1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
2	x
3	KELLOGG BROWN & ROOT :
4	SERVICES, INC., ET AL., :
5	Petitioners : No. 12-1497
6	v. :
7	UNITED STATES, EX REL. :
8	BENJAMIN CARTER. :
9	x
LO	Washington, D.C.
L1	Tuesday, January 13, 2015
L2	
L3	The above-entitled matter came on for oral
L 4	argument before the Supreme Court of the United States
L5	at 11:11 a.m.
L 6	APPEARANCES:
L7	JOHN P. ELWOOD, ESQ., Washington, D.C.; on behalf of
L8	Petitioners.
L9	DAVID S. STONE, ESQ., Short Hills, N.J.; on behalf of
20	Respondent.
21	MALCOLM L. STEWART, ESQ., Deputy Solicitor General,
22	Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; on behalf of
23	United States, as amicus curiae, supporting
24	Respondent.
25	

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1	PROCEEDINGS
2	(11:11 a.m.)
3	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We'll hear argument
4	next in Case 12-1497, Kellogg Brown & Root Services v.
5	United States, Ex Rel. Benjamin Carter.
6	Mr. Elwood.
7	ORAL ARGUMENT OF JOHN P. ELWOOD
8	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
9	MR. ELWOOD: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
10	please the Court:
11	By clearing the way for relator to file a
12	fifth identical False Claims Act complaint against KBR,
13	raising allegations the government had long known from
14	other sources, the court below erred in two respects.
15	First, the plain text and and history of
16	the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act confirmed that
17	it applies exclusively to crimes. The language of the
18	provision tolls limitations limitations periods
19	for offenses at the on the very day that that
20	provision went into effect.
21	A neighboring provision, a nearby provision,
22	of Title 18 divided offenses into two categories,
23	felonies and misdemeanors, both plainly applying to
24	crimes. A neighboring provision, also of Title 18,

divided offenses between capital offenses and noncapital

25

- 1 offenses, again, referring solely to crimes. And it is
- 2 very telling that in 857 dual-column pages of Title 18,
- 3 neither the government nor relator has been able to
- 4 identify any provision that uses the word "offense" to
- 5 refer to a civil violation.
- 6 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Is it unusual that a
- 7 criminal statute of limitations would be much longer
- 8 than a civil statute of limitations, which is the effect
- 9 of your argument?
- 10 MR. ELWOOD: I don't think it is
- 11 necessarily. I mean, it depends on what exactly
- 12 Congress is trying to attempt. And it reflects some of
- 13 the differences between how criminal law is prosecuted
- 14 and civil law is prosecuted, because recall that
- 15 Congress did -- it has its separate provision for
- 16 recognizing that the False Claims Act may be hard to
- 17 investigate at times, and it provided a discovery
- 18 mechanism there that doesn't apply to relators, it only
- 19 applies to the government, a three-year discovery period
- 20 with a ten-year backstop.
- 21 JUSTICE SCALIA: Didn't some states used to
- 22 have no statute for -- for murder, and yet had a statute
- 23 of limitations on wrongful death claims? I think
- 24 that's -- that's the case, with respect to state law,
- anyway.

- 1 MR. ELWOOD: But I think it all kind of
- 2 reflects the kind of differences between criminal law
- 3 and civil law, because the minute a complaint is filed
- 4 -- I mean, most of the investigation, especially for
- 5 relators -- they don't have any legal status to conduct
- 6 investigations. They don't -- they can't bring
- 7 subpoenas. So usually it's based on their own
- 8 knowledge. They file a complaint, they come into court,
- 9 and then they have the Federal rules. Also at that
- 10 point, the government gets a 60-day period to
- 11 investigate, which is, on average, 13 months, according
- 12 to the Chamber of Commerce brief. It cites a letter
- 13 from the DOJ to the Senate. And in our own experience,
- 14 and in this case, it is usually a couple of years.
- And during that time they have, you know,
- 16 all the time they want to investigate. So I think it
- 17 just reflects the fact that criminal litigation and
- 18 civil litigation are conducted differently.
- 19 But clearly Congress already contemplated
- 20 how to handle delays under the False Claims Act, and it
- 21 enacted a civil provision for that under the FCA. And
- 22 so I don't think the Court needs to import in this
- 23 general provision which applies only to offenses to
- 24 address the False Claims Act situation that Congress has
- 25 already specifically addressed.

1	Now, all parties agree that the Wartime
2	Suspension Act began its life as a criminal provision,
3	an exclusively and explicitly criminal provision. The
4	only question is whether Congress changed it along the
5	way to make it civil.
6	The thing that the relators point to is the
7	deletion in 1944 of the words "now indictable," but that
8	went unremarked in Congress, and you would expect
9	somebody to say something if they were fundamentally
10	transforming the nature of the statute. And that's not
11	what people understood those words "now indictable" to
12	mean at that time, if you look at if you look at the
13	other things that were around it at the time.
14	Like, for example, 47 days after the first
15	Wartime Suspension Act was enacted, Congress for
16	crimes, and all agreed it was for crimes they also
17	enacted an antitrust suspension act which didn't use the
18	word "offenses." It used the word "violations." And it
19	said "now indictable" or "subject to civil proceedings,"
20	which shows that what was going on in that clause was
21	about the "now." The it was to tell you that it
22	applies to things that came before this. And
23	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Were you adopting the
24	argument of the New England Foundation, the amici brief?
25	MR. ELWOOD: That is yes, we made that

- 1 argument, I think, in our brief as well, but I think that they did a
- 2 more full-throated version. And also, NDIA did a
- 3 more full-throated version of that. But yes, I think
- 4 that it was -- the purpose of that was to say it
- 5 was applied to things before the date of enactment and
- 6 hadn't yet been barred.
- 7 And that was one of the other things -- I
- 8 mean, if you look at what this Court said about that
- 9 language in McElvain, it said that that was to -- to say
- 10 that the statute of limitations hadn't run, but that's
- 11 what that "now indictable" language did. This Court's
- 12 McElvain --
- 13 JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Elwood, I take the
- 14 point, and that seems like a fair understanding of why
- 15 that term came out. But it wasn't the only change that
- 16 they made at that point. And taking that term out may
- 17 have had more than one reason, of course.
- 18 So two other changes they make are, they put
- 19 in the word "any." So the old statute just says
- 20 "offense" and now it's "any offense," which suggests
- 21 breadth and expansiveness. And the other thing, of
- 22 course, is that they do all of this in connection with
- 23 this Contract Settlement Act, which presumably refers
- 24 both to civil and to criminal matters. And it follows
- 25 right after this Contract Settlement Act and suggests

- 1 that it's following on it.
- 2 So, you know, put all those three things
- 3 together: The taking out of the indictment language,
- 4 the putting in the word "any," and the passage in
- 5 conjunction with the Contract Settlement Act. I think
- 6 that that would be an argument on the other side.
- 7 MR. ELWOOD: Sure. I'll try to address each
- 8 of those. I have a pretty terrible memory, so just
- 9 bring me back to it if I forget.
- I think "now indictable" is just to make it
- 11 forward-facing, because they were now not worrying about
- 12 just those cases. They wanted to make it
- 13 forward-looking for the rest of the war.
- With respect to "any offenses," it wasn't
- 15 just any offense simpliciter. It was any offenses
- 16 against the laws of the United States. And Congress
- 17 meant -- thought that was so unequivocally applied to
- 18 criminal law that that is the exact phrase they used in
- 19 enacting the statute giving district courts exclusive
- 20 jurisdiction over crimes. They didn't say "crimes,"
- 21 they said "offenses against the laws of the
- 22 United States" in 1948.
- 23 And what was the third point?
- 24 JUSTICE KAGAN: Contract settlement.
- 25 MR. ELWOOD: I told you I was a terrible

- 1 memory -- pardon me?
- 2 JUSTICE KAGAN: Contract settlement.
- 3 MR. ELWOOD: Oh, and the Contract Settlement
- 4 Act.
- I mean, they say it was, you know,
- 6 predominantly a civil statute, and it did create a big
- 7 administrative state, or an administrative apparatus.
- 8 But the provisions that they -- the causes of action
- 9 they created are actually -- the primary ones it created
- 10 were not actually subject to a statute of limitations,
- 11 so it would have been curious to try to toll them.
- 12 For example, the thing -- and this Court
- 13 said in Kohler that 26(b)(1) of the -- of the Surplus
- 14 Property Act wasn't subject to any statute of
- 15 limitations. There was an analogous provision in that,
- 16 19(c), which is the one that the relator and the
- 17 government both pick out and say, aha, look at this, a
- 18 new civil cause of action. They were probably trying to
- 19 toll that.
- 20 But as the Solicitor General said in
- 21 footnote 3 of their Kohler brief to this Court, the
- 22 remedy in that is substantially like the remedy in 20(b)
- 23 -- in 26(b)(1), with the suggestion being that it was
- 24 not itself subject to a statute of limitations, which is
- 25 what the district courts that have addressed 19(c) have

