

No. 23-1275

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IN THE  
**Supreme Court of the United States**

EUNICE MEDINA, in her official capacity as Interim  
Director, South Carolina Department of Health and  
Human Services,

*Petitioner,*

*v.*

PLANNED PARENTHOOD SOUTH ATLANTIC, *et al.*,  
*Respondents.*

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of  
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

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**AMICUS BRIEF OF THE AMERICAN CENTER FOR  
LAW AND JUSTICE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER**

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**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

	<i>Page</i>
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .....	ii
INTEREST OF AMICUS .....	1
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .....	1
ARGUMENT .....	2
I. This Court Should Clarify That <i>Talevski’s</i> “Demanding Bar” Is Highest When, as in This Case, The Implication of a Private Right of Action Would Coerce State Policy in a Sensitive Area of Traditional State Concern .....	4
A. Traditional Tools of Statutory Construction Must Be Employed Consistent with the Limitations on Congress’s Spending Power That Protect State Autonomy Against Federal Coercion.....	5
B. After <i>Dobbs</i> , Abortion Policy and Taxpayer Subsidization of Abortion Clinics are Quintessential Areas of Sensitive State Concern .....	7
CONCLUSION .....	11

**TABLE OF AUTHORITIES**

<b>CASES</b>	<b>PAGE(S)</b>
<i>Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc.</i> , 575 U.S. 320 (2015).....	4
<i>BFP v. Resol. Tr. Corp.</i> , 511 U.S. 531 (1994) .....	6
<i>Blessing v. Freestone</i> , 520 U.S. 329 (1997).....	3
<i>Bond v. United States</i> , 564 U.S. 211 (2011) .....	5, 6
<i>Bond v. United States</i> , 572 U.S. 844 (2014) .....	6, 11
<i>Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Center</i> , 506 U.S. 263 (1985) .....	1
<i>California v. Azar</i> , 950 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2020) ...	10
<i>Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C.</i> , 596 U.S. 212 (2022) .....	10
<i>Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org.</i> , 597 U.S. 215 (2022) .....	1, 7, 8, 10
<i>Doe v. Gillespie</i> , 867 F.3d 1034 (8th Cir. 2017).....	9
<i>Gee v. Planned Parenthood of Gulf Coast, Inc.</i> , 586 U.S. 1057 (2018) .....	3
<i>Gonzaga University v. Doe</i> , 536 U.S. 273 (2002)....	3, 4

<i>Gregory v. Ashcroft</i> , 501 U.S. 452 (1991) .....	6
<i>Harris v. Olszewski</i> , 442 F.3d 456 (6th Cir. 2006) .....	9
<i>Health &amp; Hospital Corp. v. Talevski</i> , 599 U.S. 166 (2023) .....	3, 4, 5
<i>Lane v. Peña</i> , 518 U.S. 187 (1996) .....	6
<i>Maher v. Roe</i> , 432 U.S. 464 (1977) .....	10
<i>Murphy v. NCAA</i> , 584 U.S. 453 (2018) .....	7, 10
<i>Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius</i> , 567 U.S. 519 (2012) .....	6, 7
<i>New York v. United States</i> , 505 U.S. 144 (1992) .....	7
<i>Pegram v. Herdrich</i> , 530 U.S. 211 (2000) .....	6
<i>Planned Parenthood Ariz. Inc. v. Betlach</i> , 727 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2013) .....	9
<i>Planned Parenthood of Greater Ohio v. Hodges</i> , 917 F.3d 908 (6th Cir. 2019) .....	10
<i>Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Fam. Plan. &amp; Preventative Health Servs., Inc. v. Kauffman</i> , 981 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 2020) .....	9
<i>Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. State Dep’t of Health</i> ,	

699 F.3d 962 (7th Cir. 2012) .....9

*Planned Parenthood of Kan. & Mid-Mo. v. Andersen*,  
882 F.3d 1205 (10th Cir. 2018) .....9

