SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE	UNITED STATES
MARK BRNOVICH, ATTORNEY GENERAL	_
MARK BRNOVICH, ATTORNET GENERAL)
OF ARIZONA, ET AL.,)
Petitioners,)
v.) No. 19-1257
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE,)
ET AL.,)
Respondents.)
	-
ARIZONA REPUBLICAN PARTY, ET AL.,)
Petitioners,)
v.) No. 19-1258
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE,)
ET AL.,)
Respondents.)
	_
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Date: March 2, 2021	

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6	v.) No. 19-1257
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15	ET AL.,)
16	Respondents.)
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18		
19	Washington, D.C.	
20	Tuesday, March 2, 2	2021
21		
22	The above-entitled ma	atter came on for
23	oral argument before the Supreme	Court of the
24	United States at 10:00 a.m.	
25		

1	APPEARANCES:
2	
3	MICHAEL A. CARVIN, ESQUIRE, Washington, D.C.; on
4	behalf of the Petitioners in 19-1258.
5	GEN. MARK BRNOVICH, Attorney General, Phoenix,
6	Arizona; on behalf of the Petitioners in 19-1257
7	JESSICA R. AMUNSON, ESQUIRE, Washington, D.C.; on
8	behalf of Respondent Secretary Hobbs.
9	BRUCE V. SPIVA, ESQUIRE, Washington, D.C.; on behalf
10	of Respondents DNC, et al.
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1	PROCEEDINGS
2	(10:00 a.m.)
3	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We will hear
4	argument this morning in Case Number 19-1257,
5	Brnovich versus Democratic National Committee,
6	and the consolidated case.
7	Mr. Carvin.
8	ORAL ARGUMENT OF MICHAEL A. CARVIN
9	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS IN 19-1258
10	MR. CARVIN: Mr. Chief Justice, and
11	may it please the Court:
12	I think the key conceptual point here
13	to understand is that Arizona has not denied
14	anyone any voting opportunity of any kind.
15	There's not, like, a literacy test which denies
16	you the right to vote. It's not like vote
17	dilution, where white bloc voting denies
18	minorities an equal opportunity to elect.
19	Everyone here is eligible and registered to
20	vote. All they have to do is utilize the myriad
21	opportunities that Arizona's offered them over
22	27 days to vote by mail for free or in person.
23	And since there's no denial of
24	opportunity, this is a disparate impact claim
25	that would not even be coonizable in other

- 1 contexts. Under Title VII, disparate impact
- 2 relates to a denial of an employment
- 3 opportunity, a job or a promotion. It doesn't
- 4 get involved in the process. No one's ever
- 5 brought a Title VII claim saying you can't
- 6 require people to send in applications because
- 7 minorities have less access to transportation
- 8 and mail, analogous to the claim being made
- 9 here.
- 10 So Respondents are trying to move
- 11 disparate impact into an entirely different
- 12 context. Since there's no denial of any voting
- opportunity in this context, the circumstances
- in which time, place, and manner rules can
- violate Section 2 are extraordinarily limited.
- 16 They only occur if the state has organized the
- time, place, and manner rules and stacked them
- in such a way that minorities have less
- 19 opportunity than non-minorities to cast their
- 20 votes.
- 21 That comes directly from the plain
- language of Section 2, and it's also, of course,
- as a practical matter, the only circumstance in
- 24 which the state has erected any kind of
- 25 cognizable barrier to minority voting.

1	Respondents' alternative view is at
2	war with the text of Section 2. Section 2 says,
3	again, voting practices cannot provide less
4	opportunity. They say that voting practices
5	which provide the same opportunity are
6	nonetheless unlawful if external socioeconomic
7	factors somehow contribute to disproportionate
8	utilization. But that language is nowhere in
9	the text and was never even mentioned in the
LO	legislative history, which is clear
L1	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Mr
L2	MR. CARVIN: and notable
L3	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Mr. Carvin,
L4	as I understand your test as you've just
L5	articulated it, it reduces to anything
L6	dealing with time, place, or manner, it's an
L7	an intent test rather than a results test that's
L8	provided under Section 2.
L9	In other words, so long as it's a
20	time, place, or manner restriction, it's only
21	when there's a difference and it's between
22	minority voters and white voters that you have a
23	problem. Is that not true?
24	MR. CARVIN: Not entirely, Mr. Chief
) E	Tugtige for this reason: It does investige

1 differential systems, unequal access, but 2 regardless of whether or not that unequal access is racially motivated, you would not have to 3 prove that the intent behind the differential 4 access provided to minorities was to suppress or 5 6 hinder the minority vote. And that's a key 7 distinction from Mobile versus Bolden. 8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Now you -- you 9 talk about the concern being that the analysis would be driven to racial proportionality under 10 11 the Respondents' approach. 12 Now I understand the concerns about 13 that when you're talking about districting, but 14 why is that -- why is that a bad thing when 15 you're talking about electoral procedures? 16 MR. CARVIN: Well, what it means is 17 that any neutral system must be changed in order to maximize minority voting strength regardless 18 19 of how strong the justification is. 20 Things that provide no unfairness at 21 all to minorities, you must rejigger every 2.2 aspect of the time, place, and manner, from 23 registration, to Election Day, to early voting, in order to maximize minorities' participation. 24

Why is that bad? Because it's the

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1 same kind of race-conscious activity of
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- 2 subordinating --
- 3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, is it --
- 4 MR. CARVIN: -- neutral principles --
- 5 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: -- is it
- 6 really -- is it maximizing participation or --
- 7 or equalizing it? In other words, that only
- 8 comes up when you have disparate results.
- 9 And -- and why should there be disparate results
- 10 if -- if -- if you can avoid them?
- MR. CARVIN: Because why should you --
- well, for example, because it would eliminate
- 13 all the valuable antifraud concerns implicated
- in the ban on ballot harvesting and because it
- 15 would substitute the federal courts for the
- 16 state legislatures to make these rules.
- 17 The question is not what's wrong with
- 18 it. The question is why a system that imposes
- 19 no unfairness on the group should nonetheless be
- 20 changed simply because they find a different
- 21 method of voting more convenient.
- 22 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
- 23 Thomas.
- MR. CARVIN: There's no reason to --
- 25 there's no reason to say --

1	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Just
2	MR. CARVIN: that simply because
3	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
4	MR. CARVIN: I apologize.
5	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Yeah.
6	MR. CARVIN: I apologize, Your Honor.
7	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
8	Thomas.
9	JUSTICE THOMAS: Thank you, Mr. Chief
10	Justice.
11	Mr. Carvin, I I under your I
12	understand your race neutrality argument, and
13	normally you see that in to come in in
14	in the context of a non-discrimination statute
15	or Fourteenth Amendment that under that
16	really requires equal treatment.
17	How does that race neutrality approach
18	fit within the language of the Voting Rights
19	Act, though, that doesn't speak in in those
20	terms?
21	MR. CARVIN: Well, Justice Thomas, I
22	think it speaks precisely in those terms. It
23	says that a voting practice cannot result in
24	minorities having less opportunity than
25	non-minorities. It says the system needs to be

- 1 equally open. So what it's saying is as long as
- 2 everyone has the same opportunity and the system
- 3 is equally open, Section 2 does not condemn it.
- 4 The Respondents, however, would say
- 5 that even if minorities are given precisely the
- 6 same opportunity, unless they utilize it
- 7 proportionally, then somehow that comes within
- 8 the constraints of Section 2.
- 9 But, again, there's nothing in the
- 10 text of Section 2 which says you need to expand
- 11 time, place, and manner restrictions to enhance
- 12 proportionality or maximization.
- 13 Indeed, if that had been the rule, in
- 14 1982, virtually every time, place, and manner
- 15 restriction in the country would have been
- illegal overnight because there was severe
- 17 disproportionate utilization and socioeconomic
- 18 disparities were ubiquitous. And surely, if
- 19 Congress had intended that kind of sea change,
- 20 it would have given some hint of it in the
- 21 legislative history.
- 22 So this rule is both contrary to the
- 23 text of Section 2 and any other formulation of
- 24 what Congress was intending.
- 25 JUSTICE THOMAS: So is there a

- 1 causation standard implicit in your neutrality
- 2 argument?
- 3 MR. CARVIN: Only in the sense that
- 4 result, obviously, connotes causation, right?
- 5 And the question is: what is the prohibited --
- 6 what can you not cause? What is the prohibited
- 7 result? And the plain language of Section 2
- 8 tells you what the system can't result in is
- 9 providing less opportunity to minorities. It
- 10 doesn't say it can't result in providing them
- 11 the same opportunity, but, for whatever reason,
- they don't utilize it to the same extent.
- So there is a causation question, but
- 14 the question is what can the state not cause.
- We say it can't cause less opportunity. The
- other side says it can't do anything that
- 17 results in disproportionate outcomes.
- 18 JUSTICE THOMAS: And how much less
- 19 opportunity? The Ninth Circuit speaks in terms
- 20 of de minimis language. Does that -- and then
- 21 the -- of course, Justice -- Judge Scan --
- 22 O'Scannlain talks more in the language of
- 23 substantial.
- What -- what -- how much less
- 25 opportunity?

- 1 MR. CARVIN: Well, again, it depends
- what you're talking about, Justice Thomas. If
- 3 you're talking about disproportionate outcomes,
- 4 we don't think that's the issue. So we don't
- 5 think a severely disproportionate outcome
- 6 jeopardizes Section 2 viability, nor does a
- 7 minor disproportionate outcome.
- The question is not the outcome. The
- 9 question is the opportunity and if the state has
- 10 provided everyone the same opportunity.
- Now I will agree with the attorney
- 12 general, however, if you get past that, then,
- obviously, there needs to be something
- 14 substantial for two reasons. No one requires
- 15 perfect, of course --
- 16 JUSTICE THOMAS: I'm out of time. I'm
- 17 sorry to cut you off, Mr. Carvin.
- 18 MR. CARVIN: I apologize. Thank you.
- 19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
- 20 Breyer.
- JUSTICE BREYER: I have two questions.
- 22 One question is a literacy test. Does that
- 23 provide people the same opportunity?
- MR. CARVIN: No.
- JUSTICE BREYER: I thought that.

- 1 MR. CARVIN: By definition, a literacy
- 2 test --
- JUSTICE BREYER: A literacy test
- 4 doesn't. And so how do we know whether the test
- 5 -- the -- the OOP and the other -- whether they
- 6 do or they don't? I didn't think --
- 7 MR. CARVIN: Well, I think --
- 8 JUSTICE BREYER: Well --
- 9 MR. CARVIN: -- there's an obvious
- 10 distinction.
- JUSTICE BREYER: Yes.
- 12 MR. CARVIN: I apologize. No, I think
- 13 there's an --
- JUSTICE BREYER: I just thought that
- it was a measure, a way of finding out if it's
- the same opportunity or not to see if minority
- 17 people use it equally.
- 18 MR. CARVIN: No, it --
- 19 JUSTICE BREYER: If they don't use it
- 20 equally, well, it doesn't prove it, but it might
- 21 be, but the rule that prevents them from using
- it equally results in an abridgement on account
- 23 of race.
- MR. CARVIN: Right. And that's the
- 25 key point. A literacy test denies you the

- 1 opportunity to vote, says you can't vote. Go to
- the polls, they won't let you vote.
- Nothing like that is going on here.
- 4 Everyone has a complete opportunity to vote.
- 5 The state has not erected any barrier. If the
- 6 state denies you an opportunity like, under
- 7 Title VII, it denies --
- JUSTICE BREYER: No, I've got that
- 9 point.
- 10 MR. CARVIN: -- you a job --
- JUSTICE BREYER: I've got that point,
- 12 but I have another --
- MR. CARVIN: -- then you ask your --
- JUSTICE BREYER: Yeah. I have
- 15 another, more -- I think a more important
- 16 question. What would you think of Professor
- 17 Stephanopoulos's test, basically, or standards
- 18 which bring in from Title VI, Title VII, The
- 19 Housing Act, the -- the ADA, you know, it uses
- 20 roughly the same approach and there would be an
- 21 opportunity for the state to say we have a good
- 22 non-race-related reason for doing this.
- And, therefore, whatever result is,
- 24 fewer -- fewer minorities use it, but it's not
- on account of race, it's on account of our good

- 1 reason. Now that's what we have in all these
- 2 other statutes, something like that.
- What would you think of just taking
- 4 forms of those rules and using them here?
- 5 MR. CARVIN: Yes. Well, two points.
- 6 One is, of course, there's nothing in the
- 7 language of Section 2 which allows you to
- 8 justify a discriminatory result based on the
- 9 strength of --
- 10 JUSTICE BREYER: What about the words
- "on account of race"?
- MR. CARVIN: Right. And --
- JUSTICE BREYER: If the reason you are
- doing it is because you have the most wonderful
- non-race-related reason in the world for doing
- 16 this, then it is not on account of race.
- MR. CARVIN: Right. "On account of
- 18 race," as you know, generally and under Gingles
- 19 means because of race. And the results test
- 20 means it doesn't have to be on account of
- 21 intentional discrimination.
- In terms of reading in a
- justification, obviously, that would make it --
- 24 make their proportionality mandate somewhat less
- 25 inflexible. But, again, even if you could read

1 it into the statute, you would nonetheless be 2 subjecting the policy judgments of state 3 legislatures to some ad hoc determinations of the sort that was engaged in by the en banc 4 court, where they can find simple things like 5 6 out-of-precinct voting and ballot harvesting 7 bans to somehow be unjustified. And even under the totality of 8 circumstances in vote dilution, the tenuousness 9 10 of the policy is only the ninth of the factors. 11 And so I don't understand why, if the statute 12 had actually prohibited, as Respondents said, 13 any kind of disparate outcome, why -- why we 14 would allow the state to get away with that. 15 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice Alito. 16 MR. CARVIN: But I will fully embrace 17 the notion that --18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice Alito. 19 JUSTICE ALITO: Mr. Carvin, you arque 20 that one benchmark for evaluating whether 21 members of a protected class have less 2.2 opportunity to participate is what we refer to 23 in Crawford as "the usual burdens of voting."

MR. CARVIN: Well --

What does that mean? What are the --

24

1	JUSTICE ALITO: "usual burdens of
2	voting"? Are they the burdens as they existed
3	in 1982? Do they change? How do we determine
4	what they are?
5	MR. CARVIN: I I think what they
6	mean is what the Court meant in Crawford, which
7	is what we all understand to be the usual
8	burdens of voting.
9	You make a very good point about 1982.
10	We know that needs to be the benchmark for the
11	usual burdens because, otherwise, that meant
12	Congress in 1982 was invalidating virtually
13	every time, place, and manner restriction. So
14	that needs to be, if you will, the safe harbor.
15	The only point we're making is Section
16	2 did not immunize minorities from the usual
17	burdens of voting. It didn't say, you you
18	don't have to show up at the right precinct and
19	those sorts of things. And there's nothing in
20	the language of Section 2 which somehow exempts
21	them from doing so.
22	So, as long as it's roughly
23	commensurate with the normal Election Day system
24	that exists, that would constitute the usual
25	burden of voting.

