No. _____

In the

# Supreme Court of the United States

SAVE JOBS USA,

*Petitioner*,

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY ET AL.,

*Respondents*.

*On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit*

## PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI


JOHN M. MIANO,
*COUNSEL OF RECORD*
CHRISTOPHER J. HAJEC
Immigration Reform Law Institute
25 Massachusetts Ave, NW,
Suite 335
Washington, DC 20001
202-232-5590
jmiano@verizon.net
*Counsel for Petitioner*

## QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the Department of Homeland Security can grant work authorization for classes of nonimmigrants for whom Congress has refused to grant work authorization.

2. Whether the statutory terms defining nonimmigrant visas in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) are mere threshold entry requirements that cease to apply once an alien is admitted or whether they persist and dictate the terms of a nonimmigrant's stay in the United States.

## PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner is Save Jobs USA. Petitioner was Appellant in the court of appeals. Respondent is the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Intervenor Respondents are Anujkumar Dhamija and Immigration Voice.

## CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Petitioner, Save Jobs USA has no shareholders.

## STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS

The proceedings directly related to this case are:

- *Save Jobs USA* v. *U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.,* No. 23-5089, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Judgment entered Aug. 2, 2024.
- *Save Jobs USA v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.,* No. 23-22, United States Supreme Court. Certiorari denied Oct. 30, 2023.
- *Save Jobs USA* v. *U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.,* No. 15-CV-615, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Judgment entered Mar. 28, 2023.
- *Save Jobs USA* v. *U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.,* No. 16-5287, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Judgment entered Nov. 8, 2019.
- *Save Jobs USA* v. *U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, No. 15-CV-615, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Judgment entered Sep 27, 2016.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Questions Presented ... i

Parties to the Proceeding ... ii

Corporate Disclosure Statement ... ii

Statement of Related Proceedings ... ii

Table of Authorities ... viii

Petition for Writ of Certiorari ... 1

Opinions Below ... 3

Jurisdiction ... 3

Statutes and Regulations Involved ... 4

Statement of the Case ... 4

A. Legal Framework ... 4

B. Factual Background ... 5

C. Proceedings Below ... 7

Reasons for Granting the Petition ... 12

I. The D.C. Circuit's reinterpretation of the visa statutes is manifestly wrong and makes the nonimmigrant visa system incoherent ... 12

A. Congress's definition of a visa should be the basis for defining the terms of an alien's stay in the United States. ... 12

B. The D.C. Circuit's entry requirement interpretation creates absurdity. .................... 15

C. The D.C. Circuit's entry requirement interpretation created a split with the other circuits. .................... 17

D. The D.C. Circuit's judicially created limit on DHS's authority is meaningless. .................... 20

II. This Court needs to settle the exceptionally important question of whether DHS shares with Congress the power to authorize alien employment. .................... 23

A. There is a circuit split over whether DHS shares with Congress the authority to authorize alien employment .................... 23

B. The failure to resolve the scope of DHS's alien employment power has created a crisis. .................... 26

III. This case provides an excellent vehicle to resolve exceptionally important issues. .................... 28

Conclusion .................... 30

Appendix A

Opinion, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, *Save Jobs USA* v. *U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, No. 23-5089 (August 2, 2024) ........................ App-1

Appendix B

Opinion, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, *Save Jobs USA* v. *U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, No. 15-CV-0615 (March 28, 2023) ................ App-9

Appendix C

Opinion, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, *Save Jobs USA* v. *U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, No. 16-5287 (November 8, 2019) ................ App-19

Appendix D

Opinion, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, *Save Jobs USA* v. *U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, No. 15-CV-0615 (September 27, 2016) ....... App-41

Appendix E

Order Denying Petition for Rehearing En Banc (November 22, 2024) .......................... App-61

Appendix F

Relevant Statutory Provisions.................... App-62
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(h)............................. App-62
8 U.S.C. § 1184(a)....................................... App-64
8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3) ................................. App-65

Appendix G

Employment Authorization for Certain H-4
Dependent Spouses,
80 Fed. Reg 10,283 (Feb. 25, 2015)............. App-66

## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

*Akbarin v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv.*,
669 F.2d 839 (1st Cir. 1982) .............................. 18

*ABA v. FTC*,
430 F.3d 457 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ............................ 14

*Anwo v. INS*,
607 F.2d 435 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ...................... 18–19

*Birdsong v. Holder*,
641 F.3d 957 (8th Cir. 2011) .............................. 18

*Brewer v. Ariz. Dream Act Coal.*,
583 U.S. 1179 (2018) .......................................... 26

*Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc.*,
467 U.S. 837 (1984) ............................ 9, 20, 29–30

*Dep't of Homeland Sec. v.*
*Regents of the Univ. of Cal.*,
591 U.S. 1 (2020) ................................................ 26

*Elkins v. Moreno*,
435 U.S. 647 (1978) ............................................ 18

*FDA v. Brown & Williamson*,
529 U.S., 120 (2000) ..................................... 29–30

*Gazeli v. Session*,
856 F.3d 1101 (6th Cir. 2017) ............................ 18

*Hispanic Affairs Project v. Acosta*,
901 F.3d 378 (D.C. Cir. 2018) ............................ 19

*Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v.*
*Nat'l Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights*,
502 U.S. 183 (1991) ............................................ 22

*Int'l Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Meese*, 891 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1989) ............................ 12

*J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States*, 276 U.S. 394 (1928) ............................................ 13

*Jang v. Reno,* 113 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 1997) ............................ 19

*Khano v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv.*, 999 F.2d 1203 (7th Cir. 1993) ............................ 18

*Lok v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv.*, 681 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1982) ............................... 18

*Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo*, 144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024) .................................... 9, 29

*Mistretta v. United States*, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) ............................................ 13

*Moreau v. Oppenheim*, 663 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1981) ............................ 19

*Morel v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv.*, 90 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1996) ................................. 18

*Moreno v. Univ. of Md.*, 645 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1981) .............................. 18

*United States v. Igbatayo*, 764 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1985) ............................ 18

*Olaniyan v. Dist. Dir., Immigr. & Naturalization Serv.*, 796 F.2d 373 (10th Cir. 1986) ............................ 18

*Sanchez v. Mayorkas*, 141 S. Ct. 1809 (2021) .................................. 16, 19

*Save Jobs USA v.*
*U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*,
210 F. Supp. 3d 1(D.D.C. 2016) ............................7

*Save Jobs USA v.*
*U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*,
942 F.3d 504 (D.C. Cir. 2019) ...............................8

*Texas v. Mayorkas*, No. 23-40653,
slip op. (5th Cir. Jan. 17, 2025) ....................25–26

*Texas v. United States*,
809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015)...............................25

*Texas v. United States*,
50 F.4th 498 (5th Cir. 2022) ...............................26

*Toll v. Moreno*, 458 U.S. 1 (1982) ..........................18

*Touray v. United States AG*,
546 F. App'x 907 (11th Cir. 2013).......................18

*United States v. Texas*,
579 U.S. 547 (2016).......................................25–26

*Von Kennel Gaudin v. Remis*,
379 F.3d 631 (9th Cir. 2004)...............................18

*Wash. All. of Tech Workers v.*
*U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*,
50 F.4th 164 (D.C. Cir 2022)...8–13, 16–25, 29–30

*Wash. All. of Tech. Workers v.*
*United States Dep't of Homeland Sec.*,
58 F.4th 506 (D.C. Cir. 2023)..............................10

*Wei v. Robinson*,
246 F.2d 739 (7th Cir. 1957)...............................19

*West Virginia v. EPA*,
597 U.S. 697 (2022) .......................................29–30

*Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA*,
573 U.S. 302 (2014) .......................................29–30

Statutes:

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) .............................................4
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(B) ...................................22
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F) ...................................22
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F)(i)..........................8, 16
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(I) ....................................22
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(J)....................................22
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K) ...................................22
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H) .................4–5, 7, 12, 14
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(M) ..................................22
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(O) ...................................22
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(P) ...................................22
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(Q) ...................................22
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(R) ...................................22
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(S)....................................22
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T) ....................................17
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U) ...................................22
8 U.S.C. § 1184(a)....................................3, 9, 19–20
8 U.S.C. § 1255a(b)(3)(B) .........................................5
8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3) .............3, 5, 9–10, 12, 23–25
8 U.S.C. § 1522 .........................................................5

Regulations:

Employment Authorization for Certain H-4 Dependent Spouses, 80 Fed. Reg. 10,284–312 (Feb. 24, 2015) ....................................2, 5–7, 11, 13, 15, 21, 25, 30

Extending Period of Optional Practical Training by 17-Months for F-1 nonimmigrant Students with STEM (Science, Technology, Mathematics, and Engineering) Degrees and Expanding Cap-Gap Relief for All F-1 Students with Pending H-1B Petitions, 73 Fed. Reg. 18,944–56 (Apr. 8, 2008)................23

Improving and Expanding Training Opportunities for F-1 Nonimmigrant Students with STEM Degrees and Cap-Gap Relief for All Eligible F-1 Students, 81 Fed. Reg. 13,040–122 (Mar. 11, 2016) .............................................6, 8, 10–11, 21, 23, 30

International Entrepreneur Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 5,238–89 (Jan. 17, 2017)......6, 23, 27

Other Authorities:

Br. for *Amicus Curiae* United States House of Representatives, *United States v. Texas*, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (No. 15-674)....................24

*Aurora mayor blames 'bad' Biden border policies for Venezuelan gang problem*, Christian Post, Aug. 31, 2024.............................28

*Humanitarian Parole Authority*, Congressional Research Service, Jan. 11, 2024 ....................................................26

Judith Crown, *Chicago's migrant crisis raises questions of equity*, Crane's Chicago Business Feb. 20, 2024 ...........28

Simon Hankinson, *Biden's border crisis comes to the suburbs*, Fox News, Mar. 11, 2024 ...................................28

H.R. Rep. No. 82-1365 (1952)................................22

Avery Kreemer, *The federal programs that paved the way for Springfield Haitian influx,* Dayton Daily News, Oct. 2, 2024 ...........28

Neil Ruiz & Abby Budiman, *Number of Foreign College Students Staying and Working in the U.S. After Graduation Surges, Pew Research Center*, May 18, 2018 .......................................................30

Patrick Thibodeau, *Southern California Edison IT workers 'beyond furious' over H-1B replacements*, ComputerWorld, Feb. 4, 2015 ..........................................................7

S. Rep. No. 82-1137 (1952)....................................22

City of Springfield, *Immigration FAQs* https://web.archive.org/web/20241204232223/https://springfieldohio.gov/immigration-faqs/...............................................................7, 28

USCIS, Processes for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans, https://web.archive.org/web/20241216224201/https://www.uscis.gov/CHNV.....................6, 27

## PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

The bedlam in the immigration system is now one of the top concerns of the nation's citizens. Much of the immigration chaos can be traced to America effectively having two competing immigration systems operating at cross-purposes: one created by Congress in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the other created with the blessing of the court below by the administrative state through regulation.

A key facet of the INA's structure is how Congress defines the classes of aliens who can work in the United States and the protections for American workers that go with them. The general rule in the INA is that aliens may not work in the United States, but there are numerous provisions in the INA defining exceptions that allow classes of aliens to work (*e.g.*, permanent residents). The power to define the classes of aliens who can work in the United States is also the power to determine the classes of aliens who have the ability to remain in the United States indefinitely. That power is vested in Congress.

In 2015, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) started creating alien work programs with no express authorization in the INA under the claim that the agency shares with Congress the power to define who can work in the United States. Since then, DHS has independently created massive programs permitting alien employment. These programs are effectively a separate immigration system that subverts the alien employment system put in place by Congress.

The regulation at issue here was the very first published under the claim of such shared authority. Employment Authorization for Certain H-4 Dependent Spouses, 80 Fed. Reg. 10,284 (Feb. 25, 2015) (H-4 Rule) (Reproduced at App.66). The H-4 visa was created in 1970, and allows dependents of an H-category nonimmigrant worker to accompany or join the worker in the United States. Its definition contains no indication of work authorization, and for forty-five years the executive interpreted it as not permitting work. With the H-4 Rule, DHS reversed this interpretation and began permitting certain spouses of H-1B nonimmigrant workers to be employed with no directive from statute. Following the H-4 Rule, there was an explosion in the number of aliens authorized to work in the United States entirely through regulations. These include the Optional Practical Training program (the largest alien work program in the immigration system) and the Humanitarian Parole Program, under which the executive granted parole and work permits to 30,000 aliens per month from Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.

The Fifth Circuit rejects DHS's claim that it shares with Congress the power to permit alien employment through regulation. The D.C. Circuit has taken a different approach than the Fifth Circuit in a line of cases holding that DHS does share with Congress the power to permit alien employment. These cases transform DHS from a regulatory body that is supposed to implement the immigration system defined by Congress into a legislative body with the power to redefine the

immigration system. Under this transformation, the D.C. Circuit has rendered the statutes governing nonimmigrants nonsensical, and its eccentric interpretation of the INA has created splits with other circuits over (1) whether 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3) confers on DHS shared authority with Congress to determine classes of aliens eligible for employment; and (2) whether the terms of the nonimmigrant visa statutes, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15), cease to apply the moment an alien enters the United States and 8 U.S.C. § 1184(a) confers on DHS the exclusive authority to set the terms of a nonimmigrant's stay while in the country.

The Court should grant this Petition to resolve whether Congress defines the structure of the immigration system or whether this is a power it shares with DHS. Leaving this vital question unanswered will ensure that the turmoil created by competing immigration systems will expand further.

## OPINIONS BELOW

The D.C. Circuit's opinion is published at 111 F.4th 76 and reproduced at App.1. The district court's opinion is published at 664 F. Supp. 3d 143 and reproduced at App.9.

## JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on August 2, 2024. App.1. A timely petition for rehearing was denied on November 22, 2024. App.61. Jurisdiction was invoked in the district court under 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1331, 1346, and 1361. This Court's jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

## STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

The statutes and regulations at issue are reproduced in the appendix at App.62.

## STATEMENT OF THE CASE

### A. Legal Framework

The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) established the current statutory immigration system. At its core, the INA defines who can become a citizen, who can come to and be in the United States, and who can work in the United States. The INA classifies aliens as either immigrants or nonimmigrants. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15). Section 1101(a)(15) defines the classes of nonimmigrant visas that allow aliens to come to the United States temporarily for different purposes. The name for a nonimmigrant visa is derived from its location within that section. Section 1101(a)(15)(H) (Reproduced at App.62) defines the H-1B, H-1B1, H-1C, H-2A, H-2B, and H-3 guestworker visas. The last sentence of that provision defines the H-4 visa, created in 1970, that allows dependents of H nonimmigrant workers to "accompany" or "join" the worker in the United States. For forty-five years, the executive and Congress treated this provision as not authorizing employment. The INA does not prohibit H-4 visa holders from getting a work visa in their own right.

The general rule under the INA is that aliens may

not work in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a. The INA has many exceptions to this general rule that authorize alien employment using three statutory constructs. First, the INA contains provisions that directly authorize classes of aliens to work. *E.g.*, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H) (App.62). Second, there are provisions that give the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) discretionary authority to permit classes of aliens to work through regulation. *E.g.*, 8 U.S.C. § 1522. Third, there are provisions that require DHS to issue regulations permitting classes of aliens to work. *E.g.*, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(b)(3)(B).

**B. Factual Background**

The rule at issue was the very first published to authorize alien employment under the claim that the term definition of *unauthorized alien* in section 1324a(h)(3) (Reproduced at App.65) conferred on DHS shared power with Congress to allow classes of aliens to be employed. Employment Authorization for Certain H-4 Dependent Spouses, 80 Fed. Reg. 10,284–312 (Feb. 24, 2015) (H-4 Rule) (reproduced at App.66). The H-4 Rule permits spouses of H-1B nonimmigrant workers who have entered the permanent residency queue to work without restrictions. *Id*. at 10,284–85 (App.66–67). The purpose of the rule was to increase the number of H-1B nonimmigrant workers by using spousal employment as an inducement to stay in the United States in competition with American workers. *Id*. DHS estimated the H-4 Rule would initially grant employment to 179,600 aliens and 55,000 each year

afterward. *Id*. at 10,286 (App.73). DHS stated that it would consider expanding H-4 employment eligibility in the future. *Id*. at 10,288 (App.90–91).

Since announcing its claim of having unlimited authority to permit alien employment, DHS has promulgated regulations authorizing several massive alien employment programs entirely through regulation. One example is the Optional Practical Training program that allows aliens to remain in the U.S. for years after graduation and work in student visa status. Improving and Expanding Training Opportunities for F-1 Nonimmigrant Students with STEM Degrees and Cap-Gap Relief for All Eligible F-1 Students, 81 Fed. Reg. 13,040–122 (Mar. 11, 2016) (OPT Rule). Optional Practical Training is now the largest alien employment program in the immigration system, yet it was created entirely through regulation. Optional Practical Training puts American college graduates in direct competition with foreign workers for entry-level jobs. Another example is the International Entrepreneur Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 5,238–89 (Jan. 17, 2017) that authorized alien employment for parolees. DHS morphed that work authorization into the Humanitarian Parole Program (created with no published regulation), under which DHS flew up to 30,000 aliens into the U.S. per month, and granted them parole and work permits (authorized entirely by regulation). [1] The town of

---

[1] USCIS, *Processes for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans,* https://web.archive.org/web/20241216224201/https://www.uscis.gov/CHNV

Springfield, Ohio (pop. 59,000 in 2020) now finds itself having to provide services for 12,000–15,000 aliens granted parole with work authorizations.[2]

**C. Proceedings Below**

Petitioner is a group of American technology workers who were among the 400 employed at Southern California Edison until they were replaced by H-1B nonimmigrants in 2015. *See* Patrick Thibodeau, *Southern California Edison IT workers 'beyond furious' over H-1B replacements*, ComputerWorld, Feb. 4, 2015. Petitioner filed its complaint challenging the H-4 Rule on Feb. 23, 2015. The complaint alleged that granting employment to H-4 nonimmigrants exceeded DHS's authority to admit dependents to accompany or join a nonimmigrant worker in the United States. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H) (App.62).

The District Court dismissed the case on standing on summary judgment. *Save Jobs USA v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, 210 F. Supp. 3d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2016) (Reproduced at App.53). The district court held Petitioner did not suffer injury from increased competition from H-1B nonimmigrants under the H-4 Rule. App.54. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the administrative record showed that the H-4 Rule did cause injury by increasing the number of H-1B workers who were in direct competition with Petitioner's members. *Save Jobs USA v. U.S. Dep't of*

---

[2] City of Springfield, *Immigration FAQs,* https://web.archive.org/web/20241204232223/https://springfieldohio.gov/immigration-faqs/

*Homeland Sec.*, 942 F.3d 504, 508–10 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (Reproduced at App.19).

From this point, the case moved in parallel and became entwined with *Wash. All. of Tech Workers v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, 50 F.4th 164 (D.C. Cir. 2022), cert. denied 144 S. Ct. 78 (2023) (*Washtech*). *Washtech* was a challenge to a later rule, also published under the claim that DHS shared power with Congress to permit alien employment. Improving and Expanding Training Opportunities for F-1 Nonimmigrant Students With STEM Degrees and Cap-Gap Relief for All Eligible F-1 Students, 81 Fed. Reg. 13,040–122 (Mar. 11, 2016) (OPT Rule). The OPT Rule allows aliens to remain in the U.S. and work in industry for three years after graduation in student visa status. *Id.* In holding that the OPT Rule was within DHS's authority, the D.C. Circuit's *Washtech* decision introduced never-before-seen judicial interpretations of the INA. The statutory terms that restrict student visas to those "solely" pursuing a course of study at an academic institution would appear to preclude employment in industry after graduation. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F)(i). To overcome that restriction, the D.C. Circuit held the nonimmigrant visa statutes only "identif[y] entry conditions" that do not apply after an alien enters the country.[3] *Washtech*, 50 F.4th at 169,

[3] Prior to *Washtech*, there had been no dispute among the courts (including the D.C. Circuit) that the nonimmigrant visa statutes applied to an alien's entire stay in the United States. *See* § I.C, *infra*.

185. To complete the transfer of power over nonimmigrants from Congress to DHS, the D.C. Circuit parsed section 1184(a) (Reproduced at App.64) such that its limitation on DHS's authority (to regulate the legal entry of nonimmigrants to "insure" aliens will leave the country when they no longer conform to the status for which they were admitted) only applied to DHS's bond authority. *Id.* at 170, 188. The D.C. Circuit held that after nonimmigrants "[] have entered. Congress gave [] control to the Executive." *Id.* at 168; *see also id.* at 170–71. Under this new interpretation, the nonimmigrant visa statutes merely provide nonbinding advice that "guides DHS in exercising its authority" to make regulations. *Id.* at 178; *see also id.* at 170, 177–78. Judge Henderson described this "tortured interpretation" of the statute as "verbicide." *Washtech*, 50 F.4th at 200 (Henderson, J., dissenting).

*Washtech* also held that the definition of the term *unauthorized alien* in section 1324a(h)(3) recognizes that DHS shares with Congress the power to define classes of aliens eligible for employment. *Id.* at 190. Applying pre-*Chevron* [4] authorities, *Washtech* held DHS regulations can allow employment on any visa, with the only constraint being that such regulations must be "reasonably related" to the visa's statutory definition. *Id.* at 169. Under this judicially created

---

[4] The *Washtech* decision and District Court opinion in this case did not arrive at their holdings under the *Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc.*, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) framework even though they were issued prior to *Chevron* being vacated in *Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo*, 144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024).

standard, a regulation can directly conflict with a visa's statutory terms but still be reasonably related to it. *Id.* at 192. The D.C. Circuit never addressed whether the OPT Rule conformed with the major question doctrine. Judge Rao observed that the *Washtech* decision had tremendous consequences because it applied to all nonimmigrant visas. *Wash. All. of Tech. Workers v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, 58 F.4th 506, 508 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (Rao, J., dissenting from denial of Pet. for Reh'g en banc).

This case immediately proved Judge Rao to be correct. Briefing in the district court was completed a year before the D.C. Circuit's *Washtech* decision, so it did not address *Washtech*'s holdings. *See* App.5 n.3. Under the by-then-precedential *Washtech*, the statutory terms of the H-4 visa became strictly entry requirements that did not dictate whether DHS could grant employment on that visa. *Washtech*, 50 F.4th at 192. The district court observed that *Washtech* held that the question of whether an alien may work is simply an admission condition just like the courses the student must take. App.15. Neither the district court nor *Washtech* observed that the INA has a general ban on alien employment but lacks a general provision regarding coursework. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a. The district court concluded that the power to define terms of admission "expressly contemplates DHS authorizing employment for foreign nationals." *Id.* Following *Washtech*, the district court did not consider whether the terms of the H-4 visa authorized employment. The district court applied the *Washtech* standard and held

unrestricted employment was reasonably related to the H-4 visa and granted summary judgment to DHS. App.24–25.

Save Jobs USA made a petition for certiorari before judgment asking this Court to consolidate the case with the pending petition in *Washtech* because both cases addressed identical issues in the context of different visas. This Court denied both petitions. *Wash. All. of Tech. Workers v. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, 144 S. Ct. 78 (2023); *Save Jobs USA v. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, 144 S. Ct. 371 (2023).

Constrained by the precedent set in *Washtech*, Petitioner raised two issues on appeal. First, "Do regulations authorizing employment on H-4 visas without a directive from Congress violate the major question doctrine?" C.A. Op. Br. viii. The D.C. Circuit reinterpreted that question as "Save Jobs USA wants us to displace *Washtech* because it did not address the major questions doctrine." App.6. As with the OPT Rule in *Washtech*, the D.C. Circuit never explained how the H-4 Rule conformed to the major question doctrine. Second, "Is unrestricted employment reasonably related to a nonimmigrant visa that allows entry to accompany or join a nonimmigrant worker whose employment is conditioned on protections for American workers?" C.A. Op. Br. viii. *Washtech* held alien employment restricted to that directly related to the alien's course of study was reasonably related to the terms of the student visa. *Washtech*, 50 F.4th at 180. Petitioner argued that unrestricted employment was

not reasonably related to "accompanying" or "following to join" a nonimmigrant worker in the United States. 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(H). C.A. Op. Br. 10–13. The D.C. Circuit held this raised no "meaningful distinction" with *Washtech* and affirmed the district court. App.5.

## REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

### I. The D.C. Circuit's reinterpretation of the visa statutes is manifestly wrong and makes the nonimmigrant visa system incoherent.

#### A. Congress's definition of a visa should be the basis for defining the terms of an alien's stay in the United States.

Petitioner raised the issue that the statutory terms of the H-4 visa do not permit employment in the district court. Sum. J. Br. 7. Until *Washtech*, courts had always addressed the question of whether the executive had the power to publish a regulation authorizing alien employment by looking at the statute defining the terms of the alien's stay in the United States. *E.g., Int'l Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Meese*, 891 F.2d 1374, 1380–84 (9th Cir. 1989). Historically, courts would have addressed this case by determining whether the power to admit aliens to "accompany" or "join" an H nonimmigrant worker in section 1101(a)(15)(H) overcomes the general prohibition on alien employment in section 1324a. *Cf. id.* The D.C. Circuit's decision confers on DHS regulatory authority

over nonimmigrant visas that is untethered to the statutes defining those visas. *See* App.5. Highlighting that reality, in holding that DHS can permit employment on H-4 visas, the court of appeals never mentioned the terms of the H-4 visa. App.1–8. Neither the district court nor the D.C. Circuit examined Congress's H-4 visa terms because of the latter's precedent that relegates visa terms to only being entry requirements, *Washtech*, 50 F.4th at 170–71, that DHS can disregard in regulation, *id.* at 185. This erroneous, circuit-splitting precedent, *see* § I.B–C, *infra*, was necessary to the decision below. If this case had instead been decided under this Court's and every numbered circuit's precedent, the H-4 visa terms would have been recognized as operative—and it is clear that the H-4 Rule does not implement them.

As this Court has repeatedly held, a delegation of authority to an agency is invalid unless the delegating statute contains an "intelligible principle" to which the agency "is directed to conform." *Mistretta v. United States*, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989); *J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States*, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). It follows, that if an agency purports to regulate[5] without

---

[5] On a theory of regulatory power derivable from *Hampton*—*viz.*, that regulatory power is a species of executive power, and is exercised only when an agency carries out or executes a statute by determining rights and obligations under the statute's instructions—an agency that issues a substantive rule without following any such instructions (that is, without implementing a statute) does not really regulate at all, but legislates as if it were a second Congress.

implementing a statute—that is, without conforming to a principle discernible in a statute—it exceeds its power.

Here, the question arises of what it means to implement a statute or conform to a principle in it. It cannot be merely that a regulation conforms to a statute if it is logically consistent with it. For example, the D.C. Circuit has rightly rejected the argument that a statute allowed the Federal Trade Commission to regulate attorneys merely because the statute did not prohibit it from doing so. *ABA v. FTC*, 430 F.3d 457, 468–69 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Manifestly, a stronger logical relation than mere consistency is needed to capture the idea of a regulation's *conforming to a principle* and *implementing a statute*. Specifically, a regulation can be said to implement a statute and conform to a principle in it only if the statute entails that the regulation is permissible—and entails this permissibility without recourse to any premise that, just because the regulation is not prohibited by the statute, it is permitted by it. In other words, if a regulation is to implement a statute, the statute must not merely fail to prohibit the regulation, but must affirmatively allow the regulation.

The principle discernible in the H-4 visa is that DHS may allow the dependents of a H guestworkers to enter the country to accompany or join the worker. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H) (App.62). From this principle, it does not affirmatively follow that DHS may allow accompanying spouses to work. After all, Congress, without any contradiction, could pass another

law barring DHS from letting accompanying spouses work, while still permitting DHS to allow H-4 nonimmigrants into the country. Because DHS could, with logical consistency, be permitted to do the one (let them in) but not the other (let them work), the former permission does not imply the latter. This failure of implication means that the visa definition does not affirmatively allow the H-4 rule. The H-4 Rule, therefore, does not conform to the visa definition and is *ultra vires* unless it implements the INA by conforming to some other principle in that statute.

The court below appealed to no such other principle. Instead, it held that the H-4 Rule conformed to the reasonable relation standard, which does not appear in the INA, and which the same court had invented in *Washtech*, 50 F.4th at 169, 177. This Court should grant *certiorari* to clarify the proper understanding of implementing and conforming to a statute, and to hold that agencies exceed their authority where (as here) they purport to regulate without implementing a statute.

### B. The D.C. Circuit's entry requirement interpretation creates absurdity.

The D.C. Circuit's new interpretation of the structure of the INA is so irrational and has such a wide impact that it cries out for this Court's review. In *Washtech*, the D.C. Circuit bent the law beyond the breaking point to reach the outcome that DHS had the authority to allow years of work in industry after grad-

uation by aliens in student visa status. This Court observed that "someone who legally entered the United States on a student visa, but stayed in the country long past graduation" would not be in "lawful status." *Sanchez v. Mayorkas*, 141 S. Ct. 1809, 1813 (2021). To reach its contrary outcome in *Washtech*, the D.C. Circuit had to overcome the statutory restriction that student visas are "solely" for aliens pursuing a course of study at a school. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F)(i). The D.C. Circuit nullified that restriction by adopting the never-before-seen interpretation that the statutory terms of the nonimmigrant visa statutes are strictly entry requirements that do not apply while an alien is in the United States. *Washtech*, 50 F.4th at 170–71. Once aliens enter the United States, the terms of their stay are solely set by DHS regulations. *Id.* at 168, 170–71, 178. Under this interpretation, DHS regulations governing a visa do not have to conform to the statute defining the visa because the statutes cease to apply after an alien enters the country. *Id.* at 192–93. The effect is that the D.C. Circuit "erases the INA's very specific requirements the moment an alien enters the United States." *Wash. All. of Tech. Workers v. United States Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, 58 F.4th 506, 509 (2022) (Rao, J., dissenting from denial of reh'g en banc).

The D.C. Circuit's entry-requirement-only interpretation creates absurdity throughout the nonimmigrant visa system. The M-1 visa's terms become nonsensical, with "no statutory constraint on who may qualify for an M-1 visa." *Washtech*, 50 F.4th at 202

(Henderson, J., dissenting). The statutory terms of the T visa only apply to those who have already entered the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T). Ridiculously under *Washtech,* the T visa's terms cease to apply after entry so the visa terms never apply. *Washtech*, 50 F.4th at 170–71. The D.C. Circuit's interpretation of the visa statutes creates absurdity in nearly every case when a change of visa status occurs while an alien is in the United States because the new visa's terms never apply. *Cf. Washtech*, 50 F.4th at 170–71. For example, if one enters the country on a B visitor visa, and changes status to an F-1 student visa while in the United States, the student visa terms do not apply at all because the alien already entered on a B visa and the alien's stay in the United States is only governed by regulation. *Id*. The D.C. Circuit has effectively nullified Congress's terms for nonimmigrant visas and blurred the distinctions among the various visas. *Wash. All. of Tech. Workers v. DHS.,* 58 F.4th 506, 508 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (Rao, J., dissenting from denial of reh'g en banc).

### C. The D.C. Circuit's entry requirement interpretation created a split with the other circuits.

Unsurprisingly, an interpretation as radical as reducing the frequently adjudicated nonimmigrant visa statutes to mere entry requirements opened up a circuit split. *Wash. All. of Tech. Workers v. DHS.,* 58 F.4th 506, 508 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (Rao, J., dissenting from denial of reh'g en banc). The entry-requirement-

only interpretation is contrary to precedent of this Court and every numbered circuit, all of which treat the statutory visa terms as applying to an alien's entire stay.[6] *Toll v. Moreno*, 458 U.S. 1, 14 n. 20 (1982); *Elkins v. Moreno*, 435 U.S. 647, 665–66 (1978); *Anwo v. INS*, 607 F.2d 435, 437 (D.C. Cir. 1979); *Akbarin v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv.*, 669 F.2d 839, 840 (1st Cir. 1982); *Lok v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv.*, 681 F.2d 107, 109 & n. 3 (2d Cir. 1982); *Morel v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv.*, 90 F.3d 833, 838 (3d Cir. 1996); *Moreno v. Univ. of Md.*, 645 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1981), aff'd, 458 U.S. 1; *United States v. Igbatayo*, 764 F.2d 1039, 1040 (5th Cir. 1985); *Gazeli v. Session*, 856 F.3d 1101, 1106 (6th Cir. 2017); *Khano v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv.*, 999 F.2d 1203, 1207 & n. 2 (7th Cir. 1993); *Birdsong v. Holder*, 641 F.3d 957, 958 (8th Cir. 2011); *Von Kennel Gaudin v. Remis*, 379 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2004); *Olaniyan v. Dist. Dir., Immigr. & Naturalization Serv.*, 796 F.2d 373, 374 (10th Cir. 1986); *Touray v. United States AG*, 546 F. App'x 907, 912 (11th Cir. 2013); *see also Washtech,* 50 F.4th at 199 (Henderson, J., dissenting) (noting *Washtech*'s conflict with precedent). Until the D.C. Circuit invented the entry-requirement-only interpretation of the visa statutes, there had never been any debate about whether those statutes applied to an alien's entire stay in the United States. Had *Washtech* been a one-off aberration from precedent there might be less of a need for supervisory review of the entry

---

[6] Only the Federal Circuit has not weighed in on this issue.

requirement holding. The decision below, however, demonstrates that *Washtech* now prevails over earlier D.C. Circuit precedent applying nonimmigrant visa terms after admission. *E.g.*, *Hispanic Affairs Project v. Acosta*, 901 F.3d 378, 389 (D.C. Cir. 2018); *Anwo v. INS*, 607 F.2d 435, 437 (D.C. Cir. 1979).

Standing alone, the D.C. Circuit's entry requirement reinterpretation of the visa statutes would have left a power vacuum, leaving no one setting the terms governing the conduct of nonimmigrants while in the United States. To complete its transfer of power over nonimmigrants from Congress to the administrative state, the D.C. Circuit reinterpreted section 1184(a), which defines DHS's regulatory power over the entry of nonimmigrants. App.2, App.5. Until this case and *Washtech*, there had never been any dispute that section 1184(a) conferred on DHS the power to regulate the *admission* of nonimmigrants. *E.g.*, *Sanchez v. Mayorkas*, 593 U.S. 409, 416–17 (2021). That power was limited to "insur[ing]" that nonimmigrants leave the country when they no longer conform to the status for which they were admitted. *E.g., Moreau v. Oppenheim*, 663 F.2d 1300, 1307 (5th Cir. 1981); *Wei v. Robinson*, 246 F.2d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 1957); *Jang v. Reno,* 113 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1997). The D.C. Circuit filled the power gap left when its entry requirement interpretation extirpated the visa statutes by parsing section 1184(a) so that its "insure" limitation only applies to the power to require a bond, and handed to DHS total and exclusive control to set the terms of a nonimmigrant's stay in the United States. App.2,

App.5 & n.3; *Washtech*, 50 F.4th at 168, 177, 188. The D.C. Circuit demoted Congress's terms for nonimmigrant visas to mere entry requirements while the court elevated DHS's authority to set terms for lawful entry to being the sole authority "to set[ting] the 'time' and 'conditions' of visa-holders' stay." App.16 (quoting *Washtech*, 50 F.4th at 190); App.5 & n.3.; *see also Wash. All. of Tech. Workers v. United States Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, 58 F.4th 506, 510 (2023) (Rao, J., dissenting from denial of reh'g en banc).

### D. The D.C. Circuit's judicially created limit on DHS's authority is meaningless.

The D.C. Circuit replaced Congress's limitation on the regulatory power given under 1184(a) with a judicially created standard based on pre-*Chevron* precedent. App.5; *Washtech*, 50 F.4th at 178–79. Under this standard, DHS regulations may permit employment on any visa where those regulations are reasonably related to the purpose for which the alien was allowed to enter. [7] *Id*. Paradoxically, the D.C. Circuit permits DHS regulations governing visas to directly contradict their corresponding visa statute but still be reasonably related to that statute. *Washtech*, 50 F.4th at 169. The effect is that the D.C. Circuit relegates the nonimmigrant visa statutes to serving solely as nonbinding advice that "guides DHS in exercising its authority."

