EXHIBIT C

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted February 26, 2024*
Decided February 27, 2024

By the Court:

Nos. 22-2903 & 23-1388

MARK BOCHRA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 21 C 3887

Sara L. Ellis,
Judge.

ORDER

Mark Bochra, a Coptic Christian of Egyptian descent, sued the Department of Education under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after it rejected his request to investigate his law school for discriminating against him. The district judge dismissed the suit for three reasons. First, Bochra lacked standing in part: He sought to challenge the Department's definition of antisemitism, but Bochra was not injured by it. Second, Bochra's claim under the APA that the Department wrongly refused to investigate his charge of discrimination failed because Bochra had the alternative remedy of suing the school for discrimination. Third, Bochra's contention under § 1983 that changes to the Department's case-processing manual violated his

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

right to due process was baseless because he had no protectible interest in the manual. All those reasons were correct; consequently we affirm.

Bochra attended Florida Coastal School of Law where he clashed with his peers and disputed his grade in one class. After the school's efforts to resolve these conflicts failed, Bochra filed an administrative complaint with the Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights, asserting that the law school discriminated against him based on his religion and national origin. After unsuccessfully mediating the complaint, the Office concluded that insufficient evidence supported Bochra's allegations and closed the administrative complaint. His administrative appeal was also unsuccessful. Years later, the law school stopped enrolling new students after the Department ruled it ineligible on unrelated grounds to receive federal funding, and it has since closed.

Bochra later sued the Department under the APA and § 1983. He appears to worry that Jewish people are at fault for his conflicts at the school and the Department's failure to grant him administrative relief. This worry led to his three charges: First, the Department uses the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance's definition of antisemitism, and Bochra believes it generally results in the preferential treatment of Jewish people. (He petitioned to represent a class of persons harmed by the definition.) Second, as the Department was processing his administrative complaint, it revised its case-processing manual, and Bochra believes the revision prompted the Department to stop investigating his law school, in violation of the APA. Third, Bochra contends that by revising the manual the Department also violated his right to due process.

The judge granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. First, the judge ruled that Bochra lacked standing to contest the Department's definition of antisemitism (or to represent his proposed class) because Bochra suffered no injury from it. Next, the judge dismissed Bochra's claim that the Department violated the APA in denying him relief on his discrimination complaint. She explained that because Bochra had a remedy under Title VI for any discrimination by the school, a suit against the Department under the APA was unavailable. Finally, his due process claim failed because Bochra lacked a protectible interest in the case-processing manual. Concluding that any amendment to the complaint would be futile, the judge dismissed the suit with prejudice.

We begin our analysis with Bochra's challenge to the Department's definition of antisemitism, and like the district judge, we conclude that he lacks standing to pursue it. Federal courts are limited to reviewing cases or controversies, and these arise only when a plaintiff has an actual or imminent injury fairly traceable to the defendant.

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). But Bochra does not assert that, under the Department's definition of antisemitism, he is accused of antisemitism, not protected from it, or otherwise injured by it. The district court thus rightly dismissed the claim. And, similarly, the judge did not abuse her discretion in denying Bochra's petition to certify a class of those allegedly harmed by the definition. Apart from his own lack of standing, Bochra is not represented by counsel and thus cannot adequately represent the proposed class. *See Howard v. Pollard*, 814 F.3d 476, 478 (7th Cir. 2015).

Next, Bochra has no claim under the APA against the Department because, as the district court ruled, he has an alternative remedy. The APA authorizes judicial review of a final agency action only if there is "no other adequate remedy in a court." 5 U.S.C. § 704; *Walsh v. U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs*, 400 F.3d 535, 537–38 (7th Cir. 2005). But he had an adequate remedy. If Bochra believes that the law school discriminated against him and the Department did not remedy it, then he could have sued the law school, as a recipient of federal funds, under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to achieve the remedy he seeks. *See Women's Equity Action League v. Cavazos*, 906 F.2d 742, 751 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (recognizing Title VI as adequate remedy for discrimination by federal-funds recipients and dismissing claim under the APA). Bochra responds that the law school no longer receives federal funds and has closed. But Bochra also tells us that he was aggrieved by the Department's inaction years before the school lost its funding and closed, and he does not deny that he could have sued the school when he had the chance. He thus had an adequate remedy against the law school for discrimination. And in any event, courts may not review non-prosecution decisions that by statute are committed to the agency's discretion, as here. *See Heckler v. Chaney*, 470 U.S. 821, 837–38 (1985).

