App. No. _____

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

LAKSHMI ARUNACHALAM,
Petitioner,

v.

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION, JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., SAP AMERICA, INC., EDWARD L. TULIN, KEVIN J. CULLIGAN, THARAN GREGORY LANIER, APPLE INC., FACEBOOK, INC., ALPHABET INC., MICROSOFT CORPORATION, FISERV, INC., WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., FULTON FINANCIAL CORPORATION, SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC., ECLIPSE FOUNDATION, INC., CLAIRE T. CORMIER, DOUGLAS R. NEMEC, JOSEPH M. BEAUCHAMP, MICHAEL Q. LEE, DAVID ELLIS MOORE, MARK J. ABATE, MATTHEW JOHN PARKER, SASHA G. RAO, ROBERT SCOTT SAUNDERS, JESSICA R. KUNZ, CITIGROUP, INC., CITICORP, CITIBANK, N.A., RAMSEY M. AL-SALAM, CANDICE CLAIRE DECAIRE, GARTH WINN, MICHAEL J. SACKSTEDER, ALAN D. ALBRIGHT, KRISTIE DAVIS, ROBERT W. SCHROEDER, III, CAROLINE CRAVEN, RYAN T. HOLTE, LYFT, INC., UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION, INTUIT, INC., JOHN ALLEN YATES, JOHN H. BARR, JR., ANDREW JAMES ISBESTER, DOMINICK T. GATTUSO, KRONOS INCORPORATED, SCOTT DAVID BOLDEN, LORI A. GORDON,,
Respondents,

ON APPLICATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

SELF-REPRESENTED PETITIONER'S APPLICATION TO EXTEND TIME TO FILE A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Lakshmi Arunachalam, Ph.D.
Self-Represented Petitioner
222 Stanford Avenue, Menlo Park, CA 94025
Tel: (650) 690-0995; Email: laks22002@yahoo.com

Self-Represented Petitioner
Dr. Lakshmi Arunachalam

Dated: June 30, 2024

SELF-REPRESENTED PETITIONER'S APPLICATION TO EXTEND TIME TO FILE A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

To the Honorable John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States and Circuit Justice for the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit:

Self-Represented Petitioner Dr. Lakshmi Arunachalam ("Petitioner" or "Dr. Arunachalam") respectfully requests that the time to file a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in this matter be extended for sixty days (60) days to and including October 30, 2024. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("CAFC") issued its opinion on May 10, 2024 (*see* Ex. A). A timely filed combined petition for panel rehearing and for rehearing *en banc* was denied on May 30, 2024 (*see* Ex. B). Absent an extension of time, the Petition would therefore be due on August 30, 2024. Self-Represented Petitioner is filing this Application at least ten days before that date. See S. Ct. R. 13.5. This Court would have jurisdiction over the judgment under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1254(1).

BACKGROUND

Dr. Lakshmi Arunachalam is the inventor of the Internet of Things, IoT-Web Apps displayed on a Web browser. She was awarded grants of a dozen patents by the U.S. Government, all of which derive priority from her Provisional Patent Application with S/N 60/006,634, with priority date of November 1995. Her inventions are exemplified in the millions of Web Apps displayed on Google

Play and on Apple Play Store. Her inventions are as significant as electricity by Edison and the telephone by Alexander Graham Bell.

The Federal Circuit ("CAFC") is silent to District Court Errors and disqualifying stock holding by judges in the defendant that call for vacatur of District Court rulings. The Federal Circuit ignored its own valuable precedential ruling on vacatur of judicial decisions when a judge has disqualifying financial interest. *Centripetal Networks, Inc. v. Cisco Sys. Inc.,* 38 F.4th 1025 (Fed. Cir. 2022). Dr. Arunachalam respectfully requested CAFC to vacate **all** lower Court rulings, and remand. But the Federal Circuit has chosen to hush up its own errors and deny Dr. Arunachalam due process. The Federal Circuit even failed to docket Dr. Arunachalam's timely filed combined petition for panel rehearing and for rehearing *en banc,* attached herewith along with Ex. B. The Federal Circuit is silent to the fact that there has been **No** Case Management Conference in over a decade, **No** Discovery, **No** Hearing, **No** Trial, **No** Evidence of "vexatious litigant" — **No** basis in fact or the law — only hushing up by the Federal Circuit of the fact that the Judge was disqualified from presiding over the case due to his undisclosed ownership of stock in the defendant. Federal Circuit's 11/30/2020 Order in her Appeal No. 2020-1493 requiring her to get leave of court to file a rehearing of her appeal is unconstitutional and denies Dr. Arunachalam due process, to obfuscate that the Federal Circuit and District Courts breached their oaths of office in not

abiding by Chief Justice John Marshall's ruling in *Fletcher v Peck*, 10 U.S. 87 (1810), the mandated prohibition from not abiding by the law that a grant is a contract that cannot be repudiated. The Federal Circuit violated this Court's landmark ruling by Chief Justice John Marshall in *Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,* 17 U.S. 518 (1819) and failed to uphold the Contract Clause of the Constitution, damaging Dr. Arunachalam by allowing Big-Tech to steal her patents. It is even a national security threat, with the Federal Circuit allowing Dr. Arunachalam's inventions to be sent to China for copying and sending infringing products into the United States.

This case requires an answer to one or more precedent-setting questions of exceptional importance:

1. Whether the Federal Circuit's Order is not void for vagueness. What is a "vexatious" litigant? Not defined and therefore has not been proven.
2. Whether the word "vexatious" was deemed to lack due process insertion of fair warning.
3. Whether the word "vexatious" "is unconstitutionally vague because it subjects the exercise of the right to a neutral judge to an unascertainable standard, and unconstitutionally broad because it authorizes the punishment of constitutionally protected conduct.

4. Whether the Federal Circuit's and the District Court's arbitrary Order of "vexatious litigant," never before been defined nor proven, is unconstitutionally vague, either on its face or as applied, in violation of "the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution."
5. Whether the Federal Circuit's Order that is too vague for the average citizen to understand, deprives citizens of their rights to due process.
6. Whether the Federal Circuit's Order is void for vagueness, if an average person cannot determine who is regulated, what conduct is prohibited, or what punishment may be imposed by a law.
7. Whether such application was rendered unduly harsh and oppressive, and therefore unconstitutional.
8. Whether an Order of "vexatious litigant" cannot be so vague that a person of ordinary intelligence cannot figure out what is innocent activity and what is illegal;
9. Whether the Order of "vexatious litigant" does not give people adequate notice of what is prohibited and what is permitted, even if a person does not violate the law while demanding one's right to a neutral judge without stock in the litigant;
10. Whether Big-Tech and the District and Appellate Courts, in retaliation, calling and ruling an individual inventor of the fundamental protocols for

any Web App displayed on a Web browser — the Internet of Things (IoT), a "vexatious litigant" because she claims her constitutionally protected right to a neutral judge with no stock in the litigant, which then renders laws seeking to limit said "liberty" either unenforceable or limited in scope.

11. Whether the Federal Circuit's Order that specified no standard of conduct at all, "vexatious" being based on personal opinion, "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning," and given its breadth, the Order would give the judiciary and Big-Tech the power to punish conduct which would otherwise be constitutionally protected;

12. Whether the Federal Circuit's Order violated the constitutionally protected right of a citizen to a neutral judge, a core guarantee which could not be abridged merely because Big-Tech might be "vexed" for taking an inventor's property without paying a license fee for it.

13. Whether the Federal Circuit's Order would give the judiciary an unlawful power to punish virtually any act that a vague Order could constitute a due process violation;

14. Whether the Federal Circuit's Order that could have both constitutional and unconstitutional applications, the factual record from the lack of trial was insufficient to determine which had occurred.

15. Whether the Federal Circuit ought to send the case back to Delaware District Court to elucidate exactly how the Court considered the inventor's actions "vexatious."

16. Whether the Federal Circuit's Order creating circumstances where individuals are left unclear about whether their actions are permitted are ultimately too vague to be constitutional.

17. Whether the District and Appellate Courts and Big-Tech labeled a citizen repeatedly persevering in claiming her constitutionally protected right to a neutral judge to no avail as a "vexatious litigant."

18. Whether the Federal Circuit must declare its Order as unconstitutionally vague as a statement under the Supreme Court.

19. Whether the Federal Circuit should have vacated and remanded the case.

20. Whether a judge or a citizen can hope to conduct himself in a lawful manner if an Order which is designed to regulate conduct does not lay down ascertainable rules and guidelines to govern its enforcement.

21. Whether the Federal Circuit's Order represents an unconstitutional exercise of the judicial power of the Appellate Court and is therefore void.

22. Whether the Federal Circuit questioned the constitutionality of the Order because it enabled any act to be prosecuted on the streets for no rhyme or reason.