---

[7] The district court called the reasonably related standard a "statutory requirement" even though it does not appear anywhere in the INA. App.22.

*Id.* at 178. This "tortured interpretation" is "verbicide." *Id.* at 200 (Henderson, J., dissenting).

The decision below confirms that the reasonably related standard is no standard at all. Petitioner pointed out to the D.C. Circuit the distinctions between work under the H-4 Rule and the OPT Rule. C.A. Op. Br. 10–13. The OPT Rule restricts the type of post-graduation employment in industry to that directly related to the alien's course of study. *Id.* at 11. Such employment was held to be reasonably related to solely pursuing a course of study at an academic institution. *Id.* In this case, the district court held that unrestricted employment was reasonably related to the H-4 visa that permits dependents to accompany or join a nonimmigrant worker in the United States. App.23–26. Addressing the difference Petitioner identified between the two work authorizations, the D.C. Circuit answered that "Save Jobs USA makes little effort trying to meaningfully distinguish this case from *Washtech*." App.5. The D.C. Circuit's holding that there is no meaningful distinction between work directly related to a course of study and unrestricted work is tantamount to an admission that the court has conferred on DHS unbounded authority to permit alien employment in the United States through regulation.

The rapidly expanding regulatory-created immigration system is tearing down the distinction between work and nonwork visas in the statutory immigration system. The decision below immediately removes any barrier against DHS permitting work on twelve more

visas that use the identical accompany or join language. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F), (I)–(K), (M), (O)–(U). It is hard to imagine where the decision prevents DHS from permitting alien employment through regulation. It even opens the door to regulations permitting work on visitor visas. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(B). The statutory prohibition against performing labor on a visitor visa is strictly an entry requirement that DHS can disregard after entry in the same manner as the D.C. Circuit permits DHS to disregard the restriction that student visas are solely for pursuing a course of study at a school. *See Washtech,* 50 F.4th at 192. When work is reasonably related to accompanying or joining, it is impossible to see why work would not be reasonably related to visitor visas that allow admission for business. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(B).

The INA created a comprehensive scheme for protecting American workers. H.R. Rep. No. 82-1365 at 50–51 (1952); S. Rep. No. 82-1137 at 11 (1952). Indeed, protecting American workers is a primary purpose of the immigration system. *Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Nat'l Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights*, 502 U.S. 183, 194 (1991). The D.C. Circuit leaves the INA's explicit protections for American workers in ruins. Whenever DHS disagrees with any worker protection in the INA, it can use its unbounded power to allow work through regulation to permit alien employment without worker protections. When DHS decided the limits on H-1B visas that Congress enacted to protect American workers harmed business, it simply allowed

similar work by regulation to bypass those limits. Extending Period of Optional Practical Training by 17-Months for F-1 nonimmigrant Students with STEM (Science, Technology, Mathematics, and Engineering) Degrees and Expanding Cap-Gap Relief for All F-1 Students with Pending H-1B Petitions, 73 Fed. Reg. 18,944–56, 18,946, 19,953 (Apr. 8, 2008); *see also* OPT Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. at 13,040–122. Worse yet, the D.C. Circuit's entry-requirement-only interpretation of the visa statutes opens the door for DHS to disregard explicit worker protections in the INA that are part of a nonimmigrant visa's terms in the same way that it allows DHS to disregard other terms of the visa statutes as merely entry requirements.

## II. This Court needs to settle the exceptionally important question of whether DHS shares with Congress the power to authorize alien employment.

### A. There is a circuit split over whether DHS shares with Congress the authority to authorize alien employment.

DHS claimed that 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3) (reproduced at App.65a) was the source of its authority to independently authorize alien employment through regulation in the H-4 Rule and subsequent similar regulations. App.17; App.111–12; *e.g.*, 81 Fed. Reg. at 13,045, 13,059 (OPT Rule); 82 Fed. Reg. at 5,239, 5,244–45 (International Entrepreneur Rule); 87 Fed. Reg. at 53,186 n.151, 53,195, 53,197 n.183, 53,198–99

(DACA). Section 1324a(h)(3) defines the term *unauthorized alien*, which is those aliens that may not work in the United States. An unauthorized alien is anyone who is not "(A) an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or (B) authorized to be so employed by this chapter or by the Attorney General [now Secretary of Homeland Security]." *Id.* The interpretation of the last clause has been the subject of dispute in litigation over the past decade. The United States House of Representatives endorsed the interpretation that the "or by the Attorney General" clause in section 1324a(h)(3) "reflects nothing more than the unremarkable reality that work authorization sometimes comes directly from a statute and other times must come from the Attorney General, pursuant to statute." Br. for *Amicus Curiae* United States House of Representatives at 26, *United States v. Texas*, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (No. 15-674). The administrative state endorses the interpretation that "Congress, . . . defined 'unauthorized alien' in such fashion as to exclude aliens who have been authorized employment by the Attorney General through the regulatory process, in addition to those who are authorized employment by statute." *Washtech*, 50 F.4th at 191 (quoting Employment Authorization; Classes of Aliens Eligible, 52 Fed. Reg. 46,092, 46,093 (Dec. 4, 1987)); App.5.

These competing interpretations have created a circuit split. The Fifth Circuit adopted the United States House of Representatives' interpretation, holding that section 1324a(h)(3) is just a term definition limited to its own section that does not confer power on DHS.

*Texas v. United States*, 809 F.3d 134, 182–83 & n.185 & n.186 (5th Cir. 2015) aff'd by an equally divided court 579 U.S. 547 (2016). The Fifth Circuit reaffirmed that position in *Texas v. Mayorkas*, No. 23-40653, slip op. (5th Cir. Jan. 17, 2025). The plaintiffs in *Texas v. Mayorkas* argued that the regulation Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, 87 Fed. Reg. 53,152–300 (Aug. 30, 2022) (DACA) exceeded DHS's authority. DACA allows certain illegal aliens who arrived as children to apply for discretion against enforcement and affirmatively grants such aliens work permits lacking any statutory authorization. 87 Fed. Reg. at 53,298–300. As with the H-4 Rule, DHS asserted in DACA that section 1324a(h)(3) conferred on it "authority for determining which noncitizens should be authorized for employment." 87 Fed. Reg. at 53,186 n.151, 53,195, 53,197 n.183, 53,198–99. *Texas v. Mayorkas* affirmed the district court's holding that DACA's affirmative grant of work permits exceeded DHS's authority, rejecting the claim that section 1324a(h)(3) confers on DHS shared authority with Congress to define classes of aliens eligible for employment. slip op. at 30. The Fifth Circuit's interpretation directly conflicts with the D.C. Circuit's that section 1324a(h)(3) "acknowledges the Executive's prerogative . . . to use powers that do not expressly mention nonnationals' work to grant work authorization." *Washtech*, 50 F.4th at 190; App.5; App.16–19. Whether DHS may erase through regulation Congress's distinctions between aliens who may work in the U.S. and those who may not "is a question of exceptional importance." *Wash. All. of*

*Tech. Workers v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, 58 F.4th 506, 508 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (Rao, J., dissenting from denial of reh'g en banc).

**B. The failure to resolve the scope of DHS's alien employment power has created a crisis.**

The question of whether DHS possesses shared power with Congress to permit alien employment has been brought to this Court repeatedly and undoubtably will continue to do so until it is resolved. *E.g., United States v. Texas*, 579 U.S. 547 (2016) (aff'd by an equally divided court); *Brewer v. Ariz. Dream Act Coal.*, 583 U.S. 1179 (2018) (cert. denied); *Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.*, 591 U.S. 1 (2020) (aff'd on other grounds); *Wash. All. of Tech. Workers v. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, 144 S. Ct. 78 (2023) (cert. denied); *Save Jobs USA v. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, 144 S. Ct. 371 (2023) (cert. denied). Coming up is more litigation over Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). *Texas v. Mayorkas*, No. 23-40653, slip op. (5th Cir. Jan. 17, 2025). That is likely to be followed by litigation over parole. *Humanitarian Parole Authority*, Congressional Research Service, Jan. 11, 2024 at 3–4. The Fifth Circuit even noted "'the uncertainty of final disposition'" of the work authorizations under DACA. *Texas v. Mayorkas,* slip op. at 38 (quoting *Texas v. United States*, 50 F.4th 498, 531 (5th Cir. 2022)). Until there is a definitive answer from this Court on whether DHS can independently authorize employment for classes of aliens through regulation, the resulting chaos and uncertainty in the

immigration system will continue to grow.

The International Entrepreneur Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 5,238–89 (Jan. 17, 2017) provides an instructive example of how work through regulation restructures the immigration system to the detriment of the public. The discretionary authority to grant parole under the INA was intended to allow the executive to bypass the immigration statutes for "emergency cases" or public interest situations, such as a "witnessor for purposes of prosecution." S. Rep. 1173 at 13 (1952). Parole was intended to provide a short-term period inside the United States. *Id*. at 12. The International Entrepreneur Rule authorized parolees to be employed, even those who were not entrepreneurs. 82 Fed. Reg at 5,289. Six years later, parole was transformed into the Humanitarian Parole Program (with no published regulation) under which DHS flew 30,000 aliens a month into the United States, and granted them parole and work permits under the International Entrepreneur Rule, creating an effectively open-ended stay.[8] When parole is combined with a work permit created by regulation, parole becomes an immigration program because, as long as aliens can work in the United States, they can afford to remain in the United States. This regulatory transformation of parole has subjected small communities to a huge influx of aliens that the communities have to support with increases

[8] USCIS, Processes for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans, https://web.archive.org/web/20241216224201/https://www.uscis.gov/CHNV

in services. *E.g.*, Avery Kreemer, *The federal programs that paved the way for Springfield Haitian influx,* Dayton Daily News, Oct. 2, 2024. Springfield, Ohio had a population of 58,000 in 2020 but now has to support 12,000–15,000 parolees brought into the country.[9] Such a regulatory-created immigration program that has reshaped the immigration system is only possible because of DHS's shared power with Congress to permit work— recognized by the D.C. Circuit and rejected by the Fifth Circuit. The resulting immigration crisis, parading in full view of the public, urgently demands this Court's intervention. *E.g.*, Judith Crown, *Chicago's migrant crisis raises questions of equity*, Crane's Chicago Business Feb. 20, 2024; Simon Hankinson, *Biden's border crisis comes to the suburbs*, Fox News, Mar. 11, 2024; *Aurora mayor blames 'bad' Biden border policies for Venezuelan gang problem*, Christian Post, Aug. 31, 2024.

**III. This case provides an excellent vehicle to resolve exceptionally important issues.**

This case presents an excellent vehicle for finally resolving the question of whether DHS shares with Congress the power to define classes of aliens eligible for employment without the complication of enforcement discretion, and outside a politically charged context. This case also presents an excellent vehicle to issue guidance on how agency authority is to be evaluated

---

[9] City of Springfield, Immigration FAQs, https://web.archive.org/web/20241204232223/https://springfieldohio.gov/immigration-faqs/

post-*Chevron*. There was an expectation that this Court's elimination of *Chevron* deference to agency interpretations of statutes would curtail the out-of-control expansion of the administrative state. *Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo*, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2265 (2024). In *Loper Bright,* this Court observed that under *Chevron*, courts faced a "byzantine set of preconditions and exceptions" and were frequently not applying *Chevron*, as in both this case and *Washtech*. *Id*. at 2,269. These cases demonstrate how courts confer power unimagined by legislators on agencies outside the *Chevron* framework. The D.C. Circuit implausibly finds that nullifying Congress's terms governing nonimmigrant visas and expanding DHS's power to set regulations governing admission into the sole power to govern an alien's stay in the United States is the "'best' and 'most straightforward reading of the INA.'" App.4 n.2 (quoting *Washtech*, 50 F.4th at 192). The radical reinterpretation of the INA "muddles our immigration law" by "replacing Congress's careful distinctions with unrestricted Executive Branch discretion," thus raising "a question of exceptional importance." *Wash. All. of Tech. Workers v. DHS.,* 58 F.4th 506, 508 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (Rao, J., dissenting from denial of reh'g en banc).

Where does the major question doctrine fit in post-*Chevron*? *West Virginia v. EPA*, 597 U.S. 697 (2022). Under the major question doctrine, "[w]e expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast 'economic and political significance.'" *Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA*, 573 U.S.

302, 324 (2014) (quoting *FDA v. Brown & Williamson*, 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000). The H-4 Rule and the OPT Rule are massive alien employment programs, with the latter being the largest in the immigration system. Neil Ruiz & Abby Budiman, *Number of Foreign College Students Staying and Working in the U.S. After Graduation Surges, Pew Research Center*, May 18, 2018, p. 7. Such regulations should run headlong into the major question doctrine and require "'clear congressional authorization.'" *West Virginia*, 597 U.S. 697 at 723 (quoting *Util. Air Regulatory Grp.*, 573 U.S. at 324). While the D.C. Circuit endorses vast power over alien employment implicitly conferred on DHS through ancillary provisions, that court steadfastly refuses to explain how this power conforms to the major question doctrine. App.6–7; *see Washtech*, 50 F.4th at 206 (Henderson, J. dissenting). This petition implicates the wider question of what principles should be applied to claims of agency power post-*Chevron*. In particular, are regulations limited to implementing a statutory scheme, or can they alter the fundamental structure of statutory systems?

## CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant the petition for certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN M. MIANO
*Counsel of Record*
CHRISTOPHER J. HAJEC
Immigration Reform
Law Institute
25 Massachusetts Ave. NW
Suite 335
Washington, DC 20001
202-232-5590
jmiano@verizon.net
*Counsel for Petitioner*

February 2025

# APPENDIX

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Appendix A

Opinion, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, *Save Jobs USA* v. *U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, No. 23-5089 (August 2, 2024) ....................... App-1

Appendix B

Opinion, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, *Save Jobs USA* v. *U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, No. 15-CV-0615 (March 28, 2023) ................ App-9

Appendix C

Opinion, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, *Save Jobs USA* v. *U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, No. 16-5287 (November 8, 2019) ................ App-27

Appendix D

Opinion, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, *Save Jobs USA* v. *U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, No. 15-CV-0615 (September 27, 2016) ....... App-41

Appendix E

Order Denying Petition for Rehearing En Banc (November 22, 2024).......................... App-61

Appendix F

Relevant Statutory Provisions.................... App-62
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(h)............................. App-62
8 U.S.C. § 1184(a)....................................... App-64
8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3) ................................. App-65

Appendix G

Employment Authorization for Certain H-4
Dependent Spouses,
80 Fed. Reg 10,283 (Feb. 25, 2015)............. App-66

## APPENDIX A

No. 23-5089

United States Court of Appeals
for the
District of Columbia Circuit

*Save Jobs USA* v. *U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*,
111 F.4th 76 (D.C. Cir. 2024)

Decided August 2, 2024

Before: SRINIVASAN, *Chief Judge*, WILKINS and WALKER, *Circuit Judges*.

Opinion for the Court filed by *Circuit Judge* WALKER.

WALKER, *Circuit Judge*: The Department of Homeland Security issued a rule that allows certain visa holders to work in the United States. Save Jobs USA challenged the rule, arguing that DHS exceeded its authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1101 *et seq.*, *see also* 8 U.S.C. §§ 1103(a)(3), 1184(a)(1).

But this court has already interpreted the relevant provisions of the INA to answer a similar question in favor of DHS. *See Washington Alliance of Technology Workers v. DHS*, 50 F.4th 164 (D.C. Cir. 2022) ("*Washtech*"). Because Save Jobs USA has not meaningfully distinguished this case from that binding precedent, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment.

**I**

The Immigration and Nationality Act includes two provisions relevant to this case. The first is 8 U.S.C. § 1184(a)(1) — when an alien is admitted into the country as a nonimmigrant, the admission "shall be for such time and under such conditions as the [Secretary of Homeland Security] may by regulations prescribe." The second is 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3) — the Secretary of Homeland Security "shall establish such regulations . . . and perform such other acts as he deems necessary for carrying out his authority under the" INA. The upshot, according to our recent precedent, is that Congress, through the INA, "granted the Executive power to set the duration and terms of statutorily identified nonimmigrants' presence in the United States." *Washtech*, 50 F.4th at 177.

Two related classes of "statutorily identified nonimmigrants" are specialized foreign workers (H–1B visa holders) and their dependent spouses (H–4 visa holders). *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H). H–1B holders are allowed to work in the United States for up to six years. But H–4 dependent spouses are generally not permitted to work.

This can lead to problems for H–1B visa holders seeking to become lawful permanent residents. *See Save Jobs USA v. DHS*, 942 F.3d 504, 506-08 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (outlining the process). Becoming a lawful permanent resident can take years, and frequent processing delays require numerous extensions of time. *See id.*

As for H–1B visa holders' dependent spouses (the H–4 visa holders), their "inability to work during these

delays leads to personal and economic hardships that worsen over time, increasing the disincentives for H–1B nonimmigrants to pursue lawful permanent resident status and thus increasing the difficulties that U.S. employers have in retaining highly educated and highly skilled nonimmigrant workers." *Id.* at 507-08 (cleaned up).

In 2015, DHS promulgated a rule to address that situation, relying on the two INA provisions described above. Its "H–4 Rule" allows select H–4 visa holders to work in the United States while their H–1B spouses transition to lawful permanent resident status. *See* Employment Authorization for Certain H–4 Dependent Spouses, 80 Fed. Reg. 10,284, 10,311 (Feb. 25, 2015) (codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.2, 274a.12, 274a.13) ("H–4 Rule"); *see also Save Jobs USA*, 942 F.3d at 507-08 (explaining the rule in detail). With the H–4 Rule, DHS hopes to "ameliorate certain disincentives for talented H–1B nonimmigrants to permanently remain in the United States and continue contributing to the U.S. economy as" lawful permanent residents. 80 Fed. Reg. 10,284, 10,284 (Feb. 25, 2015) (codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.2, 274a.12, 274a.13).

Save Jobs USA challenged DHS's authority to issue the rule. *See Save Jobs USA v. DHS*, 664 F. Supp. 3d 143, 148-51 (D.D.C. 2023). The district court granted DHS's motion for summary judgment. *See id.* at 148 (citing *Washtech*, 50 F.4th at 164).[1] Save Jobs USA appealed.

---

[1] The district court initially held that Save Jobs USA lacked standing and granted summary judgment to DHS. *See Save Jobs*

## II

DHS says this court's recent decision in *Washtech* interpreted the Immigration and Nationality Act to authorize immigration-related employment rules like the H–4 Rule. Save Jobs USA makes little effort to dispute that reading of *Washtech*. We therefore affirm the district court's decision awarding summary judgment to DHS.

### A

*Washtech* reviewed an employment rule promulgated by DHS pursuant to the INA. 50 F.4th at 169–72 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1184(a)(1)). The rule allowed foreign students (F–1 visa holders) who had completed their coursework to work for a limited time to gain practical training. *Id.* at 172 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(5)(i), (f)(10), (f)(11)). To support the rule, DHS relied on § 1184(a)(1) and § 1103(a) of the INA. *Id.* at 177, 179. *Washtech* upheld the F–1 Rule for two key reasons relevant on this appeal.[2]

---

*USA v. DHS*, 210 F. Supp. 3d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2016). Our court reversed and remanded. *See Save Jobs USA*, 942 F.3d at 512.

[2] *Washtech* did not depend on *Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.*, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), overruled by *Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo*, 144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024). True, *Washtech* applied *Chevron* as a counter-factual, fallback argument. See 50 F.4th at 192 ("even if [the INA] is ambiguous on the point, the statute may reasonably be understood as the Department has read it") (emphasis added); id. ("[e]ven if alternative readings are available") (emphasis added). But that did not alter *Washtech*'s holding that the "best" and "most straightforward reading of the INA" authorized the challenged rule. *Id.*

First, according to *Washtech*, § 1184(a)(1) "specifically provides" DHS with "time-and-conditions authority." *Id.* at 190, 193. Because the F–1 Rule "regulates the 'time' and 'conditions' of admission for F–1 visa-holders, and because it is reasonably related to the distinct composition and purpose of that visa class, as defined in the F–1 provision, the Secretary had authority to promulgate it." *Id.* at 177.

Second, according to *Washtech*, our precedents recognize "broad authority conferred upon DHS by sections 1184(a) and 1103(a)." *Id.* at 179 (cleaned up). *Washtech* read those precedents to mean "that the INA need not specifically authorize each and every action taken by DHS, so long as its action is reasonably related to the duties imposed upon it." *Id.* (cleaned up).

With that understanding, we turn to our case. Here, DHS authorized certain nonimmigrants to work in the United States — just like in *Washtech*. And to do so, DHS relied on § 1184(a)(1) and § 1103(a) of the INA — just like in *Washtech*.

Save Jobs USA makes little effort trying to meaningfully distinguish this case from *Washtech*. Instead, it disparages *Washtech*, arguing that it "held that the Immigration and Nationality Act confers on DHS *the vast power to permit alien employment through regulation* through ancillary provisions that do not even mention employment." Save Jobs USA Br. at 16 (emphasis added).[3]

---

[3] In the district court, Save Jobs USA did "not cite, much less contest, the explicit statutory grant of time-and-conditions authority to DHS in 8 U.S.C. § 1184(a)(1)." *Save Jobs USA*, 664 F. Supp. 3d at 150. And on appeal, Save Jobs USA argues

As the end of that last sentence suggests, Save Jobs USA disagrees with *Washtech* — and would like us to overrule it. *See id.* at 10, 15, 16-17. But we "cannot overrule a prior panel's decision, except via an *Irons* footnote or en banc review." *Robinson v. DHS Office of Inspector General*, 71 F.4th 51, 56 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (cleaned up).[4]

**B**

Save Jobs USA wants us to displace *Washtech* because it did not address the major questions doctrine. *See* Save Jobs USA Br. at 8–10, 16–17; *cf. Washtech*, 50 F.4th at 206 & n.11 (Henderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (raising major questions doctrine concerns); *Washington Alliance of Technology Workers v. DHS*, 58 F.4th 506, 508-11 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (Rao, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). But that's not how stare decisis works.

The major questions doctrine holds that courts "expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast economic and political significance." *West Virginia v. EPA*, 597 U.S. 697, 716 (2022) (cleaned up). Like a dictionary, or expressio

---

*Washtech* is inconsistent with past precedents, but does not name any relevant to this case. *See* Save Jobs USA Br. at 16-17.

[4] Last year, the court denied the petition for en banc review in *Washtech*. *Washington Alliance of Technology Workers v. DHS*, 58 F.4th 506, 508 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (en banc); *cf. Robinson*, 71 F.4th at 56 n.1 ("In an *Irons* footnote, named after the holding in *Irons v. Diamond*, 670 F.2d 265, 267-68 & n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1981), the panel seeks for its proposed decision the endorsement of the *en banc* court, and announces that endorsement in a footnote to the panel's opinion.") (cleaned up).

unius, or the extraterritoriality canon, the major questions doctrine is a tool of statutory interpretation. That's true whether you think it's a linguistic canon, or a substantive canon with a constitutional basis safeguarding the separation of powers, or both. *Compare Biden v. Nebraska*, 143 S. Ct. 2355, 2376-83 (2023) (Barrett, J., concurring), *with West Virginia*, 597 U.S. at 736–46 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Regardless, the function of the major questions doctrine is simple — to help courts figure out what a statute means. And so far as today's case is concerned, *Washtech* has already done that.

To be sure, vertical stare decisis requires fidelity to *West Virginia* when deciding any open question of statutory interpretation. It also requires a circuit panel to depart from a circuit precedent decided before *West Virginia* if the circuit precedent's reasoning was later "eviscerated" by the reasoning in *West Virginia. Dellums v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,* 863 F.2d 968, 978 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1988); *see also Bahlul v. United States*, 77 F.4th 918, 925 (D.C. Cir. 2023) ("We may depart from the law of the case and from circuit precedent . . . based on an intervening Supreme Court decision.").

But *Washtech* was decided after *West Virginia*. So the relationship between those two cases was *Washtech*'s legal issue, not ours. And "if stare decisis means anything, it means a future court lacks the authority to say a previous court was wrong about how it resolved the actual legal issue before it." *Gibbons v. Gibbs*, 99 F.4th 211, 215 (4th Cir. 2024).

* * *

We affirm the district court.

*So ordered.*

## APPENDIX B

No. 15-CV-0615

United States District Court
for the District of Columbia

*Save Jobs USA* v. *U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*

[Filed: March 28, 2023]

### Memorandum Opinion

In this Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") action, Plaintiff Save Jobs USA, an association representing Southern California Edison workers, challenges a Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") rule allowing H-4 visa-holders to apply for employment authorization. Plaintiff claims that the rule lacks statutory authorization, violates the nondelegation doctrine, and is arbitrary and capricious. Both parties have moved for summary judgment. Intervenors Immigration Voice and Anujkumar Dhamija, as well as *amici curiae* comprising more than forty companies and organizations have filed briefs in support of Defendant's motion. Having considered all those filings, and for the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment will be DENIED, and Defendant's motion for summary judgment will be GRANTED.

## I. BACKGROUND

The court has set forth the relevant background for this case in prior opinions, so only a brief description is necessary here. *See Save Jobs USA v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, 210 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2016); *Save Jobs USA v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, 105 F. Supp. 3d 108 (D.D.C. 2015).

### A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework

The Immigration and Naturalization Act ("INA") authorizes DHS to admit foreign workers into the U.S. to perform certain types of labor. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H). The "H-1B" category of visa-holders are admitted "to perform services . . . in a specialty occupation" for an initial period of three years, extendable for three additional years. *Id.* § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b). Spouses and minor dependents of H-1B visa-holders are granted H-4 visas allowing them to reside in the United States as well. See id.

Generally, H-1B visa-holders and their H-4 spouses and dependents may reside in the U.S. for up to six years, after which time they must leave and remain abroad for at least one year before seeking to reenter in the same status. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(4); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(13)(iii)(A). However, H-1B visa-holders may transition to legal permanent resident ("LPR") status—*i.e.*, become a green card holder—through the employer-sponsored immigration process. This process requires the H-1B visa-holder's employer to obtain a Department of Labor certification that there are no U.S. workers who are "able, willing, qualified[,] . . . and available" to perform the job, and that the "wages

and working conditions" of "similarly employed" American workers will not be "adversely affected." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A)(i). If the Secretary of Labor approves the certification, the employer then submits a Form I-140 petition for DHS's approval. *See id.* § 1154(a)(1)(F), (b); 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(a). Due to frequently oversubscribed quotas for the number of H-1B visa-holders who may transition to LPR status, there are often long delays, and an applicant may have to leave the U.S. before receiving a decision on their status adjustment application.

To prevent the potential for disruption to employers and families, Congress passed the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000 ("AC21 Act"). Under that Act, if an applicant has an approved Form I-140 petition and is unable to adjust their status because of per-country visa limits, they may extend their H-1B stay in three-year increments until their application for LPR status has been adjudicated. *See* Pub. L. No. 106-313, § 104(c), 114 Stat. 1251, 1253; 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(13)(iii)(E). H-1B visa-holders who are the subject of labor certification applications or Form I-140 petitions may also be eligible for recurring one- year extensions of H-1B status if 365 days have elapsed since the application or petition was filed. *See* AC21 Act § 106(a)-(b), 114 Stat. at 1253-54, *as amended by* 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 11030A, 116 Stat. 1762, 1836-37 (2002); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(13)(iii)(D).

The rule at issue in this case permits a subset of H-4 visa-holders to apply for Employment Authorization Documents ("EADs") allowing them to work in the

United States. To be eligible, the H-4 visa-holder's H-1B spouse must either be transitioning to LPR status by way of either an extension past their sixth year under the AC21 Act or be the subject of an approved Form I-140 petition but cannot adjust status because of visa oversubscription. *See* Employment Authorization for Certain H-4 Dependent Spouses, 80 Fed. Reg. 10,284, 10,285 (Feb. 25, 2015) (codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.2, 274a) ("H-4 Rule"). The H-4 Rule aims to "ameliorate certain disincentives that currently lead H-1B nonimmigrants to abandon efforts to remain in the United States while seeking LPR status, thereby minimizing disruptions to U.S. businesses employing such workers." *Id*. The Rule underwent notice-and-comment procedures, *see* Employment Authorization for Certain H-4 Dependent Spouses, 79 Fed. Reg. 26,886 (May 12, 2014) (proposed rule), and took effect on May 26, 2015, *see* 80 Fed. Reg. 10,284 (Feb. 25, 2015).

**B. Procedural History**

On April 23, 2015, Plaintiff filed this suit and moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent Defendant from implementing the H-4 Rule. *See* Pl. Mot. Prelim. Inj. ECF No. 2. The court denied Plaintiff's motion on May 24, 2015. *See* May 24, 2015 Order, ECF No. 14; 105 F. Supp. 3d at 116. Later that year, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. *See* Pl. Second Summ. J. Mot., ECF No. 26;[5] Def. First Summ. J. Cross-Mot., ECF No. 27. The court denied Plaintiff's

---

[5] Plaintiff's first motion for summary judgment was dismissed without prejudice. *See* July 1, 2015 Minute Order.

motion and granted Defendant's motion, ruling that Plaintiff lacked standing. *See* 210 F. Supp. 3d at 13. Plaintiff appealed and the D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings. *Save Jobs USA v. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, 942 F.3d 504 (D.C. Cir. 2019). Plaintiff and Defendant have once again cross-moved for summary judgment. ECF Nos. 67, 69.

## II. LEGAL STANDARD

The APA commands that a court set aside agency action that is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law," or that is "contrary to [a] constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)-(B).

Summary judgment is typically appropriate when the pleadings and evidence demonstrate that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). But Rule 56(a)'s standards do not apply in an APA action where "the district judge sits as an appellate tribunal," and the "[e]ntire case on review is a question of law." *Am. Bioscience, Inc. v. Thompson*, 269 F.3d 1077, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead of reviewing the record for disputed facts, "the function of the district court is to determine whether or not as a matter of law the evidence in the administrative record permitted the agency to make the decision it did." *Sierra Club v. Mainella*, 459 F. Supp. 2d 76, 90 (D.D.C. 2006) (quotation marks and citation omitted). This standard of review is "narrow," and a court applying it "is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency." *Motor*

*Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).

## III. ANALYSIS

### A. Statutory Authorization

Plaintiff's primary contention is that Congress has never granted DHS authority to allow foreign nationals, like H-4 visa-holders, to work during their stay in the United States. But as the D.C. Circuit has recently explained, that contention runs headlong into the text of the INA, decades of Executive-branch practice, and both explicit and implicit congressional ratification of that practice.

The Circuit's analysis in *Washington Alliance of Technology Workers v. United States Department of Homeland Security* is directly applicable to this case. 50 F.4th 164 (D.C. Cir. 2022) ("*Washtech*"). There, a labor union representing STEM workers claimed DHS lacked statutory authority to authorize employment as part of a post-graduation, "Optional Practical Training" program for F-1 student visa-holders. Id. at 190. The D.C. Circuit squarely rejected that argument for at least three reasons, all of which foreclose Plaintiff's parallel assertion here.

The first reason was "the INA's explicit grant of authority to the Department," which not only "commands DHS to 'establish such regulations' as its Secretary 'deems necessary for carrying out his authority,'" but also "specifically provides that the 'admission to the United States of any alien as a nonimmigrant shall be for such time and under such conditions as the

Attorney General may by regulations prescribe.'" *Id.* (first quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3), then quoting *id.* § 1184(a)(1)). The Attorney General's authority to set the "time" and "conditions" of visa-holders' stay has been transferred to DHS. *Id.* at 170 n.1. In the case of F-1 students, the D.C. Circuit held, "[w]hether they can work" is such a condition, just like rules governing "where they can study," the "courses they must take," and "what any accompanying spouse or children may do while in the country." *Id.* at 190 (citations omitted). The INA's text therefore expressly contemplates DHS authorizing employment for foreign nationals. *Id.*

Second, "[h]istory corroborates that Congress meant what it plainly said in the INA when it granted DHS authority in section 1184(a)(1) to set the conditions of F-1 students' admission." *Id.* "DHS and its predecessors have been authorizing student visa-holders to work at jobs related to their studies since at least 1947." *Id.*; *see also id.* at 171-73 (reviewing history). "And across decades of the Executive doing so openly, . . . Congress has chosen to maintain the relevant provisions" of the INA. *Id.* at 190; *see id.* at 180-83 (reviewing history). In fact, "Congress also expressly exempted F-1 students from several forms of wage taxes—a measure that would be completely unnecessary if those students lacked authorization to work." *Id.* at 191. Thus, "Congress has not just kept its silence by refusing to overturn [an] administrative construction, but has ratified it with positive legislation," which renders "that construction virtually conclusive." *Id.* (quoting *Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor*, 478 U.S. 833, 846 (1986)).

Finally, and relatedly, Congress verified "that DHS may lawfully authorize employment for nonimmigrants" when it passed the 1986 Immigration Control and Reform Act ("IRCA"). *Id.* "IRCA prohibits the employment of 'unauthorized aliens,'" which it defines as "one who is neither 'lawfully admitted for permanent residence' nor 'authorized to be so employed by this chapter or by the Attorney General'—now DHS." *Id.* (first quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1), then quoting *id.* § 1324a(h)(3)). "IRCA's express recognition that aliens may be 'authorized to be . . . employed . . . by' DHS confirms that Congress has deliberately granted the Executive power to authorize employment." *Id.*

The D.C. Circuit's holding and reasoning in *Washtech* apply with equal force in this case. Like the Optional Practical Training program at issue there, Defendant promulgated the H- 4 Rule here pursuant to its time-and-conditions and general regulatory authority, as confirmed by IRCA. *See* 80 Fed. Reg. at 10,285 & 10,294 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1103(a)(3), 1184(a), 1324a(h)(3)(B)). On their face, the "time" and "conditions" of a visa-holder's stay in the United States include "what an accompanying spouse . . . may do while in the country," as well as whether "[w]hether they can work." *Washtech*, 50 F.4th at 190. IRCA verifies the plain meaning of those terms in the INA by recognizing that some visa-holders may be "authorized to be . . . employed . . . by" DHS. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3). In short, Congress has expressly and knowingly empowered Defendant to authorize employment as a permissible condition of an H-4 spouse's stay in the United States.

The fact that the Executive Branch has had longstanding and open responsibility for authorizing employment for similar visa classes further manifests Congress's approval of Defendant exercising that authority. For example, DHS and its predecessors have authorized employment not just for students, *see Washtech*, 50 F.4th at 171-73, but also for their spouses and dependents, see Brief of Leading Companies and Business Associations as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant at 12 n.5, ECF No. 80 ("Amici Brief") (collecting agency policy documents dating back to 1965 permitting, among others, J-2 spouses to work). For instance, DHS has long extended work authorization to spouses of foreign government officials and spouses of employees or officers of international organizations. See Employment Authorization to Aliens in the United States, 46 Fed. Reg. 25,079 (May 5, 1981). Rather than refuting the straightforward interpretation of the INA that permits DHS to exercise that authority, Congress has repeatedly blessed it by leaving the relevant provisions of the INA untouched, even as it as amended other portions of the statute during the last several decades. See Washtech, 50 F.4th at 183; see, e.g., Amici Brief at 18 n.8 (citing several recent amendments to 8 U.S.C. § 1324a). That constitutes "persuasive evidence that the interpretation is the one intended by Congress." Schor, 478 U.S. at 846. Mindful of controlling precedent in this Circuit, this court will not disturb it.[6]

---

[6] Because the statute's text and history plainly permit Defendant to authorize employment for H-4 spouses, the court does not analyze Defendant's contention that it may do so under *Chevron*

Plaintiff's arguments do nothing to undermine Defendant's statutory authority. First, Plaintiff argues that "Congress did not delegate to DHS general authority to authorize aliens to work in 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3)." Plaintiff's Second Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment at 7, ECF No. 67 ("Pl.'s MSJ"); *id.* at 7-9. Plaintiff "is right that section 1324a(h)(3) is not the source of the relevant regulatory authority," but that is beside the point, which is that "section 1324a(h)(3) expressly acknowledges that employment authorization need not be specifically conferred by statute; it can also be granted by regulation, as it has been" here. *Washtech,* 50 F.4th at 191-92. Plaintiff does not cite, much less contest, the explicit statutory grant of time-and-conditions authority to DHS in 8 U.S.C. § 1184(a)(1).

