

(ORDER LIST: 577 U.S.)

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 29, 2016

CERTIORARI -- SUMMARY DISPOSITIONS

15-316 SCHUMACHER HOMES, INC. V. SPENCER, JOHN, ET UX.

The motion of Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America for leave to file a brief as *amicus curiae* is granted. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia for further consideration in light of *DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia*, 577 U. S. ____ (2015).

15-805 BAKER, WARDEN, ET AL. V. ELVIK, PETER

The motion of respondent for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* is granted. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for further consideration in light of *Davis v. Ayalá*, 576 U. S. ____ (2015).

15-6053 RICHARDSON, FRANK V. UNITED STATES

The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for further consideration in light of *Johnson v. United States*, 576 U. S. ____ (2015).

ORDERS IN PENDING CASES

15A595 SHERBOW, ANIRUDDHA V. UNITED STATES

15A650 ROBINSON, STEPHEN, ET AL. V. SUPERIOR COURT OF CA, ET AL.
(15-7501)

The applications for stays addressed to Justice Sotomayor and referred to the Court are denied.

15M77 XU, HUAFENG V. WALSH, WILLIAM T.

15M78 READE, WILLIAM V. GALVIN, WILLIAM F., ET AL.

15M79 LESNICK-OAKES, KAREN V. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., ET AL.

15M80 KIM, SEUNGJIN V. GOOGLE, INC.

15M81 GIDDENS, MYRON V. UPS SUPPLY CHAIN SOLUTIONS

The motions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time are denied.

15M82 JOSEPH H. V. CALIFORNIA

The motion for leave to file a petition for a writ of certiorari with the supplemental appendix under seal is granted.

15M83 POLZER, ROBERT D. V. ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PA, ET AL.

15M84 WATTS, ANDREW B. V. CALIFORNIA

The motions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time are denied.

15M85 FURCH, CHAD L. V. STEPHENS, DIR., TX DCJ

The motion to direct the Clerk to file a petition for a writ of certiorari out of time under Rule 14.5 is denied.

15M86 JONES, NAKOMIS V. MORROW, WARDEN

15M87 MOORE, IVAN R. V. WELLS FARGO BANK

The motions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time are denied.

14-1278 PEABODY COAL COMPANY V. OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMP., ET AL.

The Court approves the parties' agreed upon attorney's fee of \$25,000, and expenses of \$2,508.34, to be awarded by the Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs from the Black Lung Trust Fund to respondent Eva Elizabeth Hill.

- 14-1468) BIRCHFIELD, DANNY V. NORTH DAKOTA
-))
- 14-1470) BERNARD, WILLIAM R. V. MINNESOTA
-))
- 14-1507) BEYLUND, STEVE M. V. LEVI, GRANT

The motion of Indiana Tech Law School Amicus Project for leave to file a brief as *amicus curiae* in support of neither party is granted. The motion of petitioners to dispense with printing the joint appendix is granted.

- 14-1504 WITTMAN, ROBERT J., ET AL. V. PERSONHUBALLAH, GLORIA, ET AL.

The motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as *amicus curiae* and for divided argument is granted. The motion of State appellees for divided argument and enlargement of time for oral argument is granted and the time is divided as follows: 35 minutes for appellants, 10 minutes for State appellees, 15 minutes for private appellees, and 10 minutes for the Solicitor General.

- 15-138 RJR NABISCO, INC., ET AL. V. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, ET AL.

The motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as *amicus curiae* and for divided argument is granted. Justice Sotomayor took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.

- 15-423) VENEZUELA, ET AL. V. HELMERICH & PAYNE INT'L, ET AL.
-))
- 15-698) HELMERICH & PAYNE INT'L, ET AL. V. VENEZUELA, ET AL.
- 15-486 IVY, DONNIKA, ET AL. V. MORATH, MIKE

15-649 CZYZEWSKI, CASIMIR, ET AL. V. JEVIC HOLDING CORP., ET AL.

The Solicitor General is invited to file briefs in these cases expressing the views of the United States.