23. Whether procedural due process requires government officials to follow fair procedures before depriving a person of life, liberty, or property. When the government seeks to deprive a person of one of those interests, procedural due process requires the government to afford the person, at minimum, notice, an opportunity to be heard, and a decision made by a neutral decision maker.

24. Whether this due process protection extends to all government proceedings that can result in an individual's deprivation.

25. Whether a citizen has a right to an unbiased tribunal and whether the decision maker's conclusion must rest solely on the legal rules and evidence adduced at the hearing, which this citizen was deprived of.

26. The requirement of a neutral judge has introduced a constitutional dimension to the question of whether a judge should recuse himself from a case. Specifically, this Court has ruled that in certain circumstances, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a judge to recuse himself on account of a potential or actual conflict of interest.

27. Whether Judge Andrews must recuse in view of the fact that this Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires judges to recuse themselves not only when actual bias has been demonstrated or when

the judge has an economic interest in the outcome of the case but also when "extreme facts" create a "probability of bias."

28. Whether the Federal Circuit's Order violates due process in that it is **impermissibly vague** on its face and **an arbitrary restriction on personal liberties**.

29. Whether the Federal Circuit's Order of "vexatious" litigant without defining the word fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits.

30. Where the right to a neutral judge is in fact harmless and innocent, whether the Federal Circuit's "vexatious litigant" Order itself is an unjustified impairment of liberty."

31. Whether the Federal Circuit's Order gave power, without bounds, to the judiciary to determine who violated the Order.

32. Whether the Federal Circuit's "vexatious litigant" Order **needs more definiteness and clarity**.

POINTS OF LAW OR FACT OVERLOOKED OR MISAPPREHENDED BY THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURT:

1. **THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S ARGUMENTS FAIL, INTENDED TO DEFLECT THE AUDIENCE AWAY BY SKIRTING THE CENTRAL TENET OF THE NON-FRIVOLOUS ISSUE AT HAND: JUDGE HOLDING STOCK IN THE DEFENDANT IN THE VERY FIRST CASE 12-282 (D.Del.) VOIDS *ALL* ORDERS.**

ALL of the arguments presented by Dr. Arunachalam in her Corrected Opening Appeal Brief, in response to the Federal Circuit's Corrected Order of 9/5/23, go to the District Court's 6/23/22 filing injunction/vexatious litigant Order. Yet the Federal Circuit sidesteps the central tenet of denying Dr. Arunachalam a neutral judge from her very first case, and has engaged in character assassination of Dr. Arunachalam without addressing the main issue of void Orders because the Judges had stock in the litigant JP Morgan Chase & Co.

The glaring omission by the Federal Circuit to address the non-frivolous, substantive fact of the Judge holding stock in the defendant in her very first case 12-282 (D.Del.) voids all orders, speaks volumes. Its arguments are invalid, against the backdrop of the Judge holding stock in the defendant voids all orders, and invalid sanctions by the financially conflicted Judge holding stock in the defendant.

2. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT DID NOT DEFINE THE WORD "VEXATIOUS," LEAVING IT VAGUE. THE ORDER IS VOID FOR VAGUENESS.

See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999); "'[A] law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits,'" noted Justice Stevens, "[i]f the loitering is in fact harmless and innocent, the dispersal order itself is an unjustified impairment of liberty." This ordinance gave power, without bounds, to

the police to determine who violated the ordinance. Overall, the majority concluded that the ordinance needs more definiteness and clarity.

Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009); violates due process in that it is impermissibly vague on its face and an arbitrary restriction on personal liberties.

Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939);

Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009);

3. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT IGNORED ITS OWN VALUABLE PRECEDENTIAL RULING ON VACATUR OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS WHEN A JUDGE HAS DISQUALIFYING FINANCIAL INTEREST. *Centripetal Networks, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,* 38 F.4th 1025 (Fed. Cir. 2022).

The Federal Circuit is silent that before the Federal Circuit, **Cisco had argued that the statute demands vacatur of all judicial decisions** starting from the August 11 date **when Judge Morgan learned of his disqualifying financial interest**. "Any other outcome would send the undesirable message that this Court does not take the disqualification statute seriously and would undermine public confidence in the judiciary." CAFC's decision was authored by Judge Dyk and joined by Judges Taranto and Cunningham. The Federal Circuit has ignored this valuable precedential case law, CAFC reversing the ruling by a judge whose wife had stock in a litigant applies to Dr. Arunachalam's cases, because

Judge Andrews had direct common stock in JPMorgan and PTAB Judges held direct stock in Microsoft.

4. JUSTICE DELAYED IS JUSTICE DENIED — A DISTRICT COURT ERROR PROPAGATED FOR A DECADE.

The fact is: it is a District Court error that has propagated for over a decade that a judge holding stock in the defendant voids all orders. The Clerk of the District Court should be able to reverse all Orders of the District Court related to Dr. Arunachalam's patents-in-suit. WSJ did an investigation in over 131 cases and reversed them all for judicial stock ownership. Vacatur of judicial decisions by Judge Andrews and Judge Robinson and Orders in all of Dr. Arunachalam's cases, is in order.

5. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S SILENCE IS ACQUIESCENCE THAT JUDGE HOLDING STOCK IN THE DEFENDANT VOIDS ALL ORDERS — A DISTRICT COURT ERROR PROPAGATED FOR A DECADE.

The Federal Circuit's silence is acquiescence to Dr. Arunachalam's substantive argument of judge holding stock in the defendant voids all orders; that it has been a District Court error that has propagated forward for over a decade that Judge Andrews and PTAB Judges had direct stock in the defendant JPMorgan and Microsoft, voiding all Orders.

The Federal Circuit is silent to the Judicial Disqualification Statute demanding vacatur of judicial decisions, screaming for attention for over a

decade. The Federal Circuit is silent to the District Court Errors, propagated for a decade, into underlying Case 1:20-cv-1020, blamed unlawfully upon Dr. Arunachalam. The Federal Circuit is silent to the District Court's Order punishing Dr. Arunachalam for her lawful defense with a Filing Injunction that is contrary to Patent Statutes that allow Patentee to sue infringers — obfuscating the District Court's own Errors.

I. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT IS SILENT TO THE DISTRICT COURT'S ERRORS, THAT DO NOT MAKE Dr. Arunachalam A "VEXATIOUS LITIGANT" NOR REQUIRING A FILING INJUNCTION.

The Federal Circuit is silent to the fact that the District and Appellate Courts have no evidence that Dr. Arunachalam is a "vexatious litigant." The Federal Circuit is silent to the fact that dubbing her a "vexatious litigant" and imposing a filing injunction is merely to obfuscate the multiple courts' own errors, propagated for over a decade fraudulently by the Respondents/Defendants-Appellees to their own advantage.

A. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT IS SILENT TO THE DISTRICT COURT'S FILING INJUNCTION, CONTRARY TO PATENT STATUTES, PUNISHING LAWFUL DEFENSE, OBFUSCATED DISTRICT COURT ERRORS FOR A DECADE INTO UNDERLYING CASE 1:20-CV-1020.

The Federal Circuit is silent to the fact that there has been **No** Case Management Conference in over a decade, **No** Discovery, **No** Hearing, **No** Evidence of "vexatious litigant" — **No** basis in fact or the law — only hushing up

by the Federal Circuit of the fact that the Judge was disqualified from presiding over the case due to his ownership of stock in the defendant.

B. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT IS SILENT TO THE FACT THAT DISTRICT COURT AND PTAB JUDGES HELD UNDISCLOSED DISQUALIFYING FINANCIAL INTERESTS IN A LITIGANT INVOLVING THE PATENTS-IN-SUIT, DENYING PLAINTIFF HER RIGHT TO A NEUTRAL JUDGE — A MATERIAL COURT ERROR.

The Federal Circuit is silent to 28 U.S.C. 455 that requires the recusal of any Judge whose "impartiality might reasonably be questioned" or who "has a financial interest in a party to the proceeding." The Federal Circuit is silent to the fact that on 2/9/16, Andrews ("RGA") admitted holding common stock in a litigant three years into the case. The Federal Circuit is silent to PTAB Judges McNamara, Siu punished Plaintiff for pointing out they held common stock in a litigant.

C. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT IS SILENT TO THE FACT THAT ON 5/8/2015, JUDGE ROBINSON ("SLR") DISQUALIFIED HERSELF FROM CASE 12-282-RGA UPON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION OF SLR'S CONFLICTS OF INTEREST—NO VACATUR TO DATE — A MATERIAL COURT ERROR.

The Federal Circuit is silent to District Court Orders that are void in Cases 12-282; 14-490; and all of Plaintiff Dr. Arunachalam's cases.

D. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT IS SILENT TO THE FACT THAT ON 5/14/2014, SLR FAILED TO APPLY PATENT PROSECUTION HISTORY— A MATERIAL COURT ERROR.