Finally, Bochra argues that he has a property or liberty interest in the previous version of the Department's case-processing manual, and the Department changed its manual without according him due process. He is wrong. As Bochra describes the manual, it addresses the Department's procedures for processing administrative complaints. Procedural rules alone, however, do not create a property or liberty interest. *See Olim v. Wakinekona*, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983) ("Process is not an end in itself. Its constitutional purpose is to protect a substantive interest to which the individual has a legitimate claim of entitlement."). Bochra's due process claim therefore has no merit.

AFFIRMED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Everett McKinley Dirksen
United States Courthouse
Room 2722 - 219 S. Dearborn Street
Chicago, Illinois 60604

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FINAL JUDGMENT

February 27, 2024

By the Court:

Nos. 22-2903 & 23-1388	MARK BOCHRA, Plaintiff - Appellant v. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, et al., Defendants - Appellees
Originating Case Information:	
District Court No: 1:21-cv-03887 Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division District Judge Sara L. Ellis	

The judgment of the District Court is **AFFIRMED**, with costs, in accordance with the decision of this court entered on this date.

Clerk of Court

form name: **c7_FinalJudgment** (form ID: **132**)

EXHIBIT D

"I came to complete not to refute. I came light to the World." Jesus Christ

No. 22-2903 and 23-1388

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Mark Bochra, individually and on Behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs -Appellants,

V.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION; Betsy Devos, in her official and individual capacity as former Secretary for the Department of Education and Kenneth Marcus, in his official and individual capacity as the former Secretary for OCR; Miguel Cardona, in his official Capacity as the Current Secretary for the Department of Education, Suzanne Goldberg in her official and individual capacity as the Former secretary for OCR, and Secretary Catherine Lhamon in her official Capacity as the current Secretary for OCR.[1]

Defendants -Appellees.

U.S.C.A.-7th Circuit
FILED
04/19/2024

DATE OF DECISION:
02/27/2024

On Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Northern District of Illinois
No. 1:21-cv-03887 (Judge Sara L. Ellis)

PETITION FOR PANEL RE-HEARING AND HEARING EN BANC

Mark Bochra
5757 North Sheridan Road, Apt 13B
Chicago, IL 60660
Plaintiff, Pro Se

[1] The parties mostly involved were former secretary Betsy Devos and former secretary Kenneth Marcus but because leadership changed from the Trump administration to the Biden administration, current secretary for the department of education and current secretary for office for civil rights had to be named in the ongoing litigation. The new administration took over leadership during Mark's appeal process of his OCR Complaint; they were partially involved.

"I came to complete not to refute. I came light to the World." Jesus Christ

FRAP 35 (B) STATEMENT

This case addresses many issues which were not addressed by the "Court"[2], even issues that are currently being litigated at the Supreme Court. This case rests on standing based on two ongoing cases currently being litigated in the Supreme Court based on reversing the "Chevron Doctrine" *Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo* No. 22-451. An additional Supreme Court case was also added *Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce* 22-1219. There is also "the major-question doctrine" in *West Virginia v. EPA*, No. 20–1530.[3] All these cases challenge Federal Agencies' power over the lives of every American, including Judges as well, that is the central issue of this case, the IHRA definition. However, what is more egregious is when you see Kenneth Marcus is ordering all 8 Federal Agencies as if they all work for the Israeli lobby telling them they need to adopt the IHRA definition and use it as a force of law calling it "unfinished business".

> The Brandeis Center's Marcus welcomed the civil rights expansion but noted that none of the eight agencies committed to using the IHRA definition: "There's still unfinished business in terms of the administration's approach to IHRA and making it applicable across the board" said the former secretary for Office For Civil Rights Kenneth Marcus.[4]

See District of Colombia appeals court reversing judgment based on "viewpoint discrimination" in terms of selective enforcement of certain laws against one group compare to another, *Frederick Douglass Foundation, Inc. v. DC*, No. 21-7108 (D.C. Cir. 2023). "Jews didn't kill Jesus Christ" said the IHRA definition; which is a government endorsed view point discrimination.