- 1 said, that it wasn't subject to a statute of limitations
- 2 as they -- SG's brief points out, the court of claims
- 3 applied a statute of limitations to both 26(b)(1), which
- 4 this Court overruled, and to 19(c). But I think that
- 5 the district courts had a better -- had the better of
- 6 that argument.
- 7 But the overall impression is it was still
- 8 -- at the end of the day, it was still applying to
- 9 offenses, that is, crimes.
- 10 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And that goes for the
- 11 government as -- I mean, suppose the government, not a
- 12 relator, brings a False Claims case against a
- 13 contractor. The government wouldn't get the -- the --
- 14 under your view, the government doesn't get the
- 15 suspension?
- 16 MR. ELWOOD: That's right. It doesn't get
- 17 the wartime suspension. It would, however, get the
- 18 specific three-year tolling provision, or three-year
- 19 discovery period, under the False Claims Act itself.
- 20 And a couple other notes that I think are
- 21 worthwhile. I mean, we've already said a lot about the
- 22 fact that the Solicitor General said in 1959, at a time
- 23 when it had been litigating these cases continuously,
- 24 that it was subject to criminal laws only. But I think
- 25 it's also significant that the officer created by the

- 1 Settlement Contract Act, or the Office of Contract
- 2 Settlements, said in 1947 that this tolling provision
- 3 only applied to crimes. And I think that's significant
- 4 because, I mean, it was within -- I'm not saying it's a
- 5 Chevron deference thing, but it was within their duty.
- 6 As the government points out, they had to investigate
- 7 and report it to the government to do what they will
- 8 with it. But the end result of it was that you have to
- 9 know whether that's subject to tolling or not when
- 10 you're deciding how to prioritize what you're going to
- 11 be investigating and reporting.
- I think one final thing, and then I'll move
- on to the other element, or the other error that the
- 14 court made, was that neighboring provisions in Title 18
- 15 simply wouldn't make sense if "offense" also applied to
- 16 violations of the civil laws. Like, for example,
- 17 3282(a), it says, "No person may be tried for an offense
- 18 unless indicted within five years of when the offense
- 19 arose." And, obviously, you can be tried for a civil crime
- 20 without being indicted within five years. And under
- 21 Cowart v. Nichols that is, you know, something the Court
- 22 takes into consideration in trying to determine the
- 23 meaning of something.
- Now, even though it would be mostly a
- 25 complete remedy if we won on the wartime suspension

- 1 grounds, if the Court also gets to the first-to-file
- 2 issue, it could save the --
- 3 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And we in any way --
- 4 MR. ELWOOD: I'm sorry?
- 5 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Assuming we agree with
- 6 you on the first question --
- 7 MR. ELWOOD: Yeah, I'm assuming you agree
- 8 with me on the first question.
- 9 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- should we -- should
- 10 we get to the second? And how would we if we believe --
- if you were right on the first?
- MR. ELWOOD: Well, you should, because among
- 13 other things it will take care of, on remand the Court
- 14 won't have to address the equitable tolling argument
- 15 that we think is waived and also meritless.
- And also, of course, there is the same issue
- 17 already behind us in the Purdue Pharma case, and in the
- 18 Shea case as well. And so I think the Court may as well
- 19 -- I -- it would be the most efficient thing to do. But
- 20 I think it will be -- it would be a complete remedy on us
- 21 if we won on the wartime suspension grounds.
- Now, the second error that the court below
- 23 made was to -- well, if Congress had meant the
- 24 first-to-file bar to be a one-case-at-a-time rule
- 25 allowing an -- you know, an unending or infinite

- 1 series of related lawsuits, they would have said so in
- 2 plain terms.
- 3 JUSTICE KENNEDY: The only problem -- the
- 4 problem you have with this argument -- and it's -- has
- 5 substantial force to it -- but you give no significance
- of the word "pending." You almost write that out of the
- 7 statute.
- 8 MR. ELWOOD: I don't -- I disagree, Justice
- 9 Kennedy, because, I mean, you have to have some sort of
- 10 word there, because otherwise it would be kind of
- 11 confusing between the two -- between the two actions.
- 12 JUSTICE SCALIA: How about "former"?
- MR. ELWOOD: Well, there are a lot of ways
- 14 --
- 15 JUSTICE SCALIA: "Pending" is a very strange
- 16 word to pick.
- 17 MR. ELWOOD: Former, for a first -- well, but the
- 18 thing is -- well, let me begin by saying that under
- 19 --
- 20 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Or "said action" or "that
- 21 action."
- 22 MR. ELWOOD: Yeah. But I think under each
- 23 of the parties here, it could have been written better
- 24 to follow up, you know, what -- to embody the reading
- 25 that we want to give it.

- 1 But I think that ours is the one that makes
- 2 the most sense, because if you just look at the
- 3 provision from the moment when the bar arises, it makes
- 4 perfect sense. It is the pending action at that point.
- 5 And --
- 6 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, aren't you going
- 7 to -- besides the problem that you're -- you're talking
- 8 , your're not giving "pending" any meaning, you're
- 9 also destroying the force of an original source. I
- 10 mean, the -- the public disclosure bar doesn't apply to
- 11 an original source. And you're sort of blocking
- 12 original sources from bringing suits, when a prior case
- involved a dismissal for a technicality, or a dismissal
- 14 because this was in the public domain. But that's not
- 15 true for an original source.
- 16 MR. ELWOOD: Right. But I think -- to begin
- 17 with, there's nothing in the public disclosure bar that
- 18 suggests that it was supposed to prevent the original
- 19 source from being subject to all of the other bars that
- 20 are out -- are out there still, like the -- you know,
- 21 like the government knowledge bar that still exists in a
- 22 tiny little corner, or the first-to-file bar.
- And original source makes a lot of sense for
- 24 public disclosure, but it doesn't make any sense for
- 25 first-to-file for this reason: When it's public

- 1 disclosure, when it's something that's said in a
- 2 committee report, you have no idea whether or not it's
- 3 gotten to the ear of the person at the Justice Department
- 4 who needs -- needs to know about it,
- for something to be done about it. And first-to-file, however,
- 6 they not only they have to file an action in
- 7 district court, and they have to give all the material
- 8 evidence they have to the Attorney General of the
- 9 United States, who is under a statutory obligation to
- 10 investigate it and who has to decide whether to
- 11 intervene or not.
- Now, that is something that guarantees that,
- 13 you know, by hook or by crook, somebody at the Justice
- 14 Department with responsibility for these things knows it
- 15 and has the information that they need to take action on
- 16 this. And after you've done that once, it doesn't make
- 17 a lot of sense for you to be able to just keep coming
- 18 into court and filing a lawsuit telling the government,
- 19 hey, you know that stuff that you already know? Let me
- 20 tell it to you again.
- 21 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, the reality is you
- 22 don't need the qui tam unless the government doesn't
- 23 want to waste resources on something, but that doesn't
- 24 mean that they didn't find that there might be something
- 25 there.

- 1 MR. ELWOOD: But once the -- I mean, once
- 2 the government has -- once the original first-to-file
- 3 bar -- once the original relator reports this
- 4 information to the government, if the other actions that
- 5 are to be barred are related, the government has the
- 6 information it needs to investigate all of them. But
- 7 what does --
- 8 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But it may not want to
- 9 prosecute it.
- 10 MR. ELWOOD: It may decide there is --
- 11 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: You have to assume that
- 12 what the intent is, is not to force the government to
- 13 prosecute but to get recovery, for -- for the
- 14 government.
- 15 MR. ELWOOD: I think it is -- the point of
- 16 the first-to-file bar is to do two things -- and this is
- 17 kind of widely accepted -- that first, it is to give
- 18 incentives for people to come forward. And I think that
- 19 basically it's requiring it to stop at one is a much
- 20 more powerful incentive to come forward promptly with
- 21 the information you have. And secondly, it is to make
- 22 sure that the government doesn't dilute its recoveries
- 23 by paying subsequent relators for information the
- 24 government already has. And if the first relator gave
- 25 you enough information to investigate the whole breadth

- 1 of the crime, you won't have to pay that initial
- 2 relator, you're -- you know, depending on whether you're
- 3 -- I guess if you intervene by presumption it would be
- 4 15 to 25 percent. But if that person can file and the
- 5 next person can file and the next person can file --
- 6 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Do you have any idea how
- 7 collateral estoppel works in this area? I actually
- 8 don't know. But let's assume that you -- that you're,
- 9 that the adversary won a claim against you. Could
- 10 someone else come in and you've now won for the
- 11 government, essentially, could anyone else file a suit
- or would they be stopped because --
- MR. ELWOOD: Well, at that point it would be
- 14 already -- I mean, I guess it would depend on the scope
- 15 and how related. You're talking about KBR loss in this
- 16 hypothetical, correct?
- 17 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Exactly.
- 18 MR. ELWOOD: Because they're the mutuality.
- 19 I mean, it gives more -- you know, because it had
- 20 already been defined and the KBR had done certain
- 21 things, that might apply to other relators. But I think
- 22 the thing that kind of matters more is what about the
- 23 non-mutuality in the other direction? Because if KBR
- 24 beats relator number 1 and they say there was no problem
- 25 here, what about relator 2 through X?