The Federal Circuit is silent to the fact that claim terms were defined in the Patent Prosecution History and are **not** indefinite.

E. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT IS SILENT TO THE DISTRICT COURT'S 6/23/22 ERRONEOUS RULING OF 'VEXATIOUS LITIGANT' WITH FILING INJUNCTION BY A RECKLESSLY MISINFORMED JUDGE NOREIKA, WITH NO EVIDENCE OF FACTS OR THE LAW, COPIED VERBATIM DISTRICT COURT JUDGE STARK'S 12/29/21 ORDER D.I.s 258/259, WHEREAS CAFC JUDGE STARK IS DISQUALIFIED FROM RULING ON THE APPEAL OF HIS OWN RULING IN THE DISTRICT COURT CASE 1:20-CV-1020.

The Timeline: 20-1020(DE)/Fed Ckt Appeal 22-2121: *Arunachalam v. IBM, et al* proves Dr. Arunachalam filed a timely NOA. The Federal Circuit is silent that filing patent lawsuits is allowed by Patent Statutes and does not make her a 'vexatious litigant' requiring filing injunction.

II. <u>THE FACTS AND THE LAW</u> PRESENTED BY Dr. Arunachalam <u>STAY SOLIDLY VALID IN PERPETUITY</u>.

The Federal Circuit is silent to the fact that they silenced Dr. Arunachalam from raising the Judge's stock ownership in the defendant, a non-frivolous fact and the law, that remains solidly valid in perpetuity.

III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT IS SILENT THAT IN THE 6/23/22 DISTRICT COURT ORDER, JUDGE NOREIKA, COPIED VERBATIM THE 12/29/2021 ORDER OF DISTRICT COURT JUDGE STARK, AND IGNORED THAT:

A. The Federal Circuit is silent that Judges Andrews ("RGA") and Robinson ("SLR") presided over Dr. Arunachalam's cases, involving her patents-in-suit despite disqualifying undisclosed financial interests demanding vacatur of their judicial decisions, and further without considering Patent Prosecution History. The Federal Circuit is silent that RGA denied Dr. Arunachalam's Motions to Substitute

as Plaintiff as the Real-Party-in-Interest as Assignee of the patents-in-suit, so as to not allow her to appeal — making all Orders void in Cases 12-282-RGA and 14-490-RGA and all of her other cases involving the patents-in-suit.

B. The Federal Circuit is silent that District and Appellate **Courts failed to consider the facts and the law**. The Federal Circuit is silent that Dr. Arunachalam filed a ***Traverse Special*** against the entire (*false*) processes and Orders of the District Court Case 1:20-cv-01020-LPS/Noreika/GBW.

> "Mr. Justice Swayne: "A **right without** a **remedy** is as **if** it **were not.** For **every beneficial purpose** it **may** be **said not** to **exist**." *Von Hoffman v City of Quincy,* 71 U.S.(4 Wall.) 535, 552, 554, 604 (1867).

The CAFC silence amounted to a proactive failure to address the totality of the record. Since the merits of the case had not yet been addressed by the Federal Circuit, the opposing parties would not be prejudiced in the least by giving Dr. Arunachalam more time. The Court of Appeals denied rehearing *en banc* on May 30, 2024. Ex. B and even failed to docket Dr. Arunachalam's Combined Petition for Panel Re-Hearing and en Banc Re-Hearing, wanting to hush up CAFC's malfeasance.

Dr. Arunachalam was denied individual liberty and property outside the sanction of law and without due process of law. This Court stated that due process is violated "if a practice or rule offends some principle of justice so rooted in the

traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." *Snyder v. Massachusetts*, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).

This Court has stated on numerous occasions that where an individual is facing a deprivation of life, liberty, or property, procedural due process mandates that he or she is entitled to adequate notice, a hearing, and a neutral judge.

Dr. Arunachalam has been deprived these most fundamental rights that are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," *Palko v. Connecticut*, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); an individual's right to some kind of a hearing ("the right to support his allegations by arguments however brief and, if need be, by proof however informal."); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., stated, *Baldwin v. Missouri*, 281 U.S. 586, 595 (1930):

> "persons holding interests protected by the due process clause are entitled to "some kind of hearing"...that assessment is to be made both concretely, and in a holistic manner. It is not a matter of approving this or that particular element of a procedural matrix in isolation, but of assessing the suitability of the ensemble in context."

Dr. Arunachalam, 76 years old, was not given a fair remedy in consideration of her own medical crisis of over 18 months from shingles in her eye from the COVID vaccine and a concussion from a fall from the post-herpetic neuralgia, and the crisis of her 73-year old, terminally ill U.S. Citizen sister, a single lady from New Jersey who has been abducted in India for over 9 months now and Dr. Arunachalam's need to work with lawyers in India and the U.S. State

Department to help bring her sister back to USA for immediate medical treatment especially when considering that the defendant would not have been prejudiced since the merits of the case had not yet been argued.

Indeed, this case was dismissed on *purely procedural grounds* before the merits had even been presented, in contravention of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

The CAFC panel imposed on Dr. Arunachalam for her own medical condition and her terminally ill sister's abduction in India, a cruel and unusual punishment "so grossly excessive as to amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law," "tortured" her to perform miracles despite her medical condition and her terminally ill sister's abduction in India, in the ambiguous and unknown timeframe. The CAFC failed to provide an effective remedy, when any number of practical, easy remedies were available.

REASONS FOR GRANTING AN EXTENSION OF TIME

The time to file a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be extended for sixty (60) days for these reasons:

1. Self-Represented Petitioner, 76-year old Dr. Arunachalam, currently is required to undergo medical treatment for 4 - 6 weeks yet to be scheduled after the U.S. Supreme Court allows her the extension. Due to the upcoming medical treatment schedule and the press of other business (getting her terminally ill 73-

year old sister U.S. citizen and single lady from New Jersey abducted in India over 9 months ago back to the USA for immediate medical treatment, requiring Dr. Arunachalam to work with her sister's lawyers 24x7 in India and with the U.S. State Department), additional time is warranted to allow preparation of a Petition.

2. This case presents an extraordinarily important issue warranting a carefully prepared Petition. The decision of the Court of Appeals, if followed, will conflict with Supreme Court precedent with respect to its findings on: (a) the denial of liberty and property without due process of law, (b) on denials of a hearing based solely on procedure over merits, and (c) a court's handling of a litigant's certified medical crisis. The decision also conflicts squarely with decisions of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals on the same subject.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is contrary to the following decision(s) of the Supreme Court of the United States:

TXO Production Corp. ***v.*** *Alliance Resources Corp.,* 509 U. S. 443, 470-471 (1993) (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment); in which Justice Scalia ruled that "*The Due Process Clause... its whole purpose is to prevent arbitrary deprivations of liberty or property; The Due Process Clause... guarantees... process.*"

Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994);

City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999); "'[A] law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it

leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits,'" noted Justice Stevens, "[i]f the loitering is in fact harmless and innocent, the dispersal order itself is an unjustified impairment of liberty." "This ordinance gave power, without bounds, to the police to determine who violated the ordinance. Overall, the majority concluded that the ordinance needs more definiteness and clarity."

Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009); "violates due process in that it is impermissibly vague on its face and an arbitrary restriction on personal liberties."

Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939);

Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009);

Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971);

United States v. Carlton, 512 US 26 (1994); "such application was rendered unduly harsh and oppressive, and therefore unconstitutional." "without notice, ... gives a different and more oppressive legal effect to conduct undertaken before enactment of the statute."

The decision of the Court of Appeals is inconsistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's earlier decisions, its due process "fundamental rights" jurisprudence.

Griswold **v.** *Connecticut*, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965)

Meyer **v.** *Nebraska*, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923);

Pierce **v.** *Society of Sisters,* 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925);

"The Supreme Court recognizes a constitutionally-based "liberty" which then renders laws seeking to limit said "liberty" either unenforceable or limited in scope;"

Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937);

Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. PUC, 301 U.S. 292 (1937);

United States v. Abilene & S.R. Co., 265 U.S. 274, 288-289 (1924);

Wichita R. & Light Co. v. PUC, 260 U.S. 48, 57—59, (1922);

In *re Murchison*, 349 U.S. 133 (1955);

Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 45—46 (1950);

or the precedent(s) of the Federal Circuit court: *Centripetal Networks, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,* 38 F.4th 1025 (Fed. Cir. 2022).

Most recently, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the decades-old Chevron decision, delivering a far-reaching and potentially lucrative win to business interests of inventors against the USPTO, which did not act within its statutory authority, to which the Federal Circuit remained silent, denying Dr. Arunachalam due process.