Second, Plaintiff admits that Defendant (or its predecessors) have long authorized employment for visa-holders but asserts that Congress has never implicitly endorsed that practice. See Reply in Support of Plaintiff's Second Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment at 9-11, ECF No. 76 ("Pl.'s Reply"); Pl.'s MSJ at 9-10. But Plaintiff's attempts to support that assertion fall short. To start, it argues that there is no legislative history suggesting Congress intentionally granted DHS power to authorize employment. Pl.'s MSJ at 9-10. In fact, as the Circuit noted in *Washtech*, the

---

*U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.*, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Were there any ambiguity in the INA, however, that ambiguity would counsel deference because Defendant has reasonably resolved it. *Id.* at 866; *Washtech*, 50 F.4th at 192-93; *see infra* Section III.C.

1950 Senate study that was the "genesis" of the INA recognized that the Executive branch was already authorizing employment for nonimmigrant visa-holders. 50 F.4th at 181 (citing S. Rep. No. 81-1515, at 503). Knowing that, Congress nonetheless decided to maintain all the relevant grants of authority to the Executive. *Id*. Thus, while Plaintiff is right that the INA "provides strong safeguards for American labor," *see* S. Rep. No. 82-117 at 11, Congress also recognized that the Executive might authorize employment to further the statute's other broad and varied goals—such as promoting "foreign policy, constitutional guarantees, public welfare, the health, the economy, and the productivity of the Nation," Congressional and Administrative News, 82nd Congress, Second Session, 1952, v. 2, p. 1750. As discussed above, "[m]ore than seventy years of history and practice since it enacted the 1952 INA shows that Congress has not changed its mind." *Washtech*, 50 F.4th at 164.

Lastly, Plaintiff cites the fact that several members of Congress have introduced but never passed bills to grant H-4 spouses work authorization. Pl.'s MSJ at 10. But the Supreme Court has noted that "Congressional inaction lacks persuasive significance because several equally tenable inferences may be drawn from such inaction, including the inference that the existing legislation already incorporated the offered change." *Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Corp.*, 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This case illustrates that problem. At most, the introduction of those bills shows that some members of Congress thought it would be a good idea for H-4 spouses to have work opportunities; it says

nothing about whether Congress believed that, even if it took no action, the Executive could still authorize that employment. Indeed, Congress could have rejected those proffered bills precisely because it wanted to leave the choice whether to authorize employment for H-4 spouses up to DHS, given its expertise in the field. See id. There is accordingly no logical basis for inferring that Congress believes Defendant powerless to promulgate the H-4 Rule.

For these reasons, the court concludes that Defendant possessed the requisite statutory authority to issue the H-4 Rule.

### B. Separation of Powers and Non-Delegation Doctrine

Plaintiff's second challenge is related to its first. It argues that any interpretation of the INA allowing Defendant to authorize employment for H-4 spouses would violate the constitutional separation of powers and related "nondelegation doctrine." Pl.'s MSJ at 13-15. This argument, too, is unavailing in light of the D.C. Circuit's decision in *Washtech*.

"The nondelegation doctrine is rooted in the principle of separation of powers that underlies our tripartite system of Government." *Mistretta v. United States*, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989). Under that system, Congress "may not transfer to another branch 'powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative.'" *Gundy v. United States*, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123 (2019) (quoting *Wayman v. Southard*, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42-43 (1825)). "This principle does not mean, however, that only Congress can make a rule of prospective force."

*Loving v. United States*, 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1996). "Congress may 'obtain[] the assistance of its coordinate Branches'—and in particular, may confer substantial discretion on executive agencies to implement and enforce the laws." *Gundy*, 139 S. Ct. at 2123 (quoting *Mistretta*, 488 U.S. at 372). And because "Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives," the Supreme Court has "held time and again, that a statutory delegation is constitutional as long as Congress 'lay[s] down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform.'" *Id.* (same). The "intelligible principle" standard is "not demanding," and is satisfied unless "Congress ha[s] failed to articulate any policy or standard" at all. *Id.* at 2129. This case does not raise those concerns. Plaintiff asserts that even if Congress granted

Defendant power to authorize employment for nonimmigrant visa-holders, it "did so while giving no guidance whatsoever on how this authority was to be used." Pl.'s MSJ at 14-15. But in Washtech, in which the plaintiffs also made nondelegation arguments, *see* 50 F.4th at 191, the D.C. Circuit explained how the INA's text and structure establishes the "limiting principle" to "constrain DHS's regulatory authority," *id.* at 189.

> Section 1184(a)(1)[] . . . provides time-and-conditions authority specifically for the "admission to the United States of any alien *as a nonimmigrant*." 8 U.S.C. § 1184(a)(1) (emphasis added). Notably, however, the INA does not define "nonimmigrant" as

> a general category, but only as a set of discrete classes. *Id.* § 1101(a)(15)(A)-(V). Those dozens of class definitions are each very brief, specifying little more than a type of person to be admitted and the purpose for which they seek to enter. No definition states exactly how long the person may stay, nor spells out precisely what the nonimmigrant may or may not do while here for the specified purpose. Those are parameters that Congress expected the Executive to establish "by regulations," which is exactly what section 1184(a)(1) grants DHS the authority to do. In short: The INA uses visa classes to identify who may enter temporarily and why, but leaves to DHS the authority to specify, consistent with the visa class definitions, the time and conditions of that admission.

*Id.* at 177-78 (footnote omitted). Thus, "[p]ursuant to the Secretary's obligation to exercise its rulemaking power in keeping with the statute's text and structure, DHS must ensure that the times and conditions it attaches to the admission of [nonimmigrant visa-holders] are reasonably related to the purpose for which they were permitted to enter." *Id.* at 179.

As the next section explains, the H-4 Rule satisfies that statutory requirement. But the requirement's mere existence provides an intelligible principle of delegation and is therefore fatal to Plaintiff's nondelegation challenge.

### C. Arbitrary and Capricious Claim

Plaintiff's final argument is that Defendant's promulgation of the H-4 Rule was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

> The scope of review under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Nevertheless, the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.

*State Farm*, 463 U.S. at 43 (quotation omitted). Plaintiff asserts two violations of that standard, but neither is persuasive.

First, Plaintiff argues that the H-4 Rule reversed without explanation a prior policy established by Congress and DHS—*i.e.*, that H-4 spouses had no work authorization. The court disagrees. As *Washtech* explained, the INA empowers (but does not require) Defendant to set certain "conditions" of nonimmigrant visa-holders' stay in the United States, potentially including work authorization. *See* 50 F.4th at 177-78. Defendant's choice to exercise its statutory discretion did not change that policy. After Defendant and Intervenors made the same argument in their briefing, Plaintiff failed to respond. *See* Memo. in Support of Def.'s Cross- Mot. for Summary Judgment and Opp. to Pl.'s Mot. for Summary Judgment at 23-28, ECF No. 69-1 ("Def.'s MSJ"); Intervenor's Memo. in Support of DHS's Mot. for Summary Judgment and in Opp. to Save Jobs USA's Mot. for Summary Judgment at 27-

28; Pl.'s Reply at 1-15. Indeed, Plaintiff's Reply did not address any of the arguments opposing its arbitrary and capricious challenge, *see* Pl.'s Reply at 1-17, and thereby effectively concedes them, *Am. Waterways Operators v. Regan*, 590 F. Supp. 3d 126, 138 (D.D.C. 2022) ("If a party fails to counter an argument that the opposing party makes in a motion, the court may treat that argument as conceded.") (citations omitted).

In any event, Defendant did explain why it had decided to authorize employment for H-4 spouses. In doing so, Defendant also demonstrated how the H-4 Rule "is reasonably related to the nature and purpose of the [H-4] visa class." *Washtech*, 50 F.4th at 179; *see supra* Section III.B. As relevant here, that class includes individuals "accompanying" or "following to join" the holder of an H-1B visa in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H). In turn, the H-1B class enables the entry of workers who come "to perform services . . . in a specialty occupation." *Id.* As the H-4 Rule explained, "[r]etaining highly skilled workers who intend to acquire LPR status" is critical to fulfill the purposes of the H-1B visa class, including benefiting from those individuals' "advances in entrepreneurship and research and development, which are highly correlated with overall economic growth and job creation." 80 Fed. Reg. at 10,284. But upon review of recent data and reports from experts, *see id.* at 10,304-05, Defendant concluded that "the lack of employment authorization for H-4 dependent spouses" undermines that retention because it "often gives rise to personal and economic hardships for the families of H-1B nonimmigrants," leading them to "abandon efforts to remain in the United States," *id.* at 10,284-85. Accordingly,

granting employment authorization for H-4 spouses furthers the dual statutory purposes of H-1B workers performing specialty services in the United States, and H-4 spouses accompanying them. *Id.*

Second, Plaintiff initially contends that Defendant "entirely failed to consider" the "negative effect" that the H-4 Rule could have on American workers. Pl.'s MSJ at 17. But in the next paragraph, Plaintiff recognizes—as it must—that Defendant did consider that effect, and instead takes aim at Defendant's methodology for doing so. *Id.* (citing 80 Fed. Reg. at 10,295). Defendant noted that the H-4 Rule would "not result in 'new' additions to the labor market" because "it simply accelerates the timeframe by which [H-4 spouses] can enter the labor market." 80 Fed. Reg. at 10,309. In addition, Defendant calculated that "even if every eligible H-4 spouse took advantage of the rule in the first year (the year with the most newly-eligible H-4 spouses) it would amount to less than 0.12% of the U.S. workforce." Def.'s MSJ at 27 (citing 80 Fed. Reg. at 10,295 & 10,309). By contrast, Defendant noted that commenters predicting negative impacts on American jobs did not provide any empirical support for that prediction. 80 Fed. Reg. at 10,296. In light of that data, Defendant concluded that the H-4 Rule's benefits outweighed its "minimal" economic costs. *Id.* at 10,295-96. That suffices to establish a "rational connection between the facts found and the choice made." *State Farm*, 463 U.S. at 43. Plaintiff's insistence that it would have been better to compare "the number of workers added under the H-4 rule per year" to "the average monthly job creation" in the United States rather than "the total size of the American workforce,"

Pl.'s MSJ at 17-18, does not render Defendant's analysis—based on the evidence before it—irrational.

As a result, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the H-4 Rule was arbitrary and capricious.

## IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 67, will be DENIED, and Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 69, will be GRANTED. A corresponding Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: March 28, 2023
Tanya S. Chutkan
TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge

## ORDER

For the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, ECF No. 85, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 67, is hereby DENIED, and Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 69, is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, this action is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. This is a final appealable order.
Civil Action No. 15-615 (TSC)
Date: March 28, 2023
Tanya S. Chutkan
TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge

**APPENDIX C**

No. 16-5287

United States Court of Appeals
for the
District of Columbia Circuit

*Save Jobs USA* v. *U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*,
942 F.3d 504 (D.C. Cir. 2019)

[Filed] November 8, 2019

Before: TATEL and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges, and SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.
TATEL, Circuit Judge: Save Jobs USA, an association representing Southern California Edison workers, challenges a Department of Homeland Security rule that permits certain visa holders to seek lawful employment. The district court found that Save Jobs lacked Article III standing and granted summary judgment in the Department's favor. We reverse. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we conclude that Save Jobs has demonstrated that the rule will subject its members to an actual or imminent increase in competition and that it therefore has standing to pursue its challenge.

**I.**

Our nation's immigration laws distinguish between two categories of foreign nationals seeking admission

to the United States: "nonimmigrants," who plan to stay in the country only temporarily, and "immigrants," who plan to stay permanently. See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(b) ("Every alien . . . shall be presumed to be an immigrant until he establishes . . . that he is entitled to a nonimmigrant status . . . ."); *id.* § 1101(a)(15) (setting forth nonimmigrant classifications). The rule challenged here attempts to ease the burdens faced by certain nonimmigrants during their often-lengthy transition to immigrant status.

The Immigration and Nationality Act authorizes the admission of nonimmigrants "to perform services . . . in a specialty occupation," *id.*§1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b), and those specialty workers' spouses, *id.*§1101(a)(15)(H). Specialty workers admitted under this provision receive H–1B visas, which permit them to work in the occupation for which they were admitted. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(1)(i), (ii)(B). The specialty workers' spouses receive H–4 visas, which permit the spouses to reside in the United States but do not authorize them to work. *Id.* § 214.2(h)(9)(iv). Generally, H–1B visa holders and their H–4 spouses may reside in the country for a maximum of six years, after which time they must depart and remain abroad for at least one year before seeking to reenter in the same status. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(4); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(13)(iii)(A).

Although the H–1B visa permits its holder to remain in the United States only temporarily, an H–1B nonimmigrant may obtain a permanent resident visa—better known as a green card—through the employer-sponsored immigration process. Getting a green card takes a long time. An employer must first identify a job for which the H–1B visa holder will be

permanently hired and then certify to the Secretary of Labor that (1) "there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified[,] . . . and available" to fill the position; and (2) that the alien's employment "will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions" of "similarly employed" workers in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A)(i). If the Secretary approves the certification, the employer then submits a so- called Form I–140 petition, which must be approved by the Department before the H–1B visa holder can change status. *See id.* § 1154(a)(1)(F), (b); 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(a). But even H–1B visa holders with approved Form I–140 petitions may be unable to adjust status because the Act limits the total number of available employment-based green cards. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1151(d). The Act also specifies a per-country cap, further limiting the number of green cards available to individuals from the same country. *See id.* § 1152(a)(2). Once a country's cap is reached, applicants from that country must wait until more employment-based green cards become available.

Recognizing the potential for delay in adjustment, Congress amended the Act to permit H–1B visa holders who have begun the employer-based immigration process to remain and work in the United States while awaiting decisions on their applications for lawful permanent residence. Under the amended Act and its implementing regulations, H–1B nonimmigrants with approved Form I–140 petitions who are unable to adjust status because of per-country visa limits may extend their H–1B stay in three-year increments until their adjustment of status applications have been adjudicated. *See* American Competitiveness in the

Twenty-first Century Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-313, § 104(c), 114 Stat. 1251, 1253 (codified at 8U.S.C. §1184 note); 8C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(13)(iii)(E). In addition, H–1B visa holders who are the beneficiaries of labor certification applications or Form I–140 petitions are eligible for recurring one-year extensions of H–1B status if 365 days have elapsed since the application or petition was filed. *See* American Competitiveness in the Twenty-first Century Act § 106(a)–(b), 114 Stat. at 1253–54, *as amended by* 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-273, §11030A, 116 Stat. 1762, 1836–37 (2002) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1184 note); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(13)(iii)(D).

Against this background, the Department issued a rule permitting H–4 visa holders to obtain work authorization if their H–1B visa-holding spouses have been granted an extension of status under the Act or are the beneficiaries of approved Form I–140 petitions but cannot adjust status due to visa oversubscription. Employment Authorization for Certain H–4 Dependent Spouses, 80 Fed. Reg. 10,284, 10,285 (Feb. 25, 2015) (codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.2, 274a) ("H–4 Rule"). By making H–4 visa holders eligible for lawful employment, the Department sought to "ameliorate certain disincentives that currently lead H–1B nonimmigrants to abandon efforts to remain in the United States while seeking [lawful permanent resident] status, thereby minimizing disruptions to U.S. businesses employing such workers." Id. Specifically, the Department explained that H–1B nonimmigrants and their families often face long delays in the process of obtaining permanent residence, and that H–4 visa

holders' inability to work during these delays leads to "personal and economic hardships" that worsen over time, "increas[ing] the disincentives for H–1B nonimmigrants to pursue [lawful permanent resident] status and thus increas[ing] the difficulties that U.S. employers have in retaining highly educated and highly skilled nonimmigrant workers." *Id*. at 10,284.

Appellant Save Jobs, an association formed to "address the problems American workers face from foreign labor entering the United States job market through visa programs," Compl. ¶ 8, challenged the rule in the district court, arguing that it exceeded the Department's statutory authority, and that, in adopting it, the Department acted arbitrarily and capriciously. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment on standing and the merits. The district court, finding that Save Jobs failed to demonstrate that the rule would cause its members any injury and thus lacked Article III standing, granted summary judgment in the Department's favor. *See Save Jobs USA v. Department of Homeland Security*, 210 F. Supp. 3d 1, 5, 8–11 (D.D.C. 2016).

Save Jobs appealed. Following the early 2017 change of presidential administrations, we held the case in abeyance, initially to allow the incoming administration time to consider the case and later because the Department expected to begin the process of rescinding the rule. In December 2018, we removed the case from abeyance and granted Immigration Voice and two of its members permission to intervene in order to defend the rule. "Our review is de novo." *American Institute of Certified Public Accountants v.*

*IRS*, 804 F.3d 1193, 1196 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).

**II.**

"The 'irreducible constitutional minimum of standing consists of three elements': '[t]he plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.'" *Air Line Pilots Ass'n, International v. Chao*, 889 F.3d 785, 788 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (alteration in original) (quoting *Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016)). As an association claiming representational standing, Save Jobs has standing to sue if "'(1) at least one of [its] members has standing to sue in her or his own right, (2) the interests [it] seeks to protect are germane to its purpose, and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of an individual member in the lawsuit.'" *American Institute*, 804 F.3d at 1197 (quoting *American Library Ass'n v. FCC*, 401 F.3d 489, 492 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). The Department challenges only the first of these three requirements. Because the district court disposed of this case at summary judgment, Save Jobs "may not rest on 'mere allegations, but must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts' demonstrating standing." *Shays v. Federal Election Commission, 414 F.3d 76, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). "For purposes of the standing inquiry, we assume [Save Jobs] would succeed on the merits of [its] claim."

*Barker v. Conroy*, 921 F.3d 1118, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 2019).

Save Jobs argues, as it did in the district court, that the rule harms its members in several ways, including by increasing competition for jobs from H–1B visa holders. The doctrine of competitor standing recognizes that "when regulations illegally structure a competitive environment—whether an agency proceeding, a market, or a reelection race—parties defending concrete interests in that environment suffer legal harm under Article III." American Institute, 804 F.3d at 1197 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Relying on this "well- established principle," Air Line Pilots, 889 F.3d at 788, our court has repeatedly held that an individual who competes in a labor market has standing to challenge allegedly unlawful government action that is likely to lead to an increased supply of labor—and thus competition—in that market. *See, e.g., Washington Alliance of Technology Workers v. Department of Homeland Security*, 892 F.3d 332, 339–40 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (labor market for science, technology, engineering, and mathematics jobs); *Mendoza v. Perez*, 754 F.3d 1002, 1011 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (labor market for open-range herding jobs). In *Washington Alliance of Technology Workers v. Department of Homeland Security*, for example, we held that a science, technology, engineering, and mathematics workers' union had standing to challenge a Department rule allowing student visa holders to remain in the United States and work after finishing their degrees. 892 F.3d at 339–40, 342. The union alleged that its members had applied to jobs at companies that employed the student visa holders and that those

companies had applied for the extension on behalf of the student-employees. Id. at 339–40. We found that the union had standing to pursue its challenge, id. at 342, explaining that "'the basic requirement'" of a competitor standing claim is "'an actual or imminent increase in competition, which increase we recognize will almost certainly cause an injury in fact,'" *id*. at 339 (quoting *Sherley v. Sebelius*, 610 F.3d 69, 73 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).

Save Jobs contends that, like the regulation challenged in *Washington Alliance*, the rule at issue here will cause its members to face increased competition for jobs. Absent the rule, argues Save Jobs, at least some H–1B visa holders awaiting permanent residence would leave the United States— exiting the labor pool—because their spouses are unable to work. By authorizing H–4 visa holders to seek employment, Save Jobs continues, the rule removes a key obstacle to H–1B visa holders remaining in the United States throughout the immigration process, meaning that more H–1B visa holders will stay and compete with Save Jobs' members than otherwise would have.

The administrative record demonstrates as much. *Cf. Competitive Enterprise Institute v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,* 901 F.2d 107, 114–15 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (relying on the "agency's own experience and sound market analysis" and the "public comments" contained in the administrative record as evidence of standing). In promulgating the rule, the Department sought to "incentivize H–1B nonimmigrants and their families to continue to wait and contribute to the United States"—that is, by working—"through an often lengthy waiting period for an

immigrant visa to become available." H–4 Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 10,296. The Department expected the rule would "benefit U.S. employers by decreasing the labor disruptions that occur when H–1B nonimmigrants abandon the permanent resident process." *Id.* The record contains evidence confirming the Department's expectation: more than sixty commenters wrote that they had planned to move out of the United States, but will instead remain and pursue lawful permanent resident status as a result of the new rule; two dozen reported that they had already left the country due to the prohibition on H–4 visa holder employment; and several warned that they would soon leave because H–4 visa holders cannot work under current (now former) law. Id. at 10,288, 10,293. Indeed, the Department expressly "disagree[d]" with one commenter's concern that the record "failed to indicate that potential immigrants have abandoned the immigration process, or have decided against coming to the United States in the first place, because their spouses would not be authorized to work," explaining that it "believes that this rule will fulfill its intended purpose"— namely, "encourag[ing] certain highly skilled H–1B nonimmigrants to remain in the United States." Id. at 10,293.

Given that Save Jobs has offered sufficient evidence to show an "actual or imminent increase in competition," *Sherley*, 610 F.3d at 73, all that remains is for it to demonstrate that its members compete with H–1B visa holders in the labor market. It has done so through its members' affidavits. Two members declare that they worked as information technology specialists at Southern California Edison for more than

fifteen years until they were fired and replaced by H–1B visa holders. Bradley Aff. ¶¶ 5, 8; Buchanan Aff. ¶¶ 7, 9. A third worked as a system analyst at Southern California Edison for twenty years until she, like the other two, was fired and replaced by an H–1B visa holder. Gutierrez Aff. ¶ 5, 10. All three have been actively looking for new jobs in the technology sector, including by attending job fairs, participating in job placement programs, and submitting job applications. See Bradley Aff. ¶13; Buchanan Aff. ¶ 14; Gutierrez Aff. ¶¶ 12–13. Although Save Jobs "has offered no evidence that the competitive harm" it claims from the rule "has yet occurred"—indeed, the members lost their jobs, and Save Jobs filed suit, before the rule went into effect—"our precedent imposes no such requirement." *American Institute*, 804 F.3d at 1198. In short, the affidavits establish that Save Jobs' members compete with H–1B workers for technology jobs, and the rulemaking record itself demonstrates that the rule will increase competition for jobs.

The Department insists that any injury to Save Jobs is caused by the H–1B visa program, not by the rule. *See* Appellee's Br. 24–26. We disagree. Save Jobs has shown that the rule will cause more H–1B visa holders to remain in the United States than otherwise would—an effect that is distinct from that of the H–1B visa holders' initial admission to the country.

The Department also contends that Save Jobs has failed to demonstrate that its members are "direct and current competitor[s]," *Mendoza,* 754 F.3d at 1013 (emphasis omitted) (quoting *KERM, Inc. v. FCC*, 353 F.3d 57, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2004)), of H–1B visa holders. *See* Appellee's Br. 26–28. But the Department overreads

our "direct and current competitor" formulation, which simply distinguishes an existing market participant from a potential—and unduly speculative— participant. Our court first used the term in *New World Radio, Inc. v. FCC*, where a licensee of a Washington, D.C. radio station challenged a Federal Communications Commission order granting a Maryland-based station's license renewal application. 294 F.3d 164, 166, 170 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Explaining that injury to the Washington station could occur "only if" the Maryland station "subsequently seeks *and* secures the relocation of its [Maryland] broadcast license to the Washington, D.C. programming area," we held that the Washington station lacked competitor standing to challenge the license. *Id.* at 171–72; *see also DEK Energy Co. v. FERC*, 248 F.3d 1192, 1194 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that a petitioner who sold gas in the Northern California market lacked standing where it failed to claim that its alleged competitor "ha[d] yet exploited [its] capacity to sell a single molecule of gas in *Northern California"); El Paso Natural Gas Company v. FERC*, 50 F.3d 23, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (rejecting argument that El Paso was a "potential competitor" of suppliers to the Baja California market because it had not satisfied the pre- conditions to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's approval of its entry into that market). By contrast, in this case we know that H–1B visa holders have competed with Save Jobs' members in the past, and, as far as we know, nothing prevents them from doing so in the future.

Making a related point, the Department argues that because H–1B visa holders "by definition are already employed," Save Jobs must provide "more evidence

that [H– 1B visa holders] are seeking new jobs in the same market as Save Jobs' members." Appellee's Br. 26–27 (emphasis omitted). Again, we disagree. The supply side of a labor market is made up of those individuals who are employed *and* those actively looking for work. Indeed, in *Washington Alliance*, we never questioned that technology job seekers competed in the same labor market as student visa holders employed at technology firms. *See* 892 F.3d at 339–40.

Next, the Department claims that any H–1B visa holders affected by the rule "are by definition . . . staying to apply for permanent residence," making them "part of the *domestic* labor pool of U.S. workers—not alien competitors." Appellee's Br. 27 (internal quotation marks omitted). We cannot see how this defeats Save Jobs' claim of increased competition, and the Department never tells us.

At oral argument, Department counsel insisted that no H–1B visa holder who will benefit from the rule will compete with any Save Jobs members because eligibility for the rule depends on the H–1B visa holder first having been offered a job for which the Department of Labor has certified "no U.S. worker is available." Oral Arg. Tr. 21:17–18. In effect, counsel invites us to distinguish between H–1B visa holders generally, with whom Save Jobs' members are quite clearly in competition, and H–1B visa holders who have begun the process of applying for lawful permanent residence, who the Department contends can only take jobs for which there is no American competition. See id. at 28:11–19 ("They have not pled that they are seeking employment at companies for which H–1B workers who would receive a benefit from the H–4 Rule are

currently employed, but even if they did, . . . [that] would require . . . the prospect that . . . the H–1B visa holder was in a job for which no U.S. worker was available, but instead they were available.").

The Department neither raised this argument before the district court nor briefed it on appeal. "Generally, arguments raised for the first time at oral argument are forfeited." *United States ex rel. Davis v. District of Columbia,* 793 F.3d 120, 127 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Given the Department's insistence that the certification procedure "goes to our jurisdiction," however, we shall consider it—"though we are disappointed in the [Department] for raising this issue so late that [Save Jobs] had no adequate opportunity to respond." *Shays v. Federal Election Commission*, 528 F.3d 914, 923 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

The argument lacks merit in any event. The rule, as well as the Department's own briefing here and before the district court, explains that for H–1B visa holders' spouses to qualify for employment authorization, the H–1B visa holders need only be the beneficiaries of pending labor certification applications. See Appellee's Br. 5–8; Def.'s Mem. in Supp. of its Mot. for Summ. J. 3–4. While the application remains pending, H–1B visa holders compete in the labor market against Save Jobs' members. Even more, after the labor certification is issued, in certain circumstances H–1B visa holders may change jobs without obtaining new certifications. *See* 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(5)(A)(iv) (explaining that a labor certification for a nonimmigrant "covered by section 1154(j)"—which pertains to nonimmigrants whose permanent residence applications remain pending for 180 days or more— "shall remain

valid with respect to a new job . . . if the new job is in the same or a similar occupational classification as the job for which the certification was issued"). The Department's last- second effort therefore does nothing to change our understanding of the case.

One additional matter remains: Save Jobs challenges the standing of Immigration Voice, Anujkumar Dhamija, and Sudarshana Sengupta to intervene in this appeal. But a motions panel has already ruled that the intervenors have standing, and we are bound by that decision. *See Petties v. District of Columbia*, 227 F.3d 469, 472 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("Under this court's practice, a decision of the motions panel is the law of the case; a later panel considering the merits is bound by that law.").

**III.**

Given that the merits here involve complex questions about the scope of the Department's authority, which the Department did not brief on appeal, and recognizing the substantial possibility this case will be mooted by the Department's promised rescission of the rule, we think it best to remand to give the district court an opportunity to thoroughly assess and finally determine the merits in the first instance. *Cf. Save Jobs*, 210 F. Supp. 3d at 12–13 ("briefly discuss[ing] the merits of Plaintiff's APA claim" but "mak[ing] no final determination"). Accordingly, we reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

*So ordered.*

## APPENDIX D

No. 15-CV-0615

United States District Court
for the District of Columbia

*Save Jobs USA v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*,
210 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2016)

[Filed: September 27, 2016]

### Memorandum Opinion

In this action brought under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), Plaintiff Save Jobs USA challenges the Department of Homeland Security's ("DHS") promulgation of a final rule allowing certain H-4 visa holders to apply for employment authorization. *See* Employment Authorization for Certain H-4 Dependent Spouses, 80 Fed. Reg. 10,284 (Feb. 25, 2015) (codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.2, 274a) (the "H-4 Rule"). Earlier in this case, Plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction, which this court denied on the grounds that it failed to establish imminent irreparable injury. 105 F. Supp. 3d 108 (D.D.C. 2015). Both parties now move for summary judgment, and Defendant additionally moves to strike the appendix attached to Plaintiff's motion. Having considered the parties' filings, and for the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is DENIED and Defendant's motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED. Defendant's motion to strike is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

## I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts of this case were set forth in full in this court's preliminary injunction opinion, 105 F. Supp. 3d at 110–12, and thus only a brief description is necessary here. Plaintiff, an organization whose members are former information technology ("tech") workers who were replaced by foreign workers with H-1B visas, sued DHS under the APA to block the H-4 Rule from taking effect.

Subsection H of the Immigration and Naturalization Act ("INA") authorizes DHS to admit foreign workers into the United States to engage in certain types of labor. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H). Subsection H-1B permits employers to hire foreign workers in a "specialty occupation," most relevantly tech jobs, for an initial period of three years, extendable for three additional years. *Id.* Spouses and minor dependents of H-1B visa holders are permitted to reside in the U.S. with H-4 visas. *Id.* Employers of H-1B visa holders who wish to transition to legal permanent resident ("LPT") status must obtain a Department of Labor certification that there are no U.S. workers who are able, willing, qualified, and available to perform the job, and that the wages and working conditions of American workers will not be adversely affected. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1255(a), 1154, 1153(b)(2)–(3), 1182(a)(5)(A). Due to frequently oversubscribed quotas for the number of H-1B visa holders who may transition to LPT status, there are long delays in this process, forcing many visa holders

who have applied to transition to leave the U.S. when their visas expire. To prevent disruption for employers and families, Congress passed the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000 ("AC21"), which permits extending H-1B visas past the sixth year for those applying for LPT status.

The H-4 Rule at issue enables a subset of H-4 visa holders to apply for Employment Authorization Documents ("EADs"), which would allow them to work in the U.S. To be eligible, the H-4 visa holder's H-1B spouse must be transitioning to LPT status by way of either an extension past their sixth year under the AC21 or having received an approved labor certification (called a Form I-140 petition).

The rule aims to alleviate the financial and emotional burden placed on H-1B visa holders and their families during this lengthy period in which only one spouse may be employed. It underwent notice-and-comment procedures, *see* 79 Fed. Reg. 26,886 (May 12, 2014) (proposed rule), and the final rule took effect on May 26, 2015, *see* 80 Fed. Reg. 10,284 (Feb. 25, 2015). DHS expects as many as 179,600 H-4 visa holders to be able to apply for EADs in the rule's first year of implementation. 80 Fed. Reg. 10,285.

## II. LEGAL STANDARD

In an APA action, the court's role at the summary judgment stage is to decide "as a matter of law, whether the agency action is supported by the administrative record and otherwise consistent with the APA standard of review." *Stuttering Found. of Am. v. Springer*, 498 F. Supp. 2d 203, 207 (D.D.C. 2007). A

court must set aside an agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the invalidity of the agency’s action. *See Fulbright v. McHugh*, 67 F. Supp. 3d 81, 89 (D.D.C. 2014). The court’s review is “highly deferential” and begins with a presumption that the agency’s actions are valid. *Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Costle*, 657 F.2d 275, 283 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The court is “not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency,” *Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe*, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971), but instead must consider only “whether the agency acted within the scope of its legal authority, whether the agency has explained its decision, whether the facts on which the agency purports to have relied have some basis in the record, and whether the agency considered the relevant factors,” *Fulbright*, 67 F. Supp. 3d at 89 (quoting *Fund for Animals v. Babbitt*, 903 F. Supp. 96, 105 (D.D.C. 1995)) . Thus, all that is required is that the agency’s decisions provide “a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” *Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,* 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).

## III. DISCUSSION

### A. Defendant’s Motion to Strike

Defendant has moved, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), to strike Plaintiff’s Appendix A (ECF No. 26-1), attached in support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 28). Defendant argues

that the Appendix should be stricken, in whole or in part, because Plaintiff may not: (1) supplement the administrative record; and (2) attempt to establish standing with evidence that post-dates the Complaint.

As a general matter, a court must base its review of agency actions solely on the record before the agency when it made its decision, *IMS, P.C. v. Alvarez*, 129 F.3d 618, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1997), though when necessary to establish standing, a plaintiff may "supplement the record to the extent necessary to explain and substantiate its entitlement to judicial review," *Sierra Club v. EPA*, 292 F.3d 895, 900 (D.C. Cir. 2002). However, the "existence of federal jurisdiction ordinarily depends on the facts as they exist when the complaint is filed," *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 569 n.4 (1992), and thus a plaintiff may not supplement the record with materials that post-date the complaint in order to establish standing. *See Tracie Park v. Forest Serv. of the U.S.*, 205 F.3d 1034, 1037–38 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding plaintiff may not "use evidence of what happened after the commencement of the suit" to show "a real and immediate threat" of injury); *see also Perry v. Village of Arlington Heights*, 186 F.3d 826, 830 (7th Cir. 1999) ("It is not enough for [the plaintiff] to attempt to satisfy the requirements of standing as the case progresses. The requirements of standing must be satisfied from the outset.").

Plaintiff's Appendix A contains charts, tables, and data illustrating H-1 Visa Petitions filed and approved; quotes from the administrative record; a magazine article; job postings; and a printout of a website. The charts and data on pages 1–6, the Congressional Record excerpts on page 7–8, and the data tables on

pages 9–12 may all be relevant for Plaintiff's standing arguments, and as such their inclusion is appropriate. Based on the date stamps, the job listings reproduced on pages 13–26 and the excerpts from the website "H4 Visa, A Curse" on pages 27–39 all post-date the Complaint. Plaintiff, without any supporting case law, theorizes that because it asserts standing based on an imminent injury caused by job competition, then these post-Complaint documents purportedly showing employers hiring H-4 visa holders retroactively proves the imminence of the injury at the time the Complaint was filed. The court is unpersuaded that these documents establish any injury, whether actual or imminent, to support this theory, and therefore will grant Defendant's motion as to pages 13–39, which will be stricken.

### B. Standing

The court must first consider whether Plaintiff has standing to challenge DHS's promulgation of the H-4 Rule, as the court's power under Article III "exists only to redress or otherwise to protect against injury to the complaining party." *Warth v. Seldin*, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). The plaintiff bears the burden of proof to establish each of the elements of Article III standing. *Arpaio v. Obama*, 797 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 561). Thus, Save Jobs must show: "(1) an 'injury in fact' that is 'concrete and particularized' as well as 'actual or imminent'; (2) a 'causal connection' between the injury and the challenged conduct; and (3) a likelihood, as opposed to mere speculation, 'that the injury will be redressed by a favorable

decision.'" *Ark Initiative v. Tidwell*, 749 F.3d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 560–61).