- 1 JUSTICE GINSBURG: The relator is treated as
- 2 the government for preclusion purposes.
- 3 MR. ELWOOD: Well --
- 4 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And that was at least, at
- 5 least sole judge after verdict.
- 6 MR. ELWOOD: I don't -- I don't think that
- 7 it's clear that that's the case.
- 8 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well, there is -- there
- 9 is good authority, at least in the court of appeals, for
- 10 that position.
- 11 MR. ELWOOD: I disagree, Justice Ginsburg.
- 12 We've -- we've been looking for it and we have not found
- 13 anything that clearly says relator 2 is bound by relator
- 14 1 having lost in an action. There is the -- the -- the
- 15 language, which I think is dicta in Eisen -- Eisenstein
- 16 to say that the United States itself is barred.
- 17 But I think that any -- well, any defendant
- 18 is going to have to establish that law anew if it's
- 19 going to apply to further relators down the road --
- 20 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But is it your -- your --
- 21 is it your position suit number 1 is filed, it's
- 22 dismissed within weeks without prejudice, no other
- 23 relator can file?
- 24 MR. ELWOOD: It depends on what the basis of
- 25 the dismissal was, because if it was dismissed on 9(b)

- 1 grounds, routinely they can amend. And it's not
- 2 dismissing the whole action. It's just dismissing that
- 3 complaint and they can come right back in with an
- 4 amended complaint. And that's the same action --
- 5 JUSTICE GINSBURG: The question is whether
- 6 somebody else could come in. So you have somebody who
- 7 is the first filer and comes in with a sloppy complaint
- 8 and it's not stated with sufficient specificity;
- 9 dismissed. And that person goes away. You're saying
- 10 nobody else can ever come in.
- 11 MR. ELWOOD: No. I think it's -- the
- 12 protection there comes from the word "related." Because
- 13 courts of appeals apply a same material facts test. If
- 14 you come in with a sloppy mess of a complaint that
- 15 doesn't allege -- it just says KBR is bad, it committed
- 16 fraud --
- 17 JUSTICE KENNEDY: What if it was a
- 18 perfect -- a perfect complaint, but he sued in the wrong
- 19 court, or there was no personal jurisdiction?
- 20 MR. ELWOOD: Well --
- 21 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Dismissed without juris-
- 22 -- dismissed without prejudice.
- 23 MR. ELWOOD: I mean, if it's -- if it's in
- 24 the wrong jurisdiction, you can transfer it. I mean,
- 25 that's a very hard thing to say because that nationwide

- 1 service --
- 2 JUSTICE KENNEDY: No. My hypothetical is
- 3 dismissed without prejudice, but it's a beautifully
- 4 drawn complaint.
- 5 MR. ELWOOD: Well, I'm going to resist --
- 6 I'm going to resist for a little while before we get to
- 7 the -- to the meat of the issue just to say that it's
- 8 not going to happen because personal jurisdiction has
- 9 nationwide service of process, and so it's very hard to
- 10 invoke a personal --
- 11 JUSTICE SCALIA: It's dismissed for failure
- 12 to prosecute.
- MR. ELWOOD: Well, if it's --
- 14 JUSTICE SCALIA: For nonmerits ground, and
- 15 so nobody else can come in?
- MR. ELWOOD: Well, if it's dismissed for
- 17 failure to prosecute -- well, first of all, let me
- 18 resist the hypothetical a little bit more. If it's
- 19 under our rule, that's an incredibly valuable lawsuit
- 20 because there are no more mulligans. And so there'll be
- 21 somebody who comes in there and is willing to
- 22 underwrite, a new set of lawyers who will be willing to
- 23 take the case.
- 24 But even if it is, I think that we would say
- 25 it has been barred. If somebody came forward and

- 1 provided all material information, then everything that
- 2 is related to that would be barred.
- 3 I'd like to get back to Justice Ginsburg's
- 4 hypothetical because it's an important one, and that is
- 5 if somebody files -- the relator says, oh, well,
- 6 somebody files a terrible complaint, it's going to bar
- 7 all the good ones. And I don't think that's the case
- 8 because they're going to compare, under that test, the
- 9 same material of facts test, you compare. And if this
- 10 one just says KBR is bad, they commit a lot of fraud,
- 11 and this one says at these three camps they were
- 12 requiring people to build 12 hours a day, 84 hours a
- 13 week regardless of how much they -- they worked, those
- 14 aren't the same material facts and you get the
- 15 protection that way.
- 16 JUSTICE GINSBURG: I thought that first file
- 17 rule was meant to protect the first filer in that --
- 18 well, one aspect of it is the first filer doesn't have
- 19 to worry about a race to judgment. Somebody else files
- 20 second and gets the judgment first.
- 21 So I thought that that was -- one of the
- 22 chief things was to protect the first filer and also to
- 23 protect that filer's recovery so he doesn't have to
- 24 split up whatever the qui tam plaintiff gets.
- 25 MR. ELWOOD: The phrase "race to judgment"

- 1 is not anything that I have found in the courts of
- 2 appeals. I've only found it in the government's brief.
- 3 I think that the court says that they want to create --
- 4 the first-to-file bar was meant to create a race to the
- 5 courthouse, not a race to judgment. And --
- 6 JUSTICE GINSBURG: The first filer is a race
- 7 to the courthouse.
- 8 MR. ELWOOD: Yes. It's meant to create a
- 9 race to the courthouse. And there's less of an
- 10 incentive to race to the courthouse under the relator's
- 11 rule because even if you aren't the first to file, you
- 12 can still bring a claim; you've just got to wait for a
- 13 break in the traffic to jump in. And under that, you --
- 14 if you are the first to file, you don't even get a
- 15 better settlement because when, you know, most of these
- 16 cases are settled, they aren't litigated to judgment.
- 17 And a defendant is not going to give you, you know,
- 18 everything you're asking for if they know that they're
- 19 going to have to settle this case again and again and
- 20 again. And, in fact, it discourages settlements because
- 21 you would be a fool to settle it right away because it
- just means more people are going to be able to sue you.
- 23 The relator's rule is as many lawsuits as
- 24 you can fit into 6 years or 10 years or an infinite
- 25 period of time because, you know, there -- there's

- 1 nothing particular to stop them. Whereas under our
- 2 rule, you have much more of an incentive to settle and
- 3 settle for the full amount, because by settling with
- 4 that first relator, you are buying peace with respect to
- 5 all related lawsuits.
- 6 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Do we know in this
- 7 case -- there were three suits. Thorpe, I think, was
- 8 the first. Do we know why those suits dropped out?
- 9 MR. ELWOOD: The first one was just
- 10 dismissed. The lawyers dropped out and they couldn't --
- 11 or they didn't find other lawyers.
- 12 JUSTICE KENNEDY: The first Carter, the
- 13 first Carter suit.
- MR. ELWOOD: No, I'm sorry, the first Thorpe
- 15 lawsuit --
- 16 JUSTICE KENNEDY: The first Thorpe.
- 17 MR. ELWOOD: -- under the related lawsuits
- 18 was just dropped for failure to prosecute when lawyer --
- 19 new lawyers didn't step in to take over for the old
- 20 ones.
- 21 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And you say that kills it
- 22 for every -- anybody else.
- 23 MR. ELWOOD: Right. Right. That they made
- 24 the full disclosure. The government investigated that
- 25 case and they knew the 12-hour-a-day, 84-hour-a-week