Federal Circuit's 11/30/2020 Order in her Appeal No. 2020-1493 requiring her to get leave of court to file a rehearing of her appeal is unconstitutional and denies Dr. Arunachalam due process, to obfuscate that the Federal Circuit and District Courts breached their oaths of office in not abiding by Chief Justice John

Marshall's ruling in *Fletcher v Peck*, 10 U.S. 87 (1810), the mandated prohibition from not abiding by the law that a grant is a contract that cannot be repudiated. Furthermore, the Federal Circuit violated this Court's landmark ruling by Chief Justice John Marshall in *Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,* 17 U.S. 518 (1819) and failed to uphold the Contract Clause of the Constitution, damaging Dr. Arunachalam by allowing Big-Tech to steal her patents. It is even a national security threat, with the Federal Circuit allowing Dr. Arunachalam's inventions to be sent to China for copying and sending infringing products into the United States.

3. There is at minimum a substantial prospect that this Court will grant certiorari and, indeed, a substantial prospect of reversal.

4. Petitioner is interviewing outside counsel with Supreme Court expertise to provide consulting assistance to her in this case. Additional time is necessary and warranted for that counsel, *inter alia*, to become familiar with the record, relevant legal precedents and historical materials, and the issues involved in this matter.

5. No meaningful prejudice would arise from the extension, as this Court would hear oral argument and issue its opinion in the same Term regardless of whether an extension is granted.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the time to file a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in this matter is respectfully requested to be extended sixty (60) days to and including October 30, 2024.

Dated: June 30, 2024

Respectfully submitted,

Lakshmi Arunachalam

Lakshmi Arunachalam

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Self-Represented Petitioner
Dr. Lakshmi Arunachalam

VERIFICATION

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. Section 1746, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct based upon my personal knowledge.

Lakshmi Arunachalam

Lakshmi Arunachalam

Dr. Lakshmi Arunachalam
Self-Represented Petitioner
222 Stanford Ave,
Menlo Park, CA 94025
650 690 0995
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Executed on June 30, 2024

Self-Represented Petitioner
Dr. Lakshmi Arunachalam

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on June 30, 2024, I filed an original and two copies of the foregoing "*Self-Represented* Petitioner's Application to Extend Time to File a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari," Exhibits and Verification, by Fedex for overnight delivery, with: Clerk of Court, Supreme Court of the United States, 1 First Street, NE, Washington, DC 20543 and that I served a copy of the same on June 30, 2024 on counsel of record for Respondents via the U.S. Postal Service for overnight delivery to:

Tharan Gregory Lanier tglanier@jonesday.com
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June 30, 2024

Respectfully submitted,

Lakshmi Arunachalam

Lakshmi Arunachalam

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Self-Represented Petitioner
Dr. Lakshmi Arunachalam

App. No. _____

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

LAKSHMI ARUNACHALAM,
Petitioner,

v.

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION, JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., SAP AMERICA, INC., EDWARD L. TULIN, KEVIN J. CULLIGAN, THARAN GREGORY LANIER, APPLE INC., FACEBOOK, INC., ALPHABET INC., MICROSOFT CORPORATION, FISERV, INC., WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., FULTON FINANCIAL CORPORATION, SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC., ECLIPSE FOUNDATION, INC., CLAIRE T. CORMIER, DOUGLAS R. NEMEC, JOSEPH M. BEAUCHAMP, MICHAEL Q. LEE, DAVID ELLIS MOORE, MARK J. ABATE, MATTHEW JOHN PARKER, SASHA G. RAO, ROBERT SCOTT SAUNDERS, JESSICA R. KUNZ, CITIGROUP, INC., CITICORP, CITIBANK, N.A., RAMSEY M. AL-SALAM, CANDICE CLAIRE DECAIRE, GARTH WINN, MICHAEL J. SACKSTEDER, ALAN D. ALBRIGHT, KRISTIE DAVIS, ROBERT W. SCHROEDER, III, CAROLINE CRAVEN, RYAN T. HOLTE, LYFT, INC., UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION, INTUIT, INC., JOHN ALLEN YATES, JOHN H. BARR, JR., ANDREW JAMES ISBESTER, DOMINICK T. GATTUSO, KRONOS INCORPORATED, SCOTT DAVID BOLDEN, LORI A. GORDON,,
Respondents,

ON APPLICATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

APPENDIX OF REFERENCED EXHIBITS IN ACCOMPANIMENT OF SELF-REPRESENTED PETITIONER'S APPLICATION TO EXTEND TIME TO FILE A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Dr. Lakshmi Arunachalam
Self- Represented Petitioner
222 Stanford Avenue
Menlo Park, CA 94025
Tel: (650) 690-0995; Email: laks22002@yahoo.com

Dated: June 30, 2024

Self-Represented Petitioner
Dr. Lakshmi Arunachalam

APPENDIX OF REFERENCED EXHIBITS

DESCRIPTION OF ENTRY	DATE	RECORD ENTRY NO.
CAFC Opinion and Order	May 10, 2024	Ex. A
CAFC *En Banc* Rehearing Denied and CAFC failed to docket Dr. Arunachalam's timely filed Combined Petition for Panel Re-Hearing and *En Banc* Re-Hearing, to hush up its own errors.	May 30, 2024	Ex. B

Ex. A: CAFC Opinion and Order

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

LAKSHMI ARUNACHALAM,
Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION, JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., SAP AMERICA, INC., EDWARD L. TULIN, KEVIN J. CULLIGAN, THARAN GREGORY LANIER, APPLE INC., FACEBOOK, INC., ALPHABET INC., MICROSOFT CORPORATION, FISERV, INC., WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., FULTON FINANCIAL CORPORATION, SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC., ECLIPSE FOUNDATION, INC., CLAIRE T. CORMIER, DOUGLAS R. NEMEC, JOSEPH M. BEAUCHAMP, MICHAEL Q. LEE, DAVID ELLIS MOORE, MARK J. ABATE, MATTHEW JOHN PARKER, SASHA G. RAO, ROBERT SCOTT SAUNDERS, JESSICA R. KUNZ, CITIGROUP, INC., CITICORP, CITIBANK, N.A., RAMSEY M. AL-SALAM, CANDICE CLAIRE DECAIRE, GARTH WINN, MICHAEL J. SACKSTEDER, ALAN D. ALBRIGHT, KRISTIE DAVIS, ROBERT W. SCHROEDER, III, CAROLINE CRAVEN, RYAN T. HOLTE, LYFT, INC., UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION, INTUIT, INC., JOHN ALLEN YATES, JOHN H. BARR, JR., ANDREW JAMES ISBESTER, DOMINICK GATTUSO, KRONOS INCORPORATED, SCOTT DAVID BOLDEN, LORI A. GORDON,
Defendants-Appellees

2022-2121

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Delaware in No. 1:20-cv-01020-VAC, Judge Maryellen Noreika.

JUDGMENT

THIS CAUSE having been considered, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

AFFIRMED

FOR THE COURT

May 10, 2024
Date

Jarrett B. Perlow
Clerk of Court

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

LAKSHMI ARUNACHALAM,
Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION, JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., SAP AMERICA, INC., EDWARD L. TULIN, KEVIN J. CULLIGAN, THARAN GREGORY LANIER, APPLE INC., FACEBOOK, INC., ALPHABET INC., MICROSOFT CORPORATION, FISERV, INC., WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., FULTON FINANCIAL CORPORATION, SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC., ECLIPSE FOUNDATION, INC., CLAIRE T. CORMIER, DOUGLAS R. NEMEC, JOSEPH M. BEAUCHAMP, MICHAEL Q. LEE, DAVID ELLIS MOORE, MARK J. ABATE, MATTHEW JOHN PARKER, SASHA G. RAO, ROBERT SCOTT SAUNDERS, JESSICA R. KUNZ, CITIGROUP, INC., CITICORP, CITIBANK, N.A., RAMSEY M. AL-SALAM, CANDICE CLAIRE DECAIRE, GARTH WINN, MICHAEL J. SACKSTEDER, ALAN D. ALBRIGHT, KRISTIE DAVIS, ROBERT W. SCHROEDER, III, CAROLINE CRAVEN, RYAN T. HOLTE, LYFT, INC., UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION, INTUIT, INC., JOHN ALLEN YATES, JOHN H. BARR, JR., ANDREW JAMES ISBESTER, DOMINICK GATTUSO, KRONOS INCORPORATED, SCOTT DAVID BOLDEN, LORI

A. GORDON,
Defendants-Appellees

2022-2121

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Delaware in No. 1:20-cv-01020-VAC, Judge Maryellen Noreika.

Decided: May 10, 2024

LAKSHMI ARUNACHALAM, Menlo Park, CA, pro se.

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Before LOURIE, DYK, and REYNA, *Circuit Judges*.

PER CURIAM.