Although there was no 3 panel judges indicated under the 7th Circuit issued Order, rather the order said "by the court". The panel's decision conflicts with a decision of the United States Supreme Court "*Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka*, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)" and a consideration by the full court is therefore necessary to secure and maintain uniformity of the court's decisions.

Moreover, the proceeding involves one or more questions of exceptional importance, which the panel decision conflicts with the authoritative decisions of other United States Courts of Appeals that have addressed the issue; for example this Court's precedent is that a Court can't dismiss a lawsuit with prejudice when standing is at issue.

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[2] This case was not assigned a 3 panel judges to review the brief and the reply brief submitted by the Plaintiff.
[3] See 20-1530 West Virginia v. EPA (06/30/2022) (supremecourt.gov)
[4] See https://www.jns.org/wire/civil-rights-act-clarified-to-include-jews-but-more-action-is-needed/

> The Seventh Circuit explained that "'[a] suit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction cannot also be dismissed "with prejudice"; that's a disposition on the merits, which only a court with jurisdiction may render.'" Id. at 6 (quoting *Frederiksen v. City of Lockport*, 384 F.3d 437, 438 (7th Cir. 2004)). See *Johnson v. Wattenbarger*, 361 F.3d 991, 993 (7th Cir.2004). "No jurisdiction" and "with prejudice" are mutually exclusive. When the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies, there is only one proper disposition: dismissal for lack of federal jurisdiction. A jurisdictional disposition is conclusive on the jurisdictional question: the plaintiff cannot re-file in federal court. But it is without prejudice on the merits, which are open to future review.

One of the mentioned arguments by Mark was this issue when standing is at issue, court can't dismiss a lawsuit with prejudice, yet it was not addressed by the 7th Circuit. In another 7th Circuit Court orders, the 7th Circuit found Judge Sara Ellis at error when she tried to dismiss cases with prejudice when standing is at issue, which is how Mark learned about this ruling when he read many of the 7th Circuit's past rulings. See also Appeal 21-2792 by Judge Rovner, Judge Jackson-Akiwumi, and Judge Lee in *YVONNE MACK vs RESURGENT CAPITAL SERVICES, L.P. and LVNV FUNDING, LLC* (reverse and remand) to Judge Sara Ellis.

Many of the raised arguments by Mark within his brief and reply brief, the 7th Circuit did not consider, nor even mention them once within their order, yet Mark took all these arguments from previous rulings by many 7th Circuit judges, for example "waiving" arguments on appeal in No. 22-1903 *Eddie Bradley vs Village of University Park et al* decided by Judge Rovner, Judge Hamilton, and Judge St. Eve.

> While Plaintiff raised many issues and arguments with the District Court, Defendants abandoned challenging these issues on appeal by waiving them. Defendants waived their rights to challenge many of Mark's legal arguments which challenges the IHRA definition under the APA on four bases: (1) arbitrary & capricious, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); (2) "contrary to a constitutional right, power, [or] privilege," id. § 706(2)(B); (3) exceeding statutory authority, id. § 706(2)(C); and (4) promulgated "without observance of procedure required by law," id. § 706(2)(D). See *CFPB v. All Am. Check Cashing, Inc.*, 33 F.4th 218, 241 (5th Cir. 2022) (Jones, J., concurring). See *Webster v. CDI Indiana*, 917 F.3d 574, 578 (7th Cir. 2019). See also forfeited arguments. *McCleskey v. CWG Plastering, LLC*, 897 F.3d 899, 901 (7th Cir. 2018); *Klein v. O'Brien*, 884 F.3d 754, 757 (7th Cir. 2018). The District Court never questioned the concrete-injury analysis for statutory claims, while it also failed to address Plaintiff's standing seeking injunctive relief against the use of the IHRA definition and the new OCR manual as alternative to a class certification.

Simply put, the order issued by the 7th Circuit Court of appeal didn't address many of Mark's raised arguments, but rather included false facts not from the case to which Mark wonders who wrote this order ECF No. 43.