1	JUSTICE ALITO: Now this relates to
2	what you were just discussing with Justice
3	Breyer. Your approach differs a bit from that
4	of the attorney general and the Solicitor
5	General's brief in that I don't understand you
6	to argue that a a consideration of the
7	strength of the state's interests for a voting
8	practice has a role to play here.
9	Is that a correct understanding of
10	your position? And if so, why isn't that a a
11	legitimate consideration?
12	MR. CARVIN: Your Honor, I would love
13	it if the state could justify its systems if
14	you're going to impose on them some kind of
15	proportionality mandate. Our basic point is
16	it's not a proportionality mandate and their
17	justification should not be an affirmative
18	defense to that. If you want to read that into
19	the statute, that would make it better than a
20	straight proportionality mandate.
21	I will emphasize again that even under
22	Houston Lawyers' Association, which the
23	Solicitor General puts forward, the
24	justification is merely one factor out of the
25	nine to be considered. So that means you're now

- 1 into this amorphous nine Senate report factors
- 2 where every district court and appellate court
- 3 can do its own kind of balancing test, which
- 4 will lead to all sorts of ad hoc results and not
- 5 give you the kind of clarity and guidance that
- 6 state legislatures need prior to Election Day.
- 7 JUSTICE ALITO: Thank you.
- 8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
- 9 Sotomayor.
- 10 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Counsel, you keep
- 11 talking about equal opportunity, but I don't see
- 12 it anywhere in the statute.
- 13 Aren't you rewriting Section 2? You
- 14 keep saying repeatedly that it prohibits giving
- or providing an unequal opportunity to vote.
- But the language is very clear. It
- 17 focuses on the effects of government action, not
- 18 the government action in a vacuum. It says no
- 19 voting qualification or practice can "result in
- 20 a denial or abridgement of the right to vote on
- 21 account of race." So --
- MR. CARVIN: Yes.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- where do you
- 24 get equal opportunity from in that language?
- 25 MR. CARVIN: In two places. One is we

```
1
      -- it's not a denial at a time, place, and
 2
     manner, so it needs --
 3
                JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Excuse me, sir.
               MR. CARVIN: -- to be a written --
 4
                JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Excuse me. If you
 5
 6
      can't vote because you are a Native American or
7
     a non-Hispanic in areas where car ownership
      rates are very small, where you don't have mail
8
 9
     pickup or mail delivery, where your post office
10
      is at the edge of town and so that you require
11
      either a relative to pick up your vote, or you
12
     happen to vote in a wrong precinct because your
     particular area has a confusion of precinct
13
14
      assignments, if you just can't vote for those
15
      reasons and you're not -- and your vote is not
16
     being counted, you've been denied the right to
17
     vote, haven't you?
18
               MR. CARVIN: I don't think anyone
19
     would say you've been denied a due process right
20
      to a hearing --
21
                JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: This is not a due
22
     process --
23
               MR. CARVIN: -- in defining --
                JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- this is not a
24
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25

due process claim.

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1
               MR. CARVIN: So I'm trying to get at
 2
      the distinction between denial and --
 3
                JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, no. You're
     denied something if you're not given the right
 4
      to vote because or it results in your denial
 5
 6
      from circumstances that the state could remedy
7
      easily.
               MR. CARVIN: Well, again, the only way
8
9
      they could remedy it is to engage in the
10
      counterintuitive policies allowing everybody to
11
     vote in any precinct they want or to have
12
     partisan operatives collect their ballots in a
13
     real threat --
14
                JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I -- I thought
     that -- but I'm sorry --
15
16
               MR. CARVIN: -- to fraud. And that's
17
     not --
18
               JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- if you --
19
               MR. CARVIN: -- that's a Hobson's
20
     Choice that --
21
                JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But I would have
22
      to --
23
               MR. CARVIN: -- I don't --
24
                JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- I have to say
25
     that if you look at the district court's
```

2.2

- 1 findings, which, in the end, it voted on your
- 2 behalf, but the district court found no
- 3 meaningful threat that ballot collection leads
- 4 to fraud. It found no meaningful threat
- 5 whatsoever. Perceived threat, but none.
- 6 And with respect to voting out of
- 7 precinct, there was no finding by the district
- 8 court that the ballots couldn't be easily
- 9 counted.
- 10 MR. CARVIN: The -- the only way they
- 11 could be counted is by defeating the entire
- 12 purpose of the precinct system, which is to have
- 13 a uniform ballot so you don't need to create
- 14 these extra post-election remedies to figure out
- 15 which offices are --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But you -- but
- 17 you --
- 18 MR. CARVIN: -- valid and which are
- 19 not.
- 20 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- but you have --
- 21 MR. CARVIN: So it would be an
- 22 enormous --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Counsel, your
- state counts out-of-precinct ballot-type things
- 25 very easily.

MR. CARVIN: Well, actually not. 1 2 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: It -- it has 3 a whole mechanism in place according to the 4 district court. MR. CARVIN: Well, what the district 5 court said and what the Ninth Circuit said was 6 7 the precincts serve -- system serve very 8 valuable purposes. And if the precinct system 9 serves valuable purposes, then enforcing the 10 precinct system must necessarily serve those 11 precinct systems. 12 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice Kagan. 13 MR. CARVIN: If we're not allowed --14 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice --15 MR. CARVIN: If we turn --16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: -- Justice --17 Justice Kagan. 18 JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Carvin, I have a number of hypotheticals for you, and I'd -- I'd 19 be grateful if we could run through these fairly 20 21 quickly just so I can get an understanding of 22 your position. So the first one is that the state 23 24 decides that each county can have one polling 25 place, and because of who lives in -- in -- in

2.4

- 1 larger counties, that creates a -- a -- a
- 2 -- a disparate impact that black voters have to
- 3 wait in line for 10 times the amount that white
- 4 voters do, two-and-a-half hours instead of 15
- 5 minutes. Is that system equally open in the
- 6 language of the statute?
- 7 MR. CARVIN: I would say not.
- 8 "Equally open" means takes into account
- 9 demographic realities. If you have one polling
- 10 place for five people and one polling place for
- 5 million people, obviously, in the latter
- 12 situation, those people do not have an equal
- 13 opportunity to vote.
- JUSTICE KAGAN: Okay. How about --
- MR. CARVIN: So, no, I would think --
- 16 JUSTICE KAGAN: -- how about this one?
- 17 MR. CARVIN: -- I would think --
- JUSTICE KAGAN: That's helpful --
- 19 that's helpful, Mr. Carvin.
- 20 A state has long had two weeks of
- 21 early voting, and then the state decides that
- 22 it's going to get rid of Sunday voting on those
- two weeks, leave everything else in place.
- 24 That -- black voters vote on Sunday 10
- 25 times more than white voters. Is -- is that

- 1 system equally open?
- 2 MR. CARVIN: I would think it would be
- 3 because, let's think about it, Sunday is the day
- 4 that we traditionally close government offices.
- 5 It would be the exception rather than the rule
- 6 to have government workers come in on a Sunday.
- 7 JUSTICE KAGAN: It -- it's a -- you
- 8 know, it's an exception --
- 9 MR. CARVIN: So simply having --
- 10 JUSTICE KAGAN: -- to have government
- 11 workers come in on a Saturday too. That's not
- 12 -- that's not a real problem.
- MR. CARVIN: Well, I mean, there are
- 14 Sunday closing laws, as we know from McGowan v.
- 15 Maryland, which are different than Saturday.
- 16 But, in all events, Saturday would implicate
- 17 other religions --
- JUSTICE KAGAN: Okay. So that -- that
- 19 means equally open.
- 20 MR. CARVIN: -- Jewish and --
- JUSTICE KAGAN: Thank you, Mr. Carvin.
- 22 Can we go -- just go on to another one? The
- 23 state says we're placing all our polling places
- 24 at country clubs. And that decision means that
- 25 black voters have to drive 10 times as long to

- 1 the polls and have to go into places which, you
- 2 know, are traditionally hostile to them.
- 3 MR. CARVIN: Yeah, I would think that
- 4 would provide them with less opportunity than
- 5 non-minorities --
- 6 JUSTICE KAGAN: And why is that?
- 7 MR. CARVIN: -- or else they'd --
- 8 well, because they have to travel further into
- 9 hostile territory where non-minorities can --
- 10 can travel one block to very sympathetic. Under
- 11 any definition of --
- 12 JUSTICE KAGAN: Okay. That's helpful.
- MR. CARVIN: -- whether or not they
- 14 have less opportunity --
- JUSTICE KAGAN: The state says we're
- going to have Election Day voting only, and it's
- going to be from 9 to 5. And there's plenty of
- 18 evidence on the record that voters of one races
- 19 are 10 times more likely to work a job that
- 20 wouldn't allow them to vote during that time
- 21 period. Is that system equally open?
- 22 MR. CARVIN: Seems like it because
- 23 that would be pretty much the status quo in
- 24 1982. And, of course, if it was 8 to 7, you
- 25 could make the same argument about people

1 working --2 JUSTICE KAGAN: How about 9 to 3? 3 MR. CARVIN: I think anytime you 4 diminish from what I will call the usual 5 burdens, if you went to 15 minutes, to -- to use 6 an extreme example, then, obviously, you're 7 effectively denying the opportunity --JUSTICE KAGAN: So 9 to 5 is okay, but 8 10 to 4 would not be okay? Is that the idea? 9 10 MR. CARVIN: Again, these are all 11 hypotheticals that have never existed in the 12 real world because --13 JUSTICE KAGAN: This -- this seems 14 like -- you know, this doesn't seem so fanciful 15 to me. Basically --16 MR. CARVIN: It may or may not be -- I 17 apologize. 18 JUSTICE KAGAN: -- 9 to 5 is okay, 10 19 to 3 is not? Is that the idea? MR. CARVIN: I -- again, it's a 20 21 sliding scale, and I think the farther you get 2.2 from the normal hours that were extant in 1982, 23 the much more specious it becomes. If you want 24 to put it --

JUSTICE KAGAN: Thank you, Mr. Carvin.

- 1 I'm sorry my time is up.
- 2 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
- 3 Gorsuch.
- 4 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Good morning,
- 5 Mr. Carvin. I'd like to return to some
- 6 questions Justice Thomas touched on.
- 7 What is the relationship between your
- 8 test focused on opportunities and the test that
- 9 the Solicitor General's brief at least suggested
- 10 about causation and the need for maybe a
- 11 proximate causation test?
- MR. CARVIN: Yeah, I -- at the end of
- 13 the day, I don't know that there's really any
- 14 difference. They -- they taught -- their first
- step is, do minorities have the ability to vote?
- 16 And they say that's synonymous with equal
- opportunity. So I think we're on the same page
- 18 there.
- 19 They also say, if socioeconomic
- 20 factors lead to underutilization by minorities,
- 21 that's not a cognizable factor under Section 2
- 22 because it's got to be the voting practice that
- causes the diminished opportunity. Again, we
- 24 are in full-throated agreement with that
- 25 provision as well.

1 So the two key points are the system 2 itself needs to provide less opportunity to 3 voters, and if socioeconomic factors, which are external to the voting practice, lead to 4 diminished utilization, under neither our test 5 nor the Solicitor's General test would there be 6 7 a problem under Section 2. JUSTICE GORSUCH: Do you -- is there 8 anything in the Solicitor General's brief that 9 10 you disagree with? 11 MR. CARVIN: I don't know why they use 12 the word "ability" instead of "opportunity," because one's in the statute and one's not, but 13 14 other than that semantic quibble, no. 15 We've also talked about reading 16 justification into the statute, a result which I 17 warmly embrace. We may be a tad more skeptical 18 about whether that flows from the statutory 19 language than the Solicitor General was. 20 But, no, we have no real disagreements with the Solicitor General --21 2.2 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Okay. 23 MR. CARVIN: -- the one that was 24 withdrawn. 25 JUSTICE GORSUCH: All right. And then

- 1 the other question Justice Thomas touched on
- 2 that I want to dig down a little bit further on
- 3 is you speak of equality of opportunity.
- 4 Does that permit any de minimis
- 5 distinctions, or does it require equality of
- 6 opportunity under all circumstances?
- 7 MR. CARVIN: Right, yes. Obviously,
- 8 any -- any of these phrases need to take into
- 9 account the sort of demographic realities, for
- 10 example, that Justice Kagan was discussing, and
- if a polling place was a foot farther away for
- 12 minorities than for non-minorities, I don't
- think anybody could argue that that really has a
- 14 cognizable effect on opportunity.
- So, sure, in all of these tests,
- there's some kind of basic common-sense
- 17 definition.
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Okay. And then, to
- 19 add one more hypothetical to this -- well, maybe
- 20 I'll just stop there. Thank you, Mr. Carvin.
- 21 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
- 22 Kavanaugh.
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Thank you, Chief
- 24 Justice.
- 25 And good morning, Mr. Carvin. Your

- 1 brief says, "Ordinary race-neutral regulations
- of the time, place, and manner of voting do not
- 3 violate Section 2." And that, of course, will
- 4 put a lot of pressure on the word "ordinary."
- 5 Can you tell us how courts are
- 6 supposed to distinguish ordinary regulations
- 7 from extraordinary regulations?
- 8 MR. CARVIN: Well, I -- I think the
- 9 way the Court has done it countless times in the
- 10 Anderson/Burdick line of cases and in Crawford,
- 11 what are the usual burdens of voting? This is
- 12 not some mystery. We have a long history of
- about how people go about voting. They show up
- 14 at precincts and they cast a ballot. That
- 15 requires you to leave your house, but that's not
- an ordinary burden of voting -- that's a usual
- 17 burden of voting.
- 18 Whereas the other side says, you can
- 19 never have a system which requires anybody to
- 20 leave their house. They claim that they can't
- 21 find the precincts because of socioeconomic
- 22 disparities. They claim that they can't get to
- 23 mailboxes because of socioeconomic disparities,
- 24 which means that the state needs to allow
- 25 partisan operatives to go collect the ballots.