Dr. Lakshmi Arunachalam, proceeding pro se, appeals from an anti-filing injunction order entered by the United States District Court for the District of Delaware. The district court also dismissed Dr. Arunachalam's underlying action. Dr. Arunachalam attempted to appeal both the dismissal of the underlying case and the anti-filing injunction. The appeal was untimely with respect to the underlying action, and we dismissed that appeal in a previous order. *Arunachalam v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp.*, No. 22-2121, ECF No. 145, at 3 (Fed. Cir. June 5, 2023). As to the appeal of the injunction order, we conclude that we have jurisdiction and that there was no abuse of discretion by the district court. Therefore, we *affirm* the injunction order.

BACKGROUND

Dr. Arunachalam has filed numerous lawsuits in the federal district courts, many of which relate to patents she previously held or now holds. She has also sued lawyers, judges, court staff, and parties that were involved in those cases under a wide variety of legal theories. The underlying litigation here is another such case. While Dr. Arunachalam seeks patent infringement damages in the complaint, she also accused 46 named defendants and 100 unnamed defendants—including corporations, judges, lawyers, and government officials that were involved in Dr. Arunachalam's past cases—of violating the common law, the United States Constitution, and several statutory provisions, including the patent statutes.

The complaint is difficult to follow. As best we can discern, Dr. Arunachalam asserted that she is "the inventor of the Internet of Things (IoT) – Web Apps displayed on a Web browser" and "was awarded a dozen patents by the U.S. Government with a priority date of 11/13/1995." *Arunachalam v. Gordon*, No. 20-cv-1020, Dkt. No. 170, at 26 (D. Del. June 23, 2022) ("*Complaint*"). She sought compensatory damages against all of the defendants "based on per Web transaction per Web App used by Defendants, their customers and Partners, but not less than $100B," *id.* at 99, and requested an order for defendants "to pay the royalties rightfully owed to the inventor," *id.* at 41.

The complaint further alleged that "[t]he Judiciary and USPTO aided and abetted in the unjust enrichment of [the] Corporate Infringers [on] the order of trillions of dollars," and that judges and the USPTO misapplied patent law. *Id.* at 37. The 14 claims of the complaint alleged violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, violations of the Administrative Procedure Act, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, a witness tampering statute, the Americans with Disabilities Act, a conspiracy statute, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1955, the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as well as the patent statutes. Dr. Arunachalam also raised theories of recovery based in tort law. Many of these claims depended on Dr. Arunachalam's repeated assertion that the defendants had made false statements in connection with her earlier patent cases.

The district court dismissed all of the claims and entered judgment on December 29, 2021. At the same time, the district court ordered Dr. Arunachalam to show cause why she should not be subject to an anti-filing injunction. Dr. Arunachalam filed a brief in opposition. *Arunachalam*, No. 20-cv-1020, Dkt. No. 263. The district court then entered an anti-filing injunction order:

> [Dr. Arunachalam] is hereby enjoined from filing, without prior authorization of the Court, any complaint, lawsuit, or petition for writ of mandamus, related to: (i) the patents she holds; (ii) the more than 100 patent lawsuits she has filed, (iii) patent infringement, and/or (iv) any and all actions taken by individuals during the course of patent litigation involving Plaintiff.

Appx. 38.[1]

On July 6, 2022, Dr. Arunachalam attempted to appeal to this court both the dismissal of her complaint and the entry of the anti-filing injunction. Because Dr. Arunachalam's appeal of the final judgment order dismissing her claims was untimely, we concluded that we lacked jurisdiction to hear those issues and dismissed that part of the appeal. *Arunachalam*, No. 22-2121, ECF No. 145, at 3, 5 (citing the 60-day time limit of 28 U.S.C. § 2107(b) and Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B)). We declined to resolve at that time whether this court had jurisdiction over the part of the appeal concerning the anti-filing injunction "based on the subject matter of the underlying complaint," and we invited briefing from Dr. Arunachalam "to argue in favor of our jurisdiction and challeng[e] the anti-filing order." *Id.* at 4.

In her principal brief, Dr. Arunachalam represented that the "U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware ('DED') alleges to have subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1338(a). This Court ('CAFC') has appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295 over the District Court's Order(s)." Appellant's Corrected Opening Br. at 1,

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[1] "Appx." citations refer to the hand-numbered appendix pages filed with Appellant's principal brief. Appellant's Corrected Opening Br., *Arunachalam*, No. 2022-2121, ECF No. 148.

Arunachalam, No. 22-2121, ECF No. 148. On the merits, she argued that "a [f]iling [i]njunction is contrary to [p]atent [s]tatutes that allow [p]atentee to sue infringers," *id.* at 8, and that "[f]iling patent lawsuits is allowed by [p]atent [s]tatutes and does not make her a 'vexatious litigant' requiring [a] filing injunction," *id.* at 11 (emphasis removed).

The appellees urged dismissal or transfer of the appeal or, in the alternative, affirmance of the injunction order.

DISCUSSION

A

We first consider the question of jurisdiction. We conclude that our court has jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1), we have jurisdiction over "an appeal from a final decision of a district court of the United States . . . in any civil action arising under . . . any Act of Congress relating to patents . . . ." Thus, our jurisdiction extends at least to cases in which "federal patent law creates the cause of action" for one claim. *Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp.*, 882 F.3d 1075, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting *Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp.*, 486 U.S. 800, 809 (1988)).

We think that the jurisdictional test set forth in *Xitronix* is met here, at least because Claim 9 invokes the "Patent Statutes" and sets forth a theory of recovery for patent infringement, namely that the defendants "aided and abetted Big-Tech, and Microsoft in stealing Plaintiff's property, worth trillions of dollars in unjust enrichment by Big-Tech." *Complaint*, at 81, 88. The damages sought are also those that would be recoverable in an action for patent infringement, specifically damages "based on per Web transaction per Web App used by Defendants, their customers and Partners, but not less than $100B," *id.* at 99, which the plaintiff alleged represents "the royalties rightfully owed to

the inventor," *id.* at 41. This is sufficient to bring the appeal under our jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). *See Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der angewandten Forschung E.V. v. Sirius XM Radio Inc.*, 59 F.4th 1319, 1323–24 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (holding that the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over ancillary orders in cases arising under the federal patent laws).

B

Having determined that we have jurisdiction over the anti-filing injunction order on appeal, we turn to the merits. The federal courts have the inherent power to issue injunctions against the abuse of the judicial process, including by the repeated filing of meritless and vexatious pleadings. *Allen v. United States*, 88 F.4th 983, 986–87 (Fed. Cir. 2023); *see also Brow v. Farrelly*, 994 F.2d 1027, 1038 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding that the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, provides the power). The party to be enjoined must be given notice of the injunction and an opportunity to be heard before the injunction is entered. *Allen*, 88 F.4th at 988; *Brow*, 994 F.2d at 1038. Both our court and the Third Circuit review the imposition of an anti-filing injunction for abuse of discretion. *Allen*, 88 F.4th at 986–87; *In re Packer Ave. Assocs.*, 884 F.2d 745, 747 (3d Cir. 1989). We see no abuse of discretion in the district court's order.

At the outset, we note that the district court gave Dr. Arunachalam notice of the proposed injunction and the grounds on which it was based, and Dr. Arunachalam was heard on the issue fully in a 37 page opposition brief. Accordingly, the district court met the notice and opportunity to be heard requirements.

As the district court stated in both its notice and in its injunction order, the District of Delaware had previously sanctioned Dr. Arunachalam for her litigation conduct and awarded almost $150,000 in attorneys' fees against her. *Arunachalam v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp.*, 989 F.3d 988, 997

(Fed. Cir. 2021). Our court affirmed that sanction, finding there that the "record amply demonstrate[d] Dr. Arunachalam's vexatious and wanton litigation conduct," including her repeated assertion of dismissed claims against the same defendants in another district court. *Id.*

During the pendency of that appeal, our court further determined that "Dr. Arunachalam has an established pattern of vexatious behavior in this and other courts" and that "her vexatious and harassing behavior" had continued during that case. *Arunachalam v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp.*, No. 20-1493, ECF No. 55, at 2 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 30, 2020). As a result, our court imposed filing restrictions requiring Dr. Arunachalam to seek leave of court to file any documents other than merits briefs, motions for extensions of time, and motions for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* in her direct appeals. *Id.* at 4. The Supreme Court has also found that Dr. Arunachalam "repeatedly abused [the Supreme Court's] process," and directed the clerk "not to accept any further petition in noncriminal matters from petitioner" unless the docketing fees were paid and the filing complied with the Supreme Court's formatting rule. *Arunachalam v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.*, 141 S. Ct. 449, 449–50 (2020).

The district court found below that "[n]otwithstanding the sanctions, [Dr. Arunachalam] continued to sue previous defendant corporations, attorneys who represented those corporations, judges who presided over the cases, judges' staff, and attorneys who represented the federal government. [Dr. Arunachalam's] filings and pleadings raised specious, implausible, frivolous and vexatious claims." Appx. 35–36. The district court also determined that Dr. Arunachalam's complaint was "replete with scandalous and baseless allegations without factual support." *Id.* at 38.