15-6181 FAISON, LOUIS T. V. UNITED STATES

The motion for leave to file an amended petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

15-6228 YOUNGBLOOD, JESSE L. V. SUPERIOR COURT OF CA, ET AL.

15-6373 LANCASTER, CHARLES C. V. TEXAS

15-6566 SPENCE, KIMBERLY T. V. WILLIS, CARL J.

15-6567 SPENCE, KIMBERLY T. V. WILLIS, CARL J.

15-6698 IN RE ARTURO SOLIS

15-6704 IN RE ARTURO SOLIS

15-6932 STOLLER, CHRISTOPHER V. CFPB, ET AL.

15-6957 GREENE, CEDRIC V. CALIFORNIA, ET AL.

The motions of petitioners for reconsideration of orders denying leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* are denied.

15-7133 KINNEY, CHARLES V. CLARK, MICHELE

15-7149 GONZALES, CAROLINA G. V. INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS OFFICE

15-7152 LATKA, PHYLLIS V. MILES, DAVID, ET AL.

15-7182 LUNDAHL, KIMBALL V. LUNDAHL, HOLLI

The motions of petitioners for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* are denied. Petitioners are allowed until March 21, 2016, within which to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38(a) and to submit petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court.

15-7352 ADKINS, EBRAHIM V. USDC KS

The motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* is denied.

15-7411 TANIKUMI, ISABELLA V. WALT DISNEY CO., ET AL.

15-7468 HOFELICH, HOWARD R. V. LACY, BARBARA, ET AL.

The motions of petitioners for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* are denied. Petitioners are allowed until March 21, 2016, within which to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38(a) and to submit petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court.

15-7539 WALSH, LILIYA V. PNC BANK, ET AL.

The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* is denied. Petitioner is allowed until March 21, 2016, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court. Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.

15-7546 THOMAS, MICHAEL B. V. NORTH CAROLINA

15-7570 HOLBROOK, DIANE V. RONNIES LLC

The motions of petitioners for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* are denied. Petitioners are allowed until March 21, 2016, within which to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38(a) and to submit petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court.

CERTIORARI DENIED

14-8112 VIALVA, CHRISTOPHER A. V. UNITED STATES

14-10247 BODDIE, ANTHONY J. V. DEPT. OF TREASURY

15-195 DOE, JOHN, ET AL. V. CHRISTIE, GOV. OF NJ, ET AL.

15-222 BARNES, LARRY W., ET UX. V. UNITED STATES, ET AL.

15-293 BURGOS, CHRISTOPHER, ET AL. V. NEW JERSEY, ET AL.

15-371 ESCOBAR, JORGE V. CELEBRATION CRUISE OPERATOR

15-372 CARVAL UK LIMITED V. GIDDENS, JAMES W., ET AL.
15-483 FREW, CARLA, ET AL. V. TRAYLOR, CHRIS, ET AL.
15-507 SENSATIONAL SMILES, LLC V. MULLEN, JEWEL, ET AL.
15-511 LAW OFFICE OF JOSEPH ONWUTEAKA V. SERNA, ROLANDO
15-533 ISOM, KEVIN C. V. INDIANA
15-541 WESTERN WORLD, INC. V. PEREZ, SEC. OF LABOR
15-549 DIRECT DIGITAL, LLC V. MULLINS, VINCE
15-553 KUCERA, DAVID, ET AL. V. JEFFERSON CTY. BD. SCH. COMM'RS
15-559 ARTHREX, INC. V. SMITH & NEPHEW, INC., ET AL.
15-566 BOLIN, BILLY, ET AL. V. MILAN, LOUISE
15-569 KY DEPT. OF REVENUE V. BULK PETROLEUM CORP., ET AL.
15-571 SPADY, MICA D. V. RODGERS, CARLTON, ET AL.
15-573 McCLEARY-EVANS, DAWNN V. MD DEPT. OF TRANSP.
15-574 MUELLER, CHRISTOPHER V. MUELLER, SHELLEY L.
15-592 STC, INC. V. GLOBAL TRAFFIC TECHNOLOGIES
15-595 SORENSEN, JEROLD R. V. UNITED STATES
15-597 WAL-MART STORES, INC. V. PHIPPS, CHERYL, ET AL.
15-599 AM. FARM BUREAU FED'N, ET AL. V. EPA, ET AL.
15-608 OLSON, EDWARD D. V. SMITH, JOHANNA, ET AL.
15-611 FIRST AMER. TITLE INSURANCE CO. V. FDIC
15-639 ePLUS, INC. V. LAWSON SOFTWARE, INC.
15-645 MARSHALL, JAMES L., ET AL. V. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE
15-677 NOBACH, KELSEY V. WOODLAND VILLAGE NURSING CENTER
15-689 JONES, SEC., FL DOC, ET AL. V. THOMPSON, ARTHUR
15-694 HARMAN INTERNATIONAL, ET AL. V. AR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES, ET AL.
15-696 SAYMAN, ROBERT W., ET UX. V. GODDARD & PETERSON, ET AL.
15-700 MYER-BENNETT, MICHELLE V. LOMONT, TRACY R.
15-707 DOE, JANE, ET AL. V. DRUMMOND COMPANY, INC., ET AL.

