

APPENDIX LIST

- APPENDIX A - Unreported decision of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit..... 1a - 2a
- APPENDIX B - Unreported decision of the United States Court
of appeals denying Petition for Rehearing..... 3a
- APPENDIX C - Prison Verification of Unusal Circumstances..... 4a

2024 WL 1477398

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Ryan Galal VANDYCK, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES of America,
Respondent-Appellee.

No. 23-15198

Argued and Submitted April 1, 2024 Phoenix,
Arizona

FILED April 5, 2024

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
District of Arizona, Cindy K. Jorgenson, District Judge,
Presiding, D.C. Nos. 4:21-cv-00399-CKJ,
4:15-cr-00742-CKJ-MSA-1

Attorneys and Law Firms

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Petitioner-Appellant.

Terry Michael Crist Assistant U.S. Attorney III,
USTU-Office of the U.S. Attorney, Tucson, AZ, for
Respondent-Appellee.

Before: HAWKINS, BADE, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM*

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication
and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth
Circuit Rule 36-3.

*1 Ryan VanDyck appeals the district court’s denial of
his motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. VanDyck was
convicted on one count of conspiracy to produce child
pomography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and
(e), and one count of possession of child pomography,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and

(b)(2). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§
1291 and 2255(d). We review de novo a district court’s
denial of a § 2255 motion, and we review factual findings
for clear error. See *United States v. McMullen*, 98
F.3d 1155, 1156 (9th Cir. 1996); *Doganieri v. United
States*, 914 F.2d 165, 167 (9th Cir. 1990).

In March 2014, America Online, Inc. (AOL) identified an
email attachment as appearing to contain child
pomography. AOL sent a report to the National Center for
Missing and Exploited Children, which traced the email
to Tucson, Arizona, and forwarded it to local police. The
police opened the attachment without a warrant,
determined that the email’s IP address was associated
with VanDyck’s residence, and then executed a search
warrant on that address. Hundreds of videos and images
of child pomography were discovered on VanDyck’s
electronic devices. After VanDyck was indicted, his trial
counsel moved to suppress the attachment on multiple
grounds, including that the affidavit and request for
extension contained material misrepresentations. The
district court denied these motions to suppress, VanDyck
was convicted on both counts following a bench trial, and
this court affirmed on direct appeal. *United States v.
VanDyck*, 776 F. App’x 495 (9th Cir. 2019) (unpublished
memorandum).

VanDyck moved for relief from his sentence under §
2255, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective
because he failed to raise a Fourth Amendment challenge
to the police opening the jpeg attachment to the AOL
email without a warrant, and that appellate counsel on
direct appeal was ineffective because she failed to
challenge the extension of a search warrant deadline that
was allegedly based on knowingly false statements. The
district court denied the motion. We affirm the district
court’s denial of VanDyck’s claim that trial counsel was
ineffective, and deny a certificate of appealability on
VanDyck’s claim that appellate counsel was ineffective.

1. The district court correctly denied VanDyck’s
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim because
counsel could have reasonably concluded that the motion
to suppress would fail. To succeed on an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show (1)
that his counsel’s performance “fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness” and (2) that “the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense.” *Strickland v.
Washington*, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984). Trial counsel
could have reasonably concluded that VanDyck lacked a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the email attachment
and therefore decided not to move to suppress the

VanDyck v. United States, Not Reported in Fed. Rptr. (2024)

attachment on the basis VanDyck asserts now, and instead decided to assert several other arguments.

*2 Specifically, trial counsel could have reasonably concluded that AOL's Terms of Service (TOS) and Privacy Policy eliminated VanDyck's reasonable expectation of privacy in the attachment because the TOS and Privacy Policy included express terms notifying users that AOL monitored their accounts and would disclose suspected illegal activity. See [United States v. Ganoë](#), 538 F.3d 1117, 1127 (9th Cir. 2008); [United States v. Borowy](#), 595 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2010). Trial counsel also could have reasonably concluded that the district court would find that opening the attachment was permissible under exceptions to the warrant requirement, including the private-search doctrine and the third-party doctrine. See [United States v. Jacobsen](#), 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984) (private-search doctrine); [United States v. Miller](#), 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976) (third-party doctrine).

Therefore, because trial counsel could have reasonably decided not to move to suppress the attachment for any of these reasons, or a combination of these reasons, the district court did not err in concluding that VanDyck did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel and denying the first claim in VanDyck's § 2255 motion. See [Sexton v. Cozner](#), 679 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that “[c]ounsel is not necessarily ineffective for failing to raise even a nonfrivolous claim”); [Lowry v. Lewis](#), 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining that counsel “cannot be required to anticipate” a later judicial

decision).

2. We decline to issue a certificate of appealability as to the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim. “A certificate of appealability may issue ... only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Reasonable jurists would not find debatable the district court's conclusion that VanDyck's ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim was frivolous. The district court correctly denied the motion to suppress based on the warrant extension after holding an evidentiary hearing in which officers testified they needed an extension because they learned VanDyck would not be in town the day they intended to execute the search warrant. Therefore, any reasonable jurist would conclude that appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the extension. See [Wildman v. Johnson](#), 261 F.3d 832, 840 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[A]ppellate counsel's failure to raise issues on direct appeal does not constitute ineffective assistance when appeal would not have provided grounds for reversal.”).

We **AFFIRM** the district court's denial of VanDyck's § 2255 motion as to his claim that trial counsel was ineffective, and **DENY** the certificate of appealability on his claim that appellate counsel was ineffective.

All Citations

Not Reported in Fed. Rptr., 2024 WL 1477398

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FILED

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

APR 22 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

RYAN GALAL VANDYCK,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 23-15198

D.C. Nos. 4:21-cv-00399-CKJ
4:15-cr-00742-CKJ-

MSA-1
District of Arizona,
Tucson

ORDER

Before: HAWKINS, BADE, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.

The panel has unanimously voted to deny the petition for panel rehearing.

The petition for panel rehearing (Dkt. 46) is DENIED.