1	Well, if that's true, of course, that
2	means that the only system that would satisfy
3	their test is something where the government is
4	sent house to house to collect the ballots.
5	And I'm just saying that that can't
6	come with any rational definition of the usual
7	burdens of voting, which is you register and you
8	go cast your ballot. And that is not a very
9	difficult burden, and it's certainly not a
LO	difficult burden here when 99.8 percent of
L1	minorities were able to find the right precinct.
L2	JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: You said in
L3	response to Justice Kagan that the test can take
L4	account of demographic realities. How exactly
L5	under your test does that occur?
L6	MR. CARVIN: Well, the precise
L7	hypothetical is populations, right? Do they
L8	provide precincts that are analogous for
L9	minorities and non-minorities? And you can't
20	engage in a formalistic view, well, we put one
21	precinct here, one precinct there, therefore,
22	that's equal.
23	Again, if there's huge population
24	disparities in whom in terms of whom the
25	precincts are serving, then that would not be

- 1 a -- a realistic equal opportunity. If you have
- 2 10 times the population, then roughly eight to
- 3 10 more precincts would need to be provided.
- 4 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: You referred to
- 5 common sense. And I think two factors among
- 6 others, but two factors that, as a matter of
- 7 common sense, as I think about it, would trigger
- 8 more suspicion. One factor would be if you're
- 9 changing to a new rule that puts minorities in a
- 10 worse position than they were under the old
- 11 rule, and a second factor would be whether a
- 12 rule is commonplace in other states that do not
- have a similar history of racial discrimination.
- 14 Do those two considerations matter
- under your view of Section 2?
- 16 MR. CARVIN: Not really. And I think
- 17 the Court has cautioned -- I'm not saying that
- 18 you couldn't look at it, but, no, the Court has
- 19 cautioned in terms of the retrogression point
- that that is an analysis under Section 5, not
- 21 under Section 2.
- 22 And if you think about it, there's a
- 23 common-sense reason for that. If one party
- takes power and expands the vote dramatically,
- 25 without concern for ballot integrity or

- 1 security, and then the other party comes in and
- 2 wants to reemphasize the notion of secure
- 3 ballots, they would somehow be hamstrung by
- 4 whatever the predecessor group did.
- 5 It would seem odd --
- 6 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
- 7 Barrett.
- 8 MR. CARVIN: -- that once they
- 9 suggested --
- 10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
- 11 Barrett.
- 12 JUSTICE BARRETT: Mr. Carvin, I want
- to make sure that I understand your position
- 14 because it strikes me that it has some
- 15 contradictions in it.
- So, as I understood from your brief,
- your position is that Section 2 does not apply
- 18 to the how, to the time, place, and manner
- 19 restrictions, as long as they're facially
- 20 neutral, that it's only about the who.
- 21 Am I right about that?
- 22 MR. CARVIN: Qualifications would deny
- 23 people the opportunity to vote. Time, place,
- and manner do not deny anybody the opportunity
- to vote. They're simply providing opportunity

1 to --2 JUSTICE BARRETT: Okay. But then I 3 don't understand why you conceded in your examples to Justice Kagan that some of those 4 5 time, place, and manner restrictions -- like 6 time, place, and manner, you can only vote at a 7 country club, or time, place, and manner, you 8 know, this is the placement of the polls and 9 they're going to be placed in areas that are 10 burdensome to minorities. Aren't those time, 11 place, and manner restrictions? 12 MR. CARVIN: But they're not neutral, 13 in other words, because they don't give 14 minorities the same opportunity to access the 15 precincts as is given to whites. In other 16 words, if you put all of your precincts at 17 country clubs, the notion that minorities have 18 the same opportunity to vote is -- is laughable. 19 So, no, no one is arguing for an 20 unrealistic opportunity in terms of what the 21 state has provided. 2.2 JUSTICE BARRETT: Okay. Well, then --23 MR. CARVIN: What we're simply saying 24 25 JUSTICE BARRETT: -- I don't think

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      that --
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               MR. CARVIN: -- is the --
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                JUSTICE BARRETT: -- I don't really
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      think -- excuse me for interrupting -- that the
      relevant distinction here is between those that
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      regulate who and those that regulate time,
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     place, and manner. Really, the -- the pressure
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      under your interpretation is looking at
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      opportunity and what opportunity means.
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                I don't see why time, place, and
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     manner really bears -- you know, carries a lot
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      of weight in your analysis. Can you explain to
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     me --
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               MR. CARVIN: Well, if --
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                JUSTICE BARRETT: -- why I'm wrong?
               MR. CARVIN: Well, I just want to make
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17
      it clear, if a facially neutral literacy test
18
      denies you the opportunity to vote, then we
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     would think, since the state has now erected a
     barrier to voting, you would need to look at the
20
21
     racial composition of who the literacy test
22
      applies to, because they denied you an
23
      opportunity. They stopped you from voting.
24
                If the state has not stopped you from
25
     voting and the electoral system doesn't skew how
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- 1 you can vote, then you haven't established the
- 2 threshold requirement to look at the
- disproportionate outcome. In other words, the
- 4 state has not done anything wrong.
- In a time, place, or manner case, if
- 6 you ask why didn't this person vote, the answer
- 7 in the literacy test would be because the state
- 8 told them not to.
- 9 JUSTICE BARRETT: Okay. Mr. Carvin --
- 10 MR. CARVIN: And the time frame for
- 11 that --
- JUSTICE BARRETT: -- let me move on to
- 13 a different question. I'm interested in knowing
- 14 why the RNC is in the case.
- So, you know, the DNC had standing and
- the district court said that it had standing to
- 17 challenge the out-of-precinct policy because the
- 18 policy placed a greater imperative on Democratic
- 19 organizations to educate their voters and
- 20 because the policy harmed its members who would
- 21 have voted out-of-precinct.
- 22 What's the interest of the Arizona RNC
- 23 here in keeping, say, the out-of-precinct voter
- 24 ballot disqualification rules on the books?
- MR. CARVIN: Because it puts us at a

- 1 competitive disadvantage relative to Democrats.
- 2 Politics is a zero sum game, and every extra
- 3 vote they get through unlawful interpretations
- 4 of Section 2 hurts us. It's the difference
- 5 between winning an election 50 to 49 and losing
- 6 --
- 7 JUSTICE BARRETT: Okay. Thank you.
- 8 MR. CARVIN: -- an election --
- 9 JUSTICE BARRETT: My time is up.
- 10 MR. CARVIN: -- 51 to 50.
- 11 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: A minute to
- 12 wrap up, Mr. Carvin.
- MR. CARVIN: Yes. Thank you, Mr.
- 14 Chief Justice.
- 15 The Court has a stark choice between
- 16 two systems here. Ours is clear, we think
- derived directly from the text, and is easy to
- 18 apply. Theirs is one that requires the courts
- 19 to engage in a maximization policy, which
- 20 anything that has a disproportionate result is
- 21 somehow taken out of the hands of state
- 22 legislatures.
- 23 If you go down that path, even if you
- 24 try and limit it by suggesting that the state
- 25 can justify it or that we'll examine

- 1 socioeconomic factors, that still gets the
- 2 courts involved in an amorphous, manipulable
- 3 situation where no one knows what the rules are
- 4 going into the next election and they'll all be
- 5 decided on an ad hoc basis in a hyper-partisan
- 6 environment.
- 7 So, in addition to the fact that our
- 8 test is the only one that comports with the text
- 9 of Section 2 and the Constitution, it's also the
- 10 only one that gives lower courts the clarity
- 11 that is especially important in the voting
- 12 context.
- 13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, Mr.
- 14 Carvin.
- 15 Mr. Brnovich.
- 16 ORAL ARGUMENT OF GEN. MARK BRNOVICH
- 17 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS IN 19-1258
- 18 MR. BRNOVICH: Mr. Chief Justice, and
- 19 may it please the Court:
- 20 Public servants have no more sacred
- 21 duty than protecting the people's right to vote
- 22 while maintaining confidence in the integrity of
- 23 election results, this case before the Court
- 24 establishing a clear and constitutional test
- 25 that allows states to meet these imperatives. A

- 1 Section 2 vote denial claim requires substantial
- 2 disparate impact that is also caused by the
- 3 challenged law.
- 4 The laws at issue here are valid under
- 5 that test. They are also common-sense and
- 6 commonplace. Requiring in-person voters to cast
- 7 their ballots at assigned precincts ensures that
- 8 they can vote in local races and helps officials
- 9 monitor for fraud. Restricting early ballot
- 10 collections by third parties, including
- 11 political operatives, protects against voter
- 12 coercion and preserves ballot secrecy.
- 13 Arizona urges this Court to adopt a
- 14 clear and workable test for voter denial claims
- that allows states to properly regulate their
- 16 elections.
- I would be happy to take questions.
- 18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
- 19 General. Your approach requires that the burden
- 20 at issue be substantial, the disparate impact,
- 21 as you just said. Where do you get that in the
- 22 statutory language?
- MR. BRNOVICH: Chief Justice Roberts,
- it's for the same reasons the Seventh, Fourth,
- and Sixth Circuits have adopted this

- 1 requirement. Section 2 prohibits state voting
- 2 practices only when they result in minorities
- 3 having less opportunity to vote and to elect
- 4 representatives of their choice. Any sort of
- 5 insubstantial impact cannot clearly meet these
- 6 thresholds.
- 7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But what if it
- 8 --
- 9 MR. BRNOVICH: But one example we
- 10 believe --
- 11 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: -- what if it
- 12 -- what if the provision --
- MR. BRNOVICH: Go ahead.
- 14 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: -- results in
- a 1 percent decline in participation by minority
- 16 voters? Is that substantial enough? I mean,
- 17 1 percent, according to the statistical
- analysis, has been denied the opportunity to
- 19 vote. Why -- is that substantial?
- 20 MR. BRNOVICH: Chief Justice Roberts,
- 21 we believe that our test is the most workable
- 22 because, if you look at what a substantial
- impact would be, we must analyze that under a
- 24 totality of circumstances, and it has to rise to
- a level of the denial and abridgement of the

- 1 right to vote and the opportunity to participate
- and elect candidates of their choice, because
- 3 the whole point of Section 2 is to suss out
- 4 intentional discrimination when it's used as a
- 5 proxy or a guise.
- 6 So I believe that if this Court looks
- 7 at even the redistricting cases, such as Harris
- 8 versus IRC, at that -- in that point, the Court
- 9 determined that 10 percent was something that
- 10 was a substantial number. And then you --
- 11 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: When you look
- 12 at what the -- you're looking at what the --
- MR. BRNOVICH: -- have the
- 14 Respondents' arguments --
- 15 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I'm sorry,
- 16 counsel. When you're looking at the impact, do
- 17 you look at alternative procedures? In other
- words, let's say there's a significant impact
- on -- for -- on minorities voting at the polls.
- In analyzing that, do you say, well,
- 21 they can vote by mail, so, overall, it's not
- 22 that substantial an impact?
- MR. BRNOVICH: Yes, Chief Justice. We
- 24 believe that in Arizona there are numerous ways
- 25 that people can vote. They can -- there's

- 1 no-excuse absentee balloting. They can vote by
- 2 mail. We have voting centers in some counties.
- 3 They can vote early up to 27 days before the
- 4 election. And so the only way to determine
- 5 whether there's a substantial impact is to look
- 6 at the totality of the election numbers.
- 7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you --
- 8 thank you, counsel.
- 9 Justice Thomas.
- 10 JUSTICE THOMAS: Thank you, Mr. Chief
- 11 Justice.
- 12 General, there's been some
- disagreement as to your standing in this case.
- 14 Would you take a minute to discuss why you have
- 15 standing here?
- 16 MR. BRNOVICH: Justice Thomas, first
- 17 and foremost, the Ninth Circuit allowed us to
- intervene on behalf of the state. As the
- 19 Attorney General for the State of Arizona, Title
- 20 41 in -- in Arizona statutes clearly allows the
- 21 attorney general to represent the state in
- 22 federal court.
- JUSTICE THOMAS: The -- there was a --
- 24 the theory that the Ninth Circuit used to
- 25 discuss some questionable legislative intent

- 1 involved in the Arizona legislation was the
- 2 cat's paw theory. One, I'd like you to address
- 3 that, but I'd also like you to tell us -- to
- 4 discuss how you would determine the intent of
- 5 the Arizona legislature in passing this
- 6 legislation.
- 7 MR. BRNOVICH: Justice Thomas, I -- we
- 8 believe that the cat's paw doctrine is
- 9 completely inapplicable to a case like that.
- 10 That doctrine arose out of the context of agency
- 11 relationships, and it imputes the motives for
- 12 superiors to the agents.
- But, as this Court knows and has
- 14 recognized in the past, that you cannot impute a
- 15 motive from one legislature -- legislator to a
- 16 group of 90 independent coequal actors spread
- 17 across two houses in the legislature. So this
- is no different, I believe, than the Court's
- 19 prior recognition that what motivates one
- 20 legislator to speak out or vote for a bill is
- 21 not -- not necessarily what motivates other
- 22 legislators to vote for that bill.
- 23 At the end of the day, as we've
- 24 articulated our test, we believe it's a
- 25 two-prong test and we need -- and it's designed

- 1 to make sure that -- and determine whether an
- 2 intentional discrimination is done by proxy.
- 3 And that's why we need to look at the
- 4 substantial disparity looking at the totality of
- 5 the circumstances and to analyze whether that
- 6 caused that difference in voting.
- 7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
- 8 Breyer.
- 9 JUSTICE BREYER: I'm curious to know
- 10 what you think of -- of Professor
- 11 Stephanopoulos's test. My reason is simply
- 12 this: It seems to me that in many
- discrimination statutes -- anti-discrimination,
- 14 Title VII, Title VI, the Housing Act, the age
- 15 discrimination -- essentially, the courts have
- 16 come down in disparate impact situations to
- 17 three elements.
- 18 First, the plaintiff has to show that
- 19 there is some kind of significant disparity.
- 20 Second, the plaintiff has to show that
- 21 there is at least a but-for cause and the
- 22 state's or the employer's policy is the but-for
- 23 cause.
- 24 And then, third, the defendant can
- 25 come back and show, well, we have a good

- 1 non-race-related reason for this and it can't be
- 2 accomplished easily in other ways.
- 3 Those three elements run through the
- 4 law. Many of the tests, and Stephanopoulos, who
- 5 says it explicitly, embody those three elements.
- 6 Are you against our saying those same three
- 7 elements that implemented the statutory language
- 8 here are the basis of a cause, we'll never get
- 9 it perfect, it will always be case by case, it
- 10 will always involve all the circumstances, but
- 11 those are the three key elements?
- MR. BRNOVICH: Justice Breyer, that --
- 13 those are -- that's an interesting test, but I
- think, at the end of the day, Congress didn't
- 15 require that. And we do believe that to adopt
- 16 those tests from the Title VII context would
- 17 actually shift the burden. And the text of
- 18 Section 2 doesn't require it.
- 19 Once again, I believe that any --
- analyzing any of these burdens on voters or if
- 21 there's statistical disparities, we have to look
- 22 at the totality of the circumstances and a
- 23 totality of the voting systems within that
- 24 state. And once again, if you look at all the
- 25 opportunities that people have to vote,