We see no error in that assessment, which accurately described Dr. Arunachalam's conduct in this case as well

as other previously-filed cases. *See, e.g.*, *Arunachalam v. Harris*, No. 21-5102, 2021 WL 5262582 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 27, 2021); *Arunachalam v. United States*, No. 2021-1410, 2021 WL 2470305 (Fed. Cir. June 4, 2021); *Arunachalam v. Andrews*, No. 5:17-CV-03383-EJD, 2018 WL 513178 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2018); *Arunachalam v. United States*, No. 5:16-CV-06591-EJD, 2017 WL 3730340 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2017). We also agree with the district court that this extraordinary history of abuse of the judicial process constitutes the exigent circumstances that justify the entry of an anti-filing injunction.

Dr. Arunachalam argues that the district court made an error regarding the number of patent lawsuits that she has filed. That finding, which was based on Dr. Arunachalam's own pleading that she has been involved "in over 100 cases," does not constitute an abuse of discretion. Appx. 38 (quoting *Complaint*, at 33). Regardless of the precise number of lawsuits that she has filed, Dr. Arunachalam concedes on appeal that she has filed numerous lawsuits, sometimes against the same defendants, and characterizes herself as having been involved in "125, rather 62 lawsuits." Appellant's Corrected Opening Br. at 11, *Arunachalam*, No. 22-2121 (emphasis removed). On this record, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion by referring to "more than 100 patent lawsuits" in its order. Appx. 38. Moreover, even if Dr. Arunachalam's lower figures were accurate, we do not think that this would transform the entry of the injunction into an abuse of discretion. The injunction was properly based on Dr. Arunachalam's repeated filing of "lawsuits that contain frivolous legal arguments and are vexatious and abusive of the judicial process" after the resolution of her initial wave of patent suits.

Appx. 38. This finding is not affected by the number of patent lawsuits Dr. Arunachalam originally filed.[2]

Finally, we see no abuse of discretion in the scope of the district court's order, which is narrowly tailored to prevent Dr. Arunachalam from filing similarly meritless and vexatious cases without the approval of the district court. The order here specifically targets Dr. Arunachalam's repeated filings of lawsuits asserting patent infringement claims that she has already lost and raising frivolous accusations against individuals involved in those earlier cases. Moreover, the order provides a process for Dr. Arunachalam to seek leave of court to file documents that would otherwise be enjoined. Thus, we cannot say that the order is overbroad or an abuse of discretion.

AFFIRMED

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[2] Dr. Arunachalam also argues that Judge Andrews should be recused because Judge Andrews purportedly owned "direct common stock in [defendant] JPMorgan." Appellant's Corrected Opening Br. at 11, *Arunachalam*, No. 22-2121 (emphasis omitted). But Judge Andrews was never assigned to this case.

Ex. B: CAFC *En Banc* Rehearing Denied and CAFC failed to docket Dr. Arunachalam's timely filed Combined Petition for Re-Hearing and *En Banc* Re-Hearing, to hush up its own errors.

NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

LAKSHMI ARUNACHALAM,
Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION, JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., SAP AMERICA, INC., EDWARD L. TULIN, KEVIN J. CULLIGAN, THARAN GREGORY LANIER, APPLE INC., FACEBOOK, INC., ALPHABET INC., MICROSOFT CORPORATION, FISERV, INC., WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., FULTON FINANCIAL CORPORATION, SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC., ECLIPSE FOUNDATION, INC., CLAIRE T. CORMIER, DOUGLAS R. NEMEC, JOSEPH M. BEAUCHAMP, MICHAEL Q. LEE, DAVID ELLIS MOORE, MARK J. ABATE, MATTHEW JOHN PARKER, SASHA G. RAO, ROBERT SCOTT SAUNDERS, JESSICA R. KUNZ, CITIGROUP, INC., CITICORP, CITIBANK, N.A., RAMSEY M. AL-SALAM, CANDICE CLAIRE DECAIRE, GARTH WINN, MICHAEL J. SACKSTEDER, ALAN D. ALBRIGHT, KRISTIE DAVIS, ROBERT W. SCHROEDER, III, CAROLINE CRAVEN, RYAN T. HOLTE, LYFT, INC., UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION, INTUIT, INC., JOHN ALLEN YATES, JOHN H. BARR, JR., ANDREW JAMES ISBESTER, DOMINICK GATTUSO, KRONOS INCORPORATED, SCOTT DAVID BOLDEN, LORI A. GORDON,
Defendants-Appellees

2022-2121

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Delaware in No. 1:20-cv-01020-VAC, Judge Maryellen Noreika.

SUA SPONTE

Before LOURIE, DYK, and REYNA, *Circuit Judges*.

PER CURIAM.

ORDER

On May 23, 2024, the court received a combined petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc from Lakshmi Arunachalam. The court notes that the petition was submitted without leave of court as required by the November 30, 2020 order issued in Appeal No. 2020-1493.

Upon consideration thereof,

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

Dr. Arunachalam is required to file a motion for leave to file a petition for rehearing consistent with the November 30, 2020 order.

FOR THE COURT

May 30, 2024
Date

Jarrett B. Perlow
Clerk of Court

2022-2121

IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

LAKSHMI ARUNACHALAM,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

V.

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION, JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., SAP AMERICA, INC., EDWARD L. TULIN, KEVIN J. CULLIGAN, THARAN GREGORY LANIER, APPLE INC., FACEBOOK, INC., ALPHABET INC., MICROSOFT CORPORATION, FISERV, INC., WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., FULTON FINANCIAL CORPORATION, SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC., ECLIPSE FOUNDATION, INC., CLAIRE T. CORMIER, DOUGLAS R. NEMEC, JOSEPH M. BEAUCHAMP, MICHAEL Q. LEE, DAVID ELLIS MOORE, MARK J. ABATE, MATTHEW JOHN PARKER, SASHA G. RAO, ROBERT SCOTT SAUNDERS, JESSICA R. KUNZ, CITIGROUP, INC., CITICORP, CITIBANK, N.A., RAMSEY M. AL-SALAM, CANDICE CLAIRE DECAIRE, GARTH WINN, MICHAEL J. SACKSTEDER, ALAN D. ALBRIGHT, KRISTIE DAVIS, ROBERT W. SCHROEDER, III, CAROLINE CRAVEN, RYAN T. HOLTE, LYFT, INC., UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION, INTUIT, INC., JOHN ALLEN YATES, JOHN H. BARR, JR., ANDREW JAMES ISBESTER, DOMINICK T. GATTUSO, KRONOS INCORPORATED, SCOTT DAVID BOLDEN, LORI A. GORDON,
Defendants-Appellees,

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Delaware in Case No. 1:20-cv-01020-LPS/GBW, Judge Leonard P. Stark/Maryellen Noreika

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PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT LAKSHMI ARUNACHALAM'S COMBINED PETITION FOR PANEL REHEARING AND REHEARING EN BANC

May 22, 2024

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Self-Represented Plaintiff-Appellant,
Lakshmi Arunachalam

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STATEMENT BY COUNSEL/SELF-REPRESENTED APPELLANT

Based on my professional judgment, I believe the panel decision is contrary to the following decision(s) of the Supreme Court of the United States:

TXO Production Corp. ***v.*** *Alliance Resources Corp.,* 509 U. S. 443, 470-471 (1993) (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment); in which Justice Scalia ruled that "The Due Process Clause… its whole purpose is to prevent arbitrary deprivations of liberty or property; The Due Process Clause… guarantees… process."

Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994);

City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999); "'[A] law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits,'" noted Justice Stevens, "[i]f the loitering is in fact harmless and innocent, the dispersal order itself is an unjustified impairment of liberty." "This ordinance gave power, without bounds, to the police to determine who violated the ordinance. Overall, the majority concluded that the ordinance needs more definiteness and clarity."

Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009); "violates due process in that it is impermissibly vague on its face and an arbitrary restriction on personal liberties."

Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939);

Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009);

Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971);

United States v. Carlton, 512 US 26 (1994); "such application was rendered unduly harsh and oppressive, and therefore unconstitutional." "without notice, ... gives a different and more oppressive legal effect to conduct undertaken before enactment of the statute."

The panel decision is inconsistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's earlier decisions, its due process "fundamental rights" jurisprudence.

Griswold **v.** *Connecticut*, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965)

Meyer **v.** *Nebraska*, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923);

Pierce **v.** *Society of Sisters,* 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925);

"The Supreme Court recognizes a constitutionally-based "liberty" which then renders laws seeking to limit said "liberty" either unenforceable or limited in scope;"

Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937);

Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. PUC, 301 U.S. 292 (1937);

United States v. Abilene & S.R. Co., 265 U.S. 274, 288-289 (1924);

Wichita R. & Light Co. v. PUC, 260 U.S. 48, 57—59, (1922);

In *re Murchison*, 349 U.S. 133 (1955);

Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 45—46 (1950);

or the precedent(s) of this court: *Centripetal Networks, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc.*, 38 F.4th 1025 (Fed. Cir. 2022).