*Planned Parenthood S. Atl. v. Baker*, 941 F.3d 687  
(4th Cir. 2019).....9

*Planned Parenthood S. Atl. v. Kerr*, 95 F.4th 152  
(4th Cir. 2024) .....3

*Rust v. Sullivan*, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) .....9

*Shelby Cnty. v. Holder*, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) .....5

*Sossamon v. Texas*, 563 U.S. 277 (2011) .....6

*United States v. Bass*, 404 U.S. 336 (1971) .....6

*Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass’n*,  
496 U.S. 498 (1990) .....3

*Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police*, 491 U.S. 58  
(1989) .....4

**OTHER AUTHORITIES**

*Federal Statute: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Spending Clause  
Health & Hospital Corp. of Marion County v.  
Talevski*, 137 Harv. L. Rev. 380 (2023).....3

Frankfurter, *Some Reflections on the Reading of  
Statutes*, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527 (1947).....6

**STATUTES**

42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23) .....3, 10  
42 U.S.C. § 1983 .....1, 3, 10  
S.C. Code Ann. § 43-5-1185 .....8

**INTEREST OF AMICUS<sup>1</sup>**

The American Center for Law and Justice (ACLJ) is an organization dedicated to the defense of constitutional liberties secured by law. ACLJ attorneys often appear before this Court as counsel either for a party, *e.g.*, *Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Center*, 506 U.S. 263 (1985), or for amicus, *e.g.*, *Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org.*, 597 U.S. 215 (2022). The ACLJ is committed to the constitutional principles of federalism and state sovereignty, and especially state autonomy over abortion policy, which necessarily encompasses taxpayer subsidization of abortion clinics.

**SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT**

In *Health & Hospital Corp. v. Talevski*, all nine Justices agreed that *Gonzaga University v. Doe* established the governing standard for determining whether spending power statutes give rise to individual rights enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. All nine also agreed that the *Gonzaga* standard set a “demanding bar,” although none of the opinions explained why, other than to note that the typical remedy for state noncompliance with spending statute conditions is termination of federal funds.

The bar is demanding because *Gonzaga*

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<sup>1</sup> No counsel for any party in this case authored this brief in whole or in part. No person or entity aside from Amicus, its members, or its counsel made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.

reemphasized the importance of preserving the constitutional balance between the states and the federal government. Congress cannot alter that balance unless it makes its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the statute. The states must be given clear notice that by accepting federal funds, they may be forfeiting autonomy over weighty state policy interests. The constitutional limits on congressional spending power serve anti-commandeering goals by ensuring that spending power statutes do not obliterate distinctions between national and local spheres of interest by imposing federal policy in the most sensitive areas of State decision-making autonomy.

*Talevski* involved certain rights of nursing home patients and implicated no clash between federal and state policy on weighty moral questions. By contrast, anti-commandeering concerns are at the forefront in this case because discovering a private right to enforce the Medicaid Act’s any-qualified-provider provision would coerce state policy on a question of profound moral and social importance—taxpayer subsidization of abortion clinics. *Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization* returned abortion policy to the states. State policy on taxpayer subsidization of abortion clinics must necessarily be included within that preserve because allocating state taxpayer money to abortion clinics undermines state policy protecting the sanctity of human life.

## ARGUMENT

While this Court’s decision in *Health & Hospital*

*Corp. v. Talevski*, 599 U.S. 166, 180-181(2023), did not resolve whether *Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass’n*, 496 U.S. 498 (1990), and *Blessing v. Freestone*, 520 U.S. 329 (1997), have any continuing vitality,<sup>2</sup> it did make clear that *Gonzaga University v. Doe*, 536 U.S. 273 (2002), establishes the standard for determining whether spending power statutes give rise to individual rights enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Federal spending power statutes provide no basis for private enforcement under § 1983, unless Congress gives clear notice to the states by manifesting an unambiguous intent in the statutory language. *Talevski*, 599 U.S. at 179-80 (citing *Gonzaga Univ.*, 536 U.S. at 280). *Talevski* characterized the *Gonzaga* standard as “a demanding bar,” 599 U.S. at 180, and for good reason. The *Gonzaga* standard reflected the Court’s renewed emphasis on the importance of federalism in cases decided after *Wilder* and *Blessing*.