15-708 CA ASSN. OF PROF'L FIREFIGHTERS V. BARBOZA, DAVID
15-710 JARAMILLO, RUBIELLA V. BANK OF AMERICA
15-725 MEDIA RIGHTS TECHNOLOGIES V. CAPITOL ONE FINANCIAL, ET AL.
15-726 D. D., ET AL. V. NILES, AVERY
15-727 SPRINGFIELD, IL, ET AL. V. NORTON, DON, ET AL.
15-728 McCORMACK, GEORGE J. V. FERNANDEZ, JULIE S.
15-730 SAWYER, RITA V. SMITH, SUPT., MUNCY, ET AL.
15-736 ALEXSAM, INC. V. THE GAP, INC., ET AL.
15-740 D. Z. V. BUELL, MARK
15-743 FLOWERS, RODERICK V. MADISON, WI, ET AL.
15-747 HAUSCH, VIVIAN L. V. ECKLOND, STEVEN A., ET AL.
15-753 JAYE, CHRIS A. V. OAK KNOLL VILLAGE CONDOMINIUM
15-757 MACHALA, MIROSLAV V. ESTATE OF LUDMILA NEMEC
15-762 DUGGAN, KENNETH S. V. DEPT. OF AIR FORCE, ET AL.
15-764 RUTHERFORD, DARREN V. HENDERSON MUNICIPAL COURT, NV
15-766 WILSON, ELISA M. V. TEXAS
15-767 MICHAUD, PATRICK V. CALDERONE, LAWRENCE A., ET AL.
15-768 ANGINO & ROVNER, P.C., ET AL. V. SANTANDER BANK, N.A.
15-769 ANGINO & ROVNER, P.C., ET AL. V. SANTANDER BANK, N.A.
15-771 HUETE, SILVIA V. BANK OF NEW MELLON
15-778 BALLAI, BRUCE W. V. KIEWIT POWER, ET AL.
15-782 DOANE, ROBERT A. V. CHOI, HOWARD, ET AL.
15-788 MARGELIS, ELLEN V. INDYMAC BANK, ET AL.
15-790 CLEMENS, JEFFREY L. V. UNITED STATES, ET AL.
15-792 GUTTORMSON, CHAD S. V. NORTH DAKOTA
15-793 GRAY-BROCK, STEPHANIE A. V. IL AMER. WATER CO., ET AL.
15-794 WALKER, RALPH D. V. WALKER, ELENA
15-796 ODION, GEGE V. VARON, SHABTAY, ET AL.

