCA notices have been spread out over some time, and based off of the amount of files you had, it wasn’t a problem.” SUF ¶ 393. This notice might support the inference that Defendants *regularly* tolerate repeated, blatant copyright infringement by users so long as the instances of infringement are sufficiently spread out and the amount of material uploaded is sufficiently voluminous. Yet the evidence fails to demonstrate that this is the case. Out of more than 700,000 users who have been active over the site since its inception, Plaintiff has identified only one—Kristy 7187—who was arguably allowed to remain on Defendants’ system despite evidence that she or he repeatedly and blatantly uploaded infringing activity. Indeed, Plaintiff failed to so much as ask Lange about the e-mail he sent to Kristy7187 during Lange’s deposition, much less ask him whether he similarly allowed other users to remain active on Motherless.com once he had evidence that they repeatedly, blatantly uploaded copyrighted material. This one episode cannot create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants’ “reasonably implemented” their repeat infringer termination policy in light of the undisputed record of compliance described above. As Nimmer has observed, the DMCA requires only that the policy be “reasonably”—not “perfectly”—implemented, and thus “[an] occasional lapse[is] not fatal to the service provider’s immunity.” 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12B.10[D][3].

VI. REMEDY

Thus, for the reasons discussed above, the Court concludes that, as a matter of law, Defendants are entitled to Section 512(c)'s safe harbor. Plaintiff's remedy is therefore "limited injunctive relief set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 512(j)." *Corbis*, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1099. Section 512(j) permits a district court to issue an order "restraining the service provider from providing access to infringing material or activity residing at a particular online site on the provider's system," or "restraining the service provider from providing access to a subscriber or account holder who is engaging in infringing activity . . . by terminating the accounts of the subscriber or account holder[.]" 17 U.S.C. § 512(j). However, Defendants have already removed the thirty three infringing clips at issue in this case; thus, Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief is moot. *See Io Group*, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1154-55 ("In this case, before it ever received notice of any claimed infringement, [the service provider] independently removed all adult content, including video files of plaintiff's works. . . . Thus, any injunctive relief to which [the copyright holder] would be entitled [under Section 512(j)] is moot.").

VII. CONCLUSION

For the reasons put forward in this Order, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment as to Plaintiff's copyright claims, and DISMISSESS those claims WITH PREJUDICE.

As to Plaintiff's remaining state law cause of action, in its Complaint, Plaintiff asserted that this Court had supplemental jurisdiction over that claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Section 1367 confers federal courts with jurisdiction over state-law claims "that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution." 28 U.S.C. § 1367. "A state law claim is part of the same case or controversy when it shares a 'common nucleus of operative fact' with the federal claims and the state and federal claims would normally be tried together." *Bahrampour v. Lampert*, 356 F.3d 969, 978 (9th Cir. 2004).

Plaintiff's state law claim asserts violations of California Business and Professions Code § 17200. Section 17200, also known as California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"), "allows individual plaintiffs to bring claims for unfair, unlawful, or fraudulent business practices." *Gutierrez v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA*, 704 F.3d 712, 717 (9th Cir. 2012). "To be 'unlawful' under the UCL, the [alleged business practice] must violate another 'borrowed' law." *Davis v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A.*, 691 F.3d 1152, 1168 (9th Cir. 2012); *see also Cel-Tech Commc'ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co.*, 20 Cal. 4th 163, 180 (1999) ("[S]ection 17200 borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable.") (internal quotation marks omitted). "Virtually any state, federal or local law can serve as the predicate for an action under section

17200.” *Davis*, 691 F.3d at 1168 (internal citations, quotation marks, and alteration omitted).

In its complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant has violated 18 U.S.C. § 2257.¹² Section 2257 is part of Congress’ “comprehensive statutory scheme to eradicate sexual exploitation of children.” *United States v. Thomas*, 893 F.2d 1066, 1068 (9th Cir. 1990). The statute requires any person who produces sexually explicit conduct to “create and maintain individually identifiable records pertaining to every performer portrayed in such a visual depiction.” 18 U.S.C. § 2257(a). Those records must document each performer’s “name and date of birth, and require the performer to provide such other indicia of his or her identity.” 18 U.S.C. § 2257(b). In its complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants are required to, and do not, keep the records required by Section 2257.

These allegations do not share a “common nucleus of operative fact” with Plaintiff’s copyright claims. Defendants’ failure to keep records has little, if anything, to do with the copyrighted material that appeared on their system. Thus, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims.

However, the Court recognizes that Plaintiff may have an alternative basis for liability—diversity

¹² Although Section 2257 is a federal statute, it does not create a private right of action. See *Bullard v. MRA Holding, LLC*, 890 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1330 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (“Congress did not create a private right of action for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2257.”).

jurisdiction. From the face of the complaint, it appears that there is complete diversity between the parties. However, Plaintiff does not allege an amount in controversy as to its Section 17200 claim. Thus, if Plaintiff wishes to pursue its state-law claim in this Court, the Court ORDERS Plaintiff to file a notice with this court within twenty days of the date of this Order demonstrating that the amount-in-controversy requirement is met as to this claim. Failure to do so will result in dismissal of Plaintiff's claim WITHOUT prejudice.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

VENTURA CONTENT, LTD., an Anguilla corporation, Plaintiff–Appellant/ Cross-Appellee v. MOTHERLESS, INC., a New York corporation; JOSHUA LANGE, an individual, Defendants-Appellees/ Cross-Appellants.	13-56332 13-56970 D.C. No. 2:11-cv-05912-SVW-FMO Central District of California, Los Angeles ORDER (Filed May 22, 2018)
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Before: KLEINFELD, RAWLINSON, and NGUYEN,
Circuit Judges.

Judges Kleinfeld and Nguyen voted to deny the petitions for panel rehearing. Judge Rawlinson voted to grant the petitions for panel rehearing. Judge Nguyen voted to deny the petitions for rehearing en banc, and Judge Kleinfeld recommended the same. Judge Rawlinson voted to grant the petitions for rehearing en banc.

The full court has been advised of the petitions for rehearing en banc, and no judge of the court has requested a vote on the petitions for rehearing en banc. Fed. R. App. P. 35(b).

Accordingly, the petitions for rehearing and for rehearing en banc are **DENIED**.