- 1 claim, and they were able to investigate it and if they
- 2 had wanted to bring it, they could have brought it and
- 3 recovered the whole thing and only paid the Thorpe
- 4 relators. And I don't know why the other ones dropped
- 5 out, but they were voluntarily dismissed, I believe, all
- 6 of them.
- 7 And as I said, I think this is the more
- 8 natural --
- 9 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Were any of them filed
- 10 by original sources?
- MR. ELWOOD: Pardon me?
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Were any of them filed
- 13 by original sources?
- 14 MR. ELWOOD: I think -- I think all of them
- 15 were original sources. They were all people who would
- 16 have qualified as original sources and -- under the --
- 17 under the statute.
- And as I say, I think that this is a more
- 19 reasonable reading of it, because if you look at this
- 20 from the point of view of when the bar arises, when it
- 21 is the pending action, it does everything, no word of
- 22 surplusage. Everything fits.
- 23 But I have yet to see a one-case-at-a-time
- 24 rule that works the way that this statute does, that
- 25 uses just an adjective, which, I mean, if you look at

- 1 it, it's an adjective that is only describing what is a
- 2 related case and usually --
- 3 JUSTICE SCALIA: But it's -- it's not a
- 4 pending action later. I mean, when that action's been
- 5 dismissed or been completed, you say that a later action
- 6 is prohibited even though there is no pending action,
- 7 right?
- 8 MR. ELWOOD: But that's -- that's because I
- 9 think that if you -- as I say, if you look at this from
- 10 the point of view of when the action is filed, it makes
- 11 complete sense and it is a pending action. And there's
- 12 a reason for doing that. If you'll look at pages 8A to
- 13 9A, this is the mirror image. The language used in
- 14 (b) (5) is the mirror image of the language used to
- 15 create the cause of action in (b)(1). It says in
- 16 (b)(1), a person may bring a civil action for violation
- of Section 3729, and then you find out what happens when
- 18 they do that and the bar arises. (5), when a person
- 19 brings an action under this subsection for that
- 20 violation of 3729, no person other than the government
- 21 may bring a related action. So it's a -- it's a
- 22 parallelism between a person may bring and no person may
- 23 bring, which suggests that you look at it then going
- 24 forward. And looking forward indefinitely, just
- 25 says, (b)(1), you look forward for 6 years or 10 years,

- 1 or if there's no statute of limitations, forever. And
- 2 by the same token, I think (5) is a looking-forward
- 3 provision, that the bar arises and that's it, no person
- 4 may bring.
- 5 And when you contrast that to saying that
- 6 this is a temporal limitation, you know, I defy you to
- 7 find another provision that uses just the word "pending"
- 8 with no verb, no nothing, to give it some sort of effect
- 9 like that. You know, we cite a couple of -- of --
- 10 JUSTICE BREYER: Since you're getting into
- 11 that event, I mean, to me, it makes perfect sense to apply it
- 12 just to the pending action. The action goes away.
- 13 Number 2 person -- and that means there isn't going to
- 14 be the problem that Justice Ginsburg suggested, so we
- 15 don't have that problem. And now we have a new person
- 16 who can bring a suit if and only if he is the original
- 17 source. Well, if he's the original source, let him
- 18 recover. Why not? And your answer to that is, well, he
- 19 didn't tell the government all this stuff, the first guy
- 20 did.
- 21 Well, see, but that's not the only purpose
- 22 of the qui tam action. It has other purposes. It's to
- 23 reward the person who, in fact, did discover this thing
- 24 and -- and made every effort to bring it to public
- 25 attention.

1 MR. ELWOOD: But there's -- there's 2 nothing --JUSTICE BREYER: Or not. 3 4 MR. ELWOOD: -- in the first-to-file bar that says anything about an original source. Original 5 source is a carveout for the public disclosure bar. 6 7 JUSTICE BREYER: I know. But he can't -but other -- other things prevent him from bringing it 8 9 unless he's the original source. Am I not right? I 10 mean, it's all been disclosed, you know. 11 MR. ELWOOD: I think that's the principal 12 ones. I think that's the principal ones. 13 JUSTICE BREYER: Everything's been 14 disclosed by number 1 --MR. ELWOOD: Well, it may or may not have 15 been --16 JUSTICE BREYER: What? 17 18 MR. ELWOOD: -- because it frequently -- it may or may not have been because the --19 20 JUSTICE BREYER: Let's take the mine run --21 MR. ELWOOD: Sure. Right, right. JUSTICE BREYER: I don't want to interrupt. 22 23 I don't want to interrupt your reserving your time. 24 MR. ELWOOD: Okay. I would -- I would like 25 to reserve the remainder of my time for rebuttal,

- 1 please.
- 2 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
- 3 Mr. Stone.
- 4 ORAL ARGUMENT OF DAVID S. STONE
- 5 ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT
- 6 MR. STONE: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
- 7 please the Court:
- 8 This civil FCA war fraud case is told under
- 9 the plain language of the WSLA because it is an offense
- 10 involving fraud against the United States under
- 11 subsection 1 and is also an offense committed in
- 12 connection with the payment or performance of a war
- 13 contract under subsection 3.
- 14 If we look at -- if we look at the text of
- 15 the law which applies here, which is at our appendix at
- 16 page 1, there is nothing in that text which limits --
- 17 which limits offenses to criminal offense. There's not
- 18 a single word in that text.
- 19 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But it's placed -- placed
- in the Criminal Code. It's placed in Title 18.
- 21 MR. STONE: That's true. That's true,
- 22 Justice Ginsburg. But as the government has identified,
- 23 I believe it's in Note 3 of their brief, there are at
- 24 least seven civil offenses in the Criminal Code,
- 25 including RICO, civil RICO. And, in fact, I would -- I

- 1 would direct the Court to Section 1034, which says
- 2 specifically, "The attorney general may bring a civil
- 3 action in the appropriate United States District Court
- 4 against any person who engages in conduct, constituting
- 5 an offense under Section 1033 upon proof of such conduct
- 6 by preponderance of the evidence."
- 7 That is a civil offense. That is not a
- 8 criminal offense. And I believe if you look, if -- the
- 9 Justices -- if you look at --
- 10 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Is there any civil
- 11 offense in Title 18?
- 12 MR. STONE: Yes, I just -- I just listed
- 13 one.
- 14 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: That's in 18.
- 15 MR. STONE: That's Title 18, Section 1034.
- 16 There in --
- 17 JUSTICE BREYER: Is that about fraud?
- 18 MR. STONE: That's about fraud, yes.
- 19 JUSTICE SCALIA: And what does the word
- 20 "offense" --
- 21 MR. STONE: Insurance.
- JUSTICE SCALIA: What does the word
- "offense" mean in that provision?
- 24 MR. STONE: The word "offense" as this
- 25 Court --

- 1 JUSTICE SCALIA: In that provision, what --
- 2 what does the word --
- 3 MR. STONE: The word "offense" means a
- 4 transgression of law, which may be punishable --
- 5 JUSTICE SCALIA: It's a criminal offense,
- 6 right?
- 7 MR. STONE: I disagree, Your Honor. I
- 8 believe "offense" --
- 9 JUSTICE SCALIA: It wouldn't make any sense
- 10 in Title 18 unless the offense they're referring to is
- 11 one -- one of the criminal offenses of Title 18.
- 12 MR. STONE: I don't agree, Justice Scalia,
- 13 because --
- 14 JUSTICE SCALIA: Read the provision again,
- 15 would you?
- 16 MR. STONE: Certainly. "The attorney
- 17 general may bring a civil action in the appropriate
- 18 United States District Court against any person who
- 19 engages in conduct constituting an offense under Section
- 20 1033 and upon proof of such conduct by a preponderance
- 21 of the evidence."
- 22 JUSTICE ALITO: Yes. But 1033 is a
- 23 criminal provision.
- 24 MR. STONE: 1033 is -- the way a number of
- 25 provisions in the criminal code are written, the

1 offenses or the conduct which is punishable are in --2 MR. STONE: -- subsection (a). 3 JUSTICE BREYER: I think -- I think the 4 point these people are trying to make, perhaps --6 MR. STONE: Right. 7 JUSTICE BREYER: -- is that that provision you've read provides for a civil action by the attorney 8 9 general --MR. STONE: Right. 10 11 JUSTICE BREYER: -- against a person who has 12 committed an offense. What offense? An offense elsewhere defined in 18. Is that offense defined 13 elsewhere criminal or civil? It is criminal. 14 MR. STONE: And I --1.5 16 JUSTICE BREYER: That's the point, I think. MR. STONE: And I disagree, Justice Breyer. 17 JUSTICE BREYER: I know you disagree, but --18 so let's turn to the other offense it 19 20 cross-references --21 MR. STONE: If we read --22 JUSTICE BREYER: -- and why don't you read 23 that. MR. STONE: If we read the language 24 25 carefully, which I have done --