"I came to complete not to refute. I came light to the World." Jesus Christ

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Mark Bochra suffered various forms of discrimination with retaliation after reporting discrimination to the dean of the law school (ECF No. 54 page 29-30 & Exhibit 18); direct violations to Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (when Mark was turned from a Complainant with the law school into a Respondent)[5]; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d *et seq.*(based on Mark's Coptic identity, reciting verses from the bible, and his faith in Jesus Christ)[6]; and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Mark was granted accommodation with the law school dean of student affairs who herself retaliated against him i.e., Lauren Levin). See also 29 U.S.C. § 794 *et seq.* Nondiscrimination under Federal grants and programs, including the procedural regulations for Title IX, 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.1-106.71; Title VI, 34 C.F.R. § 100.7; and Section 504, 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.11-104.14 and 104.61.

Mark was also discriminated and retaliation against by OCR leadership, mainly Melanie Velez the former director of OCR Atlanta and Kenneth Marcus the former OCR Secretary. Mark's OCR complaint went from a resolution agreement and enforcement action if a resolution is failed to be signed by the recipient to OCR tempering with witnesses and evidence and dismissal of the OCR complaint after Mark Bochra filed several complaints with OIG DOE; first OIG DOE complaint was pertaining to OCR Atlanta and handled by special agent Neil Sanchez and later when Kenneth Marcus tried to implement the IHRA definition. See ECF No. 54 Exhibit 1 (Bochra Decl), and Exhibits 2-3 (resolution agreement), Exhibit 10 (Prof. Korin Munsterman's name and testimony were redacted from the findings after she was interviewed by OCR, her testimony in part was the school wanted to get rid of Mark and Mark was a good student). The history of OCR alone is extensive and long, Senator Dick Durbin was also involved sending 3 letters on Mark's behalf to former Secretary Betsy Devos, see ECF No. 54 Exhibit 12.

The district court granted defendants motion to dismiss without a hearing claiming in short 14 pages summary that Mark lacks standing to lawsuit the department of education under the APA. The district court analysis also failed to evaluate Counts I to VI related to both the 2020 OCR Manual and the IHRA definition under the APA for injunctive and declaratory relief. See ECF

[5] Mark was assaulted, battered, and threatened to be killed by Michael Roy Guttentag (German Jewish). Mark Bochra (Coptic) was a complainant with the law school, see ECF No 54 page 29 for OCR finding.

[6] OCR considered the faith in Jesus Christ religion per se and didn't have jurisdiction over religion discrimination but considered title vi with retaliation after discrimination was reported to the dean of the law school, Scott Devito.

No. 84-85. Mark filed a motion for reconsideration with more analysis in ECF No. 86 and the district court denied it without any written analysis in ECF No. 91 and was advised to appeal the decision with the 7th Circuit. In ECF No. 92 Mark requested an extension of time to file an appeal and was granted as good cause was shown, see ECF No. 94.

Mark timely appealed with the 7th Circuit and while on appeal Mark filed a motion with the district court in ECF No. 103 under FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) in light of recent 5th and 8th Circuit Court rulings under the APA, seeking leave to file an amended complaint but it was denied in ECF No. 105 for lack of jurisdiction. Mark filed a motion for reconsideration in ECF No. 106 with supplements ECF Nos. 108-109 under F.R.C.P 62.1 and F.R.A.P 12.1. If the district court chooses option 3 under F.R.C.P 62.1 then it can retain jurisdiction over the case and plaintiff can notify the 7th Circuit of the district court decision under F.R.A.P 12.1. The district court denied the motion without any analysis in ECF No. 110. Mark timely appealed those decisions as well and the 7th Circuit on its own consolidated the appeals.

ARGUMENT

Humans, humans create rules and laws to rule over others; humans will create rules to enslave others or come up with segregation by claiming "separate but equal". "Separate but equal" refers to the infamously racist decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896) that allowed the use of segregation laws by states and local governments. The phrase "separate but equal" comes from part of the Court's decision that argued separate rail cars for whites and African Americans were equal at least as required by the Equal Protection Clause.

Following this decision, a monumental amount of segregation laws were enacted by state and local governments throughout the country, sparking decades of crude legal and social treatment for African Americans. The horrid aftermath of "separate but equal" from Ferguson was halted by the Supreme Court in *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954) where the Court said that separate schools for African American students were "inherently unequal."