- 1 regardless of who they are or their background,
- 2 Arizona provides a plethora of options for
- 3 people to exercise their franchise.
- 4 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice Alito.
- 5 JUSTICE ALITO: Can I ask you
- 6 something about the statistics regarding
- 7 out-of-precinct voting. Are -- do they refer
- 8 only to voters who cast their ballots at a
- 9 polling place on Election Day, or do they also
- include voters who voted early?
- 11 MR. BRNOVICH: Justice Alito, Mark
- 12 Twain famously said that there are three types
- of lies: lies, damn lies, and statistics. And
- 14 I -- we believe that the Ninth Circuit
- cherry-picked some of those statistics because,
- if you look at the overall totality of people
- 17 that voted in Arizona, we're talking about a
- tenth of a percent, essentially, that may have
- 19 been affected by the rules relating to
- 20 in-precinct voting. And --
- 21 JUSTICE ALITO: No. What about what
- 22 would --
- 23 MR. BRNOVICH: -- at the end of the
- 24 day, of the nearly 2 million votes cast, only
- 25 4,000 -- about 4,000 people voted

- 1 out-of-precinct. So, to simply answer your
- 2 question, that only included day of voting. It
- 3 did not include the 80 percent of people that
- 4 voted early by mail.
- 5 JUSTICE ALITO: So what would happen
- 6 if someone showed up for early voting and went
- 7 to the wrong precinct?
- 8 MR. BRNOVICH: Justice Alito, they
- 9 would be told that they are voting in the wrong
- 10 precinct and they would be told where to go to
- 11 vote. If they insisted on voting in that
- 12 precinct, they would be giving a -- given a
- provisional ballot but be told that that ballot
- 14 may not count.
- JUSTICE ALITO: And this would apply
- to early voting as well as Election Day voting?
- 17 That was the question I was getting at.
- 18 MR. BRNOVICH: I'm sorry, Justice
- 19 Alito. All ballots are available at early
- voting centers, but not every county in Arizona
- 21 has voting centers if I understand your question
- 22 correct -- question correctly.
- JUSTICE ALITO: Okay. Let me go on to
- 24 another -- another point. You say we should
- 25 give some teeth to the requirement that

- 1 challengers must show not only that a protected
- 2 class has less opportunity to -- to participate
- 3 in the political process but also less
- 4 opportunity to elect representatives of their
- 5 choice. What would that look like in practice?
- 6 Does it require pointing to a very close
- 7 election on -- on a particular day?
- 8 MR. BRNOVICH: Justice Alito, under
- 9 our test, it would require looking at both of
- 10 those prongs. So, first, there would have to be
- 11 a determination made by the plaintiffs, who
- would have the burden of proof, to show that
- there was a substantial disparate impact on the
- ability of minority voters' ability to
- 15 participate and elect candidates of their
- 16 choice.
- 17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
- 18 Sotomayor.
- 19 MR. BRNOVICH: Once that hurdle is --
- JUSTICE ALITO: Thank you, thank you.
- 21 My time is up.
- 22 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
- 23 Sotomayor.
- 24 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Counsel, you said
- 25 that the general test under Title VII and other

- 1 civil rights statutes in response to Justice
- 2 Breyer puts the burden on the state. But the
- 3 only burden that that test requires is for the
- 4 state to justify its practice, to explain why.
- Why is that a burden that you can't
- 6 meet?
- 7 MR. BRNOVICH: Well, the text of
- 8 Section 2 doesn't require it. What Section 2 --
- 9 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, compatible
- 10 --
- MR. BRNOVICH: -- essentially means is
- 12 that --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- in their -- I'm
- sorry, counsel. By your own admission, the test
- under voting -- voting rights too is a totality
- of the circumstances test. And isn't
- justification one of the circumstances that the
- 18 Senate report pointed to?
- MR. BRNOVICH: Justice Sotomayor, but
- 20 the burden would be on the plaintiffs to
- 21 establish that. Under our test --
- 22 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: You have that --
- MR. BRNOVICH: -- the plaintiffs would
- 24 have to come forward --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- absolutely --

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               MR. BRNOVICH: -- and, one, fill that
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      substantial --
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               JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Counsel, the test
      requires an examination of the totality of the
 4
     circumstances. Can you seriously argue that the
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 6
      reason for why you did something isn't part of
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      that test?
               MR. BRNOVICH: Well, first and
 8
      foremost, I believe we look to the -- to the
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     text of the statute itself --
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               JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: The statute --
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               MR. BRNOVICH: -- to determine how it
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14
               JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- talks about --
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               MR. BRNOVICH: -- should be
     interpreted, of course.
16
17
               JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- totality --
18
     counsel, the statute talks about totality of
19
      circumstances. I'm asking you a simple
20
      question. Are you arguing that the reason you
     did something is not part of that totality of
21
2.2
      circumstances?
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               MR. BRNOVICH: Well, twofold. One is
      -- is --
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               JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Counsel, why is
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1 that question --2 MR. BRNOVICH: -- as I mentioned earlier --3 4 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- counsel, why is 5 that question so hard to answer? Yes or no? 6 the reason why the state has picked a particular 7 practice an important part of the totality of the circumstances test? 8 9 MR. BRNOVICH: Yes. 10 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Thank you, 11 counsel. 12 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice Kagan. 13 JUSTICE KAGAN: General Brnovich, 14 would you have answered my hypotheticals the 15 same way that Mr. Carvin did? 16 MR. BRNOVICH: No. 17 JUSTICE KAGAN: What would be 18 different? 19 MR. BRNOVICH: Well, I think that our 20 test would require looking first and foremost at 21 whether there was a substantial disparity and 22 then, two --23 JUSTICE KAGAN: I'm just asking 24 which --

MR. BRNOVICH: -- really going through

- 1 a causation analysis.
- 2 JUSTICE KAGAN: -- which hypotheticals
- 3 would be different.
- 4 MR. BRNOVICH: So --
- 5 JUSTICE KAGAN: Which ones would you
- 6 have answered differently?
- 7 MR. BRNOVICH: All three of them. I
- 8 mean, yeah, I -- I think all three of them would
- 9 require that analysis. For example --
- 10 JUSTICE KAGAN: I mean --
- MR. BRNOVICH: -- just because there's
- 12 --
- JUSTICE KAGAN: -- I'm not asking
- 14 really about analysis.
- MR. BRNOVICH: -- a polling place at a
- 16 country club, I don't believe --
- 17 JUSTICE KAGAN: General, if you could
- 18 stop for a second. I -- I just want to know
- 19 what the -- the -- the answers are. Mr. Carvin
- said both polling place hypotheticals would be
- 21 impermissible. Are they impermissible?
- MR. BRNOVICH: Justice, it would
- 23 depend on the evidence that was presented at
- 24 trial.
- JUSTICE KAGAN: I -- I just gave --

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1
               MR. BRNOVICH: We know in our case --
 2
               JUSTICE KAGAN: -- you the evidence.
 3
               MR. BRNOVICH: -- it was a 10-day
 4
      trial that --
               JUSTICE KAGAN: I just gave you the
 5
      evidence, General. The -- the evidence is 10
 6
7
      times more wait times, 10 times fewer votes for
     blacks than whites. That's the evidence.
8
9
               MR. BRNOVICH: Under -- under our
10
     analysis, so you would look at whether there's a
11
      substantial disparity. So, in that situation,
12
     what percentage of, for example, African
     American voters were voting less than white
13
14
     voters.
15
               JUSTICE KAGAN: I just meant --
16
               MR. BRNOVICH: They say now -- now
17
      they'd have to look at the --
18
               JUSTICE KAGAN: General, the
19
     hypothetical is the hypothetical, all right?
      It's 10 times the impact, right? Ten times, you
20
21
     know, a greater distance to the polls, 10 times
22
     more polling stations.
23
               MR. BRNOVICH: Justice Kagan, I'm not
      trying to be difficult, but it -- it really
24
25
      depends on the magnitude. Are we talking about
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- one person versus 10 people, 100 people versus
- 2 1,000 people?
- JUSTICE KAGAN: All right. We're
- 4 talking about 1,000 people.
- 5 MR. BRNOVICH: Ultimately, it's is
- 6 that burden -- does that cause someone to not be
- 7 allowed to elect a representative of their
- 8 choice and --
- 9 JUSTICE KAGAN: Okay.
- 10 MR. BRNOVICH: -- if there's a
- 11 significant prohibition --
- 12 JUSTICE KAGAN: How about hours? How
- about hours, General? How about hours, 10 to 2?
- MR. BRNOVICH: Same answer. It -- it
- 15 depends on the circumstances and how that
- impacts and does that have a substantial impact
- on the ability of minorities to participate in
- 18 the election.
- 19 JUSTICE KAGAN: Yes, it does have a
- 20 substantial impact, General. You know, if it's
- 10 to 2, people who work 10 to 2 and don't have
- 22 cars and -- and -- the impact has been shown to
- 23 be that black voters will be very
- 24 disproportionately impacted by hours that are 10
- 25 to 2.

- 1 MR. BRNOVICH: Justice Kagan, in that
- 2 hypothetical, it very well could be a violation
- 3 of Section 2. At that point, I believe it would
- 4 be -- we've moved on to the second prong of that
- 5 and we'd look at causation and whether the
- 6 challenged law did indeed cause that --
- 7 JUSTICE KAGAN: Thank you, General.
- 8 MR. BRNOVICH: -- circumstance. Once
- 9 it's generally determined that --
- 10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
- 11 Gorsuch.
- MR. BRNOVICH: -- the totality of the
- 13 circumstances --
- 14 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
- 15 Gorsuch.
- 16 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Go ahead and finish
- 17 your answer, counsel, please.
- 18 MR. BRNOVICH: Thank you, Justice
- 19 Gorsuch. Once again, both of these prongs, we
- 20 have to look at the totality of circumstances.
- 21 And so, even with voting hours, the question
- becomes, well, what are the alternative methods
- or ways for people to vote? How many people act
- 24 -- actually are affected by that 10 to 2 voting,
- 25 those hours?

1	JUSTICE GORSUCH: All right. So we
2	we have before us two actual voting practices,
3	the in-precinct requirement and the rule against
4	vote collection or harvesting. Can you explain
5	in in succinctly your thoughts on why
6	those don't count as substantial burdens?
7	MR. BRNOVICH: Justice Gorsuch, after
8	a 10-day trial, Federal District Judge Rayes
9	found both of these statutes constitutional,
LO	that there was additionally, the states, when
L1	it comes to time, place, and manner, when it
L2	comes to regulations that are designed to upholo
L3	the integrity of the election process, I think
L4	the Court should be very skeptical when it
L5	overturns any sort of state election statutes
L6	based on some sort of statistical anomalies.
L7	JUSTICE GORSUCH: Okay. But what do
L8	you say about what you call the statistical
L9	anomalies but the other side would call proof?
20	What why why don't they rise to the
21	level of a substantial burden?
22	MR. BRNOVICH: As the district court
23	found, there was there was no burden on the
24	ability of votes. And literally we're talking,
25	for example in the out-of-precinct voting of

- 1 about 4,000 ballots of more than 2 million cast.
- No one was denied the opportunity.
- 3 And if we look at these statistical anomalies,
- 4 those slight statistical differences, we have to
- 5 look at that in the context of the totality of
- 6 our voting system. You know, once again,
- 7 Arizona provides, you know, early voting.
- 8 People can vote at voting centers. They can
- 9 vote 27 days before the election.
- 10 There's no excuse. Absentee
- 11 balloting. Eighty percent of people in Arizona
- vote by mail. So there are a whole plethora of
- options and ways for people to exercise the
- 14 right to franchise. And so by -- just when
- 15 the -- what the Ninth Circuit en banc did is
- 16 they took a small number, as Justice Alito
- 17 referred to, of people that actually voted day
- of and then tried to extrapolate that somehow
- 19 that Arizona's laws were racist or
- 20 unconstitutional.
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Thank you.
- 22 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
- 23 Kavanaugh.
- 24 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Thank you, Chief
- 25 Justice.

1 Counsel, you acknowledged several 2 times that the totality of the circumstances are 3 relevant here, and, of course, that's in the statutory text, as my colleagues have pointed 4 Is the availability of alternatives that 5 6 could serve your policy goals a circumstance 7 that matters when we consider the totality of the circumstances? 8 9 MR. BRNOVICH: Yes, absolutely, 10 Justice Kavanaugh. JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: And so, if there's 11 12 an alternative available that would serve the 13 policy objective without causing the 14 disproportionate impact or would cause less of a 15 disproportionate impact, do you have to go with 16 that? And if not, why not? 17 MR. BRNOVICH: Yes, Justice Gorsuch, 18 that -- that is in the law. And we believe that 19 causation also plays an important role. In the 20 totality, we look at that not only on 21 substantial impact but also on the causation 2.2 because that causation plays an important role 23 in connecting the totality of the circumstances 24 with the integrity measures. 25 So there may be multiple or there

- 1 could be isolated instances of disparity, and
- 2 those can be remedied without upsetting a
- 3 race-neutral election integrity law. And that
- 4 would obviously be strongly preferred.
- 5 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Thank you.
- 6 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
- 7 Barrett.
- 8 JUSTICE BARRETT: So, General, one of
- 9 the disputes in this case about -- is about
- 10 whether we look at the electoral system as a
- 11 whole or whether we look at the challenged
- 12 regulation in isolation or let's say on a
- 13 regulation-by-regulation basis.
- 14 And I want to give you this point or
- this example that's in Secretary Hobbs's brief,
- she makes a pretty good point. She says in
- 17 response to your argument that we have to look
- 18 at the process itself to say, overall, is the
- 19 process, you know, open enough for disadvantaged
- 20 voters. So, you know, even if they can't send
- 21 their ballot in via ballot collection, they have
- 22 many other opportunities to do so, early voting,
- 23 et cetera.
- She points out in Footnote 6 on page
- 25 23 that if a state sends unsolicited ballot

- 1 applications to residents of white neighborhoods
- 2 but not to residents of black neighborhoods,
- 3 that would amount to giving the latter less
- 4 opportunity to participate. And she's, you
- 5 know, quoting the Republican party there.
- 6 Wouldn't that be true even if black
- 7 voters could vote in other ways? In other
- 8 words, reducing an opportunity is reducing an
- 9 opportunity in the text of the statute even if
- there's still other avenues open to the black
- 11 voters.
- 12 MR. BRNOVICH: Justice Barrett, in the
- 13 hypothetical, the example you provided, that
- 14 would seem to be unconstitutional on its face
- 15 because it's not facially neutral.
- JUSTICE BARRETT: Okay. But isn't --
- 17 you know, we might disagree about that, but
- 18 let's say that, you know, some of Justice
- 19 Kagan's examples, which seemed on their face to
- 20 be ostensibly neutral, on their face, time,
- 21 place, and manner restrictions, if it takes one
- 22 opportunity away, I guess I still don't
- 23 understand why that isn't reducing the ability
- 24 of those voters to vote, relative to other white
- voters that don't share that same burden.