- 1 JUSTICE BREYER: I've got the language of
- 2 that.
- 3 MR. STONE: If we read the language of a
- 4 number of the statutes -- a number of the statutes in
- 5 Title 18, they have punishments that are criminal.
- 6 Everything in Title 18 has punishments that are
- 7 criminal. There are a number of statutes within Title
- 8 18 that also have civil remedies or create civil private
- 9 rights of action. Nobody believes by using the term
- 10 "offense" that Congress intended to turn those into
- 11 criminal statutes. That is --
- 12 JUSTICE BREYER: I -- I agree with -- the
- 13 word "offense" appears and it provides for a civil
- 14 action. What I wonder is, when you turn to the
- 15 particular provisions that do that, and look at the word
- 16 "offense," is that word "offense" in those civil remedy
- 17 provisions referring to a civil or criminal behavior?
- 18 MR. STONE: It is referring to --
- 19 JUSTICE BREYER: To civil you say. So let's
- 20 read --
- 21 MR. STONE: It is referring to conduct which
- 22 can constitute a crime which is punishable by criminal
- 23 punishment, but is also punishable by civil -- by civil
- 24 remedies.
- JUSTICE BREYER: And the word "offense"

- 1 refers to the civil behavior.
- 2 MR. STONE: Yes, because they're saying --
- 3 JUSTICE BREYER: Okay. Good. Read me the
- 4 example because I must have missed it.
- 5 MR. STONE: Because it says it must have
- 6 proved by a preponderance of the evidence, which means
- 7 it's not proved by, you know, beyond a reasonable doubt.
- 8 So it can't be a crime. It has to be a civil offense.
- 9 And that language appears in a number of places in Title
- 10 18. But may I --
- 11 JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Stone, don't take this
- 12 for more than it's worth because I think there are
- 13 plenty of arguments against you, but I'm actually not
- 14 sure I understand this one. I mean, it seems to me if
- 15 your view is it applies to both criminal and civil
- 16 offenses --
- 17 MR. STONE: Right.
- 18 JUSTICE KAGAN: -- well, Congress had to put
- 19 the thing someplace.
- 20 MR. STONE: Exactly.
- 21 JUSTICE KAGAN: It could have put it in the
- 22 criminal code or it could have put it with all the other
- 23 civil provisions --
- 24 MR. STONE: And in fact --
- JUSTICE KAGAN: Either way, there'd be kind

- 1 of a mismatch. And presumably, this started out as
- 2 criminal and it refers largely to criminal, and so
- 3 that's where it goes.
- 4 MR. STONE: Right. And -- and there's no
- 5 dispute that there was a limitation in 1921 and in 1942
- 6 on the statute because it said now indictable. It said
- 7 now indictable, so that referred to criminal.
- 8 Well, they took that limitation out, as I
- 9 believe one of the Justices made the point earlier, not
- 10 only did they take out that limitation, so there's no
- 11 limitation on the word "offense," they added the word
- 12 "any," which this Court has held in Gonzalez should be
- 13 read broadly, any offense. And this Court has said both
- 14 in Moore, this Court said that an offense is -- is an
- 15 infraction of the law which may be punishable either
- 16 civilly or criminally.
- 17 And, again, this Court said in National
- 18 Gypsum that Congress knows the difference between the
- 19 elements of a criminal offense and a civil offense. So
- 20 obviously --
- 21 JUSTICE ALITO: What is your -- what is
- 22 your --
- 23 MR. STONE: -- "offense" can be civil. It
- 24 is a textually permissible reading of this text that
- 25 "offense" can be civil --

- 1 JUSTICE ALITO: What is your answer to the
- 2 argument that this would be a big change if it
- 3 previously applied only to crimes and then, according to
- 4 you, it was changed so that it applied to civil claims
- 5 as well. That would be a big change. What is your
- 6 response to the argument that we might find a little --
- 7 a bit of evidence here or there that that's what was
- 8 intended, but Mr. Elwood says there's nothing?
- 9 MR. STONE: There is much evidence, Justice
- 10 Alito. First of all, this was -- historically, you have
- 11 to look at when the statute was being passed. In 1942,
- 12 they were concerned about -- they were in the middle of
- 13 a war that was consuming the entire nation. In 1944,
- 14 they were concerned with wrapping up that war. They
- 15 were passing Contract Settlement Act, primarily a civil
- 16 act. This was passed, this amendment was passed as part
- 17 of this Contract Settlements Act. They were passing the
- 18 Surplus Property Act. How are we going to deal with all
- 19 this property? They created civil offenses for surplus
- 20 property.
- 21 They did say, this same Congress, the 1944
- 22 Congress said in a report that this will allow, because
- 23 the bulk of the offenses under this Act will not be
- 24 cognizable and investigated until after the war, this
- 25 will allow for that -- for the litigation to occur. So

- 1 they used the term "litigation," again, suggesting
- 2 that's not a term you normally use when you're talking
- 3 about crimes. They used that term.
- 4 So -- so they clearly --
- 5 JUSTICE ALITO: Is that your -- that's your
- 6 best evidence, that there was a reference to litigation?
- 7 MR. STONE: That's -- that's the best
- 8 reference because there's not -- there's virtually --
- 9 JUSTICE SCALIA: Where -- where did that
- 10 appear?
- 11 MR. STONE: That appeared in a Senate report
- 12 when they passed --
- 13 JUSTICE SCALIA: Okay. That's all I needed
- 14 to know.
- MR. STONE: -- when they passed the Surplus
- 16 Property Act.
- 17 (Laughter.)
- 18 MR. STONE: But I -- I think you need to
- 19 look -- you need to look at the historical reference of
- 20 when this was occurring. This was occurring when they
- 21 were creating all these civil remedies. It made sense
- 22 for them to expand. They added the word "any" to
- 23 offense. They had no need to add the word "any" to
- 24 offense. They did that because they wanted to make it
- 25 clear that it could -- it covered any offense, including

- 1 civil or criminal offenses. And they took out -- and I
- 2 agree there could be more than one reason why you take
- 3 this language out -- but they took out the now
- 4 indictable language, which was the only limitation that
- 5 could be read in the text that would limit it to crimes.
- 6 And there's nothing in the text as it now occurs.
- 7 I would also point out that the 2008
- 8 Congress, when they strengthened this obviously
- 9 believing that Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act
- 10 should continue to be enforced, mentioned twice
- 11 litigation, they mentioned the fact that -- that this
- 12 was in order to allow courts, prosecutors, and litigants
- 13 to know when the statute --
- JUSTICE SCALIA: What Congress was that?
- 15 MR. STONE: The 2008 Congress.
- 16 JUSTICE SCALIA: And that's -- where does
- 17 that appear?
- 18 MR. STONE: That appears in a Senate report
- 19 as well.
- 20 JUSTICE SCALIA: Two -- two Senate
- 21 committees or just one Senate committee?
- 22 MR. STONE: One Senate committee report.
- 23 It's cited in --
- JUSTICE SCALIA: And that's the Congress.
- 25 MR. STONE: Cited in our red brief, yes.

- 1 Yes, Your Honor.
- I would point out, though, that the meaning
- 3 of "offense" in 1921 and the meaning of "offense" in
- 4 1942 was a transgression of law as this Court said in
- 5 Moore v. Illinois. It's a transgression of law which
- 6 could be punished civilly. It could be punished
- 7 criminally. We need more context. We need something in
- 8 the statute to limit it. There's nothing in the
- 9 statute.
- 10 And it makes sense that Congress wouldn't
- 11 have wanted to limit it because they would have wanted
- 12 to give the government the option of pursuing a criminal
- 13 remedy --
- JUSTICE SCALIA: I mean, all that's true
- 15 except --
- 16 MR. STONE: -- or a civil remedy.
- JUSTICE SCALIA: -- except when you're
- 18 dealing with an old statute that used to be clearly
- 19 criminal, and it seems to me at that point the
- 20 burden -- when that statute is expanded -- the burden is
- 21 on you to show that it's been changed from the criminal
- 22 to the civil --
- 23 MR. STONE: Well, Judge, I would point
- 24 out --
- 25 JUSTICE SCALIA: -- to include the civil.