Based on my professional judgment, I believe this appeal requires an answer to one or more precedent-setting questions of exceptional importance:

1. Whether this Court's Order is not void for vagueness. What is a vexatious litigant, not defined and therefore has not been proven?
2. Whether the word "vexatious" was deemed to lack due process insertion of fair warning.
3. Whether the word "vexatious" is unconstitutionally vague.
4. Whether the word "vexatious" "is unconstitutionally vague because it subjects the exercise of the right to a neutral judge to an unascertainable standard, and unconstitutionally broad because it authorizes the punishment of constitutionally protected conduct.
5. Whether this Court's and the District Court's arbitrary Order of "vexatious litigant," never before been defined nor proven, is unconstitutionally vague, either on its face or as applied, in violation of "the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution."
6. Whether this Court's Order that is too vague for the average citizen to understand, deprives citizens of their rights to due process.

7. Whether this Court's Order is void for vagueness, if an average person cannot determine who is regulated, what conduct is prohibited, or what punishment may be imposed by a law.
8. Whether such application was rendered unduly harsh and oppressive, and therefore unconstitutional.
9. Whether an Order of "vexatious litigant" cannot be so vague that a person of ordinary intelligence cannot figure out what is innocent activity and what is illegal;
10. Whether the Order of "vexatious litigant" does not give people adequate notice of what is prohibited and what is permitted, even if a person does not violate the law while demanding one's right to a neutral judge without stock in the litigant;
11. Whether Big-Tech and the Courts, in retaliation, calling and ruling an individual inventor of the fundamental protocols for any Web App displayed on a Web browser— the Internet of Things (IoT), a "vexatious litigant" because she claims her constitutionally protected right to a neutral judge with no stock in the litigant, which then renders laws seeking to limit said "liberty" either unenforceable or limited in scope.
12. Whether this Court's Order that specified no standard of conduct at all, "vexatious" being based on personal opinion, "men of common intelligence

must necessarily guess at its meaning," and given its breadth, the Order would give the judiciary and Big-Tech the power to punish conduct which would otherwise be constitutionally protected;

13. Whether this Court's Order violated the constitutionally protected right of a citizen to a neutral judge, a core guarantee which could not be abridged merely because Big-Tech might be "vexed" for taking an inventor's property without paying a license fee for it.

14. Whether this Court's Order would give the judiciary an unlawful power to punish virtually any act that a vague Order could constitute a due process violation;

15. Whether this Court's Order that could have both constitutional and unconstitutional applications, the factual record from the lack of trial was insufficient to determine which had occurred.

16. Whether this Court ought to send the case back to Delaware District Court to elucidate exactly how the Court considered the inventor's actions "vexatious."

17. Whether this Court's Order creating circumstances where individuals are left unclear about whether their actions are permitted are ultimately too vague to be constitutional.

18. Whether the Courts and Big-Tech labeled a citizen repeatedly persevering in claiming her constitutionally protected right to a neutral judge to no avail as a "vexatious litigant."

19. Whether this Court must declare its Order as unconstitutionally vague as a statement under the Supreme Court.

20. Whether this Court should have vacated and remanded the case.

21. Whether a judge or a citizen can hope to conduct himself in a lawful manner if an Order which is designed to regulate conduct does not lay down ascertainable rules and guidelines to govern its enforcement.

22. Whether this Court's Order represents an unconstitutional exercise of the judicial power of this Appellate Court and is therefore void.

23. Whether this Court questioned the constitutionality of the Order because it enabled any act to be prosecuted on the streets for no rhyme or reason.

24. Whether procedural due process requires government officials to follow fair procedures before depriving a person of life, liberty, or property. When the government seeks to deprive a person of one of those interests, procedural due process requires the government to afford the person, at minimum, notice, an opportunity to be heard, and a decision made by a neutral decision maker.

25. Whether this due process protection extends to all government proceedings that can result in an individual's deprivation.

26. Whether a citizen has a right to an unbiased tribunal and whether the decision maker's conclusion must rest solely on the legal rules and evidence adduced at the hearing, which this citizen was deprived of.

27. The requirement of a neutral judge has introduced a constitutional dimension to the question of whether a judge should recuse himself from a case. Specifically, the Supreme Court has ruled that in certain circumstances, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a judge to recuse himself on account of a potential or actual conflict of interest.

28. Whether Judge Andrews must recuse in view of the fact that the United States Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires judges to recuse themselves not only when actual bias has been demonstrated or when the judge has an economic interest in the outcome of the case but also when "extreme facts" create a "probability of bias."

29. Whether this Court's Order violates due process in that it is **impermissibly vague** on its face and **an arbitrary restriction on personal liberties.**

30. Whether this Court's Order of "vexatious" litigant without defining the word fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so

vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits.

31. Where the right to a neutral judge is in fact harmless and innocent, whether this Court's "vexatious litigant" Order itself is an unjustified impairment of liberty."

32. Whether this Court's Order gave power, without bounds, to the judiciary to determine who violated the Order.

33. Whether this Court's "vexatious litigant" Order **needs more definiteness and clarity**.

Lakshmi Arunachalam
Self-Represented Plaintiff-Appellant

COMBINED PETITION FOR REHEARING AND REHEARING *EN BANC*

POINTS OF LAW OR FACT OVERLOOKED OR MISAPPREHENDED BY THE COURT; AND ARGUMENT:

Appellant incorporates by reference the preceding pp 1-8 as if written herein.

1. **THIS COURT'S ARGUMENTS FAIL, AS IT IS INTENDED TO DEFLECT THE AUDIENCE AWAY BY SKIRTING THE CENTRAL TENET OF THE NON-FRIVOLOUS ISSUE AT HAND: JUDGE HOLDING STOCK IN THE DEFENDANT IN THE VERY FIRST CASE 12-282 (D.Del.) VOIDS *ALL* ORDERS.**

ALL of the arguments presented by Dr. Arunachalam in her Corrected Opening Appeal Brief, in response to the Court's Corrected Order of 9/5/23, go to the District Court's 6/23/22 filing injunction/vexatious litigant Order. Yet this Court sidesteps the central tenet of denying Appellant a neutral judge from her very first case, and has engaged in character assassination of Appellant without addressing the main issue of void Orders because the Judges had stock in the litigant JP Morgan Chase & Co.

The glaring omission by this Court to address the non-frivolous, substantive fact of the Judge holding stock in the defendant in her very first case 12-282 (D.Del.) voids all orders, speaks volumes. Its arguments are invalid, against the backdrop of the Judge holding stock in the defendant voids all orders, and invalid sanctions by the financially conflicted Judge holding stock in the defendant.

2. **THIS COURT DID NOT DEFINE THE WORD "VEXATIOUS," LEAVING IT VAGUE. THE ORDER IS VOID FOR VAGUENESS.**

See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999); "'[A] law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits,'" noted Justice Stevens, "[i]f the loitering is in fact harmless and innocent, the dispersal order itself is an unjustified impairment of liberty." This ordinance gave power, without bounds, to the police to determine who violated the ordinance. Overall, the majority concluded that the ordinance needs more definiteness and clarity.

Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009); violates due process in that it is impermissibly vague on its face and an arbitrary restriction on personal liberties.

Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939);

Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009);

3. THIS COURT IGNORED ITS OWN VALUABLE PRECEDENTIAL RULING ON VACATUR OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS WHEN A JUDGE HAS DISQUALIFYING FINANCIAL INTEREST. *Centripetal Networks, Inc. v. Cisco Sys.,* *Inc.*, 38 F.4th 1025 (Fed. Cir. 2022).

This Court is silent that before the Federal Circuit, **Cisco had argued that the statute demands vacatur of all judicial decisions** starting from the August 11 date **when Judge Morgan learned of his disqualifying financial interest**. "Any other outcome would send the undesirable message that this Court does not take the disqualification statute seriously and would undermine public confidence in the judiciary." CAFC's decision was authored by Judge Dyk and joined by Judges

Taranto and Cunningham. This Court has ignored this valuable precedential case law, CAFC reversing the ruling by a judge whose wife had stock in a litigant applies to Dr. Arunachalam's cases, because Judge Andrews had direct common stock in JPMorgan and PTAB Judges held direct stock in Microsoft.