- 1 MR. BRNOVICH: Once again, if we focus
- 2 too much on de minimis or small statistical
- disparities, I believe we run into grounds where
- 4 then the statute itself would run afoul of the
- 5 Fourteenth, Fifteenth Amendments.
- 6 So that's why, if we take a step back
- 7 and we analyze it with our test, looking at,
- 8 one, the substantial disparate impact, the total
- 9 -- totality of circumstances --
- 10 JUSTICE BARRETT: Okay. Thank you,
- 11 General.
- 12 MR. BRNOVICH: -- and then looking at
- 13 --
- JUSTICE BARRETT: I'm out of time.
- 15 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Take a minute
- 16 to wrap up, General Brnovich.
- 17 MR. BRNOVICH: Thank you, Chief
- 18 Justice.
- 19 Arizona endorses without qualification
- 20 the Voting Rights Act goal of ending racial
- 21 discrimination in voting. The Constitution
- 22 demands that all Americans be free from this
- 23 pernicious evil.
- A disparate impact on minority voters
- 25 can be an appropriate proxy for legal

- 1 discrimination when that disparity is 2 substantial. But, without these showings, 3 Section 2 would exceed Congress's powers to enforce the Reconstruction amendments, 4 improperly inject race into all voting laws, and 5 6 impede a state's ability to run their elections. 7 Arizona's requirement that ballots be 8 cast at assigned local precincts and its 9 restrictions on ballot harvesting are 10 appropriate election integrity measures that do 11 not create any disparate impact on racial 12 minorities but serve us all equally well. The desire to enhance the convenience 13 14 of voting must never outweigh the imperative of 15 securing the integrity of the result. 16 We urge this Court to reverse with 17 instructions and enter judgment for the State. 18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, 19 counsel. 20 Ms. Amunson. 21 ORAL ARGUMENT OF JESSICA R. AMUNSON 2.2 ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT SECRETARY HOBBS

Justice, and may it please the Court:

MS. AMUNSON: Good morning, Mr. Chief

When an eligible voter casts a ballot

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- 1 and that ballot is discarded rather than
- 2 counted, that voter has been denied the right to
- 3 vote. Likewise, when an eligible voter relies
- 4 on ballot collection to vote and that practice
- 5 is criminalized, that citizen's vote right has
- 6 at the very least been abridged.
- 7 The question then is whether that
- 8 denial or abridgement has occurred on account of
- 9 race. Section 2's plain text tells courts how
- 10 to answer that question, and the statutory
- 11 command to answer based on the totality of
- 12 circumstances necessarily requires rejection of
- 13 the inflexible rules Petitioners advocate.
- To the contrary, it mandates what this
- 15 Court has called a searching, practical
- 16 evaluation of the past and present reality and a
- 17 functional view of the political process.
- 18 Petitioners have caricatured the
- 19 Section 2 results test as resting on bare
- 20 statistical disparities that will call into
- 21 question every election regulation in the
- 22 country. Not true.
- 23 Section 2's results test has been in
- 24 place for almost 40 years, and nothing like what
- 25 Petitioners claim has come to pass. Indeed,

- 1 successful Section 2 challenges to statewide
- 2 election laws involving voter ID, early voting,
- 3 ballot collection, and out-of-precinct voting
- 4 number in the single digits.
- 5 Section 2 liability has been limited
- 6 to policies that, due to their interaction with
- 7 particular facts on the ground, are outliers in
- 8 the discriminatory burden that they impose on
- 9 minority voters. That is the case here.
- 10 As Arizona's chief elections officer,
- 11 Secretary of State Hobbs knows that the
- 12 out-of-precinct policy and the ballot collection
- 13 statute impose discriminatory burdens on Native
- 14 American, Latino, and black voters that are not
- justified by any legitimate state interest.
- We, therefore, ask this Court to
- 17 affirm the judgment below. And I welcome the
- 18 Court's questions.
- 19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Counsel,
- 20 you're aware of what the Carter-Baker Commission
- 21 found about ballot harvesting. They said that
- 22 absentee ballots are the largest source of
- 23 potential voter fraud. They said citizens who
- vote at home, at nursing homes, at the workplace
- or church are more susceptible to pressure or to

- 1 intimidation and that they recommended that the
- 2 practice of allowing candidates or party workers
- 3 to pick up and deliver absentee ballots should
- 4 be eliminated.
- 5 You think that's -- you disagree with
- 6 that in this case, right, given your --
- 7 MS. AMUNSON: In --
- 8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: -- position on
- 9 ballot harvesting?
- 10 MS. AMUNSON: In this case, Your
- 11 Honor, and that is the important distinction
- 12 here. States can have an interest in -- in
- 13 securing their elections through limiting ballot
- 14 collection, but, when you look at the particular
- 15 facts here, that does not appear to have been
- 16 Arizona's interest.
- 17 And in McCutcheon, for example, Your
- 18 Honor, the Court noted that where, as here, a --
- 19 a legislature takes a prophylaxis upon
- 20 prophylaxis approach, the courts should be
- 21 particularly diligent in scrutinizing the law.
- 22 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So the -- the
- 23 law is -- you would strike down because of --
- 24 there's not racial proportionality in -- in
- 25 enforcing the law, and that means that your

- 1 pursuit of racial proportionality would require
- 2 you to keep in place the pressure, the
- 3 intimidation that caused President Carter and
- 4 Secretary Baker to recommend that that
- 5 harvesting practice be eliminated?
- 6 MS. AMUNSON: Your Honor, it has -- it
- 7 has nothing to do with racial proportionality.
- 8 What it has to do with are the burdens that the
- 9 law actually imposes on voters here. So there
- 10 are particular facts and circumstances in
- 11 Arizona that may not be present in other states.
- 12 And --
- 13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, but when
- 14 you say it doesn't -- when you say it doesn't
- involve racial proportionality, you say it's if
- the burdens were equally distributed among the
- 17 races, that issue or that policy wouldn't be
- 18 before us, would it?
- MS. AMUNSON: Your Honor, what I'm
- 20 saying is that, here, what we have is a record
- 21 that shows that Native Americans and Latinos in
- 22 Arizona rely disproportionately on ballot
- 23 collection and white voters do not. So that is
- 24 why this is before you.
- 25 So, for example, as the district court

1 found, voting on Native American reservations is 2 an activity that requires the active --3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: No, no --MS. AMUNSON: -- participation of --4 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: -- I 5 6 understand your position, which is that if there 7 isn't racial proportionality, then the -- the 8 law should be struck down. I'm just asking you 9 if that requires you to tolerate the 10 difficulties and problems and pressures that 11 President Carter and Secretary Baker outlined in 12 their report. 13 MS. AMUNSON: Your Honor, I am simply 14 saying that while states can have a -- an 15 interest in -- in securing absentee ballots and 16 in limiting ballot collection, that is not the 17 -- the interest here. And I think the legislative history shows that, in fact, what 18 19 Arizona was acting to do was to limit the 20 participation of Hispanics and Native Americans 21 in particular to enable --2.2 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, 23 counsel. Justice Thomas. 24

JUSTICE THOMAS: Thank you, Mr. Chief

- 1 Justice.
- 2 Ms. Amunson, is the out-of-precinct
- 3 policy still in place?
- 4 MS. AMUNSON: It is, Your Honor.
- 5 JUSTICE THOMAS: And there's -- and
- 6 the Secretary of State plans to enforce it?
- 7 MS. AMUNSON: The out-of-precinct
- 8 policy is in -- is part of the election
- 9 procedures manual that is by statute in place
- 10 until at least the end of this year. So, yes,
- 11 the -- the -- the out-of-precinct policy was
- 12 enforced in the 2020 election.
- JUSTICE THOMAS: Okay. The -- what
- 14 percentage of the minority voters in the state
- of Arizona are affected by the out-of-precinct
- 16 policy or were adversely affected, as well as
- the ballot collection policies?
- 18 MS. AMUNSON: As to the
- 19 out-of-precinct policy, the -- the record showed
- 20 that minority voters were affected at a rate of
- 21 two to one as to the -- as to the
- 22 out-of-precinct policy.
- 23 As to the --
- 24 JUSTICE THOMAS: No, I -- I understand
- 25 what you're saying there, but what percentage of

- 1 the minorities who cast ballots in the State of
- 2 Arizona were affected by the policies?
- 3 MS. AMUNSON: It was less than
- 4 1 percent, Your Honor. However, Your Honor,
- 5 this Court has never held -- and, in fact, the
- 6 text of Section 2 says that it is about the
- 7 right of any voter to be abridged.
- 8 Of course, we recognize that the
- 9 number of voters affected may affect how a
- 10 plaintiff can prove that a policy denied or
- abridged the right to vote on account of race.
- 12 But it is not the case that simply a small
- 13 number of voters being affected by the policy is
- 14 enough to render it immune from Section 2
- 15 liability, as -- as the United States also
- 16 agreed both in its brief below and in its brief
- 17 in this case.
- 18 JUSTICE THOMAS: You know, I often
- 19 wonder when you -- when we say there's an
- 20 additional burden, Arizona is a big state and
- 21 it's quite rural. I'm sure there are some
- 22 people in very rural parts of Arizona who are
- 23 quite burdened by the distance they have to
- 24 travel in order to vote.
- How do you compare someone who is

- 1 supposedly burdened or allegedly burdened by the 2 out-of-precinct policy to a person like that? 3 MS. AMUNSON: Well, Your Honor, it's -- it's -- that's exactly our point here, 4 is that, for example, with respect to Native 5 6 American voters, who have to vote -- who rely on 7 ballot collection to vote, simply saying that 8 those voters can go ahead and vote in person or 9 go ahead and vote by mail when they don't actually have home mail service or access to 10 postal facilities, that's exactly our -- our --11 12 the contrast that we draw with Mr. Carvin's position that it's all just about opportunity. 13 14 Instead, you have to actually look at 15 the reality of how the -- the burden is 16 affecting voters on the ground under the 17 totality of circumstances inquiry. 18 JUSTICE THOMAS: Thank you. 19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice 20 Breyer. 21 Well, I have two JUSTICE BREYER: 2.2 related questions, and both are about standards,
- 25 impact is -- this is not the only field in which

What do you think of, since disparate

which I think is the main issue here.

23

- 1 it comes up, that we take the standards from the
- other areas -- employment, age, and housing and
- 3 so forth -- and simply say they're roughly the
- 4 same here? The statute does speak on account of
- 5 race, which means if it's justified, it's not on
- 6 account of race, all right? So we simply take
- 7 those standards, producing a uniformity in the
- 8 law. That's my general question.
- 9 My specific question is, what do you
- 10 really say about the question that I think
- 11 Justice Thomas was asking, that if you win in
- 12 the details here, in many -- in the majority of
- states, they won't be able to engage in precinct
- voting, because a lot of the precincts will turn
- out to be maybe 10 feet or maybe 100 yards or
- 16 maybe 1,000 yards on -- in general further away
- from a minority group of houses than a majority
- 18 group of houses. Are you supposed to go out
- 19 with a tape measure? What? All right. That's
- 20 a concern in the specific case.
- 21 So I'm interested in both. One,
- 22 what's your general view of using roughly the
- 23 same standards, and, two, what about that
- 24 specific case?
- 25 MS. AMUNSON: First, Your Honor, as to

- 1 the -- the disparate impact standard, we think
- 2 that is -- those elements are already
- 3 incorporated in the test that the court applied
- 4 below, and our only quibble with the -- with the
- 5 standard that Your Honor set forth is the
- 6 requirement of a "significant disparity."
- We don't think that simply importing a
- 8 textual adjective like "significant" or
- 9 "substantial" really moves the ball. That said,
- 10 we do recognize that you have to -- that the
- 11 size of a disparity will matter for purposes of
- being able to prove whether a policy is, in
- 13 fact, discriminatory on account of race.
- 14 As to Your Honor's second question
- about whether states can engage in -- still
- 16 engage in precinct-based voting, certainly, Your
- 17 Honor, states maintain plenty of discretion and
- 18 authority to regulate their elections as they
- 19 see fit and to have precinct-based voting
- 20 systems.
- 21 The reality is that is actually not --
- 22 not what is happening in Arizona. In fact, in
- 23 2020, 75 percent of voters voted in counties
- that do not actually use precinct-based systems.
- 25 And so, while there may be some

- 1 interest in maintaining precinct-based systems
- 2 in other states, that is not actually the
- 3 reality on the ground in Arizona. We don't
- 4 think the states need to take out tape -- tape
- 5 measures. Instead, what they have to do is
- 6 ensure that they are not providing less
- 7 opportunity to minorities.
- 8 So they do have to be conscious of
- 9 ensuring that -- that, in fact, opportunities
- 10 are equalized across the races, and that is what
- 11 Section 2 is meant to do.
- 12 JUSTICE BREYER: Thank you.
- 13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice Alito.
- JUSTICE ALITO: Counsel, I want to try
- to give you a couple of examples and ask you for
- 16 each one to assume that a Title -- a Section 2
- 17 plaintiff is able to show statistical
- disparities that are at least as great as those
- 19 that were shown here with respect to
- 20 out-of-precinct -- precinct voting and that
- 21 those disparities were cause for -- but-for
- 22 caused by the same socioeconomic factors that
- you say were the but-for causes here.
- So the first example is a state that
- 25 has the early voting period begin two weeks

- 1 before Election Day and the plaintiffs say --
- 2 and they show that that has -- instead, it
- 3 should have been 60 days, and there's the same
- 4 kind of statistical disparities.
- 5 MS. AMUNSON: Your Honor, if I may ask
- 6 in your hypothetical, the -- the plaintiffs want
- 7 to go from 14 to 60 days or --
- 8 JUSTICE ALITO: Right.
- 9 MS. AMUNSON: -- they're reducing it
- 10 from --
- 11 JUSTICE ALITO: They want to go --
- 12 they want to go from 14 to 60. A lot of
- minority voters are unable, they -- they -- they
- 14 -- or they -- they don't vote within the 14-day
- 15 period to the same extent as they would within
- 16 the 60-day period.
- MS. AMUNSON: Well, Your Honor, we
- 18 think that there is a difference both in text
- 19 and in precedent in asking a court or asking a
- 20 state to adopt a new policy versus a state
- 21 taking away a policy that already exists.
- 22 And so I don't think that Section 2
- 23 plaintiffs could come in and say that you are
- required to expand from six -- from 14 to 60.
- 25 And that's because the text actually talks about

- 1 the challenged standard practice or procedure in
- 2 the state or political subdivision.
- JUSTICE ALITO: All right. How about
- 4 a -- how about a rule -- the state has a rule
- 5 that you have to -- you have to fill in a little
- 6 box to vote for a candidate, but it can be shown
- 7 that there's a statistical disparity with
- 8 respect to voters who don't actually fill in the
- 9 box, but they -- they make a checkmark beside
- 10 the box.
- MS. AMUNSON: Your Honor, again, I --
- 12 I think that what Section 2 calls for and -- and
- 13 what this Court has said is a practical
- 14 evaluation of the past and present reality. I
- don't think statistic -- I just want to be
- 16 clear, statistical disparities alone are not
- 17 enough to make out a Section 2 violation.
- 18 You would have to show that it is, in
- 19 fact, imposing a burden on -- a discriminatory
- 20 burden on the minority voters that it is not
- 21 imposing on non-minority --
- JUSTICE ALITO: Well, I don't really
- 23 see the difference between -- let me give you
- one more example. The state has a rule that
- 25 says that mailed-in ballots have to be received