- 1 And, you know, that's a different burden from what you
- 2 expect.
- 3 MR. STONE: Justice Scalia, I would point
- 4 out that nine of ten courts that considered this in the
- 5 aftermath of the 1944 amendment held that it did apply
- 6 civilly, and five of those were False Claims -- Civil
- 7 False Claims Act cases. And those courts and that
- 8 judicial precedent was in place -- for forty years,
- 9 Congress never changed that language, never went back --
- 10 they could easily have written the word "criminal" in in
- 11 1944, they chose not to do that. And --
- 12 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, were they --
- 13 MR. STONE: -- they could have written it in
- 14 --
- JUSTICE SCALIA: Were they district courts?
- 16 Four district courts? Is that it?
- 17 MR. STONE: They were district courts, yes.
- 18 JUSTICE SCALIA: And did Congress know about
- 19 those?
- 20 MR. STONE: Congress is presumed to know
- 21 about them.
- 22 JUSTICE SCALIA: Ah, ah.
- 23 MR. STONE: But I would also point out that
- 24 the people in the courts that were operating at the time
- 25 that this amendment was made understood it to change the

- 1 law. Nine of the ten courts understood it to change the
- 2 law. So it goes to what people believed at the time the
- 3 meaning of that word was. Because --
- 4 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Changed the law to do
- 5 what? They changed it to --
- 6 MR. STONE: To allow civil defenses --
- 7 JUSTICE GINSBURG: -- operating
- 8 prospectively, not just to crimes that had already
- 9 occurred?
- 10 MR. STONE: Right.
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: So that's one change that
- 12 everybody agrees.
- 13 MR. STONE: Right. Changed the law to
- 14 include any offense, we would say, that was related to
- 15 the war, which would include our civil FCA war fraud
- 16 offense in this case. It's specifically consistent with
- 17 Congress' intent that -- that a fraud such as occurred
- in this case, that the government would be able to
- 19 pursue it. It's a fraud on the troops in wartime. It's
- 20 exactly why this statute was passed and exactly why the
- 21 False Claims Act was passed.
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: The government can pursue
- 23 it in a criminal case. The question is whether --
- 24 MR. STONE: Right, and --
- 25 JUSTICE GINSBURG: -- the civil --

- 1 MR. STONE: And the question is whether it's
- 2 appropriate and -- and based on the language -- Justice
- 3 Scalia, based on the language of this statute, which
- 4 nowhere in it contains a limitation -- the only
- 5 limitation was taken out in 1944, and instead they added
- 6 the word "any" and they added two subsections that could
- 7 be read --
- 8 JUSTICE SCALIA: Who urges the word
- 9 "offense"? That's the limitation that is urged, which
- 10 is normally used to connote a crime.
- 11 MR. STONE: What?
- 12 Well, the two --
- 13 JUSTICE SCALIA: And I don't think that
- 14 changes --
- 15 MR. STONE: The terms --
- 16 JUSTICE SCALIA: -- if you put the word
- 17 "any" in front of it.
- 18 MR. STONE: But, Your Honor, in Moore v.
- 19 Illinois, the Court said that "offense" means a
- 20 transgression of law that could be punished either
- 21 criminally or civilly. And presumably Congress was
- 22 aware of this Court's holding in Moore, or is presumed
- 23 to be. And then this Court again, on a number of
- 24 occasions, including in National Gypsum, referred to
- 25 Congress as being familiar with the difference between

- 1 criminal and civil offenses. There would be no need for
- 2 the term "civil offense" or the term "criminal offense"
- 3 if "offense" meant "crime."
- 4 "Offense" doesn't mean "crime." There would
- 5 be no need for the word "criminal offense" if that's
- 6 the --
- 7 JUSTICE GINSBURG: The problem is that --
- 8 MR. STONE: By the way, the word "criminal
- 9 offense" occurs a number of times --
- 10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice Ginsburg.
- 11 MR. STONE: I'm sorry.
- 12 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Everyone agrees that from
- 13 1921 on, it was understood that this was a criminal
- 14 statute and I think the point has been made before. If
- 15 Congress really was going to change it, to vote it all
- 16 onto the excision of two words which can be explained on
- 17 other grounds, it's a bit much. Wouldn't Congress have
- 18 said, now we're going to make it -- we want it to be
- 19 civil, so we're going to make it clear that it's civil?
- 20 MR. STONE: Justice Ginsburg, I -- I would
- 21 point out a couple of things about that.
- 22 First of all, the surplusage language
- 23 which -- which Petitioner points to which they claim was
- 24 the reason that this was taken out, was in the statute
- 25 since 1921. So they have no historical reason why all

- 1 of a sudden, in 1944, it was taken out. It was there --
- 2 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well, there was a reason.
- 3 MR. STONE: -- the entire time.
- 4 JUSTICE GINSBURG: The statute acted
- 5 retrospectively for the first part of its history, and
- 6 then they took it out when it was going to operate
- 7 prospectively.
- 8 MR. STONE: But Judge -- Judge Ginsburg,
- 9 that's not correct, because the language at the end of
- 10 the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act holds that --
- 11 provides that the statute does apply retrospectively.
- 12 It applies to any statute of limitation which has not
- 13 yet run. And that's been in the statute since -- since
- 14 1942.
- 15 I would also point out that the 1921 statute
- 16 had nothing to do with the war. There's not much we can
- 17 glean from the 1921 statute. All that it did was to
- 18 increase the statute of limitations from three years to
- 19 six years for fraud. It didn't mention the war at all.
- 20 And in 1942, all that the statute did was extend until
- 21 1945 the provision that was in in 1942. It also did not
- 22 refer to the wars. The first statute that actually
- 23 referred to the war was the 1944 statute.
- So, yes, it's true that some language was
- 25 used, but I believe, you know, as -- as we set forth in

- 1 our -- our brief, that "offense" can mean criminal or
- 2 civil. It's a textually permissible interpretation.
- 3 There's nothing in -- that limits it in the current law.
- 4 It's consistent with Congress intended when they
- 5 passed these statutes. And I urge the Court to
- 6 seriously consider that, because it would be
- 7 inappropriate for the government to be limited to
- 8 pursuing cases only criminally against defendants who
- 9 are war profiteers and not have that civil -- civil
- 10 remedy.
- 11 If I may move on to the False Claims Act --
- 12 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, you can either
- 13 reserve time or move on. It's up to you.
- 14 MR. STONE: I'd like to move on, if I may.
- 15 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Go ahead.
- 16 MR. STONE: The False Claims Act -- as
- 17 Justice Scalia pointed out, "pending" in the False
- 18 Claims Act, it's a word that was chosen in the
- 19 first-to-file provision. It's a word that Congress
- 20 chose to use. It makes sense, because if you look at
- 21 the statutory scheme in which that provision is found,
- 22 it's talking about while that action is pending, what
- 23 the government can do. It talks about -- the previous
- 24 provisions talk about the government making a decision
- 25 about intervening. The next provision talks about the

- 1 government can dismiss that case, which -- which
- 2 protects all the concerns that -- that Mr. Elwood has
- 3 pointed out because the government has the ability to
- 4 dismiss a case any time that it wants to if it isn't in
- 5 the interest of the government for that case to be
- 6 there.
- 7 So it also uses the term "intervention."
- 8 You cannot intervene in a non-pending case. Congress
- 9 specifically chose to put these in the same sentence to
- 10 say, no person shall intervene or file a related case
- 11 while the -- the case is pending.
- 12 So for that reason, I believe, "pending" is
- 13 clearly the most reasonable interpretation, but it's
- 14 also the most consistent with the statutory scheme,
- 15 which as Justice Kagan pointed out, provides that
- 16 original sources can go forward even if the government
- 17 has knowledge of a fraud and even if the government is
- 18 investigating that fraud as this Court found in Graham
- 19 County.
- 20 JUSTICE GINSBURG: What happens -- what
- 21 happens if you have a first filer who brings a claim,
- 22 it's successful, either gets a judgment or gets a
- 23 settlement, and the case is over? It's no longer
- 24 pending.
- MR. STONE: We -- we would argue, and I

- 1 believe the government will agree, that claim
- 2 preclusion, res judicata, all the typical doctrines
- 3 would apply. I would point the Court to Stephens, where
- 4 the Court held that the relator was an assignee of the
- 5 government, and if an assignee of the government brings
- 6 a case and either settles it or it's decided on the
- 7 merits, that would bar any future case, and I believe
- 8 the government will agree with that.
- 9 But to allow the defendants to say that a
- 10 case that is brought that may never be pursued -- like
- in this case, Thorp, where they alleged everywhere in
- 12 the world there was fraudulent billing. This person had
- 13 never been to the base where the fraudulent billing was
- 14 occurring in our case, had no personal knowledge of it.
- 15 No relator, other relator, was found to be an original
- 16 source. They didn't reach that issue.
- 17 JUSTICE SCALIA: I'm not sure the government
- 18 will agree with that, as you confidently predict, but I
- 19 guess we'll ask the government. But I think --
- 20 MR. STONE: Right. Well, that would be my
- 21 -- that would be our position.
- JUSTICE SCALIA: I think you're saying that
- 23 if somebody brings a suit and is -- and loses, the
- 24 government is -- is thereby precluded from joining a
- 25 later suit. Right? The government is.