When an agency's action relates to one party but a third party alleges harm, the indirectness of the injury does not deprive that third party of standing. *Warth*, 422 U.S. at 505. However, Plaintiff, as such a third party, faces a burden that is "substantially more difficult to meet the minimum requirement of Art. III: to establish that, in fact, the asserted injury was the consequence of the defendants' actions, or that prospective relief will remove the harm." *Id.*; see also *Arpaio*, 797 F.3d at 15 ("Our precedents establish that standing based on third-party conduct . . . is significantly harder to show than standing based on harm imposed by one's litigation adversary.")

Finally, the court analyzes standing "as of the time a suit commences." *Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. United States*, 570 F.3d 316, 324 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Thus, Plaintiff must "allege that he has been or will in fact be perceptibly harmed by the challenged agency action, not that he can imagine circumstances in which he could be affected by the agency's action." *United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP)*, 412 U.S. 669, 688–89 (1973). The law in this Circuit is clear: "When considering any chain of allegations for standing purposes, we may reject as overly speculative those links which are predictions of future events (especially future actions to be taken by third parties)." *Williams v. Lew*, 819 F.3d 466, 473 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting *Arpaio*, 797 F.3d at 21).

### 1. Associational Standing

Plaintiff first contends that it has associational standing. To have standing, an association must: (1) identify members who would have standing to sue in their own right; (2) seek to protect interests that are germane to its purpose; and (3) show that neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires an individual member to participate in the suit. *Nat'l Envtl. Dev. Ass'ns Clean Air Project v. EPA*, 752 F.3d 999, 1005 (D.C. Cir. 2014). To satisfy these requirements, Plaintiff provides affidavits from three members—Brian Buchanan, D. Stephen Bradley, and Julie Gutierrez—whom it alleges would have standing to bring this suit on their own. Plaintiff further argues that its mission includes "protect[ing] the economic security and working conditions of its members," and that an individual member does not have to participate in the suit in order for the organization to seek relief under the APA.

DHS failed to respond to Save Jobs' associational standing argument, and therefore the court will treat that argument as conceded. *See Wilkins v. Jackson*, 750 F. Supp. 2d 160, 162 (D.D.C. 2010) (when a party fails to respond to an argument raised in a motion, "it is proper to treat that argument as conceded").

### 2. Injuries to Plaintiff's Members

Plaintiff next contends that it has met the constitutional minimum requirement for standing because its members have suffered four specific injuries-in-fact caused by the H-4 Rule: (1) the rule creates increased competition for jobs from H-4 visa holders; (2) the rule creates increased competition for jobs from H-1B visa

holders; (3) the rule confers a benefit on its members' H-1B competitors; and (4) the rule deprives its members of statutory protections from foreign labor. The court will address each injury individually.

**a. Increased Competition from H-4 Visa Holders** Under the competitor standing doctrine, a plaintiff suffers an injury-in-fact when a regulatory change increases her exposure to economic competition. *See Mendoza v. Perez*, 754 F.3d 1002, 1011 (D.C. Cir. 2014). A party who may be injured by increased competition need not wait until she has been actually injured before bringing suit. *Sherley v. Sebelius*, 610 F.3d 69, 72 (D.C. Cir. 2010). However, Plaintiff must show that the H-4 Rule has "the clear and immediate potential" to cause H-4 visa holders to compete with its members. *See La. Energy and Power Auth. v. FERC*, 141 F.3d 364, 367 (D.C. Cir. 1998). To demonstrate this clear and immediate potential for injury, Plaintiff must demonstrate that its members are "direct and current" competitors, *Mendoza*, 754 F.3d at 1013, or that there is an "actual or imminent increase in competition," *Sherley*, 610 F.3d at 73.

Plaintiff argues that its members face imminent increased competition in the labor market from H-4 visa holders because, if these workers are granted Employment Authorization Documents, they may apply for the same jobs in the tech field that Plaintiff's members currently seek. Plaintiff submitted evidence that three of its members are active participants in the labor market for tech jobs. (Bradley Aff. ¶¶ 5, 13; Buchanan Aff. ¶¶ 6, 7, 14; Gutierrez Aff. ¶¶ 5, 12 (ECF No. 26-2)). However, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate more

than a possibility that DHS's H-4 Rule might introduce new competitors into the market for tech jobs.

While Plaintiff correctly states that it need not prove that any competition for specific jobs has already taken place, *La. Energy*, 141 F.3d at 367, it must still present evidence beyond just mere speculation, since "[b]are allegations of what is likely to occur are of no value," *Wis. Gas. Co. v. FERC*, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Here, only a subset of H-4 visa holders will be eligible to apply for and then attain EADs, which will allow them to seek employment in any job in the entire U.S. labor market. To support its argument that the alleged harm to Plaintiff's members from competing with this subset of H-4 visa holders is more than speculative, Plaintiff points primarily to two cases in which plaintiffs were granted standing due to increased job competition: *Mendoza* and *Washington Alliance of Technology Workers v. DHS*, 156 F. Supp. 3d 123, 132 (D.D.C. 2015), *vacated as moot*, 2016 WL 3041029 (D.C. Cir. May 13, 2016). However, this case differs significantly from Mendoza, which involved individuals in the specific labor market for open-range herding jobs and a regulation directly affecting wages in that field, as well as Washington Alliance of Technology Workers, which involved a DHS rule "explicitly intended to increase the number of foreign nationals competing for jobs" in the science, technology, engineering, and math ("STEM") labor market. Here, there is simply no evidence that the H-4 Rule was targeted at the tech field,[7] or that even one H-4 visa

---

[7] Plaintiff's only evidence on this point is a quote from Leon Rodriguez, director of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration

holder has sought or will seek a tech job in competition with Plaintiff's members. Plaintiff's argument, without evidence, is bare speculation, and the injury it contemplates is insufficient to establish standing.

**b. Increased Competition from H-1B Visa Holders**

Plaintiff argues that, as with H-4 visa holders, the increased job competition from H-1B workers creates an injury-in-fact sufficient to establish standing. For reasons substantially similar to the ones stated above, the court finds that it does not. At the core of Plaintiff's argument is its assertion that DHS's goal in promulgating the H-4 Rule was designed "to increase the number of H-1B workers." In support, it points to various statements from the Federal Register in which DHS discusses its goal of encouraging H-1B workers pursuing LPT status to remain in the country to complete the process, when otherwise they might choose to leave the U.S. (Pl. App. at 7–8). However, these statements fail to demonstrate an *increase* in competition from H-1B visa holders; instead, it appears the H-4 Rule might simply contribute to keeping H-1B visa holders applying for LPT status in the U.S. This is insufficient to show that Plaintiff's members are threatened with increased competition in the labor market from H-1B visa holders.

---

Service, that H-4 visa holders "are in many cases, in their own right, high-skilled workers of the type that frequently seek H-1Bs." (Pls. App. at 12). Without more, this isolated quote fails to establish that DHS intended H-4 visa holders to apply for tech jobs.

Plaintiff also describes at length the number of H-1B visas granted each year, whether the program was over- or under-subscribed in certain years, and notes that H-1B eligible positions in universities and research centers do not contribute to the cap on H-1B visas. It is unclear to the court why past data on H-1B visas is relevant to establish harm from the H-4 Rule, but even if in some years the H-1B program was undersubscribed, meaning more H-1B visas could have been approved, and in future years more visas are issued so the quota is reached, this is data concerning existing *statutory* limitations, which are not impacted by the H-4 Rule.[8] While Plaintiff's members allege past injury from being replaced by H-1B visa holders at their previous employment, the source of that injury is unrelated to the H-4 Rule. And, if in future years the H- 1B program is again oversubscribed, Plaintiff offers no evidence that this will be due to the H-4 Rule, nor why the court should consider this an injury at all given that Congress sets the quotas for the visa program, not DHS. Because Plaintiff offers no evidence that its members face an imminent or actual increase in competition from H-1B visa holders as a result of the H-4 Rule, this alleged injury is also insufficient to establish standing.

---

[8] *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(1)(A)(vii) (capping the number of H-1B visas granted each year at 65,000), (g)(5)(A)–(B) (stating that H-1B workers employed at universities or research organizations do not count towards the 65,000 cap), (g)(5)(C) (stating that recipients of a master's or higher degree from a U.S. university do not count towards the 65,000 cap until the number of such individuals reach 20,000 a year).

### c. Conferral of a Benefit on H-1B Competitors of Plaintiff's Members

Plaintiff next argues that the H-4 Rule confers a benefit on its members' H-1B competitors, which courts recognize as causing an injury-in-fact. *See New World Radio, Inc. v. FCC*, 294 F.3d 164, 172 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (finding injury when a rule "provides benefits to an existing competitor"). The cases upon which Plaintiff relies typically involved government action giving commercial benefits to market competitors. *See Nat'l Envtl. Dev.*, 752 F.3d at 1005 (agency action imposing additional costs and processing time for entities in certain regions); *Sea-land Serv., Inc. v. Dole*, 723 F.2d 975, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (agency's grant of subsidy to shipping competitor). Plaintiff alleges that the benefit here is articulated in DHS's statement of purpose in the Federal Register: "DHS expects this change to reduce the economic burdens and personal stresses that H-1B nonimmigrants and their families may experience." 80 Fed. Reg. 10,285. Plaintiff offers no support for its position that the goal of relieving economic uncertainty and personal anxiety in H-1B workers' families amounts to an injury to Plaintiff's members. Thus, the court rejects this theory of standing as well.

### d. Loss of Statutory Protections

Finally, Plaintiff points to the loss of statutory labor protections as a fourth injury for Article III standing, citing *Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. United States*, 101 F.3d 718, 724 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("*BLE*"), *National Treasury Employees Union v. Chertoff,* 452 F.3d 839, 852–55 (D.C. Cir. 2006), *International Union of*

*Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen v. Meese*, 761 F.2d 798, 802–05 (D.C. Cir. 1985), and *Clinton v. City of New York*, 524 U.S. 417, 433 & n.22 (1998). However, these cases are inapplicable here and do not support finding a separate injury for standing. The first three cases, in which union members were denied collective bargaining rights or denied jobs by DHS (or its predecessor INS), involved *past* instances of harm, not speculation of future harm. The plaintiffs in *Clinton* had standing because they were challenging the cancellation of a limited tax subsidy enacted for their specific benefit. None of these cases help Plaintiff establish that enabling H-4 visa holders to seek jobs in the U.S. labor market is a "cancellation" or deprivation of any specific rights in the statute so as to create an injury-in-fact for standing. Instead, as explained further below, whether Plaintiff's claims fall within the "zone of interests" of the statute is a separate inquiry from standing altogether.

In sum, the H-4 Rule enables a subset of H-4 visa holders to apply for EADs, which permit them to apply for and secure paid employment in any job in the U.S. labor market. While Plaintiffs may be correct in speculating that H-4 visa holders will seek tech jobs in competition with its members, there is simply no evidence before the court to show that that will happen. Therefore, because Plaintiff cannot establish that its members face an imminent or actual injury, the court need not engage in further analysis regarding causation, redressability, or ripeness, and the court concludes that Plaintiff lacks standing to proceed with this case.

### C. Zone of Interests

Having determined that Plaintiff cannot establish an injury-in-fact, the court will briefly turn to whether Plaintiff's claim would fall within the statute's zone of interests, an additional requirement for establishing an APA cause of action. *Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak*, 132 S.Ct. 2199, 2210 (2012). The zone of interests analysis requires courts to "determine, using traditional tools of statutory interpretation, whether a legislatively conferred cause of action encompasses a particular plaintiff's claim." *Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.*, 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387 (2014); *see also Ass'n of Battery Recyclers, Inc. v. EPA*, 716 F.3d 667, 675–676 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Silberman, J., concurring) (stating that the zone of interests analysis asks whether "this particular class of persons ha[s] a right to sue under the substantive statute") (quoted in *Lexmark*). This analysis is "not . . . especially demanding," and "the benefit of any doubt goes to the plaintiff. . . . The test forecloses suit only when a plaintiff's interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit." *Patchak*, 132 S. Ct. at 2210 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The D.C. Circuit has explained that, "[i]n determining whether a petitioner falls within the 'zone of interests' to be protected by a statute, 'we do not look at the specific provision said to have been violated in complete isolation,' but rather in combination with other provisions to which it bears an 'integral relationship.'"

*Nat'l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass'n v. EPA*, 287 F.3d 1130, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (quoting *Fed'n for Am. Immigration Reform, Inc. v. Reno*, 93 F.3d 897, 903 (D.C. Cir. 1996)); *see also Washington Alliance of Tech. Workers*, 156 F. Supp. 3d at 135 (finding plaintiff's claims within the zone of interests subsection (H)(1)(b) because it includes "many provisions designed to protect American labor," and that subsection (F)(1) was integrally related to (H)(1)(b) because both fall under the same section of the statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)). Plaintiff primarily argues that the H-4 Rule circumvents the labor protections Congress required under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H) and related statutes for other H- type visas. This section of the statute requires compliance with annual caps on the number of visas issued, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g), and requires the employer to certify with the Department of Labor that it will pay the H-1B worker the same wages paid to other employees in that position, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(n), in order to prevent employers from using H-1B workers as a cheaper alternative to American workers. Defendant argues that 8 U.S.C. §§ 1184(g) and (n) do not apply to non-immigrants and their H-4 visa holding spouses, and thus cannot encompass Plaintiff's claim in their zone of interests.

Given that these provisions are part of the larger framework offering protections for American labor, and the H-4 and H-1B visas are established in the same subsection of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15), the court would have little difficulty concluding that 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(H)(1)(b) and 1101(a)(15)(H) are sufficiently "integrally related." Therefore, the court would conclude that Plaintiff's interests in challenging the

H-4 Rule are within the zone of interests of the protections offered by the statutory provision authorizing H-1B visas. However, this determination does not provide an independent basis for Plaintiff's claim to survive. Having failed to demonstrate an injury-in-fact to establish Article III standing, Plaintiff's claim, though within the zone of interests of the statute, cannot proceed.

### D. Statutory Authority

Despite having found that Plaintiff lacks standing, the court will also nevertheless briefly discuss the merits of Plaintiff's APA claim. For decades, Congress has delegated substantial authority to DHS and its predecessor agency to issue employment-related immigration regulations, as part of the broader scope of its power to enforce the INA and issue rules governing nonimmigrants.[9] The H-4 Rule was promulgated under this delegated authority, and DHS engaged in the required notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures.

---

[9] *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) ("The Secretary of Homeland Security shall be charged with the administration and enforcement of [the INA] and all other laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens . . . ."); *id.* § 1184(a)(1) ("The admission to the United States of any alien as a nonimmigrant shall be for such time and under such conditions as the Attorney General may by regulations prescribe . . . ."); *id.* § 1324a(h)(3) ("[T]he term 'unauthorized alien' means, with respect to the employment of an alien at a particular time, that the alien is not at that time either (A) an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or (B) authorized to be so employed by this chapter or by the Attorney General.").

See 79 Fed. Reg. 26,886 (May 12, 2014) (proposed rule); 80 Fed. Reg. 10,284 (Feb. 25, 2015) (final rule).

Plaintiff articulates an interpretation of these authorizing statutes that would render DHS unable to promulgate the H-4 Rule. However, DHS is entitled to discretion in its interpretation of its statutory authority to implement the INA. Under step one of the analysis laid out in *Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRD*C, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984), the court determines that Congress has already spoken to the issue of whether DHS can issue employment authorization regulations, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1103(a)(1), 1324a(h)(3), though not precisely to the question of whether it may do so for H-4 visa holders. When Congress is not entirely clear, the court proceeds to *Chevron* step two, which asks whether DHS acted under a "reasonable interpretation" of the statutes. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. This court must uphold the H-4 Rule unless it is "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." *Id.*; *see also Allied Local & Reg'l Mfrs. Caucus v. EPA*, 215 F.3d 61, 71 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("Under Chevron, we are bound to uphold agency interpretations as long as they are reasonable—'regardless whether there may be other reasonable, or even more reasonable, views.'") (quoting *Serono Lab., Inc. v. Shalala*, 158 F.3d 1313, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). Defendant argues that Congress's acquiescence in its employment authorization rulemaking, stretching back as far as the 1952 passage of INA § 1103 (delegating enforcement of the INA to the Attorney General), indicates its interpretation of its authority is reasonable. This long-standing interpretation has never been altered by Congress. Indeed, the U.S. Attorney General adopted a final rule

in June 1981 which recognized its broad authority to issue employment authorization to foreign workers, see 46 Fed. Reg. 25,079 (June 4, 1981), and shortly thereafter Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, amending the INA and including the new § 1324a(h)(3), which affirmed the Attorney General's authority by specifically mentioning foreign workers "authorized to be so employed by this chapter or by the Attorney General." 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3) (emphasis added).

Moreover, the H-4 Rule is not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the INA. The court's role here is simply to find "a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made" by DHS. *State Farm*, 463 U.S. at 43. Plaintiff argues that DHS reversed long- standing policy without adequate explanation and improperly concluded that 179,600 additional foreign workers will have a minimal impact on U.S. workers. However, the record indicates that DHS clearly justified its change in policy, *see* 80 Fed. Reg. 10,284 (describing the purpose of the regulatory action), and carefully considered the impact the rule will have on U.S. labor markets, *see id.* at 10,295–96, 10,301. Plaintiff additionally refers to numerous provisions of the INA that are allegedly violated by the H-4 Rule, without explaining why the rule violates these statutes. None of those provisions offer support for Plaintiff's argument that the INA bars DHS from authorizing this subset of H-4 visa holders to seek employment while transitioning to LPT status.

Given Plaintiff's lack of standing in this case, the court makes no final determination on the merits of Plaintiff's APA claim. However, in light of the broad

delegation of authority Congress conferred to DHS to set rules regarding employment authorization in §§ 1103(a) and 1324(h)(3), and its thorough consideration of the relevant factors in its decision-making, the court would likely conclude that DHS's interpretation of its authority under the INA is not unreasonable, and the H-4 Rule is a valid exercise of this rulemaking authority.

## IV . CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court grants Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and denies Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.

Date: September 27, 2016
TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge

## ORDER

Upon consideration of the parties' filings, and for the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is DENIED and Defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Defendant's motion to strike is also GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED with prejudice.

Date: September 27, 2016

TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge

## APPENDIX E

No. 21-5028

United States Court of Appeals
for the
District of Columbia Circuit

Save Jobs USA, Appellant
v.
U.S Department of Homeland Security, *et al.*,
Appellees [Filed] November 22, 2024

Before: SRINIVASAN, *Chief Judge*; HENDERSON, MILLETT, PILLARD, WILKINS, KATSAS, RAO, WALKER, CHILDS, PAN, and Garcia *Circuit Judges*.

### ORDER

Upon consideration of appellant's petition for rehearing en banc, the responses thereto, the amicus brief filed by America First Legal Foundation, and the absence of a request by any member of the court for a vote, it is

ORDERED that the petition be denied.

**Per Curiam**
**FOR THE COURT:**
Mark J. Langer, Clerk

BY: /s/ Daniel J. Reidy Deputy Clerk

## APPENDIX F

## Relevant Statutory Provisions

### 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a). Definitions.

* * *

(15) The term "immigrant" means every alien except an alien who is within one of the following classes of nonimmigrant aliens—

* * *

(H) an alien (i) (b) subject to section 1182(j)(2) of this title, who is coming temporarily to the United States to perform services (other than services described in subclause (a) during the period in which such subclause applies and other than services described in subclause (ii)(a) or in subparagraph (O) or (P)) in a specialty occupation described in section 1184(i)(1) of this title or as a fashion model, who meets the requirements for the occupation specified in section 1184(i)(2) of this title or, in the case of a fashion model, is of distinguished merit and ability, and with respect to whom the Secretary of Labor determines and certifies to the Attorney General that the intending employer has filed with the Secretary an application under section 1182(n)(1) of this title, or (b1) who is entitled to enter the United States under and in pursuance of the provisions of an agreement listed in section 1184(g)(8)(A) of this title, who is engaged in a specialty occupation described in section 1184(i)(3) of this title, and with respect to whom the

Secretary of Labor determines and certifies to the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of State that the intending employer has filed with the Secretary of Labor an attestation under section 1182(t)(1) of this title, or (c) who is coming temporarily to the United States to perform services as a registered nurse, who meets the qualifications described in section 1182(m)(1) of this title, and with respect to whom the Secretary of Labor determines and certifies to the Attorney General that an unexpired attestation is on file and in effect under section 1182(m)(2) of this title for the facility (as defined in section 1182(m)(6) of this title) for which the alien will perform the services; or (ii)(a) having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning who is coming temporarily to the United States to perform agricultural labor or services, as defined by the Secretary of Labor in regulations and including agricultural labor defined in section 3121(g) of title 26, agriculture as defined in section 203(f) of title 29, and the pressing of apples for cider on a farm, of a temporary or seasonal nature, or (b) having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning who is coming temporarily to the United States to perform other temporary service or labor if unemployed persons capable of performing such service or labor cannot be found in this country, but this clause shall not apply to graduates of medical schools coming to the United States to perform services as members of the medical profession; or (iii) having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning who is coming temporarily to the United

States as a trainee, other than to receive graduate medical education or training, in a training program that is not designed primarily to provide productive employment; *and the alien spouse and minor children of any such alien specified in this paragraph if accompanying him or following to join him*; (Emphasis added)

**8 U.S.C. § 1184 - Admission of nonimmigrants**

(a) Regulations

(1) The admission to the United States of any alien as a nonimmigrant shall be for such time and under such conditions as the Attorney General may by regulations prescribe, including when he deems necessary the giving of a bond with sufficient surety in such sum and containing such conditions as the Attorney General shall prescribe, to insure that at the expiration of such time or upon failure to maintain the status under which he was admitted, or to maintain any status subsequently acquired under section 1258 of this title, such alien will depart from the United States. No alien admitted to Guam or the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands without a visa pursuant to section 1182(l) of this title may be authorized to enter or stay in the United States other than in Guam or the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands or to remain in Guam or the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands for a period exceeding 45 days from date of admission to Guam or the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. No alien admitted to the

United States without a visa pursuant to section 1187 of this title may be authorized to remain in the United States as a nonimmigrant visitor for a period exceeding 90 days from the date of admission.

**8 U.S.C. § 1324a. Unlawful employment of aliens**

* * *

(h) Miscellaneous provisions

* * *

(3) Definition of unauthorized alien

As used in this section, the term "unauthorized alien" means, with respect to the employment of an alien at a particular time, that the alien is not at that time either (A) an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or (B) authorized to be so employed by this chapter or by the Attorney General.

## APPENDIX G

### Employment Authorization for Certain H-4 Dependent Spouses

80 Fed. Reg 10,283
Feb. 25, 2015

**Agency:**
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Department of Homeland Security.

**ACTION:**
Final rule.

**SUMMARY:**
This final rule amends Department of Homeland Security (DHS or Departmen) regulations by extending eligibility for employment authorization to certain H-4 dependent spouses of H-1B nonimmigrants who are seeking employment-based lawful permanent resident ("LPR") status. Such H-1B nonimmigrants must be the principal beneficiaries of an approved Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker (Form I-140), or have been granted H-1B status in the United States under the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-first Century Act of 2000, as amended by the 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act. DHS anticipates that this regulatory change will reduce personal and economic burdens faced by H-1B nonimmigrants and eligible H-4 dependent spouses during the transition from nonimmigrant to LPR status. The final rule will also support the goals of

attracting and retaining highly skilled foreign workers and minimizing the disruption to U.S. businesses resulting from H-1B nonimmigrants who choose not to pursue LPR status in the United States. By providing the possibility of employment authorization to certain H-4 dependent spouses, the rule will ameliorate certain disincentives for talented H-1B nonimmigrants to permanently remain in the United States and continue contributing to the U.S. economy as LPRs. This is an important goal considering the contributions such individuals make to entrepreneurship and research and development, which are highly correlated with overall economic growth and job creation. The rule also will bring U.S. immigration policies concerning this class of highly skilled workers more in line with those of other countries that are also competing to attract and retain similar highly skilled workers.

**DATES:**

This final rule is effective May 26, 2015.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:**

Jennifer Oppenheim, Adjudications Officer, Office of Policy and Strategy, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Department of Homeland Security, 20 Massachusetts Avenue NW., Suite 1100, Washington, DC 20529-2140; Telephone (202) 272-1470.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:**

**Table of Contents**

I. Executive Summary
- A. Purpose of the Regulatory Action
- B. Legal Authority

C. Summary of the Major Provisions of the Regulatory Action
D. Summary of Costs and Benefits
E. Effective Date

II. Background
A. Current Framework
B. Proposed Rule
C. Final Rule

III. Public Comments on Proposed Rule
A. Summary of Public Comments
B. Classes Eligible for Employment Authorization
1. Comments Supporting the Rule
2. Comments Requesting Expansion of the Rule
3. Comments Opposing the Rule
4. Comments Requesting a More Restrictive Policy
C. Legal Authority To Extend Employment Authorization to Certain H-4 Dependent Spouses
D. Comments on the Analysis of Executive Orders 12866 and 13653
1. Comments Related to Labor Market Impacts
2. Comments on the Volume Estimate and Methodology
3. Comments on Specific Costs and Benefits Discussed in the Analysis
E. Comments on the Application for Employment Authorization
1. Streamlined or Modernized Filing Procedures

2. Employment Authorization Document (Form I-766) Validity Period
3. EAD Renewals
4. Acceptable Evidentiary Documentation
5. Concurrent Filings
6. Premium Processing
7. Automatic Extensions of Work Authorization
8. Filing Fees
9. Possible Restrictions on EADs Issued to H-4 Dependent Spouses
10. Circular EADs
11. Form I-765 Worksheets
12. Other Related Issues
F. Fraud and Public Safety Concerns
1. Falsifying Credentials and Marriage Fraud
2. Prohibition Related to Felony Charges and Convictions
3. Unauthorized Employment
4. Employer Abuse of H-1B Nonimmigrants and H-4 Dependent Spouses
G. General Comments
H. Modifications to the H-1B Program and Immigrant Visa Processing
1. H-1B Visa Program
2. Immigrant Visa Processing and Adjustment of Status
I. H-1B Nonimmigrant's Maintenance of Status
J. Environmental Issues
K. Reporting
L. Implementation

IV. Statutory and Regulatory Requirements
A. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
B. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996
C. Executive Orders 12866 and 13563
1. Summary
2. Purpose of the Rule
3. Volume Estimate
4. Costs
5. Benefits
6. Alternatives Considered
D. Regulatory Flexibility Act
E. Executive Order 13132
F. Executive Order 12988
G. Paperwork Reduction Act
V. Regulatory Amendments

## I. Executive Summary

### A. Purpose of the Regulatory Action

DHS does not currently extend eligibility for employment authorization to H-4 dependents (spouses and unmarried children under 21 years of age) of H-1B nonimmigrants. See 8 CFR 214.2(h)(9)(iv). The lack of employment authorization for H-4 dependent spouses often gives rise to personal and economic hardships for the families of H-1B nonimmigrants. Such hardships may increase the longer these families remain in the United States. In many cases, H-1B nonimmigrants and their families who wish to acquire LPR status in the United States must wait many years for employment-based immigrant visas to become available. These waiting periods increase the disincentives for H-1B nonimmigrants to pursue LPR status and thus

increase the difficulties that U.S. employers have in retaining highly educated and highly skilled nonimmigrant workers. These difficulties can be particularly acute in cases where an H-1B nonimmigrant's family is experiencing economic strain or other stresses resulting from the H-4 dependent spouse's inability to seek employment in the United States. Retaining highly skilled workers who intend to acquire LPR status is important to U.S. businesses and to the Nation given the contributions of these individuals to U.S. businesses and the U.S. economy. These individuals, for example, contribute to advances in entrepreneurship and research and development, which are highly correlated with overall economic growth and job creation.

In this final rule, DHS is amending its regulations to extend eligibility for employment authorization to certain H-4 dependent spouses of H-1B nonimmigrants to support the retention of highly skilled workers who are on the path to lawful permanent residence. DHS expects this change to reduce the economic burdens and personal stresses that H-1B nonimmigrants and their families may experience during the transition from nonimmigrant to LPR status while, at the same time, facilitating their integration into American society. As such, the change will ameliorate certain disincentives that currently lead H-1B nonimmigrants to abandon efforts to remain in the United States while seeking LPR status, thereby minimizing disruptions to U.S. businesses employing such workers. The change will also support the U.S. economy, as the contributions H-1B nonimmigrants make to entrepreneurship and research and

development are expected to assist overall economic growth and job creation. The rule also will bring U.S. immigration policies concerning this class of highly skilled workers more in line with those of other countries that compete to attract similar highly skilled workers.

**B. Legal Authority**

The authority of the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary) for this regulatory amendment can be found in section 102 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, 6 U.S.C. 112, and section 103(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1103(a), which authorize the Secretary to administer and enforce the immigration and nationality laws. In addition, section 274A(h)(3)(B) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1324a(h)(3)(B), recognizes the Secretary's authority to extend employment to noncitizens in the United States.

**C. Summary of the Major Provisions of This Regulatory Action**

On May 12, 2014, DHS published a notice of proposed rulemaking, which proposed to amend DHS regulations at 8 CFR 214.2(h)(9)(iv) and 274a.12(c) to extend eligibility for employment authorization to H-4 dependent spouses of H-1B nonimmigrants if the H-1B nonimmigrants either: (1) Are the principal beneficiaries of an approved Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker (Form I-140); or (2) have been granted H-1B status pursuant to sections 106(a) and (b) of the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-first Century Act of 2000, Public Law 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, as amended by the 21st Century Department of Justice

Appropriations Act, Public Law 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758 (2002) (collectively referred to as "AC21"). See Employment Authorization for Certain H-4 Dependent Spouses, 79 FR 26886 (May 12, 2014). After careful consideration of public comments, DHS is adopting the proposed regulatory amendments with minor wording changes to improve clarity and readability.[1] Also, DHS is making additional revisions to 8 CFR 214.2(h)(9)(iv) and 8 CFR 274a.13(d) to permit H-4 dependent spouses under this rule to concurrently file an Application for Employment Authorization (Form I-765) with an Application to Extend/Change Nonimmigrant Status (Form I-539).

**D. Summary of Costs and Benefits**

In preparing this final rule, DHS updated its estimates of the impacted population by examining more recent data, correcting data entry errors made in calculating the population of H-4 dependent spouses assumed to be in the backlog, and revising the estimate of the population eligible pursuant to AC21. This final rule is expected to result in as many as 179,600 H-4 dependent spouses being eligible to apply for employment authorization during the first year of implementation. As many as 55,000 H-4 dependent spouses will be eligible to apply for employment authorization each year after the first year of implementation. DHS stresses that these are maximum estimates of the number of H-4 dependent spouses who may become eligible to apply for employment authorization. Although the estimates are larger than those provided in the preamble to the proposed rule, the initial year estimate (the year with the largest number of potential

eligible applicants) provided in this final rule still represents far less than one percent of the overall U.S. workforce. DHS's rationale for this rule thus remains unchanged, especially as the changes made in this rule simply alleviate the long wait for employment authorization that these H-4 dependent spouses endure through the green card process, and accelerate the timeframe within which they generally will become eligible to apply for employment authorization (such as when they apply for adjustment of status).

The costs associated with this final rule stem from filing fees and the opportunity costs of time associated with filing an Application for Employment Authorization, Form I-765 ("Application for Employment Authorization" or "Form I-765"), as well as the estimated cost of procuring two passport-style photos. These costs will only be borne by the H-4 dependent spouses who choose to apply for employment authorization. The costs to the Federal Government of adjudicating and processing the applications are covered by the application fee for Form I-765.

DHS expects these regulatory amendments to provide increased incentives to H-1B nonimmigrants and their families who have begun the immigration process to remain permanently in the United States and continue contributing to the Nation's economy as they complete this process. DHS believes these regulatory changes will also minimize disruptions to petitioning U.S. employers. A summary of the costs and benefits of the rule is presented in Table 1.

Table 1—Total Costs and Benefits of Initial Employment Authorization for Certain H-4 Dependent Spouses 10-Yr Present Value Estimates at 3% and 7%
[$Millions]

| | Year 1 estimate (179,600 filers) | Sum of years 2-10 (55,000 filers annually) | Total over 10-year period of analysis * |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3% Discount Rate: | | | |
| Total Costs Incurred by Filers @3% | $76.1 | $181.3 | $257.4 |
| 7% Discount Rate: | | | |
| | 73.2 | 146.1 | 219.3 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Qualitative Benefits | This rule is intended to remove a disincentive to pursuing lawful permanent resident (LPR) status due to the potentially long wait for employment-based immigrant visas for many H-1B nonimmigrants and their family members. This rule will encourage H-1B nonimmigrants who have already taken steps to become LPRs to not abandon their efforts because their H-4 dependent spouses are unable to work. By encouraging H-1B nonimmigrants to continue in their pursuit of becoming LPRs, this rule would minimize disruptions to petitioning U.S. employers. Additionally, eligible H-4 dependent spouses who participate in the labor market will benefit financially. DHS also anticipates that the socioeconomic benefits associated with permitting H-4 spouses to participate in the labor market will assist H-1B families in integrating into the U.S. community and economy. |

** Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding.*

**E. Effective Date**

This final rule will be effective on May 26, 2015, 90 days from the date of publication in the Federal Register. DHS has determined that this 90-day effective date is necessary to guarantee that USCIS will have sufficient resources available to process and adjudicate Applications for Employment Authorization filed by eligible H-4 dependent spouses under this rule while maintaining excellent customer service for all USCIS stakeholders, including H-1B employers, H-1B nonimmigrants, and their families. With this 90-day effective date, USCIS will be able to implement this rule in a manner that will avoid wholesale delays of processing other petitions and applications, in particular those H-1B petitioners seeking to file petitions before the FY 2016 cap is reached. DHS believes that this effective date balances the desire of U.S. employers to attract new H-1B workers, while retaining current H-1B workers who are seeking employment-based LPR status.

**II. Background**

**A. Current Framework**

Under the H-1B nonimmigrant classification, a U.S. employer or agent may file a petition to employ a temporary foreign worker in the United States to perform services in a specialty occupation, services related to a Department of Defense (DOD) cooperative research and development project or coproduction project, or services of distinguished merit and ability in the field of fashion modeling. See INA section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b);

8 CFR 214.2(h)(4). To employ a temporary nonimmigrant worker to perform such services (except for DOD-related services), a U.S. petitioner must first obtain a certification from the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) confirming that the petitioner has filed a labor condition application (LCA) in the occupational specialty in which the nonimmigrant will be employed. See 8 CFR 214.2(h)(4)(i)(B) and 8 CFR 214.2(h)(1)(ii)(B). Upon certification of the LCA, the petitioner may file with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) a Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker (Form I-129 with H supplements) ("H-1B petition" or "Form I-129").

If USCIS approves the H-1B petition, the approved H-1B status is valid for an initial period of up to three years. USCIS may grant extensions for up to an additional three years, such that the total period of the H-1B nonimmigrant's admission in the United States does not exceed six years. See INA section 214(g)(4), 8 U.S.C. 1184(g)(4); 8 CFR 214.2(h)(9)(iii)(A)(1), (3), and 8 CFR 214.2(h)(15)(ii)(B)(1). At the end of the six-year period, the nonimmigrant generally must depart from the United States unless he or she: (1) Falls within one of the exceptions to the six-year limit; [2] (2) has changed to another nonimmigrant status; (3) or has applied to adjust status to that of an LPR.[3] See INA sections 245(a) and 248(a), 8 U.S.C. 1255(a) and 1258(a); 8 CFR 245.1 and 8 CFR 248.1. The dependents (i.e., spouse and unmarried children under 21 years of age) of the H-1B nonimmigrants are entitled to H-4 status and are subject to the same period of admission and limitations as the H-1B nonimmigrant. See 8 CFR 214.2(h)(9)(iv).