15-799 BURCH, RYAN D. V. COCA-COLA BOTTLING CO. UNITED
15-803 SCOTT, WILLIAM S. V. FRANKEL, STEVEN A., ET AL.
15-804 SOUTHERN CA INST. OF LAW V. BIGGERS, ARCHIE J., ET AL.
15-806 MUNNS, MARK, ET AL. V. KERRY, SEC. OF STATE, ET AL.
15-807 DANSBERRY, PERCELL V. PFISTER, WARDEN
15-810 WHITMAN, SANDRA V. LaSALLE BANK, N.A.
15-811 ZUTRAU, LEILANI V. JANSING, JOHN C., ET AL.
15-813 MUECKE COMPANY, INC., ET AL. V. CVS CAREMARK CORP., ET AL.
15-814 OWEN THOMAS, INC. V. ATIAPO, FRANCES
15-815 SQUALLS, KIM C. V. BRENNAN, POSTMASTER GEN.
15-817 SCOTT, MICHAEL A. V. SAMUEL I. WHITE, P.C., ET AL.
15-818 RUIZ, LAZARO V. NORTH LAS VEGAS, NV
15-819 CARTER, MICHAEL S., ET UX. V. FIRST SOUTH FARM CREDIT, ET AL.
15-822 BALDONE, DAMON J. V. ROGERS, RHONDA R.
15-825 BURGIS, ANDRENIA, ET AL. V. NY CITY DEPT. OF SANITATION
15-828 BILLHARTZ, MARCIA V. CIR
15-832 GOODALL-GAILLARD, STACEY V. NJ DOC, ET AL.
15-836 LIVINGSTON COUNTY, MI, ET AL. V. ACLU FUND OF MI
15-837 DISCOUNT INN, INC. V. CHICAGO, IL
15-839 HOLUB, GINA V. GDOWSKI, CHRIS, ET AL.
15-856 TRUST TITLE CO. V. UNITED STATES
15-857 MARQUEZ CARRILLO, JOSE L. V. LYNCH, ATT'Y GEN.
15-860 SCHNEIDER, KENNETH V. UNITED STATES
15-874 MIRE, PATRICK G. V. UNITED STATES
15-875 CLOUGH, STEPHANIE Y. V. FRANKLIN CTY. CHILDREN'S SVCS.
15-885 GOMEZ, SANTOS P. V. UNITED STATES
15-887 HENTZEN, ERIK A. V. UNITED STATES
15-893 UNIVERSAL LIGHTING TECHNOLOGIES V. LIGHTING BALLAST CONTROL

15-897 ALOMARI, OMAR V. OH DEPT. OF PUB. SAFETY, ET AL.
15-904 AARON, VALENCIA V. AL ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE, ET AL.
15-908 HAYDEN, CALVIN V. WALMART STORES, INC.
15-915 SOUTHERN CA INST. OF LAW V. STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL.
15-936 MULTI TIME MACHINE, INC. V. AMAZON.COM, INC., ET AL.
15-959 GAGACKI, TED S. V. GREEN TREE SERVICING
15-976 NAGLE, JOSEPH W. V. UNITED STATES
15-5613 MOREIRA, DORA V. UNITED STATES
15-5697 JONES, BRUCE V. UNITED STATES
15-5767 COLLIE, CYNTHIA E. V. SC COMMISSION ON LAWYER CONDUCT
15-5947 MACEDO-FLORES, REYNALDO V. UNITED STATES
15-5976 VILLERY, JARED M. V. SHERMAN, WARDEN
15-6006 MATHEWS, GLEN V. BECHTOLD, WARDEN
15-6060 WOOD, JOHN W. V. FL ATL. UNIV. BD. OF TRUSTEES
15-6099 FLEMING, DON M. V. SHORE HEALTH SYSTEM
15-6206 CLINKSCALE, ANDRE V. UNITED STATES
15-6224 JACKSON, MICHAEL V. MASSACHUSETTS
15-6258 CASSANO, AUGUST V. OHIO
15-6408 DUNCAN, JOSEPH E. V. UNITED STATES
15-6448 FRIERSON, RODNEY W. V. UNITED STATES
15-6450 GOAD, JAMIE V. UNITED STATES
15-6593 MORRIS, GEORGE H. V. UNITED STATES
15-6615 ALLEN, GUY LEN V. STEPHENS, DIR., TX DCJ
15-6657 BUSBY, DAVID V. UNITED STATES
15-6660 RIVERA, EDDIE V. CREECH, CHARLES
15-6662 GIBBS, BARRY V. SHANNON, ROBERT, ET AL.
15-6669 ABDULLAH, AZAD H. V. IDAHO
15-6761 MACHULAS, LEONARD P. V. UNITED STATES