1 MR. STONE: I am saying that if somebody 2 brings a lawsuit --JUSTICE SCALIA: Yeah. 3 4 MR. STONE: -- and on the merits, there is a decision on the merits --6 JUSTICE SCALIA: Right. 7 MR. STONE: -- the government has chosen not to intervene in that case. 8 JUSTICE SCALIA: Right. 9 MR. STONE: They've had the opportunity to 10 11 intervene at any point --12 JUSTICE SCALIA: But they didn't intervene. 13 MR. STONE: Then they are bound. 14 JUSTICE SCALIA: Then they are bound. MR. STONE: Yes. 1.5 JUSTICE SCALIA: Okay. 16 MR. STONE: And furthermore --17 18 JUSTICE SCALIA: We'll see what the government thinks of that. 19 20 MR. STONE: And furthermore, I just want --I want to make the point that Congress, in the False 21 22 Claims Act -- I've been doing this for a while -- that 23 Congress inextricably intertwined the government and 24 relators. You can't tear them apart, because the whole

point of the False Claims Act is to incentivize people

25

- 1 with knowledge, with evidence, with witnesses, to come
- 2 forward. Because even if the government knows -- and
- 3 Congress understood this -- even if the government has
- 4 knowledge of the fraud, that doesn't mean they can prove
- 5 the fraud. That doesn't mean that they're going to be
- 6 able to find out about the fraud by investigating it.
- 7 What helps them prove the fraud is somebody who has
- 8 personal knowledge, an original source who can testify,
- 9 here's the evidence, I saw this happen. And Congress
- 10 knew that was very important, and that's why they
- 11 created the original source provision and provided that
- 12 original sources can pursue cases even if the government
- 13 doesn't intervene. Because there may be cases where the
- 14 government doesn't intervene for various reasons where
- it's valuable for those cases, for the taxpayers and for
- 16 the government, for those cases to be pursued.
- 17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
- 18 Mr. Stone.
- 19 MR. STONE: Thank you very much.
- 20 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I'm sorry for my
- 21 confusion about the time reservation. Thank you.
- 22 Mr. Stewart.
- ORAL ARGUMENT OF MALCOLM L. STEWART
- ON BEHALF OF UNITED STATES,
- 25 AS AMICUS CURIAE, SUPPORTING RESPONDENT

1 MR	. STEWART:	Mr. Ch	ief Justice,	, and may	y it
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- 2 please the Court:
- 3 When Congress enacted the 1942 version of
- 4 the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act, it was acting
- 5 against the backdrop of this Court's 1921 decision in
- 6 United States v. Hutto. And the Court in Hutto was
- 7 construing the general Federal criminal conspiracy
- 8 statute. And that statute made it a crime, among other
- 9 things, to conspire to commit an offense against the
- 10 United States. And the question before the Court was
- 11 whether that criminal statute covered conspiracies to
- 12 commit civil violations.
- 13 And the Court held that it did. The Court
- 14 held that there was no necessity in the statute for the
- 15 offense, the object of which is the conspiracy, to be a
- 16 criminal offense, and that the criminal statute could be
- 17 violated by a conspiracy to commit a civil wrong.
- 18 And there are certainly a great many
- 19 provisions in Title 18 that use the word "offense" in
- 20 which there are other contextual clues within the
- 21 provision that make clear that only crimes are covered.
- 22 JUSTICE BREYER: Is there -- is there a
- 23 provision that uses the word "offense" even though it
- 24 may be civil, where that word "offense" in that
- 25 provision refers to something other than a criminal

- 1 offense?
- 2 MR. STEWART: Not other than a criminal
- 3 offense. As Mr. Stone has --
- 4 JUSTICE BREYER: Every use of the word
- 5 "offense" in Title 18 is in reference to a criminal
- 6 offense.
- 7 MR. STEWART: It refers to conduct with
- 8 criminal -- that -- to which criminal penalties attach.
- 9 As Mr. Stone was explaining, there are
- 10 provisions in Title 18 that use the word "offense" to
- 11 describe conduct that is subject to both criminal and
- 12 civil sanctions; and those are criminal offenses.
- JUSTICE BREYER: But the answer to my
- 14 question was yes?
- 15 MR. STEWART: They are still crimes, yes.
- 16 JUSTICE BREYER: Yes.
- 17 MR. STEWART: But what we would say about
- 18 3287 is the word "offense" is being used something in
- 19 the same way, as a hybrid. There is no dispute that the
- 20 current version of the WSLA does cover crimes. It tolls
- 21 the limitations period for criminal prosecutions, but it
- 22 also applies to civil offenses.
- 23 That -- the next thing I would ask the Court
- 24 to look at is on page 1A of the government's brief.
- 25 We've reproduced the original 1942 version of the

- 1 Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act.
- 2 And the provision begins: "The running of
- 3 any existing statute of limitations applicable to
- 4 offenses involving the defrauding or attempts to defraud
- 5 the United States or any agency thereof, whether by a
- 6 conspiracy or not, and in any manner, and now indictable
- 7 under any existing statutes."
- 8 And if you look even to the rest of that
- 9 provision, the only clear evidence you would find that
- 10 this version of the statute was limited to crimes was
- 11 the phrase "now indictable."
- 12 Now, it's possible that the phrase "now
- indictable" did other work as well; but it was the only
- 14 language in the statute that limited the provision to
- 15 crimes.
- And so part -- part of the questioning by
- 17 the Court, understandably, has been to the effect of, if
- 18 Congress meant to change this in 1944, why didn't it do
- 19 something more direct to manifest that intent?
- 20 And part of our point is, in some sense,
- 21 removal of "now indictable" is indirect, but in some
- 22 sense removing the only language that previously limited
- 23 the -- the provision to crimes is the most way -- direct
- 24 way to go about it. If the statute had originally --
- JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, whoa, whoa. You can

- 1 say that it limited it or you can say that it -- it
- 2 showed -- it showed that the word "offense" in that
- 3 statute was being used to mean a criminal offense,
- 4 right?
- 5 MR. STEWART: I don't think --
- 6 JUSTICE SCALIA: It could. I acknowledge
- 7 that sometimes you can say "offense" and it means civil,
- 8 sometimes you can say that it means criminal, and
- 9 sometimes you can say it means both.
- 10 But what that language did in the original
- 11 statute was to make it clear that the word "offense" in
- 12 this statute was being used in a criminal sense. And I
- don't think that that implication is eliminated by
- 14 simply taking out the -- taking out the "now indictable"
- 15 language, which could have been eliminated for a very
- 16 different reason; and that is, to show that it -- it
- 17 operates prospectively.
- 18 MR. STEWART: I quess part of the point I
- 19 would make is if the initial version of the statute had
- 20 referred to existing -- statutes of limitations on
- 21 criminal offenses and Congress had then excised the word
- 22 "criminal," we would say -- I think that would be viewed
- 23 as very powerful evidence that Congress intended an
- 24 expansion.
- 25 JUSTICE SCALIA: But there would be no other

- 1 reason for eliminating the word "criminal"; whereas,
- 2 there is a very good other reason for eliminating the
- 3 phrase "now indictable."
- 4 MR. STEWART: Well, the reason that has been
- 5 postulated is that "now indictable" originally served
- 6 the purpose of making clear that the WSLA would not
- 7 revive expired prosecutions, and that this was no longer
- 8 necessary in 1944 because the statute was amended to
- 9 make that point clear separately.
- But, in fact, the 1942 version of the
- 11 statute said: "This Act shall apply to acts, offenses,
- or transactions where the existing statute of
- 13 limitations has not yet fully run, but..." it shall not
- 14 apply to acts that would otherwise be -- be barred.
- 15 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Counsel.
- MR. STEWART: Yes.
- 17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Is the Korean War
- 18 covered by the WSLA?
- 19 MR. STEWART: I think the general
- 20 understanding at that time was that only declared wars
- 21 were covered; and so, likely, the Korean War would not
- 22 have been covered. I don't know the --
- 23 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Is that your -- is
- 24 that your position now, that only declared wars are
- 25 covered?