4. JUSTICE DELAYED IS JUSTICE DENIED — A DISTRICT COURT ERROR PROPAGATED FOR A DECADE.

The fact is: it is a District Court error that has propagated for over a decade that a judge holding stock in the defendant voids all orders. The Clerk of the District Court should be able to reverse all Orders of the District Court related to Dr. Arunachalam's patents-in-suit. WSJ did an investigation in over 131 cases and reversed them all for judicial stock ownership. Vacatur of judicial decisions by Judge Andrews and Judge Robinson and Orders in all of Dr. Arunachalam's cases, is in order.

5. THIS COURT'S SILENCE IS ACQUIESCENCE THAT JUDGE HOLDING STOCK IN THE DEFENDANT VOIDS ALL ORDERS — A DISTRICT COURT ERROR PROPAGATED FOR A DECADE.

This Court's silence is acquiescence to Dr. Arunachalam's substantive argument of judge holding stock in the defendant voids all orders; that it has been a District Court error that has propagated forward for over a decade that Judge Andrews and PTAB Judges had direct stock in the defendant JPMorgan and Microsoft, voiding all Orders.

This Court is silent to the Judicial Disqualification Statute demanding vacatur of judicial decisions, screaming for attention for over a decade. This Court is silent to the District Court Errors, propagated for a decade, into underlying Case 1:20-cv-1020, blamed unlawfully upon Dr. Arunachalam. This Court is silent to the District Court's Order punishing Dr. Arunachalam for her lawful defense with a Filing Injunction that is contrary to Patent Statutes that allow Patentee to sue infringers — obfuscating the District Court's own Errors.

I. THIS COURT IS SILENT TO THE DISTRICT COURT'S ERRORS, THAT DO NOT MAKE APPELLANT A "VEXATIOUS LITIGANT" NOR REQUIRING A FILING INJUNCTION.

This Court is silent to the fact that the District and Appellate Courts have no evidence that Dr. Arunachalam is a "vexatious litigant." This Court is silent to the fact that dubbing her a "vexatious litigant" and imposing a filing injunction is merely to obfuscate the multiple courts' own errors, propagated for over a decade fraudulently by the Defendants-Appellees to their own advantage.

A. THIS COURT IS SILENT TO THE DISTRICT COURT'S FILING INJUNCTION, CONTRARY TO PATENT STATUTES, PUNISHING LAWFUL DEFENSE, OBFUSCATED DISTRICT COURT ERRORS FOR A DECADE INTO UNDERLYING CASE 1:20-CV-1020.

This Court is silent to the fact that there has been **No** Case Management Conference in over a decade, **No** Discovery, **No** Hearing, **No** Evidence of "vexatious litigant" — **No** basis in fact or the law — only hushing up by this Court

of the fact that the Judge was disqualified from presiding over the case due to his ownership of stock in the defendant.

B. THIS COURT IS SILENT TO THE FACT THAT DISTRICT COURT AND PTAB JUDGES HELD UNDISCLOSED DISQUALIFYING FINANCIAL INTERESTS IN A LITIGANT INVOLVING THE PATENTS-IN-SUIT, DENYING PLAINTIFF HER RIGHT TO A NEUTRAL JUDGE — A MATERIAL COURT ERROR.

This Court is silent to 28 U.S.C. 455 that requires the recusal of any Judge whose "impartiality might reasonably be questioned" or who "has a financial interest in a party to the proceeding." This Court is silent to the fact that on 2/9/16, Andrews ("RGA") admitted holding common stock in a litigant three years into the case. This Court is silent to PTAB Judges McNamara, Siu punished Plaintiff for pointing out they held common stock in a litigant.

C. THIS COURT IS SILENT TO THE FACT THAT ON 5/8/2015, JUDGE ROBINSON ("SLR") DISQUALIFIED HERSELF FROM CASE 12-282-RGA UPON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION OF SLR'S CONFLICTS OF INTEREST—NO VACATUR TO DATE — A MATERIAL COURT ERROR.

This Court is silent to District Court Orders that are void in Cases 12-282; 14-490; and all of Plaintiff's cases.

D. THIS COURT IS SILENT TO THE FACT THAT ON 5/14/2014, SLR FAILED TO APPLY PATENT PROSECUTION HISTORY— A MATERIAL COURT ERROR.

This Court is silent to the fact that claim terms were defined in the Patent Prosecution History and are not indefinite.

E. THIS COURT IS SILENT TO THE DISTRICT COURT'S 6/23/22 ERRONEOUS RULING OF 'VEXATIOUS LITIGANT' WITH FILING INJUNCTION BY A RECKLESSLY MISINFORMED JUDGE NOREIKA, WITH NO EVIDENCE OF FACTS OR THE LAW, COPIED VERBATIM DISTRICT COURT JUDGE STARK'S 12/29/21 ORDER D.I.s 258/259, WHEREAS CAFC JUDGE STARK IS DISQUALIFIED FROM RULING ON THE APPEAL OF HIS OWN RULING IN THE DISTRICT COURT CASE 1:20-CV-1020.

The Timeline: 20-1020(DE)/Fed Ckt Appeal 22-2121: *Arunachalam v. IBM, et al* proves Dr. Arunachalam filed a timely NOA. This Court is silent that filing patent lawsuits is allowed by Patent Statutes and does not make her a 'vexatious litigant' requiring filing injunction.

II. THE FACTS AND THE LAW PRESENTED BY APPELLANT STAY SOLIDLY VALID IN PERPETUITY.

This Court is silent to the fact that they silenced Dr. Arunachalam from raising the Judge's stock ownership in the defendant, a non-frivolous fact and the law, that remains solidly valid in perpetuity.

III. THIS COURT IS SILENT THAT IN THE 6/23/22 DISTRICT COURT ORDER, JUDGE NOREIKA, COPIED VERBATIM THE 12/29/2021 ORDER OF DISTRICT COURT JUDGE STARK, AND IGNORED THAT:

A. This Court is silent that Judges Andrews ("RGA") and Robinson ("SLR") presided over Dr. Arunachalam's cases, involving her patents-in-suit despite disqualifying financial interests demanding vacatur of their judicial decisions, and further without considering Patent Prosecution History. This Court is silent that RGA denied Dr. Arunachalam's Motions to Substitute as Plaintiff as the Real-

Party-in-Interest as Assignee of the patents-in-suit, so as to not allow her to appeal — making all Orders void in Cases 12-282-RGA and 14-490-RGA and all of her other cases involving the patents-in-suit.

B. This Court is silent that **Courts failed to consider the facts and the law**. This Court is silent that Dr. Arunachalam filed this ***Traverse Special*** against the entire (*false*) processes and Orders of the District Court Case 1:20-cv-01020-LPS/Noreika/GBW.

> "Mr. Justice Swayne: "A **right without** a **remedy** is as **if** it **were not**. For **every beneficial purpose** it **may** be **said not** to **exist**." *Von Hoffman v City of Quincy,* 71 U.S.(4 Wall.) 535, 552, 554, 604 (1867).

CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT

This Court is silent to District Court Errors and disqualifying stock holding by judges in the defendant that call for vacatur of District Court rulings. This Court ignored its own valuable precedential ruling on vacatur of judicial decisions when a judge has disqualifying financial interest**.** *Centripetal Networks, Inc. v. Cisco Sys. Inc.,* 38 F.4th 1025 (Fed. Cir. 2022). Appellant respectfully requests CAFC to vacate **all** lower Court rulings, and remand. Certificate of Service is attached.

May 22, 2024

Respectfully submitted,

Lakshmi Arunachalam

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Self-Represented Plaintiff-Appellant,
Lakshmi Arunachalam

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

Dr. Lakshmi Arunachalam
v.
International Business Machines Corporation, *et al,*
No. 22-2121

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on 5/22/2024, I sent a copy of this brief and any attachments to:

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and one original and 3 copies via Fedex to: Clerk of Court, U. S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 717 Madison Place NW, Washington, DC 20439.

May 22, 2024

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH FRAP 32(G)

The undersigned hereby certifies that this brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 32(g).

1. The brief contains 3075 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(g).

2. The brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word in 14 point Times New Roman font.

May 22, 2024

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ADDENDUM WITH THE COURT'S DISPOSITIVE ORDER, OPINION, OR JUDGMENT OF AFFIRMANCE WITHOUT OPINION

No.	Title of Document	Date	Page #
1	OPINION filed for the court by Lourie, Circuit Judge; Dyk, Circuit Judge and Reyna, Circuit Judge. Nonprecedential Per Curiam Opinion. Service as of this date by the Clerk of Court. [1003423] [MVH] [Entered: 05/10/2024 10:13 AM]	05/10/2024	APPX1-APPX12
2	JUDGMENT. AFFIRMED. Terminated on the merits after submission on the briefs. COSTS: Costs taxed against Appellant(s). Mandate to issue in due course. For information regarding costs, petitions for rehearing, and petitions for writs of certiorari click here. Service as of this date by the Clerk of Court. [1003424] [MVH] [Entered: 05/10/2024 10:15 AM]	05/10/2024	APPX13-APPX14