The same is true with the idea of "separation of state and church" as this is not what the founding fathers envisioned for America, in fact the founding fathers envisioned that the best teachings for America is Jesus Christ; see National Archives publishing the Doctrines of Jesus Compared with Others, 21 April 1803 letter by Thomas Jefferson.[7] What the founding fathers didn't want to see is to see Christianity being used as a form of power like in Europe's King and

[7] See https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-40-02-0178-0002

Queen, rather than wanted to see salvation and fostering great moral values and care that were being taught by Jesus Christ with the end goal "salvation" rather than "power". However, times moved and came the atheists and the Jewish people and started to lobby the Supreme Court to proclaim "separation of state and church" in the famous case *Everson v. Board of Education* (1947).

The result of the infamous case *Everson v. Board of Education* (1947) was the same as *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896) as it was used to target employees of religious background, to force them to accept even values that contractive with their morals, such as LGBTQ values. And just as *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954) came and overruled *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896), came also many cases to overrule the idea of "*separate of state and church*" just like "*separate but equal*" because of injustice. The world works in parables.

In *Carson v. Makin* (20-1088)[8] in a 6–3 decision, Chief Justice Roberts wrote that the free exercise clause prohibited Maine from discriminating against religious schools by excluding those schools from a tuition assistance program open to nonsectarian schools in rural areas without free-standing public schools.

See *Shurtleff et al v. City of Boston et al* (20–1800).[9] This case was the definition of what constituted a government endorsed view point or not. The Supreme Court held that the Boston's flag-raising program does not express government speech. Pp. 5–12 and so everyone is entitled to fly their preferred flag.

> The Free Speech Clause does not prevent the government from declining to express a view. See *Pleasant Grove City v. Summum*, 555 U. S. 460, 467–469. The government must be able to decide what to say and what not to say when it states an opinion, speaks for the community, formulates policies, or implements programs. The boundary between government speech and private expression can blur when, as here, the government invites the people to participate in a program. In those situations, the Court conducts a holistic inquiry to determine whether the government intends to speak for itself or, rather, to regulate private expression. The Court's cases have looked to several types of evidence to guide the analysis, including: the history of the expression at issue; the public's likely perception as to who (the government or a private person) is speaking; and the extent to which the government has actively shaped or controlled the expression. See *Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc.*, 576 U. S. 200, 209–213.

The Justice Department in its Amicus Curiae Brief to the Supreme Court stated that "the government-speech doctrine allows the government to rely on contributions from private actors,

[8] See ruling 20-1088 Carson v. Makin (06/21/2022) (supremecourt.gov)
[9] See 20-1800 Shurtleff v. Boston (05/02/2022) (supremecourt.gov)

but does not apply when the government creates a forum for a diversity of private views." The justice Department added that because the City's flag-raising program is a forum for private speech, the denial of petitioners' application was impermissible viewpoint discrimination and they cited many case laws within their brief.[10]

> *Adderley v. Florida*, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); *American Legion v. American Humanist Association*, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019); *A.N.S.W.E.R. Coalition v. Jewell*, 153 F. Supp. 3d 395 (D.D.C. 2016), affirmed on other grounds, 845 F.3d 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2017); *Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes*, 523 U.S. 666 (1998); *Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board* v. *Pinette*, 515 U.S. 753 (1995); *Community for Creative Non-Violence* v. *Lujan*, 908 F.2d 992 (D.C. Cir. 1990); *Cornelius* v. *NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc.*, 473 U.S. 788 (1985); *Good News Club* v. *Milford Central School*, 533 U.S. 98 (2001); *Greer* v. *Spock*, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); *International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.* v. *Lee*, 505 U.S. 672 (1992); *Johanns* v. *Livestock Marketing Association*, 544 U.S. 550 (2005); *Lamb's Chapel* v. *Center Moriches Union Free School District*, 508 U.S. 384 (1993); *Legal Services Corp.* v. *Velazquez*, 531 U.S. 522 (2001); *Lehman* v. *City of Shaker Heights*, 418 U.S. 298 (1974); *Matal* v. *Tam*, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017); *Minnesota Voters Alliance* v. *Mansky*, 138 S. Ct. 1876 (2018); *National Endowment for the Arts* v. *Finley*, 524 U.S. 569 (1998); *Perry Education Association* v. *Perry Local Educators' Association*, 460 U.S. 37 (1983); *Pleasant Grove City* v. *Summum*, 555 U.S. 460 (2009); *Rosenberger* v. *Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia*, 515 U.S. 819 (1995); *Rust* v. *Sullivan*, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); *United States Postal Service* v. *Council of Greenburgh Civic Associations*, 453 U.S. 114 (1981); *Walker* v. *Sons of Confederate Veterans*, 576 U.S. 200 (2015); *Widmar* v. *Vincent*, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)