- 1 MR. STEWART: Well, the statute was amended
- 2 in 2008; and it now provides -- and the current version
- 3 of the statute is at page 4-A. This is current 3287.
- 4 It says: "When the United States is at war
- 5 or Congress has enacted a specific authorization for the
- 6 use of the Armed Forces --"
- 7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Was there such an
- 8 authorization in the Korean War?
- 9 MR. STEWART: Not -- not pursuant to --
- 10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: No, no. I mean at
- 11 the time.
- MR. STEWART: Right.
- 13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I don't think there
- 14 was, right?
- 15 MR. STEWART: I don't -- I don't --
- 16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I'm trying to get at
- 17 the question of the breadth of your position. As I --
- 18 as I understand it, you're now saying "at war" doesn't
- 19 necessarily have to have a declared war.
- 20 MR. STEWART: I think what we would say is
- 21 at -- up under the current version of the -- the current
- 22 wording of the statute implies that "at war" does
- 23 require a declaration of war, but Congress has added an
- 24 additional category when there has been a UMF pursuant
- 25 to the War Powers Resolution.

1 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So if -- so if the 2 current version were effect -- were in effect in 1950, 3 the Korean War would not be covered, because there 4 wasn't a declared war? And my understanding is there 5 wasn't a specific authorization for the use of forces. 6 MR. STEWART: That would be my understanding as well, that Congress seems to have acted to extend the 7 statute beyond declared wars but not to anything that 8 9 could be considered military operations if they have not 10 been authorized in a particular manner. 11 JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Stewart, before your 12 time runs out, what -- what is the Government's position 13 on the -- on the point raised by counsel for Respondent; 14 namely, if there is a dismissal of -- on the merits of 15 a -- a civil action, is the government barred from later 16 bringing a different action on the same claim? Yes, we would think we would 17 MR. STEWART: 18 be barred. We think that was Congress's expectation in 1986 and that's the understanding of the statute that 19 20 we've been operating under; that is, our protection 21 under the statute is that when a qui tam suit is filed, 22 we have an initial opportunity to decide whether to 23 intervene or not. Even if we initially decide not to 24 intervene, we can move later to intervene for good cause 25 shown and so if we initially think the relator can do a

- 1 capable job but then we decide later, no, he can't, our
- 2 protection against the claim being badly litigated is
- 3 that we can take over the suit, and if we don't avail
- 4 ourselves of that protection and the case is decided
- 5 against us on the merits, then claim preclusion would
- 6 apply.
- 7 And I think in Taylor v. Sturgell, the Court
- 8 identified a number of categories of cases in which
- 9 nonparties can be barred in subsequent litigation. One
- 10 of them is when a litigant allows his claim to be
- 11 litigated by a representative, and the Court in Stevens
- described qui tam suits as a species of representational
- 13 standing.
- And I think the same principle would apply
- 15 to a suit brought by a second relator as well, that is
- 16 an additional category of nonparty preclusion that the
- 17 Court in Stevens -- I'm sorry, that the Court in
- 18 Taylor v. Sturgell identified was that when one party is
- 19 barred from litigating himself, he can't relitigate the
- 20 same claim through a proxy. And if the United States
- 21 would be barred by the judgment in the first qui tam
- 22 suit from filing its own suit, then to allow a second
- 23 relator to go forward on the same claim would, in
- 24 essence, be allowing the United States to relitigate
- 25 through a proxy. And to us, it makes perfect sense that

- 1 Congress drafted the first-to-file bar specifically with
- 2 reference to pending actions because --
- 3 JUSTICE KENNEDY: If the case is not -- the
- 4 first case is not dismissed on the merits, dismissed
- 5 without prejudice and then relator 2 files, your
- 6 position is that that suit may be maintained?
- 7 MR. STEWART: It would not be -- our
- 8 position is it would not be barred by the first-to-file
- 9 provision.
- Now, if -- the Court may want to look at --
- 11 JUSTICE KENNEDY: I'm curious to know, just
- 12 because of background, would the first suit toll the
- 13 statute of limitations as to the second relator?
- 14 MR. STEWART: I -- probably -- we believe
- 15 probably not. That is, I think typically the -- the
- 16 rule is that if the first suit is ultimately dismissed,
- 17 then the second suit proceeds as though nothing had
- 18 happened. But that time wouldn't be tolled. But the
- 19 Court may look at page 5a of the brief, which reproduces
- 20 the current version of the public disclosure bar, and it
- 21 says, this is about halfway down the page: "The court
- 22 shall dismiss an action or claim under this section,
- 23 unless opposed by the government, if substantially the
- 24 same allegations or transactions as alleged in the
- 25 action or claim were publicly disclosed in a Federal

- 1 criminal, civil, or administrative hearing in which the
- 2 Government or its agent is a party."
- 3 So often the effect of the
- 4 first suit may be to bar second relators from suing
- 5 under the public disclosure bar unless they qualify as
- 6 original sources.
- 7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, Mr.
- 8 Stewart.
- 9 Mr. Elwood, you have reserved 4 minutes.
- 10 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF JOHN P. ELWOOD
- ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
- MR. ELWOOD: Mr. Stewart said that the only
- 13 language in the provision in the Wartime Suspension of
- 14 Limitations Act which limited it to criminal -- limited
- 15 it to crimes, was the phrase "now indictable, and I
- 16 disagree with that. If you look at the Antitrust
- 17 Suspension Act that's reproduced in our brief, it said
- 18 -- what the Congress said there was "any violation."
- 19 It's very telling that 47 days after enacting the
- 20 Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act which used
- 21 "offense" to apply only to crimes, it said "any
- 22 violation which is now indictable or subject to a civil
- 23 proceeding." So it was the word "offense" there that
- 24 was limiting it to crimes, not the word -- not "now
- 25 indictable."

- 1 In addition, I want to be perfectly clear
- 2 about this, and at page 5 of our reply brief in note 3,
- 3 we go through all of the claimed criminal code
- 4 provisions which supposedly used the word "offense" to
- 5 mean a civil violation and they do not. Every time the
- 6 word "offense" appears, it is to describe the crime in
- 7 the statute, not something else. They may say the
- 8 conduct underlying the offense or something like that,
- 9 but every time they use the word "offense," it is to
- 10 refer to a crime and nothing else.
- 11 Mr. Stewart also mentioned this -- the Hutto
- 12 case, and to decide it against the backdrop of Hutto. I
- 13 want to point out that that -- the crime at issue in
- 14 Hutto is the last criminal code provision which they
- 15 have identified which used the word "offense" they say
- 16 to include a civil violation. And the Government there
- 17 said that that was taken care of, it's now no longer
- 18 a -- no longer applies to civil violations because
- 19 Congress amended it, 371, the conspiracy statute, to say
- 20 that a minor offense is a misdemeanor.
- 21 Well, that has exactly the same effect of
- 22 the statute that I talked about earlier that was in
- 23 force the day this provision of the Wartime Suspension
- 24 Act was enacted. It says that offenses are either
- 25 felonies or misdemeanors. Nobody has said a word about

- 1 that yet.
- 2 And it has exactly the same provision as the
- 3 amendment that Mr. Stewart says overruled Hutto. Also,
- 4 I think Hutto has to be viewed in light of the case it
- 5 cited, a five-page opinion that relied heavily on the
- 6 1893 case of Pettibone, which has said there can be
- 7 conspiracies to violate the civilian laws. So I think
- 8 Hutto is a conspiracy case and nothing more.
- 9 Oh, and with respect to the -- the res
- 10 judicata, I want to point out that at this point, still
- 11 no one has cited a case in which relator two is bound by
- 12 the loss of relator one. Taylor v. Sturgill talks about
- 13 representative litigation, and I think that that maybe
- 14 works in one direction, and that the government can be
- 15 bound by relator one's loss. But it's hard to say that
- 16 relator one -- I mean, at least, I will be more than
- 17 happy to argue this position, but I can expect there
- 18 will be some pushback, probably including from the
- 19 Government at that time, if I say that relator two was
- 20 the representative of relator one when relator two was a
- 21 stranger to relator one.
- 22 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Relator two is treated as
- 23 the Government for this purpose.
- 24 MR. ELWOOD: But in any event, no one has
- yet cited to me a case where this has already been

1	determined, so it's all litigation risk to my client
2	now. And Finally, I want to point out one final thing,
3	which is that Mr. Stewart said that a undeclared war
4	under the pre-amendment Wartime Suspension Act did not
5	apply to undeclared wars. The Fourth Circuit said
6	differently, and the Government has now confessed error
7	or at least they said that the Fourth Circuit erred in
8	that position. I just wanted to bring that to the
9	Court's attention, even though it is at most a tertiary
10	issue before this Court.
11	And if there are no further questions, we'll
12	rely on our submission.
13	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
14	The case is submitted.
15	(Whereupon, at 12:11 p.m., the case in the
16	above-entitled matter was submitted.)
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