For H-1B nonimmigrants seeking to adjust their status to or otherwise acquire LPR status through employment-based (EB) immigration, an employer generally must first file a petition on their behalf. See INA section 204(a), 8 U.S.C. 1154(a). An H-1B nonimmigrant may seek LPR status under one of the following five EB preference categories:

- First preference (EB-1)—Aliens with extraordinary ability, outstanding professors and researchers, and certain multinational executives and managers;
- Second preference (EB-2)—Aliens who are members of the professions holding advanced degrees or aliens of exceptional ability;
- Third preference (EB-3)—Skilled workers, professionals, and other workers;
- Fourth preference (EB-4)—Special immigrants (see INA section 101(a)(27), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)); and
- Fifth preference (EB-5)—Employment creation immigrants. See INA section 203(b), 8 U.S.C. 1153(b).

Generally, the second (EB-2) and third (EB-3) preference categories require employers to obtain an approved permanent labor certification from DOL prior to filing an immigrant petition with USCIS on behalf of the worker. See INA section 212(a)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(5)(A); 8 CFR 204.5(a). To apply for adjustment

to LPR status, the alien must be the beneficiary of an immigrant visa that is immediately available. See INA sections 201(a), 203(b) and (d), and 245(a); 8 U.S.C. 1151(a), 1153(b) and (d), 1255(a).

The EB-2 and EB-3 immigrant visa categories for certain chargeability areas are oversubscribed, causing long delays before applicants in those categories, including H-1B nonimmigrants, are able to obtain LPR status. U.S. businesses employing H-1B nonimmigrants suffer disruptions when such workers are required to leave the United States at the termination of their H-1B status as a result of these delays. To ameliorate those disruptions, Congress enacted provisions in AC21 that allow for the extension of H-1B status past the sixth year for workers who are the beneficiaries of certain pending or approved employment-based immigrant visa petitions or labor certification applications. See S. Rep. No. 106-260, at 22 (2000) ("These immigrants would otherwise be forced to return home at the conclusion of their allotted time in H-1B status, disrupting projects and American workers. The provision enables these individuals to remain in H-1B status until they are able to receive an immigrant visa number and acquire lawful permanent residence through either adjustment of status in the United States or through consular processing abroad, thus limiting the disruption to American businesses.").

DHS cannot alleviate the delays in visa processing due to the numerical limitations set by statute and the resultant unavailability of immigrant visa numbers.[4] DHS, however, can alleviate a significant obstacle that may encourage highly skilled foreign workers to leave the United States,[5] thereby preventing

significant disruptions to U.S. employers in furtherance of the congressional intent expressed through AC21.

**B. Proposed Rule**

On May 12, 2014, DHS published a proposed rule in the Federal Register at 79 FR 26886, proposing to amend:

- 8 CFR 214.2(h)(9)(iv) to extend eligibility for employment authorization to H-4 dependent spouses of H-1B nonimmigrants if the H-1B nonimmigrants either: are the principal beneficiaries of an approved Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker (Form I-140); [6] or have been granted H-1B status pursuant to sections 106(a) and (b) of AC21; and

- 8 CFR 274a.12(c) by adding paragraph (26) listing the H-4 dependent spouses described in revised 8 CFR 214.2(h)(9)(iv) as a new class of aliens eligible to request employment authorization from USCIS. Aliens within this class would only be authorized for employment following approval of their Application for Employment Authorization (Form I-765) by USCIS and receipt of an Employment Authorization Document (Form I-766) ("EAD").

DHS also proposed conforming changes to Form I-765. DHS proposed adding H-4 dependent spouses described in the proposed rule to the classes of aliens eligible to file the form, with the required fee. DHS also proposed a list of the types of supporting documents

that may be submitted with Form I-765 to establish eligibility.

DHS received nearly 13,000 public comments to the proposed rule. An overwhelming percentage of commenters (approximately 85 percent) supported the proposal, while a small percentage of commenters (approximately 10 percent) opposed the proposal. Approximately 3.5 percent of commenters expressed a mixed opinion about the proposal.

**C. Final Rule**

In preparing this final rule, DHS considered all of the public comments contained in the docket. Although estimates of the current population of H-4 dependent spouses who will be eligible for employment authorization pursuant to this rule have changed, the effect of the revision does not affect the justification for the rule, and DHS is adopting the regulatory amendments set forth in the proposed rule with only minor, nonsubstantive changes to 8 CFR 214.2(h)(9)(iv) to improve clarity and readability. These technical changes clarify that an H-4 dependent spouse covered by this rule should include with his or her Application for Employment Authorization (Form I-765) evidence demonstrating that he or she is currently in H-4 status and that the H-1B nonimmigrant is currently in H-1B status. Also, in response to public comments regarding filing procedures for Applications for Employment Authorization (Forms I-765) under this rule, DHS is making conforming revisions to 8 CFR 214.2(h)(9)(iv) and 8 CFR 274a.13(d) to permit H-4 dependent spouses under this rule to concurrently file the Form

I-765 with an Application to Extend/Change Nonimmigrant Status (Form I-539).

The rationale for the proposed rule and the reasoning provided in its background section remain valid with respect to these regulatory amendments. This final rule does not address comments seeking changes in U.S. laws, regulations, or agency policies that are unrelated to this rulemaking. This final rule also does not change the procedures or policies of other DHS components or federal agencies, or resolve issues outside the scope of this rulemaking. Comments may be reviewed at the Federal Docket Management System (FDMS) at http://www.regulations.gov, docket number USCIS-2010-0017.

## III. Public Comments on the Proposed Rule

### A. Summary of Public Comments

In response to the proposed rule, DHS received nearly 13,000 comments during the 60-day public comment period. Commenters included, among others, individuals, employers, academics, labor organizations, immigrant advocacy groups, attorneys, and nonprofit organizations. More than 250 comments were also submitted through mass mailing campaigns.

While opinions on the proposed rule varied, a substantial majority (approximately 85 percent) of commenters supported the extension of employment authorization to the class of H-4 dependent spouses described in the proposed rulemaking. Supporters of the proposed rule agreed that it would help the United States to attract and retain highly skilled foreign workers; alleviate economic burdens on H-1B nonimmigrants and their families during the transition from

nonimmigrant to LPR status; and promote family unity. Some supporters also stated that the rule furthers women's rights, noting the impact the rule's change will have on promoting financial independence for the H-4 dependent spouse, potentially reducing factors which could lead to domestic violence, and assuaging negative health effects (such as depression).[7] Others voiced the belief that this rule aligns with core U.S. values, asserting that employment authorization should be considered a constitutional or human rights issue or an issue of equal opportunity.

Commenters commonly stated that if spouses are authorized for employment, families would be more stable, contribute more to their local communities, and more fully focus on their future in the United States. Additionally, commenters outlined ways they thought this proposal would help the U.S. economy, such as by increasing disposable income, promoting job creation, generating greater tax revenue, and increasing home sales. Several commenters agreed that extending employment authorization as described in the rule will promote U.S. leadership in innovation by strengthening the country's ability to recruit and retain sought-after talent from around the world. Finally, some commenters noted that this rule would facilitate U.S. businesses' ability to create additional U.S. jobs by improving the retention of workers with critical science, technology, engineering and math (STEM) skills.

The approximately 10 percent of commenters who opposed the proposed rule cited to potential adverse effects of the rule, including displacement of U.S. workers, increasing U.S. unemployment, and lowering of wages. Some commenters expressed concern that

the rule may negatively affect other nonimmigrant categories. Other commenters were concerned that this rule may cause the lowering of minimum working standards in certain sectors of the economy, such as in the Information Technology sector. Some commenters questioned DHS's legal authority to promulgate this regulatory change.

About 3.5 percent of commenters had a mixed opinion about the proposed regulation. Some of these commenters were concerned about the size and scope of the class made eligible for employment authorization under the rule; some argued that the described class is too restrictive, while others argued that it is too broad. Other commenters expressed concern about the possibility of fraud. Approximately 200 commenters (about 1.5 percent of commenters) submitted responses that are beyond the scope of this rulemaking, such as comments discussing U.S. politics but not addressing immigration, submissions from individuals who sent in their resumes or discussed their professional qualifications without opining on the proposed rule, and comments on the merits of other commenter's views, but not on the proposed changes.

DHS has reviewed all of the public comments received in response to the proposed rule and addresses relevant comments in this final rule. DHS's responses are grouped by subject area, with a focus on the most common issues and suggestions raised by commenters.

## B. Classes Eligible for Employment Authorization

### 1. Comments Supporting the Rule

The comments supporting the proposed rule largely underscored the positive socioeconomic benefits this rule would have for certain H-1B nonimmigrants and their H-4 dependent spouses. For example, several commenters noted that while they knew about the restriction on H-4 employment before coming to the United States, they did not anticipate such a long wait to apply for LPR status or the emotional toll that long-term unemployment would take on them and their families. Other commenters noted they have not been able to apply for a social security card or a driver's license in certain states because they do not have an Employment Authorization Document (EAD) (Form I-766). Approximately 200 commenters noted that the current policy of allowing only the H-1B nonimmigrant to work often led to family separation or the decision to immigrate to other countries that authorize employment for dependent spouses.

A few commenters described their families as dual H-1B nonimmigrant households and supported the principle of both spouses working. These commenters voiced appreciation for the changes in the proposed rule, which will allow the H-4 dependent spouse to seek employment while the H-1B nonimmigrant continues to pursue permanent residence.

More than a thousand commenters believe this change will help U.S. businesses retain highly skilled H-1B nonimmigrants. More than 500 commenters asserted that the addition of skilled H-4 dependent

spouses into the workforce will help U.S. employers. More than 60 commenters stated that they had planned to move out of the United States, but will instead remain and pursue LPR status as a result of this rule change. Approximately two dozen commenters noted that they had already moved out of the United States due to the prohibition on employment for H-4 dependent spouses. Several commenters stated that they are planning to leave the United States in the near future because H-4 dependent spouses cannot work under the current rules.

Nearly 400 commenters who supported the final rule also asserted that the regulation should be implemented without change as a matter of fairness. According to the comments, the regulation will help H-1B nonimmigrants and their families who have maintained legal status for years, contributed to the economy, and demonstrated the intent to permanently remain in the United States.

The overwhelmingly positive responses from the public to the proposed rule has strengthened DHS's view, as expressed in the proposed rule, that extending employment authorization eligibility to the class of H-4 dependent spouses of H-1B nonimmigrants described in this rulemaking will have net beneficial results. Among other things, the rule will increase the likelihood that H-1B nonimmigrants will continue to pursue the LPR process through completion. DHS further believes that this rule will provide increased incentives to U.S. employers to begin the immigrant petitioning process on behalf of H-1B nonimmigrants, encourage more H-1B nonimmigrants to pursue lawful permanent residence, and bolster U.S.

competitiveness. This rule will also decrease workforce disruptions and other harms among U.S. employers caused by the departure from the United States of H-1B nonimmigrants for whom businesses have filed employment-based immigrant visa petitions. This policy supports Congress' intent in enacting AC21. See S. Rep. No. 106-260, at 2-3, 23 (2000).

A handful of commenters supporting the proposed rule requested clarification on whether H-4 dependent spouses will be permitted to file for employment authorization based on their classification as an H-4 dependent spouse if they have a pending adjustment of status application. DHS confirms that under this rule, H-4 dependent spouses with pending adjustment of status applications are still eligible for employment authorization on the basis of their H-4 classification. They may choose to apply for employment authorization based on either the H-4 dependent spouse category established by this rule under new 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(26) or the adjustment of status category under 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(9).

Another commenter asked if H-4 dependent spouses of H-1B nonimmigrants who have extended their stay under section 104(c) of AC21 would be eligible for work authorization. DHS confirms that H-4 dependent spouses of H-1B nonimmigrants who have extended their stay under section 104(c) of AC21 are eligible for employment authorization under this rule. Section 104(c) of AC21 applies to a subset of H-1B nonimmigrants who are the principal beneficiaries of approved Form I-140 petitions.[8] Because this rule provides eligibility for employment authorization to H-4 dependent spouses of all H-1B nonimmigrants who are the

principal beneficiaries of approved Form I-140 petitions, it captures the section 104(c) subset. DHS has thus determined that it is unnecessary to include section 104(c) of AC21 as a separate basis for employment authorization eligibility in this rule.

**2. Comments Requesting Expansion of the Rule**

**i. H-4 Dependent Spouses of H-1B1, H-2 and H-3 Nonimmigrants**

Slightly over 200 commenters requested that DHS extend eligibility for employment authorization to the H-4 dependent spouses of H nonimmigrants who are not in H-1B status (H-1B1, H-2 and H-3 nonimmigrants), and not only to the spouses of certain H-1B nonimmigrants who have begun the process of permanent residence through employment.[9] Some of these commenters expressed that this expansion would also help U.S. competitiveness by attracting more skilled workers from abroad.

DHS has determined that expansion of employment authorization beyond the class of H-4 dependent spouses described in the proposed rule is not appropriate at this time, and it has therefore not included such an expansion in this final rule. First, the Department believes this rule best achieves DHS's goals of helping U.S. employers minimize potential disruptions caused by the departure from the United States of certain highly skilled workers, enhancing U.S. employer's ability to attract and retain such workers, and increasing America's economic competitiveness.

Second, DHS notes two significant differences between H-1B nonimmigrants and other H nonimmigrants under the immigration laws. The INA explicitly

permits H-1B nonimmigrants to have what is known as "dual intent," pursuant to which an H-1B nonimmigrant may be the beneficiary of an immigrant visa petition filed under section 204 of the INA or otherwise seek LPR status without evidencing an intention to abandon a foreign residence for purposes of obtaining or maintaining H-1B status. See INA 214(h); see also 8 CFR 214.2(h)(16). Further, in enacting AC21, Congress permitted H-1B nonimmigrants who are the beneficiaries of certain pending or approved employment-based immigrant visa petitions or labor certification applications to remain in the United States beyond the six-year statutory maximum period of stay. Congress therefore has passed legislation specifically encouraging, and removing impediments to, the ability of H-1B nonimmigrants to seek LPR status, such that they may more readily contribute permanently to United States economic sustainability and growth. Congress has not extended similar benefits to other H nonimmigrants, including H-1B1 (Free Trade Agreement specialty workers from Chile and Singapore), H-2A (temporary agricultural workers), H-2B (temporary nonagricultural workers), or H-3 nonimmigrants (trainees). Extending employment authorization to certain H-4 dependent spouses of H-1B nonimmigrants, and not to H-4 dependent spouses of other H nonimmigrants, thus serves to advance the Department's immediate interest in furthering the aims of AC21.[10]

Finally, as noted in the proposed rule, DHS may consider expanding H-4 employment eligibility in the future. *See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. EPA*, 722 F.3d 401, 410 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (observing that "`agencies

have great discretion to treat a problem partially'") (quoting *City of Las Vegas v. Lujan*, 891 F.2d 927, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1989)); *Lamers Dairy Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric.*, 379 F.3d 466, 475 (7th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he government must be allowed leeway to approach a perceived problem incrementally. Similarly, equal protection does not require a governmental entity to choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all.") (quotation marks omitted) (citing *FCC v. Beach Commc'ns*, 508 U.S. 307, 316 (1993); and *Dandridge v. Williams*, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970)).

**ii. H-4 Dependent Spouses of All H-1B Nonimmigrants**

Over 150 commenters noted that all dependent spouses of other nonimmigrant categories, such as the spouses of L-1 (intracompany transferee), E-1 (treaty trader), E-2 (treaty investor), and E-3 (Australian specialty occupation workers) nonimmigrants, are eligible to apply for employment authorization These commenters stated that because the employment-based nonimmigrant categories are similar to each other, all H-4 dependent spouses of H-1B nonimmigrants—rather than only certain subclasses of H-4 dependent spouses—likewise should be eligible for employment authorization.

DHS, however, recognizes an important difference between the dependent spouse category of H-1B nonimmigrants and those of L-1, E-1, E-2, and E-3 nonimmigrants. Specifically, Congress directed by statute that DHS grant employment authorization to all spouses of L-1, E-1, E-2, and E-3 nonimmi-

grants.[11] *See* Public Law 107-124 (2002) (amending the INA to expressly authorize employment for spouses of E nonimmigrants); Public Law 107-125 (2002) (same for spouses of L nonimmigrants); see also INA section 214(c)(2)(E) & (e)(6), 8 U.S.C. 1184(c)(2)(E) & (e)(6). Congress has not provided such statutory direction with respect to the spouses of H-1B nonimmigrants. Thus, the fact that the INA authorizes dependent spouses of L and E nonimmigrants for U.S. employment does not indicate that H-4 dependent spouses of all H-1B nonimmigrants also must be authorized to work.

In extending such employment authorization through regulation, DHS studied congressional intent with respect to H-1B nonimmigrants. Although Congress has not specifically required extending employment authorization to dependent spouses of H-1B nonimmigrants, Congress did recognize in AC21 the importance of addressing the lengthy delays faced by such workers seeking to obtain LPR status. Consistent with this congressional concern, and the legal authorities vested in the Secretary of Homeland Security described in Section C, below, DHS has chosen to limit this regulation within that statutory framework, and the Department declines to extend the changes made by this rule to the H-4 dependent spouses of all H-1B nonimmigrants at this time.

### iii. Employment Authorization Incident to Status

Over 60 commenters requested that H-4 dependent spouses be granted employment authorization "incident to status," which would relieve the need to apply

for employment authorization before receiving it. These commenters generally recommended that DHS provide employment authorization incident to status by authorizing the employment of H-4 dependent spouses through amendment to 8 CFR 274a.12(a) instead of 8 CFR 274a.12(c), which provides employment authorization through case-by-case, discretionary adjudications of each individual request.[12] For those classes of aliens listed in 8 CFR 274a.12(a), employment authorization is automatic upon the grant of immigration status. Examples of classes of aliens who are employment authorized incident to status under 8 CFR 274a.12(a) are LPRs, asylees, and refugees.

DHS is unable to classify H-4 dependent spouses described in this rule as employment authorized incident to status. Unlike other noncitizens who are employment authorized incident to status, H-4 dependent spouses will not be eligible for employment authorization based solely on their immigration status. Rather, H-4 dependent spouses must meet certain additional conditions before they can be granted employment authorization, and current USCIS systems cannot automatically and independently determine whether such conditions have been met. USCIS systems, for example, cannot independently or automatically determine whether an H-4 dependent spouse has the requisite spousal relationship to an H-1B nonimmigrant who either is the beneficiary of an approved Form I-140 petition or has been granted H-1B nonimmigrant status under sections 106(a) and (b) of AC21; that determination must be made by a USCIS adjudicator. DHS has therefore determined that it must require the filing of an application requesting employment authorization,

see 8 CFR 274a.12(c) and 8 CFR 274a.13, before it can extend employment authorization to the class of H-4 dependent spouses described in this rule. This application process will ensure that only eligible H-4 dependent spouses receive a grant of employment authorization and proper documentation evidencing such employment authorization, and will avoid granting employment authorization to ineligible spouses.

**iv. Employment Authorization at Different Points in Time**

More than a dozen commenters requested that the class of H-4 dependent spouses who are eligible for employment authorization be expanded by permitting them to file at points in time different from those provided in the proposed rule. DHS carefully considered these suggestions for determining when an H-4 dependent spouse should be eligible for employment authorization. For the reasons that follow, DHS has determined that it will not adopt the commenters' suggestions in this final rule.

**(1) H-1B Nonimmigrants With Pending PERM Labor Certifications or Form I-140 Petitions**

Some commenters requested that DHS make H-4 dependent spouses eligible for employment authorization when their H-1B nonimmigrant spouses have filed permanent (PERM) labor certifications with DOL.[13] Other commenters suggested providing such eligibility when H-1B nonimmigrants have Form I-140 petitions or adjustment of status applications pending with USCIS.

DHS believes that the basis for eligibility in the proposed rule reasonably addresses H-4 dependent spouses' interests in obtaining employment authorization at the earliest possible time in advancing the Department's policy goals of attracting and retaining highly skilled workers and promoting compliance with U.S. immigration laws. In furtherance of these goals, DHS has chosen to limit eligibility for employment authorization to cases where the H-1B nonimmigrant either: (1) Is the principal beneficiary of an approved Form I-140 and thus is on a path to lawful permanent residence that is reasonably likely to conclude successfully; or (2) has been granted H-1B status under sections 106(a) and (b) of AC21. This approach provides several benefits to the Department.

Among other things, the approach allows DHS to confirm a significant record of compliance with U.S. immigration laws, which indicates the likelihood of continued compliance in the future. Requiring an approved Form I-140 petition, for example, reduces the risk of frivolous labor certification and immigrant visa petition filings for the purpose of making H-4 dependent spouses eligible for employment authorization, because the approval of the petition generally signifies that the foreign worker is eligible for the underlying immigrant classification. In contrast, authorizing employment immediately upon the filing of a PERM application or Form I-140 petition (rather than after the 365-day waiting period or the approval of the Form I-140 petition) could produce a reasonable possibility of granting employment authorization to an H-4 dependent spouse where the H-1B nonimmigrant's case

might not be approvable and the H-1B nonimmigrant has a relatively shorter record of compliance with U.S. immigration laws. The eligibility requirements in this rule also allow for better control of processing, as it is difficult for USCIS to track another agency's filings, such as PERM applications. Finally, with respect to the comment suggesting that employment should be authorized at the point when an adjustment of status application is pending, Department regulations already provide eligibility for employment authorization in that situation. See 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(9).

**(2) H-1B Nonimmigrants Who Are Eligible for AC21 Extensions Under Sections 106(a) and (b)**

Some commenters expressed support for an alternative policy that would extend employment authorization to certain H-4 dependent spouses of H-1B nonimmigrants who are eligible for, but have not yet been approved for, extensions of status under sections 106(a) and (b) of AC21. DHS declines to adopt such a policy because it creates the possibility of granting employment authorization to H-4 dependent spouses of H-1B nonimmigrants who are later denied the extension of H-1B status. For instance, a labor certification or Form I-140 petition may have been timely filed on behalf of the H-1B nonimmigrant 365 days prior to the prospective expiration of his or her six-year limitation of stay, thus making the H-1B nonimmigrant eligible for an extension under AC21. But the labor certification or Form I-140 petition ultimately may be denied before the H-1B nonimmigrant files for and receives the AC21 extension. Additionally, if the individual is determined to be ineligible for the H-1B extension, he

or she would no longer be maintaining H-1B status and the U.S. employer will be unable to retain the worker. Accordingly, DHS believes the sounder policy is to extend employment authorization to H-4 dependent spouses of H-1B nonimmigrants who have been granted H-1B status pursuant to AC21, ensuring that such H-1B nonimmigrants are maintaining H-1B status and are significantly down the path to obtaining LPR status.

**(3) Pending Form I-140 Immigrant Petitions With New Employer**

Fewer than a dozen commenters requested that DHS extend employment authorization to H-4 dependent spouses in cases where the H-1B nonimmigrants have transferred their employment to a new employer and are in the process of obtaining approval of a new Form I-140 petition. As noted above, however, authorizing employment based solely on the filing (rather than the approval) of a PERM application or Form I-140 petition is likely to encourage frivolous filings to allow the H-4 dependent spouse to obtain employment authorization while the filings remain pending. DHS thus is not extending this rule on the basis of pending PERM applications or Form I-140 petitions. By requiring that a Form I-140 petition first be approved, DHS will further disincentivize frivolous filings and better serve the goal of extending the immigration benefit of this rule to only those spouses of H-1B nonimmigrants who are genuinely on the path to lawful permanent residence.

**v. H-4 Minors**

Less than 40 commenters requested that DHS authorize employment for certain H-4 dependent minor children whose H-1B nonimmigrant parent is the beneficiary of an approved Form I-140 or has been granted an extension of his or her authorized period of admission in the United States under AC21. These commenters cited concerns about H-4 dependent children being unable to obtain the same types of work experience as their peers, being unable to afford post-secondary education in the United States, and losing eligibility for H-4 status through age (known as "aging-out" [14]) before their parents can file for adjustment of status. Some commenters also raised fairness concerns, given the eligibility under DHS deferred action policies that make eligible for employment authorization certain individuals who came to the United States unlawfully as children under the age of 16.[15]

DHS declines to adopt the commenters' suggestions to expand eligibility for employment authorization to H-4 dependent minor children. As reflected by the comments, DHS does not view the employment of dependent minor children in the United States as a significant deciding factor for an H-1B nonimmigrant considering whether to remain in the United States and seek LPR status while continuing employment with his or her U.S. employer. Also, as stated in the proposed rule, extending employment eligibility to certain H-4 dependent spouses will alleviate a significant portion of the potential economic burdens that H-1B nonimmigrants currently may face, such as paying for academic expenses for their children, during the transition from nonimmigrant to LPR status as a result of

the inability of their dependent family members to work in the United States.

Additionally, limiting employment authorization to H-4 dependent spouses is consistent with the treatment of dependent minors in other nonimmigrant employment categories (such as the L and E nonimmigrant categories), which provide employment authorization to dependent spouses but not dependent children. And in the instances where DHS has extended eligibility for employment authorization to minor children, foreign policy reasons have been an underlying consideration. DHS has extended eligibility for employment authorization to minors within the following nonimmigrant categories: Dependents of Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) E-1 nonimmigrants; J-2 dependent children of J-1 foreign exchange visitors; dependents of A-1 and A-2 foreign government officials; dependents of G-1, G-3, and G-4 international organization officials; and dependents of NATO officials. Each of these instances involves foreign policy considerations that are not present in the H-1B nonimmigrant program.

DHS also declines to extend employment authorization to H-4 dependent children who age out and lose their H-4 status. Providing work authorization in such circumstances would encourage such individuals to violate the terms of their authorized stay. Moreover, comments suggesting that the Department should make changes to prevent H-4 dependent minor children from aging out are outside the scope of this rulemaking, which in no way involves the ability of a minor to maintain H-4 status or eligibility for LPR status

as a derivative beneficiary of a parent's immigrant petition.

Finally, the circumstances of persons eligible for consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals ("DACA") are distinct from those of H-4 dependent minor children, and the policy for authorizing employment for individuals who have received deferred action has no bearing on whether H-4 dependent minor children should be eligible to apply for employment authorization. The DACA program concerns the departmental exercise of prosecutorial discretion with the aim of ensuring that limited DHS enforcement resources are appropriately focused on the Department's highest enforcement priorities. The policy aims underlying this rule, as described above, are different, and for the reasons already discussed do not justify extending employment authorization to the H-4 dependent children of H-1B nonimmigrants.

**vi. Principal Beneficiaries**

A few dozen commenters requested that the rule also allow H-1B nonimmigrants to receive Employment Authorization Documents (EADs), which authorize employment without regard to employer, incident to status.[16] One commenter requested that DHS provide one EAD to households in which both spouses have H-1B status in order to avoid necessitating one of the spouses to change to H-4 status. A few commenters requested an EAD for an H-1B nonimmigrant whose spouse is also in H-1B status, but has been granted a different length of stay.

DHS declines to adopt the commenters' suggestions regarding EADs for H-1B nonimmigrants. If an H-1B

nonimmigrant would like to apply for an EAD as the dependent spouse of an eligible H-1B nonimmigrant, he or she must first change to H-4 status. Moreover, issuance of an EAD to an H-1B nonimmigrant authorizing employment other than with his or her petitioning employer is incompatible with the H-1B classification, which allows employment only with the petitioning employer.[17] If an H-1B nonimmigrant works on an EAD for an employer other than his or her petitioning employer, he or she may be violating the terms and conditions of his or her petition and, therefore, may no longer be maintaining a valid nonimmigrant status.

**vii. H-4 Dependent Spouses Not Selected in the H-1B Lottery**

Less than 20 commenters requested a carve-out for H-4 dependent spouses who had filed an H-1B petition but who were not selected in the H-1B computer-generated random selection process ("H-1B lottery").[18] Although DHS appreciates the frustration that may result from not being selected in the H-1B lottery, the Department declines to extend eligibility for employment authorization to these H-4 dependent spouses. This rule is not a substitute for the H-1B program and is not intended to circumvent the H-1B lottery. A primary purpose of this rule is to help U.S. businesses retain the H-1B nonimmigrants for whom they have already filed an employment-based immigrant petition. Expanding the rule to help nonimmigrants in other situations does not directly support this goal.

**viii. Other Nonimmigrant Categories**

Less than 20 commenters requested that DHS authorize employment for the dependents of principals in

other employment-based nonimmigrant classifications, such as dependents of O-1 nonimmigrants (O-3) [19] and TN nonimmigrants (TD).[20] One commenter specifically requested employment authorization for children of O-1 and TN nonimmigrant highly skilled workers who are on the path to lawful permanent residence.

DHS declines to expand eligibility for employment authorization in this rule to the dependents of principals with other nonimmigrant classifications. DHS is narrowly tailoring the expansion of eligibility for employment authorization to meet several policy objectives, including the goal of helping U.S. businesses retain highly skilled H-1B nonimmigrants who are on the path to lawful permanent residence. DHS may consider expanding employment authorization to other dependent nonimmigrant categories in the future.

Moreover, there are significant differences between the H-1B nonimmigrant classification on the one hand, and the O-1 and TN classifications on the other, that inform the Department's decision to limit applicability of this rule to only H-4 dependent spouses. The spouses of H-1B nonimmigrants, for example, generally have greater need for the benefits of this rule than the spouses of O-1 nonimmigrants. O-1 nonimmigrants typically apply for LPR status through the EB-1 immigrant visa preference category, which has not historically suffered from visa backlogs. This allows the spouses of O-1 nonimmigrants to generally obtain employment authorization much more quickly than the spouses of H-1B nonimmigrants who typically seek LPR status through the EB-2 and EB-3

preference categories, which have historically been subject to lengthy backlogs.

The spouses of TN nonimmigrants are also not similarly situated to the spouses of H-1B nonimmigrants. Unlike H-1B status, TN status stems from an international agreement—the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)—negotiated between the United States and foreign nations. As such, changes to that status implicate reciprocal international trade and foreign policy concerns that are generally not implicated with respect to the H-1B classification and are beyond the scope of this rulemaking.

**3. Comments Opposing the Rule**

Approximately ten percent of commenters opposed extending employment authorization to the class of H-4 dependent spouses described in the proposed rule. Many of these commenters were generally concerned that the rule would result in the displacement of U.S. workers; exacerbation of the nation's unemployment rate; and a decrease in wages. All comments discussing economic issues, both in opposition to and in support of the proposed rule, are discussed in Part III, Public Comments on Proposed Rule, Section D, Comments on Executive Orders 12866 and 13563.

Commenters also questioned whether the change in the proposed rule is actually necessary in light of other provisions of U.S. immigration law. Other commenters suggested that the proposed rule would have an adverse impact on other immigration categories or nationalities. DHS has carefully considered these concerns. But for the reasons that follow, DHS has decided to finalize the rule as proposed.

**i. Change Unnecessary**

More than 20 commenters believed that because current immigration laws provide the ability for H-4 dependent spouses to change status to an employment-authorized category, the proposed rule would not provide any additional incentives for H-1B nonimmigrants to remain in the United States and continue to pursue LPR status. One commenter stated that most of the comments posted on www.regulations.gov failed to indicate that potential immigrants have abandoned the immigration process, or have decided against coming to the United States in the first place, because their spouses would not be authorized to work.

DHS disagrees with these commenters and believes that the changes made by this rule are warranted. DHS acknowledges that thousands of commenters who voiced support for the rule did not provide specific reasons for their support, including whether H-1B nonimmigrants were abandoning their applications for LPR status. DHS notes, however, that more than 60 commenters specifically indicated they planned to abandon their pursuit of lawful permanent residence without the changes in the proposed rule. Approximately, two dozen commenters stated that they left the United States because the current regulations preclude H-4 dependent spouses from engaging in employment. And several U.S. employers submitted comments in which they describe the loss of valued H-1B nonimmigrants because of the restriction on spousal employment. These employers noted that the changes in the proposed rule would help to align America's

immigration laws with the policies of other countries that allow spousal employment. DHS agrees with these employers and other commenters who supported the proposed rule, and the Department believes that this change will support U.S. businesses and strengthen U.S. competitiveness. DHS also believes that this rule will fulfill its intended purpose and encourage certain highly skilled H-1B nonimmigrants to remain in the United States and continue to pursue their efforts to become LPRs.

**ii. Impact on Other Categories or Nationalities**

Less than 80 commenters suggested that the proposed rule would harm persons in other nonimmigrant categories or with certain nationalities. A few commenters who had changed status from H-4 status to F-1 nonimmigrant student status, for example, thought the rule was unfair because F-1 nonimmigrant graduates who had exhausted their Optional Practical Training had no path to employment authorization except through another principal nonimmigrant classification, such as the H-1B classification. These commenters argued that the rule would put recent F-1 nonimmigrant graduates at a disadvantage because they would have to go through the H-1B petition process whereas the qualifying H-4 dependent spouses would be eligible for an EAD authorizing employment without regard to employer.

DHS appreciates these commenters' concerns but does not believe that the changes made by this rule will adversely affect other classifications or specific nationalities. Rather, DHS expects that this rule will help to partially alleviate the adverse impact of

oversubscription of certain chargeability categories in the EB-2 and EB-3 categories on certain H-1B nonimmigrants and their families, without negatively impacting others. DHS has narrowly tailored this rule to provide employment authorization to only those H-4 dependent spouses of H-1B nonimmigrants who have taken active steps to become LPRs. The rule does not affect any other nonimmigrant category, nor does the rule make distinctions among persons of different nationalities. Moreover, as noted throughout this rule, DHS expects that because of the small size of the newly eligible class of workers, the rule should not negatively impact the employment of persons in other nonimmigrant categories. DHS also notes that the H-4 dependent spouses at issue may already obtain employment authorization when they file their applications to adjust status; this rule simply accelerates the timeframe in which they may enter the labor market.

**iii. Impact on Universities**

Several commenters suggested that because it is common for H-4 dependent spouses to change status to F-1 nonimmigrant student status to enhance their marketability and use their time productively, universities may lose revenue from decreased enrollment if such H-4 dependent spouses are allowed to work pursuant to this rule. DHS carefully considered but declined to address these concerns. First, this rule does not directly regulate U.S. institutions of higher education or its students (including F-1 nonimmigrants), and any impacts on university enrollments or revenues would be an indirect impact of this rule. Second, the rule merely expands the choices available to H-4

dependent spouses. While the rule expands the ability for such individuals to obtain employment authorization, it does nothing to restrict or otherwise change their ability to engage in study to the extent authorized by the Department in accordance with law. Third, even if the opportunity for employment authorization may mean that fewer H-4 dependent spouses eventually choose to enroll as nonimmigrant students, it is not clear how this rule could significantly impact revenues at colleges and universities considering the relatively small number of people impacted by this rule.[21] Indeed, other commenters noted that this rule could actually help university enrollment, as the increased ability for H-1B nonimmigrant families to generate income would further enable the H-1B nonimmigrant and H-4 dependent spouse to engage in higher education or contribute towards the higher education of their children. Consequently, it is uncertain if the net impact of this rule is to reduce overall enrollment and revenues, given the offsetting effects of this rule suggested by commenters. Commenters did not provide statistics or data demonstrating that this rule will have significant adverse effects on U.S. institutions of higher education or that DHS should limit employment opportunities for H-4 dependent spouses to protect revenue sources. Finally, DHS notes that it received several supportive comments both from representatives of the academic community and also from self-identified H-4 dependent spouses who viewed this rulemaking as positive.

## 4. Comments Requesting a More Restrictive Policy

Slightly over 180 commenters suggested limiting employment authorization to a more restricted class of H-4 nonimmigrants. For the reasons discussed below, DHS has determined that it will not adopt the commenters' suggestions in this final rule.

### i. Certain Skills or Sectors

A number of commenters recommended granting employment authorization only to H-4 dependent spouses who have certain skills or work in certain sectors of the economy. Other commenters requested that DHS limit employment authorization under the rule to H-4 dependent spouses who hold advanced degrees from U.S. universities or have degrees in certain subjects, such as subjects in STEM fields. Some commenters were concerned that eligible H-4 dependents will be able to compete across all occupations, not just skilled professions.