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<sup>2</sup> This case presents the ideal vehicle for answering that question and eliminating the confusion prevailing among the lower courts on whether Congress unambiguously created a privately enforceable right in § 1396a(a)(23) of the Medicaid Act. See *Gee v. Planned Parenthood of Gulf Coast, Inc.*, 586 U.S. 1057, 1059 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“We created this confusion. We should clear it up.”); *Planned Parenthood S. Atl. v. Kerr*, 95 F.4th 152, 170 (4th Cir. 2024) (Richardson, J., concurring) (pleading for “a third time” for clarification on the precedential status of *Wilder* and *Blessing*). See also *Federal Statute: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Spending Clause Health & Hospital Corp. of Marion County v. Talevski*, 137 Harv. L. Rev. 380, 388 (2023) (*Talevski* “will likely perpetuate” “two decades” of confusion because the majority “never once referenced *Blessing’s* three-part test” even though the court below believed the test controlled.)

“If Congress intends to alter the ‘usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government,’ it must make its intention to do so ‘unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.’” *Gonzaga Univ.*, 536 U.S. at 286 (quoting *Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police*, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989)). See also *Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc.*, 575 U.S. 320, 330 n.1 (2015) (*Gonzaga* “plainly repudiate[s] the ready implication of a §1983 action that *Wilder* exemplified.”).

To determine whether this “demanding bar” is cleared, *Talevski* instructed lower courts to “employ traditional tools of statutory construction.” 599 U.S. at 182. Under this Courts’ precedents, however, those tools must be wielded under the lens of maximal regard for state autonomy when, as here, the implication of a private right of action would coerce state policy in a sensitive area of state concern. The “demanding bar” should be at its zenith when a federal spending power condition would coerce state policy on a question of profound moral and social importance—here, taxpayer subsidization of abortion providers.

**I. This Court Should Clarify That *Talevski’s* “Demanding Bar” Is Highest When, as in This Case, the Implication of a Private Right of Action Would Coerce State Policy in a Sensitive Area of Traditional State Concern.**

In his *Talevski* concurrence, Justice Gorsuch remarked on the anti-commandeering issues that were “lurking” but undeveloped in that case. 599 U.S.

at 192-93 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). The issues that were lurking in *Talevski* are front and center in this case. Discovering a private right of action to enforce the Medicaid Act’s any-qualified-provider provision would directly assault the States’ status as independent sovereigns by coercing taxpayer subsidization of an entity that engages in conduct deeply violative of at least some states’ public policy.

*A. Traditional Tools of Statutory Construction Must Be Employed Consistent with the Limitations on Congress’s Spending Power That Protect State Autonomy Against Federal Coercion.*

Outside the bounds of the Supremacy Clause, States enjoy broad autonomy under the Tenth Amendment to pursue legislative objectives reflecting the policy preferences of their citizens. *Shelby Cnty. v. Holder*, 570 U.S. 529, 543 (2013). “Federalism secures the freedom of the individual” as well as the prerogatives of state governments. *Bond v. United States*, 564 U.S. 211, 221 (2011). The “allocation of powers in our federal system preserves the integrity, dignity, and residual sovereignty of the States.” *Id.* Protecting state government prerogatives fosters an environment where local policies can reflect the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society. *Id.* Federalism “permits ‘innovation and experimentation,’ enables greater citizen ‘involvement in democratic processes,’ and makes government ‘more responsive by putting the States in

competition for a mobile citizenry.” *Id.* (quoting *Gregory v. Ashcroft*, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)).