15-6798 CUNNINGHAM, ALBERT V. DAVIS, WARDEN
15-6816 OKEZIE, BOLARINWA V. LEONARD, NICHOLAS, ET AL.
15-6821 MAZAREGO-SALAZAR, LUIS A. V. UNITED STATES
15-6827 EMERY, MICHELLE L. V. BOGLE, BRYAN A., ET AL.
15-6853 DUERST, RYAN J. V. PLACER COUNTY, CA, ET AL.
15-6863 FLETCHER, BARBARA, ET VIR V. PARK COUNTY, MT
15-6880 ANDREWS, BEVERLY V. V. SUPERIOR COURT OF CA, ET AL.
15-6896 KINNEY, CHARLES G. V. CLARK, MICHELE R.
15-6897 KINNEY, CHARLES G. V. CHOMSKY, ERIC, ET AL.
15-6916 KINNEY, CHARLES G. V. STEELE, SUSAN, ET AL.
15-7083 BREAKIRON, MARK D. V. WETZEL, SEC., PA DOC, ET AL.
15-7101 CONNER, JOHN W. V. HUMPHREY, WARDEN
15-7107 HOLLOWAY, OMAR V. ALBANY, NY, ET AL.
15-7119 GONZALES, RAFAEL E. V. FLORIDA
15-7122 MACIAS, JUAN V. UNITED STATES
15-7127 SEEBOTH, TIMOTHY V. AHLIN, PAM
15-7129 POUYEH, BOZORGMEHR V. BASCOM PALMER EYE INST., ET AL.
15-7131 LADEAIROUS, JOSEPH V. GOLDSMITH, MICHAEL, ET AL.
15-7134 LaROCHE, ROBERT A. V. DUNLAP, WARDEN
15-7136 NOTICE, CHRISTOPHER A. V. ARIZONA
15-7138 NASH, TRANELL V. ZATECKY, SUPT., PENDLETON
15-7139 SELDEN, GLENN L. V. JONES, SEC., FL DOC
15-7144 STRAKER, ANDERSON, ET AL. V. UNITED STATES, ET AL.
15-7155 BEESON, HUBERT K. V. PERRITT, SUPT., LUMBERTON
15-7156 BRADLEY, DEMETRIUS V. CAIN, WARDEN
15-7157 BACKSTROM, STEVEN M. V. TEXAS
15-7161 NORTON, CHRISTOPHER V. ME DEPT. OF HEALTH, ET AL.
15-7163 CAMPBELL, THOMAS W. V. ILLINOIS

15-7167 LANKFORD, KIRK M. V. LANKFORD, CORINNE G.
15-7172 WITKIN, MICHAEL A. V. FRAUENHEIM, WARDEN
15-7174 GILES, LORIE A. V. TRANSIT EMPLOYEES FEDERAL CREDIT
15-7175 DEAN, PHILLIP V. BECKSTROM, WARDEN
15-7176 TYLER, CASEY R. V. JOYNER, CARLTON B, ET AL.
15-7179 PRUITT, DONALD J. V. TEXAS
15-7181 MANNING, KENNETH H. V. AK DEPT. OF FISH AND GAME, ET AL
15-7183 VASQUEZ, FLORENCIA V. NEW YORK
15-7184 WHITTKER, JOSEPH L. V. KANSAS
15-7186 TAYLOR, MICHAEL V. NEW YORK
15-7196 WATKINS, LINCOLN A. V. MICHIGAN
15-7197 JOHNSON, DEBRA L. V. INTERNATIONAL UNION, ET AL.
15-7200 KOENIG, BRUCE V. CORTEZ, KRISTI, ET AL.
15-7202 MITCHELL, ANNE E. V. UNITED MEDICAL SYSTEMS, ET AL.
15-7204 PIANKA, VICTOR V. DE LA ROSA, WARDEN, ET AL.
15-7205 JORDAN, EDWARD V. SOTO, WARDEN
15-7207 DE LA CRUZ, ROBERTO G. V. TEXAS
15-7211 MAYFIELD, RICHARD V. CASSADY, SUPT., JEFFERSON CITY
15-7215 LAMONT, ALLEN R. V. CREWS, SERGEANT, ET AL.
15-7216 LORDMASTER, FRANKIE J. V. KIETH EPPS, ET AL.
15-7217 MAULDIN, RANNALL V. CAIN, WARDEN
15-7220 RODRIGUEZ, SERGIO V. KERNAN, SEC., CA DOC
15-7221 YO V. RATLIFFE-WALKER, WARDEN
15-7224 COCHRAN, MAC D. V. CALIFORNIA
15-7231 LINDSEY, CHARLES R. V. MORGAN, WARDEN
15-7232 JAY, GLORIA F. V. WRIGHT, CAROLYN J., ET AL.
15-7234 CRUDUP, DON V. ENGLEHART, ET AL.
15-7238 ENCARNACION, BERNABE V. ANNUCCI, COMM'R, NY DOC, ET AL.