DHS declines to restrict employment authorization eligibility to H-4 dependent spouses with certain skills or degrees. A primary purpose of this rule is to help U.S. employers retain H-1B nonimmigrant employees who have demonstrated the intent to become LPRs, which would provide substantial benefits to these employers and the U.S. economy. This rule is intended to provide this incentive to H-1B nonimmigrants regardless of the academic backgrounds of their H-4 dependent spouses. Limiting the rule to benefit only H-1B nonimmigrants whose H-4 dependent spouses have

certain skills or hold certain educational credentials would undermine the effectiveness of this rule.

**ii. Reciprocity**

A number of commenters recommended limiting employment authorization to H-4 dependent spouses who are from countries that authorize employment for spouses of U.S. citizens in a similar immigration status abroad (i.e., when there is reciprocity). DHS's focus in this rule, however, is on retaining H-1B nonimmigrants for the benefit of U.S. employers and the U.S. economy, including by helping businesses minimize expensive disruptions caused by the departures from the United States of certain highly skilled H-1B nonimmigrants. As noted above, limiting the rule to affect only a subset of H-1B nonimmigrant families based on reciprocity would weaken the rule's efficacy. Moreover, reciprocity would implicate foreign policy considerations that are outside the scope of this rulemaking.

**iii. Limiting Employment Authorization Based on AC21 Extensions**

A few commenters requested that DHS extend eligibility for employment authorization only to the H-4 dependent spouses of H-1B nonimmigrants who are beneficiaries of AC21 extensions. DHS discussed this option in the proposed rule. The Department appreciates this suggestion, but believes that also extending employment authorization to the spouses of H-1B nonimmigrants who are the beneficiaries of approved Form I-140 petitions more effectively accomplishes the goals of this rulemaking. For the benefit of U.S. businesses and the U.S. economy, DHS believes the rule should

provide incentives for those workers who have established certain eligibility requirements and demonstrated intent to reside permanently in the United States and contribute to the U.S. economy. Extending employment authorization to H-4 dependent spouses of H-1B nonimmigrants with either approved Form I-140 petitions or H-1B status granted pursuant to sections 106(a) and (b) of AC21 encourages a greater number of professionals with high-demand skills to remain in the United States. Moreover, by tying eligibility for employment authorization to approved Form I-140 petitions, DHS is reaching the H-4 dependent spouses of H-1B nonimmigrants granted status under section 104(c) of AC21. DHS thus declines to exclude from this rule the spouses of H-1B nonimmigrants who have approved Form I-140 petitions.

**C. Legal Authority To Extend Employment Authorization to Certain H-4 Dependent Spouses**

Over 40 commenters questioned DHS's legal authority to extend employment authorization to certain H-4 dependent spouses, often emphasizing that employment for spouses of L and E nonimmigrants is expressly authorized by statute.[22] Several commenters argued that it was the role of Congress, not the Executive Branch, to create immigration laws.

DHS disagrees with the view that this rule exceeds the Secretary's authority. In the INA, Congress provided the Secretary with broad authority to administer and enforce the immigration laws. The Secretary is expressly authorized to promulgate rules and "perform such other acts as he deems necessary for

carrying out his authority" based upon considerations rationally related to the immigration laws. INA section 103(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(3). Congress also provided the Secretary with the more specific statutory authority to set by regulation the conditions of nonimmigrant admission. INA section 214(a), 8 U.S.C. 1184(a). These provisions grant the Secretary broad discretion to determine the most effective way to administer the laws. *See Narenji v. Civiletti*, 617 F.2d 745, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (observing that the INA "need not specifically authorize each and every action taken by the Attorney General [(now Secretary of Homeland Security)], so long as his action is reasonably related to the duties imposed upon him"); *see also Arizona v. United States*, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012) (noting "broad discretion exercised by immigration officials" under the immigration laws).

More specifically, section 274A(h)(3)(B) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1324a(h)(3)(B), recognizes that employment may be authorized by statute or by the Secretary. *See Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer*, 757 F.3d 1053, 1062 (9th Cir. 2014) ("Congress has given the Executive Branch broad discretion to determine when noncitizens may work in the United States."); Perales v. Casillas, 903 F.2d 1043, 1050 (5th Cir. 1990) (describing the authority recognized by INA 274A(h)(3) as "permissive" and largely "unfettered"). Thus, the commenters' arguments that DHS lacks authority to grant employment eligibility to H-4 dependent spouses because Congress has not specifically required it by statute are misplaced. The fact that Congress has directed the Secretary to authorize employment to specific classes of aliens (such as the spouses

of E and L nonimmigrants) does not mean that the Secretary is precluded from extending employment authorization to other classes of aliens by regulation as contemplated by section 274A(h)(3)(B) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1324a(h)(3)(B).[23]

### D. Comments on the Analysis of Executive Orders 12866 and 13563

#### 1. Comments Related to Labor Market Impacts

Of the approximately ten percent of commenters who generally opposed the rule, a majority of those commenters asserted that allowing eligible H-4 dependent spouses to receive employment authorization would have negative economic impacts. Chief among these concerns was the impact of the proposed rule on the U.S. labor market. Many commenters believed that the proposed rule would increase competition for jobs; exacerbate the nation's unemployment rate; drive down wages; and otherwise negatively impact native U.S. workers. A few commenters also suggested that allowing H-4 dependent spouses to enter the labor market would negatively impact highly skilled H-1B nonimmigrants.

DHS appreciates these viewpoints and has carefully considered the potential for negative labor market impacts throughout this rulemaking. DHS affirms its belief expressed in the proposed rule that any labor market impacts will be minimal. As a preliminary matter, this regulatory change applies only to the H-4 dependent spouses of H-1B nonimmigrants who have actively taken certain steps to obtain LPR status. As such, the rule simply accelerates the timeframe by which these spouses are able to enter the U.S. labor market.

Importantly, the rule does not require eligible H-4 spouses to submit an application for an EAD, nor does the granting of an EAD guarantee that H-4 spouses will obtain employment. Further, the relatively small number of people affected by the rule limits any impact the rule may have on the labor market. Although DHS, in this final rule, increased its estimate of the number of H-4 dependent spouses who might benefit from the rule, the maximum number of such spouses who could request employment authorization and actually enter the labor market in the initial year (the year with the largest number of potential applicants) represents only 0.1156 percent of the overall U.S. civilian labor force. This increased estimate does not change the Department's conclusion that this rule will have minimal labor market impacts.

Moreover, with respect to the potential that this rule and the policy goals of retaining certain highly skilled H-1B nonimmigrants may cause native-worker displacement and wage reduction, DHS notes that there is a large body of research that supports the findings that immigration of highly skilled workers is beneficial to the U.S. economy and labor market in the long-term. For example, several commenters provided studies that refuted arguments that highly skilled immigrants are used for “cheap labor,” [24] while many others offered evidence that showed the positive effects of immigration, and particularly high-skilled immigration, on the U.S. labor market.[25] These commenters pointed to a Congressional Budget Office report and academic study [26] that showed that immigration generally produces a modest increase in the wages of native-born workers in the long-run, and that

any negative economic effects—in the form of wages—are largely felt by other immigrant workers with similar education and skill levels. DHS also notes that the Immigration and Nationality Act's employment-related antidiscrimination provision, enforced by the Department of Justice's Office of Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair Employment Practices, prohibits employment discrimination in hiring, firing and recruiting and referring for a fee based on citizenship status. In general, employers may not reject U.S. workers in favor of nonimmigrant visa holders based on citizenship status. INA section 274B(a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1324b(a)(1)(B).

From a labor market perspective, it is important to note that there are not a fixed number of jobs in the United States. Basic principles of labor market economics recognize that individuals not only fill jobs, but also stimulate the economy and create demand for jobs through increased consumption of goods and services. On this point, approximately 2,600 commenters thought that the regulation as proposed will stimulate the U.S. economy through the spillover effects associated with dual-income households, thus leading to increased spending throughout the economy, greater investments in real estate, the potential for job creation, and increased tax revenue. Relatedly, other commenters expressed their belief that the rule will bolster U.S. competitiveness, economic strength and innovation. A few commenters noted that the proposal will enhance the ability of U.S. businesses to attract and retain highly skilled immigrants, resulting in potential economic gains to U.S. companies and the U.S. economy.

In addition, commenters also highlighted several social benefits of the proposed rule, including: Family unification; overall family financial security and stability; providing a means for H-4 dependent spouses to be financially independent; and significantly aiding the H-1B nonimmigrant and his or her family in integrating into American culture and communities. DHS appreciates these comments and agrees that the rule will provide economic and social benefits to the H-1B nonimmigrant worker and his or her family as they wait to obtain LPR status.

Finally, a few commenters suggested that allowing H-4 dependent spouses to enter the labor market would negatively impact the job prospects of highly skilled H-1B nonimmigrants. These commenters generally suggested, without providing empirical support, that by allowing H-4 dependent spouses to have an EAD, U.S. employers will prefer to hire such individuals rather than to go through the additional effort of hiring an H-1B nonimmigrant. DHS appreciates these concerns but lacks data on the skillsets or educational levels of H-4 dependent spouses to indicate that they will take jobs that are typically held by highly skilled H-1B nonimmigrants. Nor, as noted above, is the U.S. labor market static; individuals who supply labor also create demand for labor through increased consumption and other spending. The fact that this rule provides employment authorization only to H-4 dependent spouses who are tied to an H-1B nonimmigrant who is sufficiently on the path to LPR status further mitigates the possibility that this rule will cause employers to hire H-4 dependent spouses over H-1B

nonimmigrants. DHS anticipates that employers will continue to fully utilize the H-1B program and does not believe that this rule will adversely affect the job prospects of H-1B nonimmigrants.

**2. Comments on the Volume Estimate and Methodology**

Of the ten percent of commenters who opposed the rule, many felt that the Department's estimates of the potential eligible population were too low. Two commenters suggested that DHS employ a different methodology to arrive at the estimated number of likely eligible H-4 dependent spouses. One commenter provided highlighted excerpts of the Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, as published by the DHS Office of Immigration Statistics, containing statistics on individuals who had obtained LPR status under employment-based preference categories. The commenter highlighted the total number of spouses who had adjusted status to lawful permanent residence and the total number of individuals who adjusted to LPR status under the first through third employment-based preference categories. DHS assumes that the commenter was suggesting that DHS simply apply that historical average to estimate the number of H-4 dependent spouses who will be eligible to apply for employment authorization under this rule.

DHS appreciates this response and carefully considered this approach. However, that approach fails to account for those H-1B nonimmigrants and their families who are currently in the backlog waiting for immigrant visas. Furthermore, that approach would also overstate the likely number of H-4 dependent spouses

who would be eligible to apply for employment authorization under this rule. That is so because the approach does not account for the proportion of employment-based adjustment applicants who are in H-1B status as compared to those adjusting from another nonimmigrant status. Moreover, not all spouses of H-1B nonimmigrants are currently in H-4 nonimmigrant status. For these reasons, DHS disagrees with the commenters' suggested approach to estimating the volume of H-4 dependent spouses who will be eligible to apply for employment authorization under this rule. Estimating the eligible population by taking into account the backlog of H-1B nonimmigrants who have approved I-140 petitions but are unable to adjust status due to a lack of available immigrant visas, along with the estimated future flow of newly eligible spouses, is a more accurate methodology for estimating the number of H-4 dependent spouses whom this rule may impact.

DHS has carefully considered ways to estimate the volume of potential H-4 dependent spouses who will be eligible to apply for employment authorization under this rule. Based on comments received that questioned whether the estimated volume of such spouses was too low, DHS reviewed and updated its estimates in preparing this final rule. DHS acknowledges that there is some uncertainty in this analysis, but believes its methodology offers the best available estimates.

Although the estimate of H-4 dependent spouses who could be eligible to apply for employment authorization increased in this final rule,[27] the findings and impacts of the rule remain essentially the same. In the first year, if all 179,600 H-4 dependent spouses

who DHS estimates may be eligible under the rule were to enter the U.S. labor market, that population would still constitute a small fraction of one percent of the overall U.S. civilian workforce. And many of these H-4 dependent spouses will be able to seek employment even without this rule, as immigrant visa numbers become available and H-1B nonimmigrant families become eligible to file for adjustment of status. As noted previously, this rule simply accelerates the timeframe in which certain H-4 dependent spouses are able to enter the labor market.

Notwithstanding the revised volume estimates, the basis for this rule, as discussed throughout the proposed rule and this final rule, remains accurate. DHS is taking this action to further incentivize H-1B nonimmigrants and their families to continue to wait and contribute to the United States through an often lengthy waiting period for an immigrant visa to become available. DHS expects that these actions will also benefit U.S. employers by decreasing the labor disruptions that occur when H-1B nonimmigrants abandon the permanent resident process.

### 3. Comments on Specific Costs and Benefits Discussed in the Analysis

One commenter believed that the proposed rule overstated the potential costs and understated the benefits of the rule. Specifically, the commenter alleged that DHS' estimates for cost per applicant were exaggerated because DHS included the monetized opportunity costs associated with applying for employment authorization. That same commenter also believed that DHS failed to stress the economic and social benefits of the

rule. Another commenter believed that the proposed rule failed to acknowledge the economic losses incurred by the current inability of H-4 dependent spouses to work.

DHS has carefully considered these comments and does not believe that the potential costs and benefits were either under- or overestimated. In the proposed rule, DHS highlighted the economic benefits to both the H-4 dependent spouse and the H-1B family unit that would accrue from additional income. In addition, in the proposed rule DHS discussed the societal integration benefits that would accrue to the H-4 dependent spouse and the H-1B family that would come from the spouse's ability to participate in the U.S. labor market. DHS disagrees with comments that the application costs were inflated because we assigned a valuation to the H-4 dependent spouse's time. DHS acknowledged in the proposed rule that these spouses do not currently work. DHS decided to use the minimum wage as a reasonable proxy to estimate the opportunity costs of their time. DHS disagrees with the questionable notion that just because these spouses are not currently able to participate in the labor market, they do not face opportunity costs and/or assign valuation in deciding how to allocate their time. As such, DHS utilized a reasonable approach in assigning value to their time.

### E. Comments on the Application for Employment Authorization

Over 180 commenters raised issues related to employment authorization, including filing procedures, premium processing, validity periods, renewals,

evidentiary documentation, concurrent filings for extension of stay/change of status, automatic extensions of employment authorization, and filing fees. DHS carefully considered these comments and addresses them below.

**1. Streamlined or Modernized Filing Procedures**

Commenters urged DHS and USCIS to utilize streamlined or modernized filing procedures for Applications for Employment Authorization (Forms I-765) submitted by H-4 dependent spouses. USCIS is moving from a paper-based application and adjudication process to an electronic one through the development of an Electronic Immigration System ("USCIS ELIS"). When complete, USCIS ELIS will allow customers to electronically view their applications, petitions or requests, receive electronic notification of decisions, and electronically receive real-time case status updates. This is a global effort affecting all USCIS benefit request programs and, therefore, is outside the scope of this rulemaking. DHS will notify the public when USCIS is prepared to begin accepting electronic filings of Applications for Employment Authorization by eligible H-4 dependent spouses. DHS will begin accepting Applications for Employment Authorization (Forms I-765) submitted by certain H-4 dependent spouses on the effective date of this rule, May 26, 2015. This effective date is intended to prevent an overlap of H-1B cap season and an initial filing surge of Forms I-765 under 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(26). As a result, USCIS will be able to implement this program in a manner that will avoid prolonged delays of processing other

petition and application types, in particular those H-1B petitions seeking an FY 2016 cap number. It will also allow USCIS to maintain excellent customer service for all USCIS stakeholders, including H-1B employers, H-1B nonimmigrants and their families.

**2. Employment Authorization Document (Form I-766) Validity Period**

Nine commenters requested that DHS issue the Employment Authorization Document (EAD) (Form I-766) with a validity period that matches the H-4 dependent spouse's status. Related to this request, another commenter requested a three-year validity period to match the H-1B and H-4 authorized periods of admission. DHS agrees with commenters that to reduce possible cases of unauthorized employment, the EAD validity period should match the H-4 dependent spouse's length of authorized admission. Thus, in issuing an EAD to an otherwise eligible H-4 dependent spouse, DHS generally will authorize a validity period that matches the H-4 spouse's remaining authorized period of admission, which may be as long as three years in cases not involving DOD-related services. This policy will ensure that USCIS does not grant employment authorization to an H-4 dependent spouse who is not eligible for the benefit. It will also likely reduce the number of times that H-4 dependent spouses may need to request renewal of their employment authorization.

One commenter requested that DHS issue a probationary EAD with a six-to twelve-month validity period, at the end of which the H-4 dependent spouse would have to prove that he or she is working legally

and paying taxes. DHS declines to adopt this suggestion. The EAD that DHS will issue H-4 dependent spouses pursuant to this rule is evidence of employment authorization to lawfully work in the United States for any employer. DHS is not aware of any risk factors—such as fraud, criminal activity, or threats to public safety or national security—associated with H-4 dependent spouses as a whole that would support imposing a six-month validity period. Moreover, the administrative burden resulting from additional adjudications and the possibility of gaps in employment authorization, together with the burdens this limitation would place on the H-4 dependent spouse, make imposing a six-month validity period unreasonable.

Regarding the suggestion that H-4 dependent spouses should be required to prove that they pay taxes as a condition of obtaining or maintaining work authorization, DHS does not require proof of payment of taxes for any of the classes of aliens eligible to file the Application for Employment Authorization. As a preliminary matter, issuance of an EAD does not require an H-4 dependent spouse to work. Nor does issuance of the EAD guarantee that an H-4 dependent spouse will find employment and therefore be required to pay taxes on any income earned through such employment. Moreover, DHS is not aware of any evidence, and the commenter provided none, indicating that H-4 dependent spouses are likely to engage in tax evasion or other tax-related unauthorized activity if they are provided employment authorization pursuant to this rule. At the same time, USCIS would face significant operational burdens if it were required to collect and verify tax documents for each H-4 dependent

spouse seeking employment authorization under this rule.

**3. EAD Renewals**

Five commenters requested that DHS allow H-4 dependent spouses to apply for EAD renewals up to six months in advance, in part to align with the time frame permitted for filing of the Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker (Form I-129) to extend the H-1B nonimmigrant's status. As explained below in Section III.E.5, DHS will permit those H-4 dependent spouses seeking to concurrently file their Form I-765 application with their Application to Extend/Change Nonimmigrant Status (Form I-539), and if applicable their spouses' Form I-129 petition, to file up to six months in advance of the requested start date. Please note, however, that USCIS will not adjudicate the Form I-765 application until a determination has been made on the underlying Form I-539 application and/or Form I-129 petition. The time at which an H-4 dependent spouse will be eligible to apply for an EAD renewal will vary, as it is dependent on actions taken by the H-1B nonimmigrant, including actions to maintain and extend his or her H-1B status, as well as the H-4 dependent spouse's status.

**4. Acceptable Evidentiary Documentation**

Several commenters submitted comments related to the Application for Employment Authorization (Form I-765) and to the evidence required to be submitted by applicants with the application. One commenter asked DHS to make changes to assist applicants in obtaining acceptable evidentiary documentation. This commenter requested that USCIS provide the H-4

dependent spouse, upon request, with his or her immigration case related paperwork, such as the original underlying petition. Another commenter requested that DHS provide clarification about the evidentiary standard relating to AC21 eligibility.

In conjunction with the proposed rule, DHS proposed conforming revisions to the Form I-765 application to add H-4 dependent spouses described in this rule to the classes of aliens eligible to file the form. Concurrent with publication of this final rule, DHS has made further changes to the form. DHS has made clarifying changes to improve readability of the form instructions describing the types of documentary evidence that may be submitted in support of the application. As further discussed in Part III.F.1 relating to marriage fraud concerns, DHS also has revised the regulatory text in 8 CFR 214.2(h)(9)(iv) and the form instructions to clarify that supporting documentary evidence includes proof of marriage. Finally, DHS has revised the form itself to include a check box that self-identifies the applicant as an eligible H-4 dependent spouse. DHS believes that adding the check box for H-4 dependent spouses to the form will aid in the efficient processing of the form by facilitating USCIS's ability to match the application with related petitions that are integral to determining the H-4 dependent spouse's eligibility for employment authorization, as discussed below in Part III.E.5.

DHS appreciates the concerns regarding the difficulty that some applicants may face in obtaining the necessary documentation to support the Form I-765 application. DHS's revisions in this final rule to 8 CFR 214.2(h)(9)(iv) and the instructions to Form I-765

provide for flexibility in the types of evidentiary documentation that may be submitted by applicants. If the H-4 dependent spouse cannot submit the primary evidence listed in the form instructions, he or she may submit secondary evidence, such as an attestation that lists information about the underlying Form I-129 or Form I-140 petition, so that an adjudicator may be able to match the Form I-765 application with the underlying petition(s). Such information may include the petition receipt number, the beneficiary's name and/or the petitioner's name. If secondary evidence does not exist or cannot be obtained, an applicant may demonstrate this and submit two or more sworn affidavits by non-parties who have direct knowledge of the relevant events and circumstances. This approach should address the situation where the H-4 dependent spouse is unable to access the immigration paperwork relating to the H-1B nonimmigrant. Notwithstanding the option for submitting secondary evidence, if an applicant prefers to obtain the primary evidence listed in the form instructions from USCIS for submission with the Form I-765, the applicant may make a request for documents maintained by USCIS by following established procedures for making such requests under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). *See* http://www.uscis.gov/about-us/freedom-information-and-privacy-act-foia/how-file-foia-privacy-act-request/how-file-foiapa-request. DHS declines to establish new procedures for making document requests that are applicable only to applicants who are H-4 dependent spouses. The established FOIA process for making document requests promotes

fairness, uniformity, and administrative efficiency, while ensuring that privacy protections are enforced.

Finally, in response to the comment on the evidentiary standard that will apply to H-4 dependent spouses, DHS notes that such spouses will have to meet the same burden of proof (i.e., preponderance of the evidence) as other applicants for employment authorization. *See, e.g., Matter of Chawathe*, 25 I. N. Dec. 369, 376 (AAO 2010) (describing "preponderance of the evidence" standard).

**5. Concurrent Filings**

A couple of commenters requested that DHS allow eligible H-4 dependent spouses to file the Application for Employment Authorization (Form I-765) concurrently with an Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker (Form I-140) or an Application to Extend/Change Nonimmigrant Status (Form I-539). For the reasons that follow, DHS agrees to allow Form I-765 to be concurrently filed with Form I-539, but not with Form I-140.

DHS currently permits an H-4 dependent spouse to file Form I-539 concurrently with a Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker (Form I-129) filed on behalf of the H-1B nonimmigrant. This provides several efficiencies, as the status of the H-4 dependent spouse is based on the resolution of the H-1B nonimmigrant's Form I-129 petition and both forms may be processed at the same USCIS locations. For similar reasons, DHS has decided to permit H-4 dependent spouses to file Applications for Employment Authorization (Forms I-765) concurrently with certain related benefit requests: Applications to Extend/Change Nonimmigrant Status (Forms I-539) and, if applicable, with

Petitions for a Nonimmigrant Worker (Form I-129). As noted previously, DHS has decided to issue EADs to eligible H-4 dependent spouses with validity dates that match their authorized periods of admission. That period of admission is determined as part of the Form I-539 application adjudication, which, in turn, is largely dependent on the H-1B nonimmigrant's period of admission determined as part of the Form I-129 adjudication. Because adjudication of those forms are interrelated, and because they are submitted to the same USCIS locations, DHS has determined that it is reasonable to allow those forms to be concurrently filed.

DHS, however, cannot extend the courtesy of concurrent filing with Form I-140 immigrant visa petitions filed on behalf of the H-1B nonimmigrant. Presently, Forms I-129 and I-539 are not processed at the same USCIS locations in which Form I-140 petitions are adjudicated. As a result, each form must be filed separately at the USCIS Service Center location having jurisdiction over the relevant form. Additionally, determining the spousal relationship between the H-1B nonimmigrant and the H-4 dependent spouse is not a necessary part of the adjudication of the Form I-140 petition.[28] To permit concurrent filing of Form I-765 with Form I-140 would undermine DHS' efforts to facilitate efficient processing of both benefit requests.

DHS also notes that it cannot adjudicate a Form I-765 filed by an H-4 dependent spouse until the Department has made a determination regarding the H-1B nonimmigrant's eligibility for H-1B status under sections 106(a) and (b) of AC21 or until a Form I-140

petition has been approved. Prior to adjudicating such Form I-765, DHS must also make a determination that the H-4 dependent spouse remains eligible for H--4 status. As such, DHS amends the current rule to clarify that the 90-day clock specified in 8 CFR 274a.13(d) authorizing DHS to issue interim employment authorization if the Form I-765 is not adjudicated within 90 days is not triggered until necessary eligibility determinations have been made on the underlying nonimmigrant status for the H-1B nonimmigrant and the H-4 dependent spouse. If the H-4 dependent spouse's employment authorization is based on a favorable eligibility determination relating to the nonimmigrant status of either the H-1B nonimmigrant or the H-4 dependent spouse, the 90-day clock is triggered when that eligibility determination is made. Alternatively, if employment authorization is based on a favorable eligibility determination relating to the nonimmigrant status of both the H-1B nonimmigrant and the H-4 dependent spouse, the 90-day clock is not triggered until an eligibility determination is made on both. Accordingly, DHS is making conforming amendments to 8 CFR 214.2(h)(9)(iv) and 8 CFR 274a.13(d) in this final rule and the instructions to Form I-765. These amendments permit H-4 dependent spouses under this rule to concurrently file their Form I-765 with related benefit requests, specified in the form instructions to include their Application to Extend/Change Nonimmigrant Status (Form I-539), and if applicable, their spouse's Form I-129 petition. As a result of the amendments, the 90-day clock described in 8 CFR 274a.13(d) would also not start until after a

determination has been made on the underlying H-1B status, H-4 status, or both.

**6. Premium Processing**

Three commenters requested premium processing service for H-4 dependent spouses seeking to file Applications for Employment Authorization (Forms I-765). These commenters highlighted the benefit that the extra premium processing fees could bring to USCIS. DHS appreciates these comments, but has decided not to extend premium processing to Form I-765 applications filed by H-4 dependent spouses in conjunction with this rulemaking. DHS currently offers premium processing service for certain employment-based petitions and applications, including H-1B, L, and E nonimmigrant worker petitions and certain EB-1, EB-2 and EB-3 immigrant visa petitions. Extending premium processing to Form I-765 applications, however, presents operational concerns and would be inconsistent with procedural realities for USCIS. The agency, for example, would be unable to comply with premium processing requirements on any Form I-765 application that is contingent on the adjudication of a concurrently filed Application to Extend/Change Nonimmigrant Status (Form I-539). Due to these and other operational concerns, DHS will not extend premium processing service to Form I-765 applications, including applications filed by H-4 dependent spouses under this rule at this time.

**7. Automatic Extensions of Work Authorization**

One commenter requested an automatic extension of work authorization for 240 days after an H-4 dependent spouse's EAD expires. DHS, however, is concerned

with improperly granting employment authorization to an H-4 dependent spouse who is ineligible for it. As the validity of the H-4 dependent spouse's eligibility for employment authorization will be tied to his or her authorized period of admission, automatic extensions of employment authorization without review of the underlying extension of stay applications for the H-1B nonimmigrant and H-4 dependent spouse could result in employment authorization being extended to individuals who will eventually be determined ineligible for this benefit. DHS thus declines to adopt this recommendation.

To avoid any potential gaps in employment authorization when seeking an extension of employment authorization, DHS recommends that the H-4 dependent spouse timely file all necessary applications. DHS's policy to permit concurrent filing of Forms I-539, I-129, and I-765 should also help H-4 dependent spouses avoid gaps in employment authorization, as these forms may be filed concurrently up to six months in advance of date of need.

**8. Filing Fees**

Several commenters submitted remarks on the filing fees without expressing support for or opposition to the fees. Additionally, some commenters asserted that USCIS would benefit from an increased volume of fees, and another commenter requested that the U.S. Government help pay for immigration-related application fees.

DHS is bound by statutes and regulations governing its collection of fees in connection with immigration benefit requests. See INA section 286(m)-(p), 8 U.S.C.

1356(m)-(p); 8 CFR 103.7. DHS generally must set application fees at a level that enables it to recover the full costs of providing services, including the costs of similar services provided without charge to certain other applicants. But DHS may offer assistance with respect to immigration-related application fees in the form of fee waivers. Discretionary fee waivers are provided on a case-by-case basis when the party requesting the benefit is unable to pay the prescribed fee and the waiver request is consistent with the underlying benefit being requested. See 8 CFR 103.7(c)(1).

For the reasons that follow, DHS believes that it would be unlikely that H-4 dependent spouses would be unable to pay the prescribed fee for the Application for Employment Authorization (Form I-765). By definition, H-4 dependent spouses are married to H-1B nonimmigrants who are employed and earning a salary of at least the prevailing wage in their occupation. H-4 dependent spouses will thus generally be unable to establish that they cannot pay the fee prescribed for the Form I-765 application. For these reasons, DHS declines to establish a general fee waiver for the Form I-765 filed by eligible H-4 dependent spouses under this rule. *See* 8 CFR 103.7(d). USCIS will consider fee waiver requests on a case-by-case basis. See 8 CFR 103.7(c)(3)(viii). As noted above, given the nature of the H-1B nonimmigrant's employment, a showing of inability to pay as required by the regulation would be the exception rather than the rule.

**9. Possible Restrictions on EADs Issued to H-4 Dependent Spouses**

A few commenters recommended imposing certain restrictions on employment authorization issued to H-4 dependent spouses, such as: Creating a cap on the number of EADs that could be granted to H-4 dependent spouses; prohibiting the H-1B nonimmigrant and H-4 dependent spouse from having the same employer or working in the same occupation; prohibiting employers from replacing an American veteran with an H-1B nonimmigrant; restricting H-4 work authorization to certain employers; creating a National Registry of Jobs that H-4 dependent spouses would be allowed to apply for; forcing individuals to surrender their foreign passports when they obtain U.S. citizenship as a way of proving allegiance; allocating EADs in a proportionate manner based on nationality; and requiring H-4 dependent spouses to pay for training programs for U.S. citizens.

DHS declines to incorporate the suggested restrictions into this final rule. A primary purpose of this rule is to assist U.S. employers in retaining certain highly skilled H-1B nonimmigrants. Allowing certain H-4 dependent spouses to apply for employment authorization removes a disincentive that currently undermines this goal. Imposing the suggested restrictions, such as numerical caps or per-country quotas, would limit the effectiveness and purpose of this rule. Additionally, DHS believes that EADs provide inherent protections that mitigate the risk of abuse and exploitation. Because these EADs may be used to work for any employer, workers are free to find new employment at any point during the EAD's validity,

including if they are dissatisfied with their pay or working conditions. Finally, DHS reiterates that the individuals being provided employment authorization under this rule belong to a class of aliens that is already likely to enter the U.S. labor market with EADs. In sum, DHS does not believe that extending eligibility for employment authorization to H-4 dependent spouses will lead to the broad exploitation of EADs.

**10. Circular EADs**

One commenter noted that this rule could lead to "circular EADs," whereby spouses who are both eligible for H-1B status may switch status (H-1B to H-4 and vice versa) so that one spouse may maintain an EAD at all times. This commenter conveyed the concern that H-1B nonimmigrants might initiate the primary steps towards permanent residence, then switch back and forth between H-1B and H-4 statuses to stay in the United States forever.

DHS acknowledges that H-1B nonimmigrants will be able to change status, as permitted by law. DHS believes it is extremely unlikely, however, that an H-1B nonimmigrant will seek to remain in the United States forever by switching between nonimmigrant statuses as a result of this rule. The rule is intended to benefit those H-1B nonimmigrants who are already well on the path to lawful permanent residence and, therefore, seek to remain in the United States permanently on this basis. Although the waiting period for an immigrant visa may be lengthy, there is an end date as indicated on the Department of State's Visa Bulletin. So any incentive to switch between statuses indefinitely would be weighed by the nonimmigrant

against the benefits of obtaining LPR status, including the ability to work in the United States without being tied to a specific employer and the ability of the H-4 dependent spouse to work without needing to periodically apply and pay for an EAD. Moreover, with lawful permanent residency, an individual is eligible to apply for U.S. citizenship, generally after five years, and to petition for relatives to immigrate to the United States, benefits that are not available to persons with H-1B or H-4 status.

**11. Form I-765 Worksheets**

One commenter expressed concern that H-4 dependent spouses would need to demonstrate economic need for employment because of the reference in the Paperwork Reduction Act section of the proposed rule to the Form I-765 Worksheet (Form I-765WS). DHS is clarifying that H-4 dependent spouses are not required to establish economic need for employment authorization. H-4 dependent spouses are not required to submit Form I-765WS with their Application for Employment Authorization (Form I-765). DHS has corrected this error in the form instructions to the Application for Employment Authorization (Form I-765).

**12. Other Related Issues**

Several commenters sought guidance on issues tangential to the issuance of employment authorization to H-4 dependent spouses. For example, one commenter asked for clarification on the type of status that an H-4 dependent spouse will receive when readmitted into the United States after traveling abroad. Another commenter wanted to know if an H-4 dependent spouse could work from home in the United States for

his or her native country employer on the native country salary. Because this rulemaking is limited to extending eligibility for employment authorization to H-4 dependent spouses and does not make changes to admission requirements or conditions of employment authorization, DHS considers these questions outside the scope of this rulemaking. Please consult the USCIS Web site at www.uscis.gov or contact USCIS Customer Service at 1-800-375-5283 for current guidance.

Finally, several commenters requested clarification about EAD processing and adjudication times. USCIS posts current processing times on its Web site and encourages interested stakeholders to consult www.uscis.gov if they have questions about adjudication times.[29]

**F. Fraud and Public Safety Concerns**

Over 100 commenters raised concerns related to fraud and public safety, including issues related to resume fraud, marriage fraud, participation by individuals with criminal records, unauthorized employment, and employer abuse in the H-1B program. Strict consequences are already in place for immigration-related fraud and criminal activities, including inadmissibility to the United States, mandatory detention, ineligibility for naturalization, and removability. *See, e.g.,* INA sections 101(f), 212(a)(2) & (a)(6), 236(c), 237(a)(1)(G) & (a)(2), 318; 8 U.S.C. 1101(f), 1182(a)(2) (a)(6), 1226(c), 1227(a)(1)(G) & (a)(2), 1429. Nevertheless, the Department welcomes suggestions to further prevent fraud and protect public safety in the implementation of its programs. The Department carefully

considered these comments and addresses them below.

**1. Falsifying Credentials and Marriage Fraud**

Over 100 commenters anticipated that certain H-4 dependent spouses would falsify their resumes or qualifications or marry for immigration purposes. With respect to potential resume fraud, DHS notes that eligibility for employment authorization for H-4 dependent spouses will not depend in any way on their professional or educational qualifications or their resumes. It will be up to potential employers to verify the qualifications of H-4 dependent spouses they may be seeking to hire. This concern is therefore outside the scope of this rulemaking.

With respect to marriage fraud, DHS is revising 8 CFR 214.2(h)(9)(iv) to clarify that establishing eligibility for employment authorization under this rule requires evidence of the spousal relationship between the H-4 dependent spouse and the H-1B nonimmigrant. DHS is also making conforming revisions to the form instructions to Form I-765 to require that H-4 dependent spouses submit proof of marriage to the H-1B nonimmigrant with the form. USCIS officers are specially trained to recognize indicia of fraud, including marriage fraud and falsified documents, and review other immigration petitions for these circumstances as well. If such fraud is suspected, the relevant USCIS officer may refer the case to the local fraud unit for further inquiry. USCIS may also submit leads related to significant fraud to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement for criminal investigation. DHS believes that current fraud-detection training, mechanisms for

detecting and investigating fraud, and fraud-related penalties are sufficient for deterring and detecting marriage fraud in this context.

**2. Prohibition Related to Felony Charges and Convictions**

Two commenters requested a prohibition against participation by anyone charged with, awaiting trial for, or convicted of a felony. DHS appreciates the commenters' concerns over public safety and notes that the eligibility for employment authorization extended by this rule to certain H-4 dependent spouses is discretionary. DHS officers will consider any adverse information—including criminal convictions, charges, and other criminal matters—on a case-by-case basis.