- 1 within three days after Election Day, and the
- 2 section -- a Section 2 plaintiff says it should
- 3 be one week, and they showed the same kind of
- 4 statistical disparities.
- 5 MS. AMUNSON: And, again, Your -- Your
- 6 Honor, my answer is the same. Statistical
- 7 disparities alone are not enough. You have to
- 8 take a functional view of the political process
- 9 and look to a holistic view of -- of how it is
- 10 actually affecting the voter on the ground.
- 11 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, those are a lot
- of words. I really don't understand what they
- 13 mean. But I -- I'm out of time. Thanks
- 14 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
- 15 Sotomayor.
- 16 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Counsel, I'd like
- 17 to return to a question that Justice Thomas
- 18 asked not of you, I don't believe, but more
- 19 generally, which is: how do you prove that a
- legislature acted with discriminatory intent,
- 21 assuming, as we must, that the legislature is
- 22 made up of individuals? And so, if you show
- only two or three of them have a discriminatory
- intent, how can you assume that the others do?
- MS. AMUNSON: Well, Your Honor, as

- 1 this Court has held in Arlington Heights and in
- 2 the cases applying it, what the plaintiffs must
- 3 do is show that discriminatory intent was a
- 4 motivating factor for the legislation.
- 5 And, here, I think the record was
- 6 abundantly clear, in fact, much more clear than
- 7 it normally is in such cases, that
- 8 discriminatory intent was a motivating factor
- 9 and that the entire purpose of introducing the
- 10 law by Senator Shooter was to attempt to keep
- 11 Hispanics in his district from voting and was
- 12 premised on far-fetched racial -- racially
- 13 tinged allegations that Latinos in the district
- were engaging in fraud with respect to ballot
- 15 collection.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Do you know
- 17 whether the -- can you remind me whether the
- 18 district court found that absent those -- those
- 19 two legislative motives, this law would not have
- 20 passed? Meaning --
- MS. AMUNSON: Sure.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- just -- the
- 23 Chief Justice pointed out that there are
- independent reasons for passing the ballot
- 25 collection limitations. Did the district court

- 1 actually look to determine that even if this was
- 2 a motivating factor, that the law would not have
- 3 passed without it?
- 4 MS. AMUNSON: Your Honor, the -- the
- 5 district court, because it found it was not a
- 6 motivating factor, did not reach that question,
- 7 but -- but, as the en banc court held, clearly,
- 8 discriminatory intent was a motivating factor.
- 9 And it used the district court's own
- 10 fact findings. The district court simply
- 11 minimized the importance of those findings.
- 12 They do show that discriminatory intent was a
- 13 motivating factor, and -- and, certainly, the
- 14 state did not meet its burden to show that the
- 15 law would -- would have been enacted absent
- 16 that.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Thank you,
- 18 counsel.
- 19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice Kagan.
- JUSTICE KAGAN: Ms. Amunson, the
- 21 longer this argument goes on, the less clear I
- 22 am as to how the parties' standards differ.
- So, if I understood what Mr. Carvin
- 24 said at argument, as opposed to what he said in
- 25 his brief, he said, of course, you should look

- 1 at demographic realities. He even said, you
- 2 know, it would be laughable not to look at
- 3 demographic realities on occasion.
- 4 And I bring you back to this
- 5 hypothetical question where black voters have
- 6 many fewer polling stations, even though that's
- 7 a completely neutral rule on its face, but the
- 8 way it operates is to make voting more difficult
- 9 for black voters than white voters and leave it
- 10 so that they -- the political system is not
- 11 equally open to their participation. And he
- 12 said, sure, you can -- you can look at that.
- 13 And, similarly, you talked about, like, the
- 14 practical evaluation of realities on the ground.
- So, I mean, tell me how you think
- 16 these things differ. And I guess, more
- 17 specifically -- I guess, when you start thinking
- about a whole run of hypotheticals, there are
- 19 some things that are really quite obvious
- 20 burdens which you just know looking at them is
- 21 going to lead to -- to real difficulty for
- 22 some -- you know, to black -- for black voters
- 23 or for Native American voters or for Latino
- voters, and then other restrictions where you
- 25 can say, well, you know, that's kind of an

- 1 inconvenience, but they could -- they could
- 2 overcome that inconvenience if -- if they really
- 3 wanted to.
- 4 So how -- how -- is -- is -- you
- 5 know, I guess what I'm saying, that there's a
- 6 spectrum of restrictions and a spectrum of the
- 7 effects that those restrictions cause. How are
- 8 we to think about that?
- 9 MS. AMUNSON: Well, Your Honor, as to
- 10 the -- Mr. Carvin's concession that the Court
- 11 needs to look to demographic realities, I -- I
- 12 find myself in agreement with him on that. And
- -- and as the Court has said in its -- its
- 14 Gingles and in its vote dilution jurisprudence,
- the essence of a Section 2 claim is looking to
- 16 how the state's practice interacts with social
- 17 and historical conditions to cause the
- 18 inequality.
- 19 And so, Your Honor, as to the kind of
- 20 spectrum of regulations, that's exactly what
- 21 Section 2 is meant for courts to do, to
- 22 undertake a functional inquiry into the totality
- 23 of the circumstances.
- 24 What I took Mr. Carvin's brief to be
- 25 saying, as opposed to what Mr. Carvin argued

- 1 here today, is that, in fact, so-called neutral
- time, place, and manner regulations don't even
- 3 implicate Section 2. That is, you don't even
- 4 get to get past the pleading stage if you come
- 5 in with -- and say this is simply a -- a neutral
- 6 time, place, and manner restriction.
- 7 Instead, what courts should be doing
- 8 is looking at how that restriction interacts
- 9 with the facts on the ground to see whether it
- is, in fact, causing a discriminatory burden on
- 11 minority voters. And, here, that's what the
- 12 court did and, in fact, found, that the
- out-of-precinct policy and the ballot collection
- law impose discriminatory burdens that are not
- justified by any legitimate state interests.
- JUSTICE KAGAN: Thank you,
- 17 Ms. Amunson.
- 18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
- 19 Gorsuch.
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Good morning,
- 21 Ms. Amunson. Would the State agree that -- or
- 22 would the Secretary of State agree that Arizona
- 23 could have a law saying we will not count
- 24 fraudulent ballots?
- MS. AMUNSON: In fact, Arizona does

- 1 have such a law, Your Honor, yes.
- 2 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Okay. And if -- if
- 3 that's the case, can the State also have some
- 4 laws that try to prevent fraud in balloting?
- 5 MS. AMUNSON: Certainly, Your Honor.
- 6 States have an interest in preventing fraud in
- 7 balloting. But, as this Court has recognized in
- 8 its campaign finance jurisprudence, when it is
- 9 acting to prevent fraud in balloting, a state
- 10 must actually have record evidence that there
- is, in fact, the danger that it is acting to
- 12 prevent. Here, there was no such danger.
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Okay. So -- so
- let's -- let's take the harvesting one, for
- 15 example. The -- you know, the district court
- 16 found that there was evidence available. The
- 17 Chief Justice has referred to the -- the
- 18 Carter-Baker Commission, and there was also
- 19 evidence, I believe, in the record of -- of
- 20 harvesting affecting -- fraudulent practices,
- 21 harvesting affecting at least one election
- 22 elsewhere. What about that is insufficient?
- MS. AMUNSON: Your Honor, with
- 24 respect, there was no such evidence of there
- 25 ever being any ballot collection fraud in

- 1 Arizona and --
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: I didn't say
- 3 Arizona. It was in another state.
- 4 MS. AMUNSON: Oh.
- 5 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Does Arizona have to
- 6 wait for fraud to occur in Arizona using a
- 7 practice --
- 8 MS. AMUNSON: No, Your Honor.
- 9 JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- before it can
- 10 outlaw it?
- MS. AMUNSON: No, Your Honor, but, as
- 12 this Court has said in its --
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Okay. So it doesn't
- 14 matter then -- you -- you agree it doesn't
- 15 matter that there -- harvesting hasn't resulted
- in fraud in Arizona. How many states, how many
- 17 elections does it need to affect out -- out of
- 18 state before Arizona can take cognizance of it
- 19 in its own state?
- MS. AMUNSON: Your Honor, what this
- 21 Court said is that when -- in McCutcheon, is
- that when a legislature takes a prophylactic
- 23 upon prophylactic approach, the courts should be
- 24 particularly diligent in scrutinizing the law.
- 25 And that should be just as true --

1	JUSTICE GORSUCH: I'm afraid that
2	yeah, I'm just asking, you know, how many
3	elections? What what would be enough in
4	in in the Secretary's view?
5	MS. AMUNSON: Well
6	JUSTICE GORSUCH: If it doesn't have
7	to happen in Arizona, how many states does it
8	have to happen in? How many elections?
9	MS. AMUNSON: Your Honor, to be clear,
10	Arizona already has a law prohibiting fraudulent
11	ballot collection. What this law does is it
12	criminalizes neighbors helping neighbors deliver
13	ballots with up to two years in jail and a
14	JUSTICE GORSUCH: But you can't
15	MS. AMUNSON: \$150,000 fine.
16	JUSTICE GORSUCH: counsel, I I
17	guess it's I'm just asking a pretty simple
18	question. You you you agree that some
19	prophylactics are allowed and that this
20	addresses a prophylactic issue that other states
21	have found to be problematic and and a
22	blue-ribbon commission found to be problematic.
23	How much more evidence what more
24	concretely would you require?
25	MS. AMUNSON: Your Honor, what I'm

- 1 saying is Arizona already has a law
- 2 preventing --
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: I understand what
- 4 you've said. I'm asking, how much more would
- 5 you require before Arizona could do -- do this?
- 6 Or are you saying it could never do this?
- 7 MS. AMUNSON: I am saying that
- 8 criminalizing non-fraudulent ballot collection
- 9 simply is -- does not get at the state's
- 10 interest in preventing fraud. And as with
- 11 respect to prophylactic restrictions, the
- 12 Court's inquiry should be at least as searching
- for restrictions on the ability to participate
- in the political process through voting as it is
- for restrictions on the political process
- 16 through spending money.
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Thank you.
- 18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
- 19 Kavanaugh.
- 20 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Thank you, Chief
- 21 Justice.
- 22 And good morning, Ms. Amunson. I want
- 23 to explore how we got here as a statutory matter
- and try to square up the statutory text and
- 25 common sense a bit. It seems like there are two

- 1 polar positions one could have reading different
- 2 parts of the statute.
- 3 So Section 2(a) speaks only of
- 4 results. That was the House bill, of course.
- 5 And that strongly supports a position that any
- 6 disproportionate impact would be problematic
- 7 under the statute. Of course, the Dole
- 8 compromise meant that Section 2(b) was added to
- 9 the statute, and that speaks of opportunity.
- 10 And a polar position on that would be,
- 11 as was suggested in Mr. Carvin's brief, that
- 12 time, place, and manner restrictions that are
- 13 race-neutral provide equal opportunity.
- But, as Justice Kagan pointed out,
- 15 just -- Mr. Carvin alluded to demographic
- 16 realities being relevant, the state attorney
- 17 general also talked about the totality of the
- 18 circumstances being relevant, and, of course, in
- 19 Section 2(b) -- refers to the totality of the
- 20 circumstances.
- So, to the extent we're not at either
- 22 polar position, we're between pure results and
- 23 pure opportunity, as defined in -- in
- 24 Mr. Carvin's brief at least, and we're in
- 25 totality of the circumstances, two -- two

- 1 circumstances that seem to make a difference as
- 2 a matter of common sense. One, as the Chief
- 3 Justice pointed out, when you have the
- 4 Carter-Baker Commission saying that a particular
- 5 state law is a good idea as a matter of policy,
- 6 that would seem to be a circumstance that is --
- 7 as a matter of common sense, would -- would lend
- 8 support to the state's rule.
- 9 And then, secondly, and I mentioned
- this earlier, when a state rule is commonplace
- in other states, that would seem to be a
- 12 circumstance that puts a thumb on the scale in
- favor of the legitimacy of the state rule and it
- 14 not being a reflection of discriminatory intent.
- 15 And, here, the out-of-precinct policy is in
- 16 something like 26 other states, including a wide
- variety of states, including states with no
- 18 history of discrimination.
- 19 So, if we get into totality of the
- 20 circumstances, why don't those two things
- 21 matter? And you can comment more generally on
- 22 how I've outlined this.
- MS. AMUNSON: Thank you, Your Honor.
- 24 Taking both policies in turn, it
- 25 certainly is relevant that policies are

- 1 commonplace. However, it doesn't give a state a
- 2 free pass just by saying this is a common
- 3 policy. Instead, you have to look at whether,
- 4 in fact, the policy is justified in that state.
- 5 And so, for example, with the out-of-precinct
- 6 policy, the state justifies it by saying that it
- 7 needs to maintain a precinct-based system.
- 8 But the reality in Arizona is that
- 9 75 percent of voters in the 2020 election voted
- in counties that do not use a precinct-based
- 11 system. And so that should cause a court to
- 12 question whether, in fact, such a policy is
- actually necessary or is, in fact, doing
- 14 something else which is disenfranchising
- 15 minority voters.
- 16 Second, with respect to the ballot
- 17 collection statute, again, Arizona had a 25-year
- 18 history of literally not a single instance of
- 19 fraud with ballot collection. It already has a
- 20 statute that criminalizes ballot collection.
- 21 And it -- the way that the policy will operate
- on the ground will be to disenfranchise Native
- 23 American and Hispanic voters. So --
- 24 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
- 25 Barrett.