15-7240 TURNER, CHARLES E. V. MAHALLY, SUPT., DALLAS, ET AL.
15-7244 POTTER, D. SIDNEY V. UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND
15-7245 LAWSON, GEOFFREY R. V. WASHINGTON
15-7246 ROBERSON, ROBERT L. V. STEPHENS, DIR., TX DCJ
15-7252 BROOKS, MARK D. V. DIAZ C., DADMA L., ET AL.
15-7256 COLE, AKANNI L. V. STEPHENS, DIR., TX DCJ
15-7260 KOSOVSKIY, IVAN V. E*TRADE BANK, ET AL.
15-7261 KNOTT, SHAWN V. McLAUGHLIN, WARDEN
15-7263 MATTHEWS, IVAN L. V. CALIFORNIA, ET AL.
15-7264 LARA, DANIEL F. V. BITER, WARDEN
15-7266 EDMONDS, DREVON M. V. CLARKE, DIR., VA DOC
15-7268 EDWARDS, DARTANION V. CURTIN, WARDEN
15-7269 EDWARDS, RONALD W. V. STEPHENS, DIR., TX DCJ
15-7270 DELARM, MICHAEL V. WOFFORD, WARDEN
15-7273 WALKER, ROMERIO L. V. FL DOC
15-7274 WILLIAMS, MAURICE V. WINGARD, SUPT., SOMERSET, ET AL.
15-7283 KING, VERNON V. LIVINGSTON, BRAD, ET AL.
15-7288 MOSS, RUSSELL V. PA BOARD OF PROBATION & PAROLE
15-7289 POSITANO, ONOFRIO V. PA CARDIOTHORACIC SURGERY
15-7291 OWENS, KEYNON M. V. TRAMMELL, WARDEN
15-7292 WOOD, JEFFERY L. V. STEPHENS, DIR., TX DCJ
15-7293 TORRES, CHRISTOPHER V. STEPHENS, DIR., TX DCJ
15-7294 TROGLIN, NELSON V. COOK, WARDEN
15-7295 GAO, LIN V. ST. LOUIS IMMERSION SCHOOLS
15-7297 KINNEY, CHARLES V. THREE ARCH BAY COMMUNITY, ET AL.
15-7298 MARSHALL, JAMES V. CRUTCHFIELD, WARDEN
15-7302 CHUTE, GARY L. V. NIFTY-FIFTIES, ET AL.
15-7306 DUHART, CURTIS V. FOX, WARDEN