**3. Unauthorized Employment**

A few commenters thought that this rule would help curb any unauthorized employment in which H-4 dependent spouses are currently engaging. Additionally, several commenters raised concerns that this rule could encourage illegal immigration and increase the number of undocumented workers in the United States. DHS disagrees that this rule may encourage illegal immigration. DHS believes that this rule will provide options to certain H-4 dependent spouses allowing them to engage in authorized employment. Individuals eligible for employment authorization under this rule must have been granted H-4 status and must remain in such lawful status before they can be granted employment authorization pursuant to this rule. An H-4 dependent spouse who engaged in unauthorized employment would not have been maintaining lawful H-4 status and therefore would be ineligible

for this new benefit. Therefore, the Department does not believe that this rule will incentivize unauthorized employment or any other illegal activities.

#### 4. Employer Abuse of H-1B Nonimmigrants and H-4 Dependent Spouses

A number of commenters raised concerns over potential employer abuse of H-1B nonimmigrants and H-4 dependent spouses. These concerns included failure to pay prevailing wages and demanding long hours without adequate compensation. DHS appreciates these concerns and maintains that employers must not intimidate, threaten, restrain, coerce, blacklist, discharge or otherwise discriminate or take unlawful action against any employee. Violators face severe penalties. See INA 212(n)(2)(C)(iv), 8 U.S.C. 1182(n)(2)(C)(iv). DHS takes seriously any potential abuse of H-1B nonimmigrants and H-4 dependent spouses and encourages any workers who feel that their rights have been violated by their employers to file a complaint with DOL or another appropriate entity, such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.[30] Any concerns raised by commenters regarding H-1B nonimmigrants and worker protections in the H-1B program, however, are outside the scope of this rulemaking.

### G. General Comments

Over 300 commenters submitted feedback about general immigration issues. A few commenters expressed support for or opposition to immigration. Comments ranged from requesting DHS to discontinue all types of immigration to underscoring the need for comprehensive reform of the immigration laws to general

support of immigration. DHS is charged with administering the immigration laws enacted by Congress, and only Congress can change those laws. The comments described above are therefore outside the scope of this rulemaking. DHS, however, is committed to comprehensive immigration reform that creates a workable system that strengthens border security, improves the U.S. economy, unites families, and preserves national security and public safety.

Additionally, fewer than a dozen commenters objected to the ability of non-U.S. citizens to submit comments on the proposed rule. As noted in that rule, DHS welcomed comments from all interested parties and did not place any restrictions based on citizenship or nationality.

**H. Modifications to the H-1B Program and Immigrant Visa Processing**

**1. H-1B Visa Program**

**i. Circumventing the H-1B Cap**

A few commenters suggested that employers may try to exploit this regulation by using it to avoid the H-1B numerical cap and hiring more foreign specialty occupation workers than permitted by the statute. As a preliminary matter, DHS cannot agree with the premise that hiring an individual with general (rather than employer-specific) employment authorization constitutes circumvention of the cap on H-1B nonimmigrants. This is particularly so when such employment authorization is contingent on being married to an individual who was selected in the H-1B program and is subject to the cap. Moreover, commenters provided no

evidence or data that would support the contention that this rule will be used by employers and H-4 dependent spouses to circumvent the cap. For example, DHS does not have, and commenters did not provide, data on the skillsets or educational levels of H-4 dependent spouses to indicate that they will generally qualify for jobs that are typically held by highly skilled H-1B nonimmigrants. Finally, it is unlikely that highly skilled individuals who could independently qualify under the H-1B program will instead opt to enter the United States as H-4 dependent spouses and subject themselves to lengthy periods of unemployment with the intent to circumvent the H-1B cap. As noted previously, this rule provides eligibility for employment authorization only to those H-4 dependent spouses who are married to certain H-1B nonimmigrants who have taken substantial steps, generally taking many years, towards obtaining permanent residence. Such an individual may eventually obtain a job for which an H-1B nonimmigrant could possibly have qualified, but the Department does not consider this a circumvention of the H-1B cap.

**ii. Elimination or Modification of the H-1B program**

More than a dozen commenters requested that the H-1B program be terminated. An approximately equal number of commenters requested that the H-1B visa cap be eliminated or modified in various ways. Several commenters requested that DHS increase the number of visas available, other commenters asked DHS to eliminate the H-1B visa cap, while others recommended decreasing the number of visas available.

DHS cannot address the commenters' suggestions in this rulemaking. The H-1B program is required by statute, which also sets the current cap on H-1B visa numbers. Congressional action is thus required to address the commenters' concerns, as the Secretary does not have the authority to eliminate the program or change the visa cap without congressional action. The suggested changes are thus outside the scope of this rulemaking.

Additionally, one commenter requested that DHS allow for more flexible filing times for H-1B visas. This request would require DHS to amend its H-1B regulations, which currently provide that an H-1B petition may not be filed or approved earlier than six months before the date of actual need for the beneficiary's services. See 8 CFR 214.2(h)(9)(i)(B). This rulemaking, however, does not make substantive changes to the H-1B program or its regulations. The request is thus outside the scope of this rulemaking.

**iii. More Flexible Change of Status From H-1B to H-4**

One commenter requested a modification of the H-1B program to allow a family member who has been in the United States for more than five years to choose between H-1B and H-4 status. To some extent, H-1B nonimmigrants currently have this option. An H-4 dependent spouse may seek classification as an H-1B nonimmigrant if an employer files a petition on his or her behalf. As long as one of the spouses maintains H-1B status, the other is eligible for H-4 status. However, the underlying H-1B status is connected to the need of a U.S. employer. To the extent that the

commenter is suggesting a change to this requirement such that both spouses could be present in the United States in H-4 status, such a change would require congressional action and, therefore, is beyond the scope of this rulemaking.

**iv. Applying for H-1B Status and Cap Exemption**

One commenter recommended that H-4 dependent spouses be allowed to apply for H-1B visas and be exempt from the cap. This final rule does not prohibit H-4 dependent spouses from seeking and obtaining H-1B status. Once an H-4 spouse seeks to change to H-1B status, he or she is subject to annual limitations on H-1B nonimmigrants. Only Congress can exempt groups of individuals from the statutory H-1B numerical limitations. This request is therefore beyond the scope of this rulemaking.

**v. Dependents of G Principal Nonimmigrants**

One commenter requested that DHS change its G visa regulations to allow dependents of principal G visa holders to more freely obtain a different visa classification (such as H-1B classification). Such a change is outside the scope of this rulemaking.

**2. Immigrant Visa Processing and Adjustment of Status**

Over 30 commenters requested the elimination of the worldwide quotas for immigrant visas.[31] One commenter requested allowing the submission and receipt of applications for adjustment of status when visas are not available, and another requested that the rule

include provisions to expedite the permanent residence process for the EB-2 and EB-3 preference categories. Several commenters requested that USCIS grant EADs to LPR applicants while they wait for their immigrant visas. Another commenter requested that USCIS grant one skilled worker visa per eligible family unit (rather than per each individual family member), for the purpose of reducing backlogs. One commenter requested that USCIS establish a procedure by which those in the process of seeking LPR status could "pre-register" their intention to apply to adjust status.

DHS appreciates feedback from the public regarding possible changes to the immigration laws and the system for obtaining LPR status. DHS, however, will not respond to these comments as they do not address changes to the regulations made by this rulemaking and are therefore outside the scope of this rulemaking.

**I. H-1B Nonimmigrant's Maintenance of Status**

Several commenters asked for more information about the effect that an H-1B nonimmigrant's loss of employment or change of employer would have on the H-4 dependent spouse's employment authorization. As stated in the proposed rule, the H-4 dependent's status is tied to the H-1B nonimmigrant's status. Thus, if the H-1B nonimmigrant fails to maintain status, the H-4 dependent spouse also fails to maintain status and would therefore no longer be eligible for employment authorization. Under current regulations, DHS may seek to revoke employment authorization if, prior to the expiration date of such authorization, any

condition upon which it was granted has not been met or no longer exists. See 8 CFR 274a.14(b).

**J. Environmental Issues**

In the proposed rule, DHS requested comments relating to the environmental effects that might arise from the proposed rule. Nine commenters submitted related feedback, noting general environmental issues that come with an increased population. DHS appreciates these comments but notes that the vast majority of the population immediately affected by the rule is already in the United States and has been here for a number of years while waiting for their immigrant visas. The H-4 dependent spouses affected by this rule generally will eventually be able to seek employment even without this rule, as immigrant visa numbers become available and H-1B nonimmigrant families become eligible to file for adjustment of status. As noted previously, this rule simply accelerates the timeframe in which these individuals are able to enter the labor market.

**K. Reporting**

A few commenters requested more information about how DHS will monitor the outcome of the final rule, such as by tracking EAD adjudications for H-4 dependent spouses and publishing annual reports. DHS maintains statistics on all immigration benefit programs and will monitor H-4 EAD adjudications and include relevant information in its annual reports in accordance with current reporting protocols.

**L. Implementation**

Several hundred commenters requested that the rule be implemented as soon as possible. One commenter requested that a sunset provision be included in the rule. At the end of the sunset period, the commenter recommended that DHS evaluate the program, and, if the results are positive, expand it. DHS believes that a general sunset provision would not be practicable or fair as it would require DHS to provide different periods of employment authorization to H-4 dependent spouses depending on when they become eligible to apply. Further, DHS considers a sunset provision to be at odds with the rule's purpose, which is to retain highly skilled workers who often have a multi-year wait before being eligible to apply for permanent residence.

With respect to implementation of this rule, DHS must consider the 30-day effective date requirement at 5 U.S.C. 553(d) as well as USCIS's implementation requirements. Based on these factors, DHS has decided that this rule will be effective 90 days from the date of publication, May 26, 2015.

**IV. Statutory and Regulatory Requirements**

**A. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995**

The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) is intended, among other things, to curb the practice of imposing unfunded Federal mandates on State, local, and tribal governments. Title II of the Act requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final agency rule that may result in a $100 million or more expenditure (adjusted annually for

inflation) in any one year by State, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector. The value equivalent of $100,000,000 in 1995 adjusted for inflation to 2014 levels by the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers is $155,000,000.

This rule does not exceed the $100 million expenditure in any one year when adjusted for inflation ($155,000,000 in 2014 dollars), and this rulemaking does not contain such a mandate. The requirements of Title II of the Act, therefore, do not apply, and DHS has not prepared a statement under the Act.

### B. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996

This rule is not a major rule as defined by section 804 of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Act of 1996. This rule will not result in an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more, a major increase in costs or prices, or significant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, productivity, innovation, or on the ability of United States companies to compete with foreign-based companies in domestic and export markets.

### C. Executive Orders 12866 and 13563

Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 direct agencies to assess the costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives and, if regulation is necessary, to select regulatory approaches that maximize net benefits (including potential economic, environmental, public health and safety effects, distributive impacts, and equity). Executive Order 13563 emphasizes the importance of quantifying both costs and benefits, of reducing costs, of harmonizing rules, and of promoting

flexibility. This rule has been designated a “significant regulatory action” under section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866. Accordingly, the rule has been reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget.

DHS is amending its regulations to extend eligibility for employment authorization to certain H-4 dependent spouses of H-1B nonimmigrants who either: (1) Are principal beneficiaries of an approved Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker (Form I-140); or (2) have been granted H-1B status under sections 106(a) and (b) of AC21.

**1. Summary**

Currently, USCIS does not issue work authorization to H-4 dependent spouses. To obtain work authorization, the H-4 dependent spouse generally must have a pending Application to Register Permanent Resident Status or Adjust Status or have changed status to another nonimmigrant classification that permits employment. AC21 provides for an authorized period of admission and employment authorization beyond the typical six-year limit for H-1B nonimmigrants who are seeking permanent residence. This final rule will extend eligibility for employment authorization to H-4 dependent spouses where: the H-1B nonimmigrant is the principal beneficiary of an approved Form I-140 petition; or the H-1B nonimmigrant has been granted status pursuant to sections 106(a) and (b) of AC21.

DHS has updated its estimate of the population of H-4 dependent spouses who will be impacted by the rule. DHS estimates the current population of H-4 dependent spouses who will be eligible for employment authorization could initially be as many as 179,600

after taking into account the backlog of H-1B nonimmigrants who have approved I-140 petitions, or who are likely to have such petitions approved, but who are unable to adjust status because of the lack of immigrant visas. For ease of analysis, DHS has assumed that those H-4 dependent spouses in the backlog population will file for employment authorization in the first year of implementation. DHS estimates the flow of new H-4 dependent spouses who could be eligible to apply for initial employment authorization in subsequent years may be as many as 55,000 annually. Even with the increased estimate of H-4 dependent spouses who could be eligible to apply for employment authorization, DHS still affirms in the initial year (the year with the largest number of eligible applicants) that the rule will result in much less than a one percent change in the overall U.S. labor force.

DHS is unable to determine and does not include in this analysis the filing volume of H-4 dependent spouses who will need to renew their employment authorization documents under this rule as they continue to wait for immigrant visas. Eligible H-4 dependent spouses who wish to apply for employment authorization must pay the $380 filing fee to USCIS, provide two passport-style photos, and incur the estimated 3-hour-and-25-minute opportunity cost of time burden associated with filing an Application for Employment Authorization (Form I-765). After monetizing the expected opportunity cost and combining it with the filing fee [32] and the estimated cost associated with providing two passport-style photos, an eligible H-4 dependent spouse applying for employment authorization will face an anticipated total cost of $436.18.

The maximum anticipated annual cost to eligible H-4 dependent spouses applying for initial employment authorization in Year 1 is estimated at $78,337,928 (non-discounted), and $23,989,900 (non-discounted) in subsequent years. The 10-year discounted cost of this rule to eligible H-4 dependent spouses applying for employment authorization is $257,403,789 at 3 percent and $219,287,568 at 7 percent. Table 2 shows the maximum anticipated estimated costs over a 10-year period of analysis for the estimate of 179,600 applicants for initial employment authorization, and the 55,000 applicants expected to file for initial employment authorization annually in subsequent years.

Table 2—Total Costs and Benefits of Initial Employment Authorization for Certain H-4 Dependent Spouses 10-Yr Present Value Estimates at 3% and 7%[$Millions]

| | Year 1 estimate (179,600 filers) | Sum of Years 2-10 (55,000 filers annually) | Total over 10-year period of analysis * |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3% Discount Rate | | | |
| Total Costs Incurred by Filers @3% | $76.1 | $181.3 | $257.4 |
| 7% Discount Rate | | | |
| Total Costs Incurred by Filers @7% | 73.2 | 146.1 | 219.3 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Qualitative Benefits | This rule is intended to remove a disincentive to pursuing LPR status due to the potentially long wait for employment-based immigrant visas for many H-1B nonimmigrants and their family members. This rule will encourage H-1B nonimmigrants who have already taken steps to become LPRs to not abandon their efforts because their H-4 dependent spouses are unable to work. By encouraging H-1B nonimmigrants to continue in their pursuit of becoming LPRs, this rule would minimize disruptions to petitioning U.S. employers. Additionally eligible H-4 dependent spouses who participate in the labor market will benefit financially. DHS also anticipates that the socioeconomic benefits associated with permitting H-4 spouses to participate in the labor market will assist H-1B families in integrating into the U.S. community and economy. |

* Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding.

**2. Purpose of the Rule**

According to the most recently released reports prepared by the DHS Office of Immigration Statistics, in Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 a total of 990,553 persons became LPRs of the United States.[33] Most new LPRs (54 percent) were already living in the United States and obtained their LPR status by applying for adjustment of status within the United States.

Employment-based immigrant visas accounted for approximately 16 percent of the total number of persons obtaining LPR status, and 30 percent of total LPRs who adjusted status in FY 2013. In FY 2013, there were a total of 161,110 LPRs admitted under employment-based preference visa categories. Of these 161,110 individuals, "priority workers" (first preference or EB-1) accounted for 24 percent; "professionals with advanced degrees" (second preference or EB-2) accounted for 39 percent; and "skilled workers, professionals, and other workers" (third preference or EB-3) accounted for 27 percent.[34]

Based on historical trends, H-1B nonimmigrants seeking to adjust status to lawful permanent residence will most likely adjust under the EB-2 and EB--3 preference categories, with a much smaller amount qualifying under the EB-1 preference category. As of January 2015, the employment-based preference categories are "current" and have visas available, except for Chinese and Indian nationals seeking admission under the second preference category and individuals of all nationalities seeking admission under the third preference category.[35] Thus, the employment-based categories under which H-1B

nonimmigrants typically qualify to pursue LPR status are the very categories that are currently oversubscribed.[36]

In many cases, the timeframe associated with seeking lawful permanent residence is lengthy, extending well beyond the six-year period of stay allotted by the H-1B nonimmigrant visa classification. As a result, retention of highly educated and highly skilled nonimmigrant workers can become challenging for U.S. employers. Retaining highly skilled persons who intend to acquire LPR status is important when considering the contributions they make to the U.S. economy, including advances in research and development and other entrepreneurial endeavors, which are highly correlated with overall economic growth and job creation. By some estimates, immigration was responsible for one quarter of the explosive growth in patenting in past decades, and these innovations have the potential to contribute to increasing U.S. gross domestic product (GDP).[37] In addition, over 25 percent of tech companies founded in the United States from 1995 to 2005 had a key leader who was foreign-born.[38] Likewise, the Kauffman Foundation reported that immigrants were more than twice as likely to start a business in the United States as the native-born in 2012, and a report by the Partnership for a New American Economy found that more than 40 percent of Fortune 500 companies in 2010 were founded by immigrants or their children.[39] Additionally, in March 2013, the House Committee on the Judiciary held a hearing on Enhancing American Competitiveness Through Skilled Immigration, providing some members of the business community with an opportunity to provide

their perspectives on immigration. The witnesses represented various industries, but underscored a unified theme: Skilled immigrants are contributing significantly to U.S. economic competitiveness and it is in our national interest to retain these talented individuals.[40]

As noted above, this rule is intended to reduce the disincentives to pursue lawful permanent residence due to the potentially long wait for immigrant visas for many H-1B nonimmigrants and their families. Also, this rule will encourage those H-1B nonimmigrants who have already started the process for permanent residence not to abandon their efforts because their H-4 dependent spouses are unable to work.

**3. Volume Estimate**

Due to current data limitations, DHS is unable to precisely track the population of H-4 dependent spouses tied to H-1B nonimmigrants who have an approved Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker (Form I-140) or who have been granted H-1B status under the provisions of AC21. DHS databases are currently "form-centric" rather than "person-centric." As USCIS transforms its systems to a more fully electronic process, there will be a shift from application- and form-based databases to one database that tracks information by the applicant or petitioner and which will improve DHS's ability to track the number of potential H-4 employment authorization applicants.

In the proposed rule, DHS estimated that as many as 100,600 H-4 dependent spouses would be eligible to apply for employment authorization in the first year, and as many as 35,900 H-4 dependent spouses would

be eligible to apply annually in subsequent years. The estimates provided in the proposed rule have been updated in this final rule. In an effort to provide a reasonable approximation of the number of H-4 dependent spouses who will be eligible for employment authorization under this final rule, DHS has compared historical data on persons obtaining LPR status against employment-based immigrant demand estimates. Based on current visa availability, DHS believes that dependent spouses of H-1B nonimmigrants who are seeking employment-based visas under the second or third preference categories will be the group most impacted by the provisions of this rule, because certain chargeability areas in these preference categories are currently oversubscribed. In addition, in line with the goals of this rule and AC21, and based on immigration statistics, we assume that the large majority of H-4 dependent spouses who will be eligible for this provision are residing in the United States and will seek to acquire LPR status by applying to adjust status with USCIS rather than by departing for an indeterminate period to pursue consular processing of an immigrant visa application overseas. This assumption is supported by immigration statistics on those obtaining LPR status. In FY 2013, there were a total of 161,110 employment-based immigrant visa admissions, of which 140,009 (or 86.9 percent) obtained LPR status through adjustment of status in the United States.[41] This analysis limits the focus and presentation of impacts based only on the employment-based preference immigrant population seeking to adjust status to that of a lawful permanent resident, rather than the employment-based preference immigrant

population seeking to obtain an immigrant visa through consular processing.

DHS will extend eligibility to apply for employment authorization to the H-4 dependent spouses of H-1B nonimmigrants who are principal beneficiaries of approved Form I-140 petitions or who have been granted H-1B status pursuant to sections 106(a) and (b) of AC21. Therefore, DHS assumes that the volume of H-4 dependent spouses newly eligible for employment authorization is comprised of two estimates: (1) an immediate, first year estimate due to the current backlog of Form I-140 petitions; and (2) an annual estimate based on future demand to immigrate under employment-based preference categories. Extending eligibility for employment authorization to H-4 dependent spouses is ultimately tied to the actions taken by the H-1B nonimmigrant; therefore, the overall volume estimate is based on the population of H-1B nonimmigrants who have taken steps to acquire LPR status under employment-based preference categories.

DHS has estimated the number of persons waiting for LPR status in the first through third employment-based preference categories as of June 30, 2014. In this analysis, the estimated number of persons waiting for an immigrant visa is referred to as the "backlog" and includes those with an approved Form I-140 petition as of June 30, 2014 and those with a filed Form I-140 petition that is pending as of June 30 but is likely to be approved in the future.[42] Currently, the first preference employment-based (EB-1) visa category is not oversubscribed. Therefore, DHS believes that the majority of H-4 dependent spouses applying for employment authorization under this rule will be those whose

H-1B principals are seeking to adjust status under the second or third preference category. However, as there are persons with pending Form I-140 petitions in the first preference category that are approved or likely to be approved based on historical approval rates, and because the provisions of AC21 apply to these individuals, DHS has included them in this analysis.[43] Additionally, DHS has examined detailed characteristics about the LPR population for FY 2009-FY 2013 to further refine this estimate.[44] We have laid out each of our assumptions and methodological steps for both the backlog and annual estimates of H-4 dependent spouses who will be eligible to apply for employment authorization. Again, the estimates are based on the actions and characteristics of the H-1B nonimmigrant (e.g., whether the H-1B nonimmigrant reports being married) because the H-4 dependent spouse's eligibility to apply for employment authorization is tied to the steps taken on behalf of the H-1B nonimmigrant to acquire LPR status under an employment-based preference category.

**a. Backlog Estimate**

The estimate of the number of individuals who are the principal beneficiaries of either an approved Form I-140 petition or a Form I-140 petition that is likely to be approved and who are waiting for an immigrant visa in the EB-1, EB-2, and EB-3 categories is shown in Table 3. Importantly, the number of principal workers shown in Table 3 is not limited only to those individuals who are currently in H-1B status. The estimates in Table 3 include aliens who are currently in H-1B and other nonimmigrant statuses, as well as

those seeking to immigrate under employment-based preference categories who are currently abroad.

Table 3—DHS Estimate of Backlog (Principals Only) as of June 30, 2014

| Preference category | Principal workers |
|---|---|
| EB-1 | 9,000 |
| EB-2 | 146,500 |
| EB-3 | 78,500 |

DHS is unable to precisely determine the number of H-1B nonimmigrants in the backlog who will be impacted by this rule. Instead, DHS examined detailed statistics of those obtaining LPR status from FY 2009-2013, and used this information as a proxy to refine the estimate of principal workers in the backlog that DHS expects to be married H-1B nonimmigrants seeking to adjust status. That estimate provides the basis for approximating the number of H-4 dependent spouses who will be impacted by this rule.[45] Table 4 presents the assumptions and steps taken to determine the upper-bound estimate of H-4 dependent spouses who are represented in the backlog and will likely now be eligible to apply for work authorization.

Table 4—Steps Taken To Arrive at the Upper-Bound Final Estimate of H-4 Dependent Spouses of H-1B Nonimmigrants Who Are in the "Backlog"

| Assumption and/or Step | EB-1 | EB-2 | EB-3 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) Principal workers in the backlog (as of June 30, 2014) | 9,000 | 146,500 | 78,500 | 234,000 |
| (2) Historical percentage of principal workers who obtained LPR Status through adjustment of status, average over FY 09-FY13 data | 96.1% | 98.2% | 89.3% | |
| (3) Estimated proportion of the backlog that DHS assumes will adjust status (rounded) | 8,649 | 143,863 | 70,128 | 222,640 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (4) Historical percentage of those who adjusted status who were H-1B nonimmigrants, average over FY 09-FY13 data | 32.5% | 89.3% | 61.6% | |
| (5) DHS estimated proportion of the assumed H-1B nonimmigrants who adjusted status (rounded) | 2,811 | 128,470 | 43,199 | 174,480 |
| (6) Historical percentage of H-1B principal workers who adjusted status and who reported being married, average over FY 09-FY13 data | 81.1% | 72.6% | 67.2% | |

| (7) DHS estimated proportion of the assumed H-1B nonimmigrants who adjusted status and who report being married (rounded) | 2,280 | 93,269 | 29,030 | 124,579 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (8) Final Estimate of H-1B Nonimmigrants in the Backlog Potentially Impacted by the Final Rule (Rounded Up) | | | | 124,600 |

As shown in Table 4, DHS estimates there are approximately 124,600 H-1B nonimmigrants currently in the backlog for an immigrant visa under the first through third employment-based preference categories who are married. Accordingly, DHS assumes by proxy that there could be as many as 124,600 H-4 dependent spouses of H-1B nonimmigrants currently in the backlog who could be initially eligible to apply for employment authorization under this rule. DHS does not have a similar way to parse out the backlog data for those classified as "dependents" to capture only those who are spouses rather than children. Furthermore, DHS recognizes that the estimate of H-4 dependent spouses in the backlog who will now be eligible to apply for employment authorization is a maximum estimate since there is no way to further refine this estimate by determining the immigration or citizenship status of the spouses of H-1B nonimmigrants who

report being married. For instance, the spouse of the H-1B nonimmigrant could reside abroad, be a U.S. citizen or LPR, or be in another nonimmigrant status that confers employment eligibility. Additionally, H-4 dependent spouses who may be eligible for employment authorization under this rule may decide not to work and therefore not apply for an EAD. Accordingly, DHS believes that the estimate of 124,600 represents an upper-bound estimate of H-4 dependent spouses of H-1B nonimmigrants currently waiting for immigrant visas.

**b. Annual Demand Estimate**

The annual demand flow of H-4 dependent spouses who will be eligible to apply for initial employment authorization under the final rule is based on: (1) The number of Form I-140 petitions approved where the principal beneficiary is currently in H-1B status; and (2) the number of extensions of stay petitions approved for H-1B nonimmigrants pursuant to AC21.[47]

Petitioners request extensions of stay or status for an H-1B nonimmigrant using the Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker (Form I-129). Section 104(c) of AC21 allows for extensions of stay for an H-1B nonimmigrant who has an approved Form I-140 petition but is unable to apply to adjust to LPR status because of visa unavailability. Sections 106(a) and (b) of AC21 allow for extensions of stay for an H-1B nonimmigrant on whose behalf a labor certification application or a Form I-140 petition was filed at least 365 days prior to reaching the end of the sixth year of his or her H-1B status.

In the preamble of the proposed rule, DHS used colloquial language to describe the basis for H-1B nonimmigrants to be eligible for extensions of their stay under section 106 of AC21. It is typical to describe H-1B nonimmigrants who are eligible for AC21 extensions as those H-1B nonimmigrants who are the beneficiaries of a labor certification application or Form I-140 petition that has been pending for at least 365 days prior to reaching the end of the sixth year of H-1B status. This colloquial description was used in the proposed rule; however, this language does not accurately describe AC21 eligibility. Per the statute, an H-1B nonimmigrant is eligible for an extension of stay pursuant to AC21 provided that they are the beneficiary of a labor certification application or a Form I-140 petition that has been filed at least 365 days prior to the end of their sixth year of H-1B status. From a practical standpoint, neither the labor certification nor the Form I-140 petition needs to remain pending adjudication for 365 days or more to qualify for an extension pursuant to AC21.

It may be helpful to illustrate this description using a graphical illustration of a case where an H-1B nonimmigrant would generally be eligible for an extension of his or her maximum period of stay pursuant to AC21, even though neither the labor certification application nor the Form I-140 petition remain pending with DOL or DHS, respectively, for a year or more.



In this illustration, the H-1B nonimmigrant would be eligible for extension of his or her stay pursuant to sections 106(a) and (b) of AC21, even though his or her labor certification was certified in 6 months and the Form I-140 petition had only been pending for two months at the time of AC21 extension.

In this final rule's preamble, DHS is correcting the description of how H-1B nonimmigrants become eligible for extensions of stay pursuant to sections 106(a) and (b) of AC21. Importantly, this language change does not impact who ultimately qualifies to apply for employment authorization under this final rule. The informal language used in the preamble of the proposed rule also does not impact the USCIS adjudication of petitions to authorize H-1B status pursuant to AC21. Accurately describing the statutory conditions of AC21 does, however, necessitate that DHS amend its estimate of the annual flow projections of H-4 dependent spouses who may be eligible to apply for employment authorization. In the proposed rule, DHS estimated the number of H-4 dependent spouses who would be eligible to apply for work authorization pursuant to AC21 by examining historical data of labor certifications or Form I-140 petitions pending for a year or more with the DOL and DHS, respectively. In contrast, this final rule examines the historical data of extensions of stay petitions approved for nonimmigrants currently in H-1B status to estimate the volume of H-4 dependent spouses eligible to apply for work authorization pursuant to AC21.

To recap, this rule will permit certain H-4 dependent spouses of H-1B nonimmigrants to be eligible to apply for employment authorization provided that the H-1B

nonimmigrants are: (1) The principal beneficiaries of an approved Form I-140 petition, or (2) granted H-1B status pursuant to sections 106(a) and (b) of AC21. The annual flow estimate will therefore be based on historical data of these two categories. USCIS began tracking those cases that were approved for an extension pursuant to AC21 on October 17, 2014; in the past, USCIS databases have not captured and stored this information.[48]

An extension of stay request may be submitted on behalf of H-1B nonimmigrants at any point throughout their authorized maximum six-year period of stay, or to extend stay beyond the maximum six years pursuant to AC21. Typically, an extension of stay request seeking eligibility pursuant to AC21 would be at least the second extension request filed on behalf of that H-1B nonimmigrant. The historical data of H-1B nonimmigrants who have been approved for extensions of stay include all requests, only some of which relate to extensions pursuant to AC21.

The number of approved Form I-140 petitions and approved Form I-129 extension of stay petitions where the beneficiary currently has H-1B status is presented in Table 5.

Table 5—Form I-140 and Form I-129 (Extension of Status or Stay (EOS) Only) Approvals for Beneficiaries Currently in H-1B Nonimmigrant Status

| Fiscal year | Form I-140 approvals | Form I-129 Extensions of status/ stay approvals |
|---|---|---|
| 2010 | 48,511 | 116,363 |
| 2011 | 54,363 | 163,208 |
| 2012 | 45,732 | 125,679 |
| 2013 | 43,873 | 158,482 |
| 2014 | 42,465 | 191,531 |
| 5-Year Average | 46,989 | 151,053 |

Based on approximately 90 days of tracking data (which is all that is currently available), DHS estimates that 18.3 percent of approved extension of stay requests filed on behalf of H-1B nonimmigrants are approved pursuant to AC21. Assuming this proportion holds constant, DHS estimates that annually it will approve approximately 27,643 [49] extension of stay requests pursuant to AC21. Importantly, because the tracking of extensions pursuant to AC21 does not distinguish between those cases adjudicated under section 104(c) of AC21 and those cases adjudicated under section 106 of AC21, there is likely some overlap in the baseline estimate of 27,643 and the estimate of persons who have approved I-140 petitions. Because DHS is unable to parse out the individuals who have extended their status pursuant to section 104(c) of AC21, and because such persons have approved I-140

petitions, DHS may be overestimating the annual number of H-4 dependent spouses who will be eligible to apply for initial employment authorization. However, while there is uncertainty that may result in overstating the annual estimates, DHS relied on the best available information to arrive at this estimate. Thus, for purposes of this analysis, DHS will use 74,632 [50] as the baseline projection of H-1B nonimmigrants who have started the immigration process.

To refine the annual flow projection estimates, DHS has chosen to estimate the proportion of applications filed in the first through third employment-based preference categories. Additionally, since DHS has already limited the historical counts in Table 5 to those approved petitions where the beneficiary's current nonimmigrant classification is H-1B, DHS has made the assumption that the petitions shown in Table 5 represent H-1B nonimmigrants who are physically present in the United States and intend to adjust status. As shown in Table 4, the historical proportion of H-1B nonimmigrants obtaining LPR status under EB-1, EB-2, and EB-3 categories who reported being married was 81.1 percent, 72.6 percent, and 67.2 percent, respectively, resulting in an average of 73.6 percent. Applying this percentage to the baseline projection results in an annual flow estimate of 55,000 (rounded).[51]

Again, due to the fact that DHS is unable to estimate the proportion of H-1B nonimmigrants granted extensions of status pursuant only to section 106 of AC21, and because DHS is unable to determine the immigration or citizenship status of spouses of H-1B nonimmigrants who report being married, this is an upper-

bound estimate of H-4 dependent spouses who could be eligible to apply for employment authorization under the rule.

Therefore, DHS estimates that this rule will result in a maximum initial estimate of 179,600 [52] H-4 dependent spouses who could be newly eligible to apply for employment authorization in the first year of implementation, and an annual flow of as many as 55,000 who are newly eligible in subsequent years.

**4. Costs**

**i. Filer Costs**

The final rule will permit certain H-4 dependent spouses to apply for employment authorization in order to work in the United States. Therefore, only H-4 dependent spouses who decide to seek employment while residing in the United States will face the costs associated with obtaining employment authorization. The costs of the rule will stem from filing fees and the opportunity costs of time associated with filing Form I-765.

The current filing fee for Form I-765 is $380. The fee is set at a level to recover the processing costs to DHS. Applicants for employment authorization are required to submit two passport-style photos along with the application, which is estimated to cost $20.00 per application based on Department of State estimates.[53]

DHS estimates the time burden of completing this application to be 3 hours and 25 minutes. DHS recognizes that H-4 dependent spouses do not currently participate in the U.S. labor market, and, as a result, are not represented in national average wage calculations. However, to provide a reasonable proxy of time

valuation, DHS chose to use the minimum wage to estimate the opportunity cost consistent with methodology employed in other DHS rulemakings when estimating time burden costs for those who are not work authorized.

The Federal minimum wage is currently $7.25 per hour.[54] In order to anticipate the full opportunity cost to petitioners, we multiplied the average hourly U.S. wage rate by 1.46 to account for the full cost of employee benefits such as paid leave, insurance, and retirement for a total of $10.59 per hour.[55] Based on this wage rate, H-4 dependent spouses who decide to file Form I-765 applications will face an estimated opportunity cost of time of $36.18 per applicant.[56] Combining the opportunity costs with the fee and estimated passport-style photo costs, the total cost per application will be $436.18.[57] In the first year of implementation, DHS estimates the total maximum cost to the total of H-4 dependent spouses who could be eligible to file for an initial employment authorization will be as much as $78,337,928 (non-discounted), and $23,989,900 annually in subsequent years. The 10-year discounted cost of this rule to filers of initial employment authorizations is $257,403,789 at 3 percent, while the 10-year discounted cost to filers is $219,287,568 at 7 percent. Importantly, in future years the applicant pool of H-4 dependent spouses filing for employment authorization will include both those initially eligible and those who will seek to renew their EADs as they continue to wait for visas to become available. DHS could not project the number of renewals as the volume of H-4 dependent spouses who will need to renew is dependent upon visa

availability, which differs based on the preference category and the country of nationality. H-4 dependent spouses needing to renew their employment authorization will still face a per-application cost of $436.18.