1 MS. AMUNSON: -- again, that it is 2 commonplace doesn't give the state a pass. You still have to look --3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: 4 Justice 5 Barrett. 6 JUSTICE BARRETT: Secretary -- Ms. --7 let's see. Sorry, I got distracted by the run-on there. 8 So, Ms. Amunson, I want to ask you a 9 question about the degree of, say, inconvenience 10 11 versus burden, because one of the difficulties 12 in this case is that, you know, the attorney 13 general says that the burden has to be 14 substantial, Mr. Carvin's talking about the 15 ordinary burdens of voting. And there's a 16 difficulty that, you know, the statutory 17 language and its lack of clarity presents in 18 trying to figure out when something crosses from 19 an inconvenience to a burden. 20 You know, on the other side -- and I 21 think some of the hypotheticals that Justice 2.2 Alito was asking you emphasized this -- I think, 23 you know, your position and its emphasis on any 24 disparity at all risks saying that any election

rule, you know, which, as Judge Easterbrook

- 1 pointed out in his Frank opinion, you know, all
- 2 election rules are going to make it easier for
- 3 some to vote than others.
- 4 So your approach risks ruling them all
- 5 out. So let me give you an example. What about
- 6 a rule that the polls close at 7 p.m. and
- 7 because of socioeconomic reasons, it's harder
- 8 for minority voters to get to the poll spot
- 9 before 7 p.m. because of the time, you know, of
- 10 their work hours in the day?
- 11 Is that the kind of burden that
- 12 triggers Section 2? Would that -- would such a
- 13 rule -- poll closure rule, would that violate
- 14 Section 2?
- MS. AMUNSON: Your Honor, no, I don't
- 16 believe so. And -- and, again, though, Your
- 17 Honor, you would look to the actual facts on the
- 18 ground. And as I said to Justice Alito, a
- 19 statistical disparity, that is not enough.
- 20 Instead, you would have to see whether, in fact,
- 21 on the ground this is acting to actually cause
- less opportunity for minority voters.
- JUSTICE BARRETT: But I'm telling you
- it is, that because of socioeconomic conditions
- and the hours that minorities work, you know,

- 1 that is the cause of their not being able to get
- 2 to the polls during hours that the polls are
- 3 open.
- 4 MS. AMUNSON: Well, again, Your Honor,
- 5 one would have to make out a case that -- that
- 6 those -- those minority voters had no other
- 7 alternatives of voting. If one was able to do
- 8 that, then, in fact, you may be able to show --
- 9 JUSTICE BARRETT: But I thought that
- 10 your position was that you look at it on a
- 11 regulation-by-regulation basis, not the system
- as a whole, so that it didn't matter if there
- were other alternatives, the question whether
- 14 this alternative --
- MS. AMUNSON: Your Honor --
- 16 JUSTICE BARRETT: -- would reduce
- 17 opportunities --
- MS. AMUNSON: -- our position is that
- 19 you should consider the -- the regulations in
- 20 the context of -- of the system as a whole.
- 21 However, you can't simply excuse one
- 22 discriminatory practice by saying that there are
- 23 others.
- So, for example, to say to a Native
- 25 American voter who lives on a reservation 45

- 1 miles from the post office that --
- JUSTICE BARRETT: Okay. But you're
- 3 changing my hypothetical. I want you to explain
- 4 why my hypothetical doesn't fail your test.
- 5 MS. AMUNSON: Your Honor, under our
- 6 test, you would have to show that the voter, in
- 7 fact, has less ability to vote, that the -- that
- 8 the policy is a but-for cause of that lesser
- 9 ability to vote, and that there -- you would
- 10 consider the totality of the circumstances,
- including, in particular, the state's
- 12 justification. The courts --
- JUSTICE BARRETT: Okay, thank you.
- MS. AMUNSON: -- always have strong
- 15 justifications in ending elections by -- by a
- 16 reasonable time.
- 17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: A minute to
- 18 wrap up, counsel.
- MS. AMUNSON: Thank you, Your Honor.
- 20 As this Court has repeatedly said, no
- 21 right is more precious in a democracy than the
- 22 right to vote and to have that vote counted.
- 23 That is what Section 2 protects.
- 24 Petitioners have pejoratively called
- 25 Section 2 a one-way ratchet, but, in a

- democracy, we should actually want to ratchet up
- 2 participation so that every eligible citizen who
- 3 wants to vote can do so. Candidates and parties
- 4 should be trying to win over voters on the basis
- of their ideas, not trying to remove voters from
- 6 the electorate by imposing unjustified and
- 7 discriminatory burdens.
- 8 Unfortunately, Petitioners have made
- 9 clear that that is not their vision of
- 10 democracy. Indeed, Mr. Carvin's clients frankly
- 11 admitted to this Court in their briefing that
- they are here because they view enforcement of
- 13 the Voting Rights Act as a "injury to their
- 14 electoral prospects."
- 15 Secretary Hobbs submits that the real
- injury here is to the Native American, Latino,
- 17 and black citizens of Arizona whose right to
- 18 vote has been denied or abridged by the
- 19 out-of-precinct policy and the criminalization
- of neighbors helping neighbors deliver their
- 21 ballots.
- We ask the Court to affirm the
- 23 judgment below.
- 24 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
- 25 counsel.

1	Mr. Spiva.
2	ORAL ARGUMENT OF BRUCE V. SPIVA
3	ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS DNC, ET AL.
4	MR. SPIVA: Thank you, Mr. Chief
5	Justice, and may it please the Court:
6	The Ninth Circuit applied the correct
7	test to determine that Arizona's policy of
8	entirely disenfranchising voters who cast
9	out-of-precinct ballots and its criminal ban on
LO	non-fraudulent ballot collection violates
L1	Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
L2	The test is rooted in the plain text
L3	of Section 2, clear congressional intent, and
L4	this Court's long-standing precedents. It has
L5	proven workable over many years in vote denial
L6	cases in the circuit courts.
L7	This test has resulted neither in the
L8	rejection of all manner of common-sense voting
L9	regulations nor in the impermissible
20	consideration of race in the adoption of voting
21	laws. Far from it.
22	Using this test, courts have done the
23	intensely localized analysis called for by the
24	Act and have struck laws only with clear
5	discriminatory effects Applying the right

- 1 test, the Ninth Circuit also reached the correct
- 2 result in this case.
- 4 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Counsel, I
- 5 want to touch on an issue that Justice Sotomayor
- 6 raised with -- with your friend about
- 7 legislative intent.
- 8 Let's say that you have 49 legislators
- 9 who speak and give good reasons for adopting,
- 10 say, a law against ballot harvesting. They --
- 11 they quote the Carter-Baker Commission, 49 of
- the legislatures don't say anything, legislators
- don't say anything at all, and two legislators
- 14 have a clear racial motivation. And the law
- 15 passes 80 to 20.
- Was race a motivating factor in that
- case so that the legislation would be suspect?
- MR. SPIVA: Probably not, Your Honor,
- 19 assuming that in your hypothetical that only the
- 20 two were motivated by race and that did not
- 21 infect any of the other members.
- What we have here in this record,
- 23 though, Your Honor, is -- is far from that. It
- 24 is a careful application of this Court's test in
- 25 Arlington Heights that looked at not only --

1 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, I 2 thought -- I thought the evidence of racial 3 intent was really quite limited in this case. 4 MR. SPIVA: It's actually well beyond what you normally have, Your Honor. Not only 5 6 did you have the pervasive influence of Senator 7 Shooter, but also you had the LaFaro video that 8 was widely played, as the district court found, and that was --9 10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, what --11 MR. SPIVA: -- wasn't going to be --12 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: -- how many -how many -- how much evidence did you have? 13 14 it -- is there any evidence of other legislators 15 other than Mr. Shooter? 16 MR. SPIVA: Well, yes, Your Honor. 17 There -- there was -- there was evidence that, in terms of the history of the -- of the -- of 18 19 the Act that a precursor bill was withdrawn when the DOJ asked for additional information, 20 declined to preclear it until it could get 21 additional information. 2.2 23 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, with 24 respect to this -- this legislation, you know, 25 the only racial motivation I -- I thought on the

- 1 record was Mr. Shooter, one of the legislators.
- MR. SPIVA: No, Your Honor, that's not
- 3 accurate. I -- I think in each of these prongs
- 4 of the Arlington Heights test that look at the
- 5 circumstantial and direct evidence that's
- 6 available, there -- there were several things
- 7 that indicated a racial motivation. One was Mr.
- 8 Shooter, but also there was the LaFaro video.
- 9 Also, there was the sequence event -- of events
- 10 that started with the DOJ --
- 11 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you.
- 12 MR. SPIVA: -- declining to preclear
- 13 --
- 14 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
- 15 counsel.
- 16 Justice Thomas.
- 17 JUSTICE THOMAS: Thank you, Mr. Chief
- 18 Justice.
- 19 Counsel, the -- again, the legislative
- intent is interesting, and I don't know how much
- 21 weight we should put on it, but the -- the Ninth
- 22 Circuit did put somewhat -- some weight on that.
- I'm wondering how you would analyze
- 24 that if, in addition to what was said that was
- 25 somewhat of a pejorative nature about

- 1 minorities, if someone said the opposite or
- 2 something similar or countervailing about
- 3 whites, and you had both sets of pejoratives in
- 4 the legislative history, how would you analyze
- 5 that and how would it change the way you would
- 6 analyze this case?
- 7 MR. SPIVA: I -- I'm -- I'm not sure
- 8 that it would make a difference, Your Honor. I
- 9 guess it would depend on what -- what was said
- and what role, if any, it played in the passage
- of the legislation, because, as this Court has
- 12 held in -- in Arlington Heights, determining
- whether racial motivation was a factor, doesn't
- 14 have to be the only factor, but a factor in the
- passage of the Act is not simply a question of
- 16 counting heads or -- or -- or statements.
- 17 Oftentimes there are -- there are no
- 18 discriminatory statements available, and yet the
- 19 Court has -- has said that the way to determine
- 20 whether racial discrimination is at work as a
- 21 motivating factor is to analyze the Arlington
- 22 Heights factors because often, in this day and
- 23 age, the circumstantial evidence of that is all
- that's available.
- 25 Here is one of these extraordinary

- 1 cases where you actually have, in addition to a
- wealth of -- of circumstantial evidence,
- 3 actually direct evidence of -- of racial
- 4 motivation at work.
- 5 JUSTICE THOMAS: The -- there have
- 6 been some questions raised about the RNC roles
- 7 or participation in this case. If there are
- 8 doubts about the RNC, if those prevail, should
- 9 that also undermine your standing in this case
- 10 too?
- MR. SPIVA: No, Your Honor. The DNC
- and the other plaintiffs' standing rests on
- organizational standing principles because they
- 14 have to expend resources in order to overcome
- 15 the discriminatory effects of these laws.
- 16 Their -- their constituents and
- 17 members are also impacted because it makes it
- 18 harder at least and sometimes result -- results
- 19 in the denial of their vote.
- The RNC's standing, as I understand it
- 21 from their briefing, is that if this -- if the
- 22 ruling stands, that -- that more minorities who
- 23 will vote for Democrats -- and this -- I'm
- 24 taking the view of their -- of their brief --
- 25 will -- will vote against them.

1 And that's not a cognizable interest, 2 trying to -- a concern that more people will be 3 able to vote and it's because you don't like the way they're going to vote. 4 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice 5 6 Breyer. 7 JUSTICE THOMAS: Thank you. JUSTICE BREYER: Listen, because I --8 9 I just appreciate your comments. You've 10 listened to the same argument I have here, and 11 it seems to me lots of the parties on both sides 12 are pretty close on the standards. 13 So you take the Title VII or these 14 other title standards. You might have to modify 15 it a little. I think you do have to use the 16 word "significant" harm because you have to out 17 -- you have to some way or other get rid of this happening just by chance. Maybe you'd say it 18 19 was reasonably foreseeable that minorities would 20 be impacted negatively. 21 And there's room there for, who has 22 the burden of proof of showing that there's a 23 justification? And there's a question about the extent to which non-race-based tradition would 24 25 count as a justification.

1	Now any comments you want to make are
2	welcome. Any additions to what I'm seeing as
3	open areas or not, any comment?
4	MR. SPIVA: Yes, Your Honor. I I
5	think there is not a lot of daylight between
6	what we think the the the statute and the
7	legislative history and this Court's precedents
8	require in terms of a standard and say the
9	Stephanopoulos, I think, principle that Your
LO	Honor has asked about. I do think that the
L1	the existing standard that has been applied in a
L2	number of cases over the last several years in
L3	vote denial cases does generally does look at
L4	the magnitude. It doesn't require it as a
L5	threshold matter, and it shouldn't, but but
L6	most of the cases where plaintiffs have
L7	prevailed have actually found a significant
L8	disparity, as the Ninth Circuit found here.
L9	And and and that that the
20	state's interest comes into consideration under
21	the tenuousness factor under the totality of the
22	circumstances, that's that's an appropriate
23	thing to look at and should be looked at and was
24	looked at here, and and what the Ninth
25	Circuit found was that really the state did not

- 1 have a justifiable interest in -- in continuing
- 2 these policies.
- 3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice Alito.
- 4 JUSTICE BREYER: Thank you.
- 5 JUSTICE ALITO: I -- I think what
- 6 concerns me is that your position is going to
- 7 make every voting rule vulnerable to attack
- 8 under Section 2 to the same extent that the
- 9 out-of-precinct policy is -- was found to -- to
- 10 violate Section 2 by the Ninth Circuit, because
- 11 people who are poor and less well educated on
- 12 balance probably will find it more difficult to
- comply with just about every voting rule than do
- 14 people who are more affluent and have had the
- 15 benefit of more education.
- 16 Explain to me why that is not so.
- 17 Will it not be possible to show with respect to
- just about every voting rule that there is the
- 19 kind of statistical disparity that was shown
- 20 with respect to out-of-precinct voting and that
- 21 the disparity was caused by the same
- 22 socioeconomic factors that you would say were
- 23 sufficient here?
- MR. SPIVA: Yes. It -- it won't
- 25 result and it hasn't resulted, Your Honor -- we

- 1 -- we don't have to project or --
- JUSTICE ALITO: No, not -- not whether
- 3 it has up to this point. This is a new area of
- 4 litigation. Tell -- explain to me why it will
- 5 not result in that.
- 6 MR. SPIVA: Well, but this -- the
- 7 standard that we support, Your Honor, has been
- 8 applied in numerous cases over the last decade,
- 9 and I'll give you an example.
- 10 Voter ID. In the League versus
- 11 Virginia State Board of Elections case, voter ID
- was -- was upheld there because the Court found
- that there wasn't a disparate impact because the
- 14 state provided free IDs in that context. Again,
- using the totality of the circumstances test,
- 16 came to the conclusion that voter ID in Virginia
- 17 was -- was -- was permissible and Section
- 18 2 didn't require it to be struck down.
- 19 Compare that to the Fifth Circuit in
- 20 Veasey, found --
- JUSTICE ALITO: All right. Thank you.
- 22 My -- my time is up. Thank you.
- 23 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
- 24 Sotomayor.
- 25 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Counsel, should

- 1 there be a different burden between changing a
- 2 long-established voting requirement and imposing
- a new one? Let's go back to the two questions
- 4 -- the two practices at issue here.
- 5 The out-of-precinct voting is not a
- 6 new law. It's always been in effect. And so
- 7 where is that fact considered in the totality of
- 8 circumstances as you define it? And I have an
- 9 easier time understanding how the ballot
- 10 collection is a change in law and one in which
- the information provided to the legislature and
- 12 the voters -- a lot of it was racially tinged
- 13 and false, correct?
- MR. SPIVA: That's correct, Your
- 15 Honor.
- 16 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: All right. So
- 17 answer -- tell me how those factors get
- 18 considered in your -- in your views.
- 19 MR. SPIVA: Yes. I -- I think that it
- 20 is part of the consideration. I think where
- 21 you're talking about adding a new method of
- voting, that that is very different from taking
- 23 away a method of voting that people have come --
- 24 minority people have come to rely upon because
- 25 the text speaks in terms of abridging a right to