And now we end up with the infamous case *Bochra v. U.S. Department of Education* (1:21-cv-03887) and with its use of the IHRA definition, it not only separates the Jewish people from the rest of America i.e., the Gentiles by exclusively have a definition with a set of privileges for the Jewish people but it also says "Jews didn't kill Jesus Christ" which invited an endorsed government view point discrimination. "Separated but equal" is the definition of IHRA.

The issue with the IHRA definition is that it was further used by the government, by Kenneth Marcus's himself when he granted Zoa's appeal; see ECF 54 Mark's response to DOJ motion to dismiss at the district level.

In a recent case, appeal No. 23-50491, the 5th Circuit directed lower court, i.e., the District court to issue a preliminary injunction against the department of education "borrower's defense regulation" in a lawsuit filed by for-profit colleges in *Career Colleges and Schools of Texas vs U.S. Department of Education et al.*[11] The huge difference between the 5th Circuit case and Mark's present case is that the 5th Circuit issued a preliminary injunction against the

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[10] See brief http://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/20/20-1800/201010/20211122165123662_20-1800tsacUnitedStates.pdf

[11] See order https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/23/23-50491-CV0.pdf

Department of Education against a rule "Borrowers Defense" that is already going through the regulatory channels and public comment. However, IHRA was used by Kenneth Marcus in granting Zoa's OCR appeal, is on the Department of Education's website and never went through any regulatory channels. The question begs itself, what are we doing here to America?

When Mark reviewed the issued order by the 7th Circuit in ECF 43, the very first line mentions facts not from the case when it said in part in "Mark a Christian Coptic lawsuit the Department of Education under the APA after it rejected his request to investigate his law school for discrimination against him" which is completely false and yet the Court claims, no need for oral argument because the record is clear based on the briefs. How could the record be clear to the Court when their very first sentence is filled with false facts not from the case?

Mark's lawsuit ECF 9 and his response objecting to the Defendants' motion to dismiss ECF 54 showed that Mark's OCR complaint was being investigated, his case was in resolution agreement negotiation for 2 years with the recipient, because there were facts and witnesses which showed evidence of discrimination with retaliation against Mark. Even Senator Durbin was involved to the point he sent 3 letters to the Department of Education and received 3 separate responses in a course of 2 years.

RICHARD J. DURBIN
ILLINOIS
DEMOCRATIC WHIP

United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510–1304

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
COMMITTEE ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION

May 15, 2018

Peter Oppenheim
Assistant Secretary for Legislative and Congressional Affairs
U.S. Department of Education
400 Maryland Avenue, SW
Washington, DC 20202-3100

Dear Mr. Oppenheim,

My constituent, Mr. Mark Bochra, recently contacted my Chicago office regarding a pending matter with the U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights (OCR). I have enclosed additional information to provide you with a more detailed explanation.

See ECF 54 with their exhibits for more details pertaining to Senator Durbin's letter to DOE

Then the next step promised by OCR Atlanta Director Melanie Velez was that if the recipient refused to sign the agreement, the next step is enforcement action meaning denial of

title iv funds to Florida Coastal School of Law until the sign the agreement and if that didn't work, handing the case to the Justice Department for prosecution, one would have to read section 601, 602 and 603 of the OCR manual.

Getting into why Mark's OCR complaint turned from substantial evidence and many filed complaints with OIG DOE and other government agencies would reveal Mark's journey with Kenneth Marcus and his use of the IHRA definition. The course of Mark's OCR Complaint changed with the coming of Kenneth Marcus as the Secretary of OCR and Mark confronting him over his use of the IHRA definition given his Coptic identity, the natural response was "get rid of this kid's complaint by any means possible" which is how Mark's OCR complaint was tempered with and destroyed by OCR officials at the hands of Kenneth Marcus and Melanie Velez.