Federalism principles therefore play a crucial role in interpreting federal statutes that intrude upon traditional areas of state sovereignty, such as regulation of the health care field. *See, e.g., Pegram v. Herdrich*, 530 U.S. 211, 237 (2000) (noting that health care regulation is within traditional state domain). Respect for state authority requires ““federal courts to be certain of Congress’ intent before finding that federal law overrides” the ‘usual constitutional balance of federal and state powers.” *Bond v. United States*, 572 U.S. 844, 858 (2014) (citations omitted).

Such certainty cannot exist without a “clear statement” from Congress that it intended to intrude on traditional areas of state sovereignty. *Id.* (quoting *United States v. Bass*, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)); *BFP v. Resol. Tr. Corp.*, 511 U.S. 531, 544 (1994) (Congress must be “reasonably explicit” when it “readjusts the balance of state and national authority.”)(citations omitted). Thus, for example, a state’s surrender of its sovereign immunity from suit “will be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign.” *Sossamon v. Texas*, 563 U.S. 277, 285 (2011) (quoting *Lane v. Peña*, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996)).

Vigilance over the balance of power between the states and the federal government serves anti-commandeering goals. *Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius*, 567 U.S. 519, 577 (2012) (Respecting constitutional limitations “is critical to ensuring that Spending Clause legislation does not undermine the status of the States as independent sovereigns in our

federal system.”). Otherwise, the Spending Clause power would “obliterate distinctions between national and local spheres of interest and power by permitting the Federal Government to set policy in the most sensitive areas of traditional state concern, areas which otherwise would lie outside its reach.” *Id.* at 676 (Scalia, Alito, Kennedy, & Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (citations omitted). If a state adopts a policy only because the federal government dictates it, “responsibility is blurred.” *Murphy v. NCAA*, 584 U.S. 453, 473-74 (2018). In the absence of preemption, the federal government “dictat[ing] what a state legislature may and may not do” is a “direct affront to state sovereignty.” *Id.* (noting that “[i]t is as if federal officers were installed in state legislative chambers and were armed with the authority to stop legislators from voting on any offending proposals”).

Thus, when state action mandated by the federal government is unpopular with state citizens, such as allocating taxpayer funds to abortion providers, the citizens may blame state officials, while the federal officials who dictated the action escape responsibility. *Id.* at 473-74 (citing *New York v. United States*, 505 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1992)).

This Court’s decision in *Dobbs*, 597 U.S. at 259, restored abortion policy as a major area of state decision-making autonomy. Taxpayer subsidization of abortion clinics must necessarily be included in that domain because funneling taxpayer money to abortion clinics is wholly incompatible with state policy promoting the sanctity of human life.

*B. After Dobbs, Abortion Policy and Taxpayer Subsidization of Abortion Clinics Are Quintessential Areas of Sensitive State Concern.*

Like other homicides, abortion is a “question of profound moral and social importance that the Constitution unequivocally leaves for the people.” *Dobbs*, 597 U.S. at 269; *see also id.* at 336-38 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (recognizing abortion as an “extraordinarily weighty” issue that must be resolved “through the processes of democratic self-government established by the Constitution”). “For the first 185 years after the adoption of the Constitution,” abortion policy was within the sole province of the states. *Id.* at 225. When the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, three quarters of the States criminalized abortion at all stages of pregnancy. *Id.* at 231. The principal reason was “a sincere belief that abortion kills a human being.” *Id.* at 254. The same moral calculus underlies current state efforts to ban or limit abortion today. *Id.* at 256; *see id.* at 335-36, 344 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (Current state efforts to limit abortion “represent the sincere and deeply held views of tens of millions of Americans.”).

While the statutory issue in this case does not involve abortion *per se*, South Carolina has, consistent with its law prohibiting the use of public funds to pay for abortion,<sup>3</sup> sought to disqualify Planned Parenthood as a Medicaid health care provider

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<sup>3</sup> S.C. Code Ann. § 43-5-1185.

because of the state’s opposition to Planned Parenthood’s abortion activities. *Planned Parenthood S. Atl v. Baker*, 941 F.3d 687, 692-93 (4th Cir. 2019).