**ii. Government Costs**

The INA provides for the collection of fees at a level that will ensure recovery of the full costs of providing adjudication and naturalization services, including administrative costs and services provided without charge to certain applicants and petitioners. See INA section 286(m), 8 U.S.C. 1356(m). DHS has established the fee for the adjudication of Form I-765 in accordance with this requirement. As such, there are no additional costs to the Federal Government resulting from this rule.

**iii. Impact on States**

Currently, once visas are determined to be immediately available, H-1B nonimmigrants and their dependent family members may be eligible to apply for adjustment of status to that of a lawful permanent resident. Upon filing an adjustment of status application, the H-4 dependent spouse is eligible to request employment authorization. This rule will significantly accelerate the timeframe by which qualified H-4 dependent spouses are eligible to enter the U.S. labor market. As a result of the changes made in this rule, certain H-4 dependent spouses will be eligible to request employment authorization well before they are eligible to apply for adjustment of status. Even with the change in the maximum number of H-4 dependent spouses who may be impacted as reported in the proposed rule and this final rule, DHS maintains that the

expected outcomes are the same. DHS believes that this regulatory change will encourage families to stay committed to the immigrant visa process during the often lengthy wait for employment-based visas whereas, otherwise, they may leave the United States and abandon immigrant visa processing altogether. As such, DHS presents the geographic labor impact of this rule even though this rule does not result in "new" additions to the labor market; it simply accelerates the timeframe by which they can enter the labor market. As mentioned previously, DHS estimates this rule can add as many as 179,600 additional persons to the U.S. labor force in the first year of implementation, and then as many as 55,000 additional persons annually in subsequent years. As of 2013, there were an estimated 155,389,000 people in the U.S. civilian labor force.[58] Consequently, 179,600 additional available workers in the first year (the year with the largest number of eligible applicants) represent a little more than one-tenth of a percent, 0.1156 percent, of the overall U.S. civilian labor force (179,600/155,389,000 × 100 = 0.1156 percent).[59]

The top five States where persons granted LPR status have chosen to reside are: California (20 percent), New York (14 percent), Florida (10 percent), Texas (9 percent), and New Jersey (5 percent).[60] While allowing certain H-4 dependent spouses the opportunity to work will result in a negligible increase to the overall domestic labor force, the states of California, New York, Florida, Texas, and New Jersey may have a slightly larger share of additional workers compared with the rest of the United States. Based on weighted average proportions calculated from FY 2009-2013,

and assuming the estimate for first year impacts of 179,600 additional workers were distributed following the same patterns, DHS anticipates the following results: California could receive approximately 35,920 additional workers in the first year of implementation; New York could receive approximately 25,144 additional workers; Florida could receive approximately 17,960 additional workers; Texas could receive approximately 16,164 additional workers; and New Jersey could receive approximately 8,980 additional workers. To provide context, California had 18,597,000 persons in the civilian labor force in 2013.[61] The additional 35,920 workers who could be added to the Californian labor force as a result of this rule in the first year would represent less than two-tenths of a percent of that state's labor force (35,920/18,597,000 × 100 = 0.1931 percent). As California is the state estimated to receive the highest number of additional workers, the impact on the states civilian labor force is minimal.

**5. Benefits**

As previously mentioned, once this rule is finalized, these amendments will increase incentives of certain H-1B nonimmigrants who have begun the process of becoming LPRs to remain in the United States and contribute to the U.S. economy as they complete this process. Providing the opportunity for certain H-4 dependent spouses to obtain employment authorization during this process will further incentivize H-1B nonimmigrants to not abandon their intention to remain in the United States while pursuing LPR status. Retaining highly skilled persons who intend to become

LPRs is important when considering the contributions of these individuals to the U.S. economy, including advances in research and development and other entrepreneurial endeavors. As previously discussed, much research has been done to show the positive impacts on economic growth and job creation from highly skilled immigrants. In addition, these regulatory amendments will bring U.S. immigration policies more in line with the policies of other countries that seek to attract skilled foreign workers. For instance, in Canada spouses of temporary workers may obtain an "open" work permit allowing them to accept employment if the temporary worker meets certain criteria.[62] As another example, in Australia, certain temporary work visas allow spousal employment.[63]

This final rule will result in direct, tangible benefits for the spouses who will be eligible to enter the labor market earlier than they would have otherwise been able to do so due to the lack of immigrant visas. While there will be obvious financial benefits to the H-4 dependent spouse and the H-1B nonimmigrant's family, there is also evidence that participating in the U.S. workforce and improving socio-economic attainment has a high correlation with smoothing an immigrant's integration into American society.[64]

Prior to this rule being effective, H-4 dependent spouses were not able to apply for employment authorization until they were eligible to submit their applications for adjustment of status or otherwise acquire a nonimmigrant status authorizing employment. The amendments to the regulations made by this final rule accelerate the timeframe by which H-4 dependent spouses of H-1B nonimmigrants who are on the path

to being LPRs are able to enter into the U.S. labor market.

**6. Alternatives Considered**

One alternative considered by DHS was to permit employment authorization for all H-4 dependent spouses. As explained in both the proposed rule and in response to public comments, DHS declines to extend the changes made by this rule to H-4 dependent spouses of all H-1B nonimmigrants at this time. Such an alternative would offer eligibility for employment authorization to those spouses of nonimmigrant workers who have not taken steps to demonstrate a desire to continue to remain in and contribute to the U.S. economy by seeking lawful permanent residence. In enacting AC21, Congress was especially concerned with avoiding the disruption to U.S. businesses caused by the required departure of H-1B nonimmigrants (for whom the businesses intended to file employment-based immigrant visa petitions) upon the expiration of the workers' maximum six-year period of authorized stay. See S. Rep. No. 106-260, at 22 (2000). This rule further alleviates these concerns.

Another alternative considered was to limit employment eligibility to just those H-4 dependent spouses of H-1B nonimmigrants who extended their status under the provisions of AC21. As discussed in Section 3.b of this Executive Order 12866/13563 assessment, DHS databases began tracking the number of extensions of H-1B status that were approved pursuant to AC21 on October 17, 2014. Historically DHS did not capture this information. Based on approximately 90 days of case history, DHS believes that approximately 18.3

percent of all extension of stay applications filed on behalf of H-1B nonimmigrants are approved pursuant to AC21. DHS estimates that there could be as many as 27,643 [65]

H-1B nonimmigrants with extensions of stay requests that were approved pursuant to AC21. Further, DHS estimates that there could be as many as 20,400 [66] married H-1B nonimmigrants who are granted an extension of stay pursuant to AC21. This alternative would also result in some fraction of the backlog population being eligible for employment authorization in the first year after implementation, but DHS is unsure of what portion of the backlog population has been granted an extension under AC21. However, DHS believes that this alternative is too limiting and fails to recognize that other H-1B nonimmigrants and their H-4 dependent spouses also experience long waiting periods while on the path to lawful permanent residence. One of the primary goals of this rulemaking is to provide an incentive to H-1B nonimmigrant families to continue on the path to obtaining LPR status in order to minimize the potential for disruptions to U.S. businesses caused by the departure from the United States of these workers. The Department believes that also extending employment authorization to the spouses of H-1B nonimmigrants who are the beneficiaries of approved Form I-140 petitions more effectively accomplishes the goals of this rulemaking, because doing so incentivizes these workers, who have established certain eligibility requirements and demonstrated intent to reside permanently in the United States and contribute to the U.S. economy, to continue their pursuit of LPR status. Thus, extending

employment authorization to H-4 dependent spouses of H-1B nonimmigrants with either approved Form I-140 petitions or who have been granted H-1B status pursuant to sections 106(a) and (b) of AC21 encourages a greater number of professionals with high-demand skills to remain in the United States.

**D. Regulatory Flexibility Act**

USCIS examined the impact of this rule on small entities under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), 5 U.S.C. 601(6). A small entity may be a small business (defined as any independently owned and operated business not dominant in its field that qualifies as a small business under the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. 632), a small not-for-profit organization, or a small governmental jurisdiction (locality with fewer than fifty thousand people). After considering the impact of this rule on such small entities, DHS has determined that this rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The individual H-4 dependent spouses to whom this rule applies are not small entities as that term is defined in 5 U.S.C. 601(6). Accordingly, DHS certifies that this rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

**E. Executive Order 13132**

This rule will not have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the National Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with section 6 of Executive Order 13132, it is determined that this rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to

warrant the preparation of a federalism summary impact statement.

### F. Executive Order 12988

This rule meets the applicable standards set forth in sections 3(a) and 3(b)(2) of Executive Order 12988.

### G. Paperwork Reduction Act

Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law 104-13, all Departments are required to submit to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), for review and approval, any reporting requirements inherent in a rule. See Public Law 104-13, 109 Stat. 163 (May 22, 1995). This final rule requires that eligible H-4 dependent spouses requesting employment authorization complete an Application for Employment Authorization (Form I-765), covered under OMB Control number 1615-0040. As a result of this final rule, this information collection will be revised. DHS has received approval of the revised information collection from OMB.

DHS submitted the proposed revisions to Form I-765 to OMB for review. DHS has considered the public comments received in response to the publication of the proposed rule. Over 180 commenters raised issues related to employment authorization requests, including filing procedures, premium processing, validity periods, renewals, evidentiary documentation, concurrent filings for extension of stay/change of status, automatic extensions of employment authorization, filing fees, and marriage fraud. One commenter asked for clarification regarding whether H-4 dependent spouses under this rule are required to demonstrate

economic need for employment authorization using the Form I-765 Worksheet (I-765WS).

DHS's responses to these comments appear under Part III.E. and F. USCIS has submitted the supporting statement to OMB as part of its request for approval of this revised information collection instrument.

DHS has revised the originally proposed Form I-765 and form instructions to clarify the supporting documentation that applicants requesting employment authorization pursuant to this rule must submit with the form to establish eligibility, and to state that USCIS will accept Forms I-765 filed by such applicants concurrently with Forms I-539. DHS has also revised the Form I-765 to include a check box for the applicant to identify him or herself as an H-4 dependent spouse. The inclusion of this box will aid USCIS in its efforts to more efficiently process the form for adjudication by facilitating USCIS's ability to match the application with related petitions integral to the adjudication of Form I-765. DHS does not anticipate any of these changes will result in changes to the previously reported time burden estimate. The revised materials can be viewed at www.regulations.gov.

Lastly, DHS has updated the supporting statement to reflect a change in the estimate for the number of respondents that USCIS projected would submit this type of request from 1,891,823 respondents to 1,981,516 respondents. This change of the initially projected number of respondents is due to better estimates regarding the general population of I-765 filers, in addition to this final rule's revised estimate on the new number of applicants that will request EADs,

which results in a change of the estimated population of aliens that DHS expects could file Form I-765. Specifically, in the proposed rule USCIS estimated that approximately 58,000 new respondents would file requests for EADs as a result of the changes prompted by this rule. USCIS has revised that estimate and projects in this final rule that approximately 117,300 new respondents will be able to file a Form I-765. With this change on the number of Form I-765 application filers, the estimate for the total number of respondents has been updated. The current hour inventory approved for this form is 7,140,900 hours, and the requested new total hour burden is 8,159,070 hours, which is an increase of 1,018,170 annual burden hours.

**V. Regulatory Amendments**

DHS adopted most of the proposed regulatory amendments without change, except for conforming amendments to 8 CFR 214.2(h)(9)(iv) and 8 CFR 274a.13(d) and minor punctuation and wording changes in 8 CFR 214.2(h)(9)(iv) to improve clarity and readability.

**List of Subjects**

**8 CFR Part 214**

- Administrative practice and procedure
- Aliens
- Employment
- Foreign officials
- Health professions

- Reporting and recordkeeping requirements
- Students

**8 CFR Part 274a**

- Administrative practice and procedure
- Aliens
- Employment
- Penalties

Reporting and recordkeeping requirements
Accordingly, DHS amends chapter I of title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations as follows:

**PART 214—NONIMMIGRANT CLASSES**

1. The authority citation for part 214 continues to read as follows:

**Authority:**
8 U.S.C. 1101, 1102, 1103, 1182, 1184, 1186a, 1187, 1221, 1281, 1282, 1301-1305 and 1372; sec. 643, Public Law 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-708; Public Law 106-386, 114 Stat. 1477-1480; section 141 of the Compacts of Free Association with the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and with the Government of Palau, 48 U.S.C. 1901 note and 1931 note, respectively; 48 U.S.C. 1806; 8 CFR part 2.

2. Section 214.2 is amended by revising paragraph (h)(9)(iv) to read as follows:

**§ 214.2**

Special requirements for admission, extension, and maintenance of status.

* * * * *

(h) * * *

(9) * * *

(iv) H-4 dependents. The spouse and children of an H nonimmigrant, if they are accompanying or following to join such H nonimmigrant in the United States, may be admitted, if otherwise admissible, as H-4 nonimmigrants for the same period of admission or extension as the principal spouse or parent. H-4 nonimmigrant status does not confer eligibility for employment authorization incident to status. An H-4 nonimmigrant spouse of an H-1B nonimmigrant may be eligible for employment authorization only if the H-1B nonimmigrant is the beneficiary of an approved Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker, or successor form, or the H-1B nonimmigrant's period of stay in H-1B status is authorized in the United States under sections 106(a) and (b) of the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-first Century Act of 2000 (AC21), Public Law 106-313, as amended by the 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Public Law 107-273 (2002). To request employment authorization, an eligible H-4 nonimmigrant spouse must file an Application for Employment Authorization, or a successor form, in accordance with 8 CFR 274a.13 and the form instructions. If such Application for Employment Authorization is filed concurrently with another related benefit request(s), in accordance with and as permitted by form instructions, the 90-day period described in 8 CFR 274.13(d) will commence on the latest

date that a concurrently filed related benefit request is approved. An Application for Employment Authorization must be accompanied by documentary evidence establishing eligibility, including evidence of the spousal relationship and that the principal H-1B is the beneficiary of an approved Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker or has been provided H-1B status under sections 106(a) and (b) of AC21, as amended by the 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, the H-1B beneficiary is currently in H-1B status, and the H-4 nonimmigrant spouse is currently in H-4 status.

* * * * *

## PART 274a—CONTROL OF EMPLOYMENT OF ALIENS

3. The authority citation for part 274a continues to read as follows:

**Authority:**

8 U.S.C. 1101, 1103, 1324a; Title VII of Public Law 110-229; 48 U.S.C. 1806; 8 CFR part 2.

4. Section 274a.12 is amended by adding a new paragraph (c)(26), to read as follows:

§ 274a.12

Classes of aliens authorized to accept employment.

* * * * *

(c) * * *

(26) An H-4 nonimmigrant spouse of an H-1B nonimmigrant described as eligible for employment authorization in 8 CFR 214.2(h)(9)(iv).

* * * * *

5. Section 274a.13 is amended by revising the first sentence of paragraph (d), to read as follows:

§ 274a.13

Application for employment authorization.

* * * * *

(d) Interim employment authorization. USCIS will adjudicate the application within 90 days from the date of receipt of the application, except as described in 8 CFR 214.2(h)(9)(iv), and except in the case of an initial application for employment authorization under 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(8), which is governed by paragraph (a)(2) of this section, and 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(9) in so far as it is governed by 8 CFR 245.13(j) and 245.15(n). * * *

* * * * *

Jeh Charles Johnson,
Secretary.

**Footnotes**

1. In this final rule, DHS has amended its estimate of the volume of individuals who may become eligible to apply for employment authorization pursuant to this rulemaking. The impact on the U.S. labor market resulting from this change is negligible, and the justification for the rule remains unaffected by this change.

2. These exceptions to the six-year limit include those authorized under sections 104(c) and 106(a) and (b) of AC21. Under sections 106(a) and (b) of AC21, an H-1B nonimmigrant who is the beneficiary of a permanent labor certification application or an employment-based immigrant petition that was filed at least 365 days prior to reaching the end of the sixth year of H-1B status may obtain H-1B status beyond the sixth year, in one year increments. See AC21 sections 106(a)-(b), as amended. Another exception is found in

section 104(c) of AC21. Under that provision, H-1B nonimmigrants with approved Form I-140 petitions who are unable to adjust status because of per-country visa limits are able to extend their H-1B stay in three-year increments until their adjustment of status applications have been adjudicated. See AC21 section 104(c).

3. For H-1B nonimmigrants performing DOD-related services, the approved H-1B status is valid for an initial period of up to five years, after which the H-1B nonimmigrants may obtain up to an additional five years of admission for a total period of admission not to exceed 10 years. See 8 CFR 214.2(h)(9)(iii)(A)(2), (h)(15)(ii)(B)(2). These H-1B nonimmigrants cannot benefit from AC21 sections 106(a) or (b), because those sections solely relate to the generally applicable six-year limitation on H-1B status under INA section 214(g)(4), whereas the requirements for H-1B status for DOD-related services, including the 10-year limitation, were established in section 222 of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978; see 8 U.S.C. 1101 note. This rule, however, will authorize eligibility for employment authorization of H-4 dependents of H-1B nonimmigrants performing DOD-related services if the H-1B nonimmigrant is the beneficiary of an approved I-140 petition.

4. The worldwide level of EB immigrant visas that may be issued each fiscal year is set at 140,000 visas, plus the difference between the maximum number of immigrant visas which may be issued under section 203(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1153(a) (relating to family-sponsored immigrants) and the number of visas used under that section for the previous fiscal year. See INA

section 201(d), 8 U.S.C. 1151(d). These EB visa numbers are also limited by country. Generally, in any fiscal year, foreign nationals born in any single country may use no more than 7 percent of the total number of immigrant visas available in the family- and employment-based immigrant visa classifications. See INA section 202(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. 1152(a)(2).

5. These obstacles, moreover, may discourage highly skilled foreign workers from seeking employment in the United States in the first instance. This final rule will diminish that possibility.

6. The H-1B nonimmigrant must be the principal beneficiary of the approved I-140 petition, not the derivative beneficiary, consistent with the preamble to the proposed rule: "Specifically, DHS is proposing to limit employment authorization to H-4 dependent spouses only during AC21 extension periods granted to the H-1B principal worker or after the H-1B principal has obtained an approved Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker." See 79 FR at 26891 (emphasis added); see also id. at 26896 (estimating "annual demand flow of H-4 dependent spouses who would be eligible to apply for initial work authorization under this proposed rule . . . based on: (1) the number of approved Immigrant Petitions for Alien Worker (Forms I-140) where the principal beneficiary is currently in H-1B status").

An H-4 dependent spouse who is the victim of domestic violence may be independently eligible for employment authorization under certain circumstances. As noted in the proposed rule, section 814(b) of the Violence Against Women Act and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005 (VAWA 2005), Public Law 109-162, amended the INA by adding new section

204(a)(1)(K), 8 U.S.C. 1154(a)(1)(K), which provides for employment authorization incident to the approval of a VAWA self-petition. Section 814(c) of VAWA 2005 amended the INA by adding new section 106, which provides eligibility for employment authorization to battered spouses of aliens admitted in certain nonimmigrant statuses, including H-1B status.

8. See Mem. from Donald Neufeld, Acting Assoc. Dir., Domestic Operations, USCIS, Supplemental Guidance Relating to Processing Forms I-140 Employment-Based Immigrant Petitions and I-129 H-1B Petitions, and I-485 Adjustment Applications Affected by the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000 (AC21) (Pub. L. 106-313), as amended, and the American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998 (ACWIA), Title IV of Div. C. of Public Law 105-277, at 6 (May 30, 2008) ("AC21 § 104(c) is applicable when an alien . . . is the beneficiary of an approved I-140 petition.") (emphasis in original).

9. The H-4 classification includes dependents of H-2A temporary agricultural workers, H-2B temporary nonagricultural workers, H-3 trainees, H-1B specialty occupation workers, and H-1B1 Free Trade Agreement specialty occupation workers from Singapore and Chile. See INA 101(a)(15)(H); see also 8 CFR 214.2(h)(9)(iv).

10. As noted in the proposed rule, to ease the negative impact of immigrant visa processing delays, Congress intended that the AC21 provisions allowing for extension of H-1B status past the sixth year for workers who are the beneficiaries of certain pending or approved employment-based immigrant visa petitions or

labor certification applications would minimize disruption to U.S. businesses employing H-1B workers that would result if such workers were required to leave the United States. See S. Rep. No. 106-260, at 22 (2000) ("These immigrants would otherwise be forced to return home at the conclusion of their allotted time in H-1B status, disrupting projects and American workers. The provision enables these individuals to remain in H-1B status until they are able to receive an immigrant visa number and acquire LPR status either through adjustment of status in the United States or through consular processing abroad, thus limiting the disruption to American businesses.").

11. DHS is implementing the statutory provisions authorizing employment of spouses of L-1, E-1, E-2, and E-3 nonimmigrants, though the regulations have not been revised.

12. DHS regulations provide for three categories of persons eligible for employment authorization: (1) aliens authorized for employment incident to status, see 8 CFR 274a.12(a); (2) aliens authorized to work for a specific employer incident to status, see 8 CFR 274a.12(b); and (3) aliens who must apply to USCIS for employment authorization, see 8 CFR 274a.12(c).

13. Currently, employers seeking to file immigrant visa petitions on behalf of noncitizens in certain employment-based preference categories must first obtain a labor certification under DOL's PERM program. See generally INA sections 204(b), 212(a)(5); 8 U.S.C. 1154(b), 1182(a)(5); 8 CFR 204.5(k)-(l); 20 CFR pt. 656.

14. To qualify as a "child" for purposes of the immigration laws, an individual generally must be unmarried and under the age of 21. See INA section

101(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1101(b)(1). The Child Status Protection Act (CSPA) amended the INA by permitting certain individuals over the age of 21 to continue to qualify as a child for purposes of certain immigration benefits. See Public Law 107-208 (2002). If an individual becomes too old to qualify as a child under the immigration law, and in turn no longer can derivatively benefit from a petition or application on behalf of a parent, he or she is described as "aging out."

15. On June 15, 2012, the Secretary of Homeland Security announced that certain aliens who came to the United States as children and meet several guidelines may request consideration for deferred action from removal for a period of two years, subject to renewal. This policy is generally referred to as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). On November 20, 2014, the Secretary announced expanded eligibility guidelines for consideration under the DACA policy and extended the period of deferred action and work authorization from two years to three years. The commenters' refer to these unrestricted EADs as "open market" EADs. In contrast, classes of aliens listed in 8 CFR 274a.12(b), such as H-1B nonimmigrants, are authorized for employment only with a specific employer.

See INA sections 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) (requiring that DOL determine and certify that "the intending employer has filed" an LCA) (emphasis added), 212(n) (establishing LCA requirements applicable to employers of H-1B nonimmigrants), 214(c) (requiring employers file petitions with the Secretary of Homeland Security to employ an H-1B nonimmigrant); 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b), 1182(n), 1184(c).

18. If USCIS receives more than a sufficient number of H-1B petitions to reach the general statutory cap of 65,000 visas or the 20,000 cap under the advanced degree exemption during the filing period, see INA section 214(g)(1)(A), (5)(C), 8 U.S.C. 1184(g)(1)(A), (5)(C), USCIS holds a computer-generated random selection process, or lottery, to select enough petitions to meet the statutory caps. See 8 CFR 214.2(h)(8)(ii)(B). USCIS rejects and returns cap-subject petitions not randomly selected, with filing fees, unless a petition is found to be a duplicate filing.

19. An O-3 nonimmigrant is a dependent of an O-1 nonimmigrant. The O-1 nonimmigrant classification applies to individuals who possess extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics, or who have a demonstrated record of extraordinary achievement in the motion picture or television industry and have been recognized nationally or internationally for those achievements. See INA section 101(a)(15)(O), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(O); 8 CFR 214.2(o).

20. A TD nonimmigrant is a dependent of a TN nonimmigrant. The TN nonimmigrant classification permits qualified Canadian and Mexican citizens to seek temporary entry into the United States to engage in business activities at a professional level. See INA section 214(e), 8 U.S.C. 1184(e); 8 CFR 214.6.

21. According to Department of Education statistics, approximately 21 million students are expected to enroll in postsecondary degree-granting institutions in fall 2014. See http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=372. Given the relatively large student population enrolled in American schools and the narrow population impacted by this rule, DHS believes

this rule would not significantly impact net college enrollments.

22. See INA section 214(c)(2)(E), (e)(6); 8 U.S.C. 1184(c)(2)(E), (e)(6).

23. Moreover, in the few instances in which Congress has determined to limit employment authorization for certain classes of aliens, it has done so expressly. See INA section 208(d)(2), 8 U.S.C. 1158(d)(2) ("An [asylum] applicant who is not otherwise eligible for employment authorization shall not be granted such authorization prior to 180 days after the date of filing of the application for asylum."); INA section 236(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1226(a)(3) (restricting employment authorization for aliens who have been arrested and are in removal proceedings unless the alien is a lawful permanent resident "or otherwise would (without regard to removal proceedings) be provided work authorization"); INA section 241(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(7) (providing that alien who has been ordered removed is ineligible for work authorization unless the Secretary finds that the alien cannot be removed for lack of a country willing to receive the alien or "the removal of the alien is otherwise impracticable or contrary to the public interest").

24. For example, commenters cited to the following studies in refuting the claim that H-1B workers are a source of cheap labor: Lofstrom, M. & Hayes, J., "H-1Bs: How Do They Stack Up to US Born Workers? IZA Discussion Paper No. 6259" (Dec. 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1981215; Rothwell, J. & Ruiz, N. "H-1B Visas and the STEM Shortage: A Research Brief" (May 11, 2013), available athttp://ssrn.com/abstract=2262872.

25. Commenters cited to the following to highlight positive effects of highly skilled immigration: National Foundation for American Policy, "H-1B Visas and Job Creation" (Mar. 2008), available at http://www.nfap.com/pdf/080311h1b.pdf.

26. Commenters cited to the following studies in highlighting the effects of immigration: Congressional Budget Office, "The Economic Impact of S. 744, the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act," June 18, 2013, available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/44346-Immigration.pdf;; Mathews, D., "No, the CBO Report Doesn't Mean Immigration Brings Down Wages," June 19, 2013, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/06/19/no-the-cbo-report-doesnt-mean-immigration-brings-down-wages/;;; Ottaviano, G. Peri, G., Rethinking the Effects of Immigration on Wages (March 2010), available at http://economics.ucdavis.edu/people/gperi/site/papers/rethinking-the-effect-of-immigration-on-wages.

27. Please refer to Section IV.C. of this document for a deeper discussion of the final estimate of the impact of this rule.

28. Unlike the I-140 adjudication, adjudication of Form I-539 requires evidence of such spousal relationship.

29. For example, as of January 26, 2015, the processing time at the California Service Center (CSC) for the Application for Employment Authorization, Form I-765, ranged from 3 weeks to 3 months depending on the basis for the Form I-765. See

https://dashboard.uscis.gov/index.cfm?formtype=12office=2charttype=1.

30. An individual can submit a Nonimmigrant Worker Information Form, Form WH-4, with DOL. This form was authorized by the American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act (ACWIA) of 1998. See INA sections 212(n)(2)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1182(n)(2)(G). It is available on-line at http://www.dol.gov/whd/forms/wh-4.pdf.

31. Section 201(d) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1151(d), prescribes the worldwide level of employment-based immigrants. Section 203(b) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1153(b), prescribes the preference allocation for employment-based immigrants. Section 202 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1152, prescribes per country levels for family-sponsored and employment-based immigrants.

32. The filing fee is assumed to be a reasonable approximation for USCIS's costs of processing the application. See INA section 286(m), 8 U.S.C. 1356(m).

33. See DHS Office of Immigration Statistics, Annual Flow Report, U.S. Lawful Permanent Residents: 2013 (May 2014), available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_lpr_fr_2013.pdf.

34. *Id.*

35. See Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs, December 2014 Visa Bulletin (Nov. 7, 2014), available at http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Bulletins/visabulletin_January2015.pdf.

36. See Wadhwa, Vivek, et al., Intellectual Property, the Immigration Backlog, and a Reverse Brain-Drain—America's New Immigrant

Entrepreneurs, Part III, Center for Globalization, Governance Competitiveness (Aug. 2007), available at http://www.cggc.duke.edu/documents/IntellectualProperty_theImmigrationBacklog_andaReverseBrainDrain_003.pdf. Note: The report examined the 2003 cohort of employment-based immigrants and showed that 36.8 percent of H-1B nonimmigrants that adjust status do so through the EB-3 category and another 28 percent do so through the EB-2 category, while only 4.62 percent adjust through the EB-1 category.

37. See generally Jennifer Hunt Marjolaine Gauthier-Loiselle, How Much Does Immigration Boost Innovation?, Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Sept. 2008, available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w14312.

38. See Wadhwa, Vivek, et al., "America's New Immigrant Entrepreneurs," Report by the Duke School of Engineering and the UC Berkeley School of Information (Jan. 4, 2007) available at http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/~anno/Papers/Americasnew_immigrant_entrepreneurs_I.pdf;; see also Wadhwa, Vivek, et al., Intellectual Property, the Immigration Backlog, and a Reverse Brain-Drain—America's New Immigrant Entrepreneurs, Part III, Center for Globalization, Governance Competitiveness (Aug. 2007), available at http://www.cggc.duke.edu/documents/IntellectualProperty_theImmigrationBacklog_andaReverseBrainDrain_003.pdf;; cf. Preston, Julia, "Work Force Fueled by Highly Skilled Immigrants," N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 2010, available at

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/16/us/16skilled.html?_r=1.

39. See Fairlie, Robert,"Kauffman Index of Entrepreneurial Activity: 1996-2012," The Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation. Apr. 2013, available at http://www.kauffman.org/what-we-do/research/2013/04/kauffman-index-of-entrepreneurial-activity-19962012; Partnership for a New American Economy, 2011, The "New American" Fortune 500, available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/2011/partnership_for_a_new_american_economy_fortune_500.pdf.

40. See Enhancing American Competitiveness through Skilled Immigration: Hearing before the H. Judiciary Subcomm. on Immigration, 113th Cong. 15 (2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg79724/pdf/CHRG-113hhrg79724.pdf.

41. See DHS Office of Immigration Statistics, 2013 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, Table 6, available at http://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics-2013-lawful-permanent-residents (compare statistics listed under "total employment-based preferences" and "adjustment of status employment-based preferences").

42. Source for backlog estimation: USCIS Office of Policy Strategy analysis of data obtained from the USCIS Office of Performance and Quality. Analysis based on CLAIMS3 data captured in approved Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker (Form I-140). Of the Form I-140 petitions that were approved or pending as of June 30, 2014, USCIS allocated those that were pending that were "likely to be approved" based on

USCIS approval rates in order to more accurately estimate the cases in the backlog.

43. Despite the fact that a beneficiary is in a preference category where a visa is immediately available, and the beneficiary is able to apply to adjust status to an LPR immediately upon the filing of the I-140 petition, DHS is including estimates of first-preference LPRs that have an approved Form I-140 or are waiting for Form I-140 approval as of June 30, 2014 for which we are unable to determine that an adjustment of status application has been concurrently filed. As mentioned previously, principal beneficiaries of Form I-140 petitions and their dependents who are eligible to file for adjustment of status also are eligible for employment authorization.

44. Source: USCIS Office of Policy Strategy analysis of data obtained from DHS Office of Immigration Statistics. Analysis based on CLAIMS3 data captured in Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status (Form I-485) records approved in the FY 2009-13 period.

45. *Id.*

46. Note: In the proposed rule, there was a data compilation error in step 4 for EB-2 estimates of the H-1B population which carried through the calculations. Instead of 19,159 reported in the proposed rule as the estimated proportion of H-1B nonimmigrants that adjusted their status to EB-2 and reported being married, that total should have read approximately 60,000. The proposed rule's total estimate of H-1B in the backlog as of September 2012 (step 8 of the calculation) should have read approximately 106,000 based on FY 08—FY 11 data.

47. There may be a very limited number of instances where an individual could be abroad and obtain an H-1B nonimmigrant visa pursuant to AC21; however, USCIS is unable to precisely determine this limited population due to current system limitations. As such, this analysis focuses only on those cases where an H-1B nonimmigrant is currently in the United States and requesting an extension of their H-1B status pursuant to AC21.

48. On October 17, 2014, USCIS began capturing this information during the adjudication of Form I-129 petitions. Importantly, the tracking of cases that were approved for extension pursuant to AC21 do not distinguish between cases approved under section 104 and cases approved under section 106. There is thus a potential for overlap between the estimate of cases approved under AC21 and the estimate of persons with approved Form I-140 petitions.

49. Calculation: 151,053 (5-year average of I-129 extension of stay approvals) × 18.3 percent = 27,643 extensions approved pursuant to AC21.

50. Calculation: 46,989 (5-year average of Form I-140 approvals) + 27,643 (annual estimate of approved extensions of stay pursuant to AC21) = 74,632 baseline estimate.

51. Calculation: 74,632 × 73.6 percent = 54,929 or 55,000 rounded up to the nearest hundred.

52. Calculation: Backlog of 124,600 plus annual demand estimate for married H-1Bs of 55,000 = 179,600.

53. DOS estimates an average cost of $10 per passport photo in the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) Supporting Statement found under OMB control number 1450-0004. A copy of the Supporting

Statement is found on Reginfo.gov at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAViewDocument?ref_nbr=201102-1405-001 (see question #13 of the Supporting Statement) (accessed Oct. 21, 2014).

54. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Wage and Hour Division. The minimum wage in effect as of July 24, 2009, available at http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/wages/minimumwage.htm.

55. The calculation to burden the wage rate: $7.25 × 1.46 = $10.59 per hour. See Economic News Release, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Table 1. Employer costs per hour worked for employee compensation and costs as a percent of total compensation: Civilian workers, by major occupational and industry group (June 2014), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/ecec_09102014.htm (viewed Oct. 23, 2014).

56. Calculation for opportunity cost of time: $10.59 per hour × 3.4167 hours (net form completion time) = $36.18.

57. Calculation for total application cost: $380 (filing fee) + $20 (cost estimate for passport photos) + $36.18 (opportunity cost of time) = $436.18.

58. See News Release, United States Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics, Regional and State Unemployment—2013 Annual Averages, Table 1 "Employment status of the civilian noninstitutional population 16 years of age and over by region, division, and state, 2012-13 annual averages" (Feb. 28, 2014), available at

http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/srgune_02282014.pdf.

59. Note that even with the changed estimate from the proposed rule, the finding remains consistent; the overall impact to the U.S. labor force is a fraction of one percent.

60. DHS Office of Immigration Statistics, Annual Flow Reports, "U.S. Legal Permanent Residents" for 2009-2012 and "U.S. Lawful Permanent Residents: 2013," available at http://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics-publications#0. Author calculated percentage distributions by State weighted over FY 2009-2013 (rounded).

61. See News Release, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics, Regional and State Unemployment—2013 Annual Averages, Table 1, Employment status of the civilian noninstitutional population 16 years of age and over by region, division, and state, 2012-13 annual averages (Feb. 28, 2014), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/srgune_02282014.pdf.

62. See Canadian Government, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Help Centre under Topic "Work Permit—Can my spouse or common-law partner work in Canada?", available at http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/helpcentre/index-featured-can.asp#tab1 (last visited Jan. 13, 2015).

63. *See* Australian Government, Dep't of Immigration and Citizenship, Temporary Work (Skilled) visa (subclass 457), available at http://www.immi.gov.au/Visas/Pages/457.aspx (last visited Jan. 13, 2015).

64. *See* Jimenéz, Tomás, Immigrants in the United States: How Well Are They Integrating into Society? (2011) Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/immigrants-united-states-how-well-are-they-integrating-society;; see also Terrazas, Aaron, The Economic Integration of Immigrants in the United States: Long- and Short-Term Perspectives (2011) Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/economic-integration-immigrants-united-states.

65. Calculation: 151,053 (5-year average of I-129 extension of stay approvals) × 18.3 percent = 27,643 extensions approved pursuant to AC21.

66. Calculation: 27,643 (extensions approved pursuant to AC21) × 73.6 percent (average percentage of H-1B nonimmigrants who adjust to LPR status that report being married) = 20,345 or 20,400 (rounded up).

[FR Doc. 2015-04042 Filed 2-24-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9111-97-P