The Court order continues with false facts claiming Mark "clashed with his peers" when the law school journey is about Michael Roy Guttetntag who assaulted, battered, and threatened to kill Mark; even OCR findings stated the same. Both the Department of Education and the Justice Department would disagree with the order issued by the 7th Circuit because these are false facts not from the case.

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"I came to complete not to refute. I came light to the World." Jesus Christ

OCR Complaint No. 04-16-2184

On February 16, 2016, the Assistant Dean submitted a referral against Student A for the January 10, 2016 incident. Student A's referral stated that it was based on the Complainant's report to law enforcement that Student A punched the Complainant, threw his eyeglasses and made the threat, "I will kill you." The referral also noted that the Assistant Dean had given the Complainant and Student A directives to stay away from each other and on November 12, 2015 had emailed Student A, requesting that he not have contact with the Complainant. The referral stated that the Complainant's report provided a sufficient basis for referral of Student A for investigation under Conduct Code Section G.2.b.

On February 18, 2016, the Panel sent a draft decision about the Complainant's referral to the Assistant Dean and the Dean, and also requested a review by the Law School's counsel. According to one of the Panel members, the professors on the Panel had not previously handled a case similar to the Complainant's and the Panel therefore asked the Assistant Dean to review a draft of their decision for consistency with applicable standards.[16]

Student A is Michael Roy Guttentag.[71]

Melanie Velez, and her haughty boss at ("OCR") Headquarter, Kenneth Marcus picked a fine chapter to omit from their memory bank.[72] ***See Exhibit 15***; **Plaintiff's appeal with OCR.**

The Circuit Court further completely neglected to address the consolidated appeal 23-1388 which is related to the threats made by Jim Richmond. The consolidated appeal 23-1388

22-2903 Mark Bochra v. Department of Education, et al "Petition for Rehearing Enbanc" (1:21-cv-03887)

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Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals

Notice of Docket Activity

The following transaction was entered on 04/19/2024 at 11:13:42 AM Central Daylight Time and filed on 04/19/2024

Case Name:	Mark Bochra v. Department of Education, et al
Case Number:	22-2903
Document(s):	Document(s)

Docket Text:
30 copies Filed Petition for Rehearing and Petition for Rehearing Enbanc by Appellant Mark Bochra in 22-2903, 23-1388 , per order. Dist. [47] [7377444] [22-2903, 23-1388] (CAG)

Notice will be electronically mailed to:

Mark Bochra
Ms. Sarah Terman, Attorney

The following document(s) are associated with this transaction:
Document Description: Petition for Rehearing Enbanc
Original Filename: Document (1).pdf
Electronic Document Stamp:
[STAMP acecfStamp_ID=1105395651 [Date=04/19/2024] [FileNumber=7377444-0]
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EXHIBIT E

22-2903 Mark Bochra v. Department of Education, et al "Rehearing Denial Order" (1:21-cv-03887)

CA07_CMECFMail@ca7.uscourts.gov <CA07_CMECFMail@ca7.uscourts.gov>
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Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals

Notice of Docket Activity

The following transaction was entered on 05/03/2024 at 3:14:24 PM Central Daylight Time and filed on 05/03/2024

Case Name: Mark Bochra v. Department of Education, et al
Case Number: 22-2903
Document(s): Document(s)

Docket Text:
ORDER: Appellant Mark Bochra's Petition for Rehearing and Petition for Rehearing Enbanc is DENIED. [48] [7380334] [22-2903, 23-1388] (FP)

Notice will be electronically mailed to:

Mark Bochra
Sara L. Ellis, District Court Judge
Ms. Sarah Terman, Attorney

The following document(s) are associated with this transaction:
Document Description: Rehearing Denial Order
Original Filename: 22-2903.pdf
Electronic Document Stamp:
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f30e2633cf8ae8]]

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604

May 3, 2024

By the Court:

Nos. 22-2903 & 23-1388

MARK BOCHRA ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 21 C 3887

Sara L. Ellis,
Judge.

ORDER

On consideration of the petition for rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc, filed on April 19, 2024, by the appellant, no judge in regular active service has requested a vote on the petition for rehearing en banc and the judges on the original panel have voted to deny rehearing. It is, therefore, **ORDERED** that the petition for rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc is **DENIED**.