- 1 vote, i.e., to shortening, lessen, taking
- 2 something away.
- 3 So I think a -- I think a plaintiff
- 4 would have a harder time in -- in -- in the
- 5 general case advocating for a new rule, some of
- 6 the hypotheticals about adding additional days
- 7 of early voting and the like. I think --
- 8 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So why don't you
- 9 have --
- 10 MR. SPIVA: -- you know, in terms of
- 11 the --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- why don't you
- have the difficulty of that burden with respect
- 14 to the out-of-precinct voting here? That's been
- around, working imperfectly, but it's been
- 16 around for a long time.
- 17 MR. SPIVA: Right. And that --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So what makes --
- 19 MR. SPIVA: -- and then some --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- what makes your
- 21 circumstances compelling enough to justify its
- 22 appearance?
- MR. SPIVA: Right. And that -- and
- 24 that, of course, is a -- is a standard that has
- resulted in the denial of the vote, and it has

- 1 been around for -- for a long time. So I think
- 2 that's -- that's one difference.
- But -- but, secondly, I think the pass
- 4 -- the passage of time here cuts the other way
- 5 because where as -- as there may have at one
- 6 time before such things as electronic poll books
- 7 and the like that -- that made it necessary
- 8 perhaps to -- to disenfranchise people if they
- 9 voted in the wrong precinct, as the Secretary
- 10 has stated and as the record reflects here,
- 11 there is no longer any such justification for
- 12 entirely disenfranchising people if they go to
- 13 the wrong precinct --
- 14 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice Kagan.
- MR. SPIVA: -- considering that --
- JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Spiva, you -- you
- 17 -- you spoke with Justice Breyer about the
- 18 Stephanopoulos test. I would like to ask you
- 19 about the old SG test. If -- if you look at the
- 20 SG brief that was filed in this case, what do
- 21 you think is right with what the SG said and
- 22 what do you think is wrong with it?
- MR. SPIVA: Well, I -- I -- what I
- think was wrong with it, which is a little bit
- 25 easier for me to -- to answer, is the proximate

- 1 cause standard that they were advocating, which,
- 2 essentially, as I read it, was saying that you
- 3 shouldn't consider the Senate factors in the --
- 4 in the totality of the circumstances, that
- 5 essentially that the -- the challenged standard
- 6 of practice by itself must have caused the
- 7 disparity, and I think the -- the problem
- 8 with that is that it essentially would immunize
- 9 any voting rule, including literacy tests, that
- were not either facially or intentionally
- 11 discriminatory.
- 12 A literacy test does not in itself,
- despite what my distinguished colleague on the
- other side said, stop anybody from voting. If
- 15 you pass the test, you can vote. Everybody has
- 16 an equal opportunity on its face to pass the
- 17 test.
- 18 And this Court actually in Lassiter v.
- 19 Northampton actually said that literacy tests
- 20 were okay prior to the -- the passage of the --
- 21 the Voting Rights Act. The problem is that
- 22 because of discrimination in education and
- opportunity, it has a disparate impact on racial
- 24 minorities.
- 25 JUSTICE KAGAN: And what's -- what's

- 1 right with it? What don't you disagree with?
- 2 MR. SPIVA: Well, I -- I think that
- 3 they maintain the position they maintained at
- 4 the Ninth Circuit, that there shouldn't be some
- 5 arbitrary threshold requirement in the test,
- 6 that you show that a certain number of -- of --
- 7 of minorities were disenfranchised before the
- 8 court proceeds to analyze under the totality of
- 9 the circumstances whether it's a prohibited
- 10 discriminatory result.
- 11 JUSTICE KAGAN: Thank you.
- 12 MR. SPIVA: I think that's right.
- 13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
- 14 Gorsuch.
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Good morning,
- 16 Mr. Spiva. Did you have a chance to comment on
- 17 the Solicitor General's causation test? What do
- 18 you think of that?
- 19 MR. SPIVA: Well, they -- they
- 20 advocated -- they, of course, have withdrawn it,
- 21 the proximate causation. And I think that
- 22 that's wrong because I think but -- but-for
- 23 causation is the appropriate standard, as this
- 24 Court said in the Bostock case, that but-for
- 25 causation is -- is the -- is the

- 1 appropriate standard.
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Well, the law
- 3 sometimes uses proximate cause and other times
- 4 it uses but-for cause. That was a Title VII
- 5 case. This is obviously a Section 2 case.
- 6 Any -- any thoughts on why a proximate
- 7 cause test would be inappropriate given the
- 8 language of the statute?
- 9 MR. SPIVA: Yes, Your Honor, because
- 10 the -- the -- the statute and the
- 11 legislative history as well call for a totality
- of the circumstances inquiry, which -- which
- 13 requires evaluating whether the standard --
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Well, what evidence
- 15 you use to -- is one question and what -- what
- 16 test you apply that evidence against is another.
- 17 So I'm not sure that that explains it.
- 18 MR. SPIVA: Well --
- 19 JUSTICE GORSUCH: What explains the
- 20 need for a but-for rather than a proximate cause
- 21 test --
- MR. SPIVA: As I --
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- as opposed to
- 24 what evidence you look at?
- MR. SPIVA: As I understand the

- 1 proximate cause standard that the SG was
- 2 advocating for and that Petitioners still are,
- 3 it would not look to any interacting factors to
- 4 establish, i.e., the Senate factors, to
- 5 establish the causal link between the disparate
- 6 impact and race.
- 7 And I think that is countertextual and
- 8 -- and -- and -- and would -- would
- 9 actually inappropriately limit the prohibition
- of Section 2 only to those circumstances where
- 11 the standard was discriminatory in -- in intent
- 12 or facially discriminatory.
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Thank you.
- 14 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
- 15 Kavanaugh.
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Good morning,
- 17 counsel. Section 2's language is elusive in the
- 18 wake of the Dole compromise, which created
- 19 murkiness because it was a compromise that
- 20 generated then overwhelming support in Congress
- 21 and from President Reagan, but the statute after
- the Dole compromise, I think you agree, creates
- 23 something of a gray area between a pure results
- and pure opportunity.
- 25 And you look at the totality of the

- 1 circumstances, several counsel have said,
- 2 including, I think you said, the Senate factors.
- 3 One of those factors is, is there a good
- 4 justification for these rules?
- 5 And then, on the ballot collection,
- 6 I'm going to repeat the question, you have the
- 7 Carter-Baker recommendation. On the
- 8 out-of-precinct, you have it being commonplace
- 9 in other states. That on its face, at least to
- 10 me, suggests a strong justification for doing
- 11 these rules. How does that weigh in the balance
- in your view?
- MR. SPIVA: Well, two things, Your
- 14 Honor. The Carter-Baker Report was not
- something that the legislature here considered.
- 16 And -- and even the recommendations of the
- 17 Carter-Baker Report was not based on any
- 18 evidence of -- of -- of ballot collection fraud
- 19 anywhere in the country. The legislature -- and
- 20 the district court found this -- had no evidence
- of voter fraud, not only in Arizona, but
- 22 anywhere in the country at the time that it
- 23 passed the criminal ballot collection ban.
- In terms of it being commonplace in
- other states, I do think you have to look to the

- 1 context. It's -- it is relevant, but there are
- 2 also more states that actually permit some form
- 3 of ballot collection than don't. And so I think
- 4 what the --
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: I mean,
- 6 out-of-precinct is common in other states,
- 7 correct, 26 states?
- 8 MR. SPIVA: Well, but also 20 -- at
- 9 least 20 partially count out-of-precinct
- 10 ballots, and so you have to do the intensely
- 11 localized analysis, to use this Court's phrase,
- 12 in -- in the jurisdiction.
- 13 And -- and when you do that in
- 14 Arizona, you find that there -- that Arizona
- moves its precincts around a lot, that it
- 16 locates them further from minority households
- 17 than from white households, that there are all
- 18 these factors at -- at work in Arizona in
- 19 particular that make -- that cause the policy to
- 20 be discriminatory --
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Thank you,
- 22 counsel.
- MR. SPIVA: -- and have a
- 24 discriminatory --
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Thank you.

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1 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
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- 2 Barrett.
- JUSTICE BARRETT: Mr. Spiva, I want to
- 4 pick up where you left off with Justice
- 5 Kavanaugh. You said there were a number of
- 6 factors in Arizona that caused the
- 7 out-of-precinct policy to discriminate on the
- 8 basis of race, including, you know, the fact
- 9 that Arizona changes its precincts often.
- 10 Let's assume that we adopt a but-for
- 11 standard of causation, as you propose. I want
- to ask you a question that Judge O'Scannlain
- raised in his dissent to the Ninth Circuit's en
- 14 banc decision, which is why isn't it the
- 15 precinct system itself rather than the policy of
- 16 discounting votes that causes the disparity?
- 17 Because, as you described it, it's the fact that
- 18 the, you know, precincts change, the locations
- move around, but you've expressly disavowed any
- 20 challenge to the precinct policy itself, am I
- 21 right?
- MR. SPIVA: Well, we -- we have
- 23 challenged -- the reason -- to answer your
- 24 question directly, the -- the -- but -- the
- 25 reason that we challenged and the reason it's

- 1 the but-for cause, the -- the policy of not
- 2 counting the votes is that is what causes
- 3 minority groups to be disenfranchised by two to
- 4 one --
- 5 JUSTICE BARRETT: But it's not --
- 6 MR. SPIVA: -- by the policy.
- JUSTICE BARRETT: -- what causes them,
- 8 as opposed to the ballot collection, where the
- 9 argument is the inability to vote by relying on
- 10 a third party actually reduces the opportunity
- 11 to vote.
- 12 Here, it's not the -- the discounting
- of the votes. It's the inability to locate and
- show up at the right precinct that causes the
- 15 disparity, correct?
- 16 MR. SPIVA: Well, but the -- but the
- 17 result -- what causes the result is the fact
- 18 that Arizona doesn't partially count those
- 19 ballots. I don't -- I don't quarrel at all with
- 20 the -- the fact that Arizona's practices
- 21 contribute to that, and that is -- that was and
- is part of our -- our challenge.
- But -- but the -- the claim, though,
- is focused on the practice that causes not only
- an abridgement but actually the outright denial

- of the right to vote in this case.
- JUSTICE BARRETT: Okay. Thank you,
- 3 counsel.
- 4 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Mr. Spiva, a
- 5 minute to wrap up.
- 6 MR. SPIVA: Thank you, Mr. Chief
- 7 Justice.
- 8 This Court said in Shelby County that
- 9 Section 2 remained as a permanent nationwide ban
- 10 on voting discrimination, and the Court
- 11 acknowledged that voting discrimination still
- 12 exists. No one doubts this.
- This is proven not just an accurate
- description of the times in 2013 but also
- 15 prophetic. More voting restrictions have been
- 16 enacted over the last decade than at any point
- 17 since the end of Jim Crow.
- The last three months have seen an
- 19 even greater uptick in proposed voting
- 20 restrictions, many aimed squarely at the
- 21 minority groups whose participation Congress
- 22 intended to protect.
- 23 Rigorous and fair enforcement of
- 24 Section 2 is as critical to the protection of
- 25 minority voting rights today as it was when

- 1 Congress passed the 1982 amendment. The test
- 2 used by the majority of circuits has not
- 3 undermined a large swath of neutral voting
- 4 restrictions. Rather, it has been used to
- 5 carefully review and, where necessary, strike
- 6 down discriminatory voting laws.
- 7 Thank you.
- 8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Mr. Carvin,
- 9 rebuttal.
- 10 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF MICHAEL A. CARVIN
- ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS IN 19-1258
- 12 MR. CARVIN: Thank you, Mr. Chief
- 13 Justice.
- I think the colloquy makes clear that
- we're the only people who are providing a clear
- 16 rule that can be applied by the lower courts.
- 17 To clarify, any ambiguity in this, both at
- argument and in our brief, we've been making the
- 19 same argument. Does the voting system provide
- 20 different opportunities to minorities than it
- does to non-minorities? Has the voting system
- 22 stacked the deck to favor non-minorities?
- 23 If it hasn't, if it doesn't treat
- 24 minority neighborhoods differently than
- 25 non-minority neighborhoods, then there's no

- 1 problem. If it does, that's what gets at it.
- Now figuring out whether there's this
- 3 kind of differential treatment, you need to look
- 4 at population or, stated differently,
- 5 demographic reality. One precinct with five
- 6 people in it is quite different than one polling
- 7 place with 5,000 people in it because the latter
- 8 has much less opportunity.
- 9 But, if there's no differential
- 10 treatment of that kind, socioeconomic factors,
- 11 contribution to minorities' ability to utilize
- 12 that same opportunity is irrelevant.
- Finally, I want to get back to the
- 14 colloquy that Justice Alito was having with Mr.
- 15 Spiva. Given the ubiquity of socioeconomic
- disparities, this would clearly put states in a
- 17 straightjacket. This case brilliantly
- 18 illustrates that.
- 19 They claim that there's a lot of
- 20 problem for minorities to get to precincts
- 21 relative to non-minorities. What does Arizona
- 22 do? Has this free mail system for 27 days
- that's utilized by 80 percent of the people, the
- 24 very system that the DNC went around the country
- advocating as an expansion of the franchise.

1	Now we're told that a mail system
2	somehow discriminates against minorities, which
3	is completely untrue under the facts. But the
4	only fact you need to know is anybody whose
5	ballot is harvested received the ballot through
6	the mail. This is all people who have already
7	got the ballots, and they're picked up after
8	they're voted.
9	Well, how did they get the ballots?
10	They received them through the mail. So, for
11	that reason, the district court was quite
12	correct to hold that there's no connection
13	between access to mail and the need for ballot
14	harvesting. They couldn't produce a single
15	voter who said it was more difficult to vote
16	without ballot harvesting.
17	Same thing in terms of precincts. The
18	notion that socioeconomic disparities make it
19	difficult to find a precinct has nothing to do
20	with this case because everybody involved here
21	found a precinct. They simply found the wrong
22	precinct. So transportation and work schedules
23	had no inhibiting effect on minorities.
24	And, finally, of course, they didn't
25	challenge the arrangement of precingts. The

_	court round at borne Appendix 330 precincts are
2	no harder to find. And, indeed, plaintiffs'
3	expert at Joint Appendix 109 said that precincts
4	were closer to Latinos in Maricopa County than
5	to non-minorities.
6	Thank you.
7	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
8	counsel. The case is submitted.
9	(Whereupon, at 11:54 a.m., the case
10	was submitted.)
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yards [2] **72**:15,16 year [1] **69**:10 years [4] **64**:24 **85**:13 **95**:15 **102**:

Z

zero [1] 38:2