Of the seven federal appellate decisions addressing the issue in these cases, all but one involved a state’s opposition to taxpayer subsidization of either Planned Parenthood specifically or other abortion clinics generally.<sup>4</sup> Even before *Dobbs*, moral opposition to taxpayer subsidization of abortion clinics was a legitimate state police power concern under this Court’s precedents.

Both state and federal governments are free to discourage abortion, including through allocation of taxpayer dollars. *Rust v. Sullivan*, 500 U.S. 173, 200-01 (1991) (upholding 1988 federal regulations

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<sup>4</sup> See *Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Fam. Plan. & Preventative Health Servs., Inc. v. Kauffman*, 981 F.3d 347, 351 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (Texas disqualified Planned Parenthood as a Medicaid provider because of substantial evidence that Planned Parenthood engaged in unethical conduct involving the sale of fetal tissue.); *Doe v. Gillespie*, 867 F.3d 1034, 1038 (8th Cir. 2017) (Arkansas Governor announced that because Planned Parenthood “does not represent the values of the people of our state and Arkansas is better served by terminating any and all existing contracts with them.”); *Planned Parenthood of Kan. & Mid-Mo. v. Andersen*, 882 F.3d 1205, 1213-14 (10th Cir. 2018) (Medicaid contracts with Planned Parenthood terminated for several reasons, including “unethical or unprofessional conduct.”); *Planned Parenthood Ariz. Inc. v. Betlach*, 727 F.3d 960, 963 (9th Cir. 2013) (Arizona law prohibiting state contracts of any kind with abortion providers); *Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. State Dep’t of Health*, 699 F.3d 962, 967 (7th Cir. 2012) (Indiana law prohibiting state agencies from providing state or federal funds to abortion clinics served the state’s interest in “eliminat[ing] the indirect subsidization of abortion.”); *Harris v. Olszewski*, 442 F.3d 456 (6th Cir. 2006).

prohibiting the use of Title X money to perform, promote, refer for, or support abortion as a method of family planning); *Maher v. Roe*, 432 U.S. 464, 465-66 (1977) (upholding state regulation denying payments for non-therapeutic abortions to Medicaid recipients); *California v. Azar*, 950 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (upholding 2018 federal regulations prohibiting the use of Title X money to perform, promote, refer for, or support abortion as a method of family planning); *Planned Parenthood of Greater Ohio v. Hodges*, 917 F.3d 908 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (upholding Ohio law that prohibited abortion organizations from participating in six state health education programs).

Because abortion is an extraordinarily weighty moral issue that *Dobbs* returned to the states, 597 U.S. at 259, state taxpayer subsidization of abortion clinics should also be deemed a matter over which states presumptively enjoy autonomy. States whose citizenry views abortion as the taking of a human life should not be commandeered by a spending statute condition into funneling taxpayer funds to the very entities that terminate human life, unless those states “voluntarily and *knowingly* accept[] . . . .” the condition. *Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C.*, 596 U.S. 212, 219 (2022) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

Congress did not give clear notice in the any-qualified-provider provision of the Medicaid Act that states would be subject to private rights of action under § 1983. There is no “more direct affront to state sovereignty,” *Murphy*, 584 U.S. at 474, than reading § 1396a(a)(23) as Congressional authorization for states to be 1) hauled into federal court to have

potentially hundreds of their Medicaid service provider disqualification decisions second-guessed; and 2) coerced to funnel taxpayer money to entities that violate the state's sincere and deeply held views on the sanctity of human life.

*Talevski's* "demanding bar" must at least mean that when extraordinarily weighty state interests are at stake, any doubts about whether Congress gave clear notice in a spending power statute must be resolved in a manner that least treads upon state sovereignty. *Bond*, 572 U.S. at 860.

## CONCLUSION

Amicus respectfully requests this Court to reverse the Fourth Circuit's judgment.

Respectfully submitted,

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