15-7308 PETRICK, ROBERT J. V. THORNTON, CYNTHIA O.
 15-7310 ROSIERE, SHAUN V. UNITED STATES
 15-7318 GARY, BRIAN E. V. ILLINOIS
 15-7322 SMITH, DANNY L. V. ALABAMA
 15-7323 HICKS, THOMAS P. V. MICHIGAN
 15-7329 JOHNSON, CORNELIUS B. V. STEWART, WARDEN
 15-7331 ROUNDTREE, ANTONIO N. V. OHIO
 15-7333 WILSON, DEMETRIUS A. V. RYAN, DIR., AZ DOC, ET AL.
 15-7334 SHOWALTER, MARK T. V. MR. LEE, ET AL.
 15-7336 ROBERTSON, JAMEY C. V. KANE, ATT'Y GEN. OF PA, ET AL.
 15-7339 COLE, SCOTT B. V. JACKSON, ACTING WARDEN
 15-7341) DAKER, WASEEM V. WARREN, SHERIFF
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 15-7342) DAKER, WASEEM V. WARREN, SHERIFF
)
 15-7343) DAKER, WASEEM V. UNNAMED DEFENDANT
)
 15-7344) DAKER, WASEEM V. WARREN, SHERIFF
)
 15-7345) DAKER, WASEEM V. WARREN, SHERIFF
 15-7346 SAMUL, THEODORE J. V. UTAH
 15-7347 AASE, JEFFREY N. V. MINNESOTA
 15-7348 BOYKIN, ANTHONY V. McMAHON, COLLEEN, ET AL.
 15-7353 SMITH, TRENT A. V. DISTRICT COURT OF TX, ET AL.
 15-7355 KARNAZES, ELIZABETH M. V. STATE BAR OF CA
 15-7356 SPEAR, STEVEN A. V. KIRKLAND, AMY, ET AL.
 15-7359 SAUER, DONALD F. V. HAWKINS, ADM'R, NASH
 15-7365 JACKSON, WILLIE F. V. TEXAS
 15-7366 STUCKEY, STEPHAN K. V. JONES, SEC., FL DOC, ET AL.
 15-7367 PERAZA, OSMIN V. TEXAS
 15-7368 MORRIS, BRENT V. NEVEN, WARDEN
 15-7370 OMRAN, MOHAMMED A. V. UNITED STATES, ET AL.

15-7375 KELLY, MICHAEL A. V. STREETER, DANIEL R.
15-7376 LI, FENG V. PENG, DIANA, ET AL.
15-7382 THOMPSON, JOHN C. V. WASHINGTON
15-7386 JONES, ESMON V. V. BUTLER, WARDEN
15-7389 PETREY, WILLIAM R. V. BARTLETT, JUDGE, ET AL.
15-7396 SIDES, THOMAS R. V. TEXAS
15-7405 WILEY, WILLIAM G. V. COOK, WARDEN
15-7407 LUMENTUT, MELKIOR V. NDOH, ACTING WARDEN
15-7408 THOMAS, CHARLES E. V. SC DOC, ET AL.
15-7409 THOMAS, FRANK V. PATTON, DIR., OK DOC
15-7412 ALI, CASSANDRA G. V. MASCARA, SHERIFF
15-7413 BROWN, CALVIN V. GEORGIA
15-7415 BENSON, JAMES P. V. DAVIS, WARDEN
15-7416 CROSKY, MICHELLE V. ASPHALT CONTRACTORS, INC.
15-7417 BOATRIGHT, CHARLES A. V. KELLEY, DIR., AR DOC
15-7419 ARRINGTON, CORETTA V. COURTYARD CITIFLATS, LLC, ET AL.
15-7420 ACKERMAN, WILLIAM J. V. MERCY BEHAVIORAL HEALTH, ET AL.
15-7423 MOORE, IVAN R. V. FRUIN, RICHARD
15-7424 RAJKOVIC, LJUBICA V. OBAMA, PRESIDENT OF U.S., ET AL.
15-7425 RAJKOVIC, LJUBICA V. LYNCH, ATT'Y GEN., ET AL.
15-7427 LEWIS, JAMES D. V. UNITED STATES, ET AL.
15-7430 LEMPAR, DONALD V. LIVINGSTON, BRAD, ET AL.
15-7434 WALKER, ROMERIO L. V. FL DOC
15-7435 PORTNOY, SERGEI V. YOLO COUNTY, CA, ET AL.
15-7436 GIRALDES, LARRY V. RAMIREZ-PALMER, WARDEN
15-7437 HUNTER, JASON T. V. BENTON, SHERIFF
15-7438 SWANSON, TONY D. V. NEVEN, WARDEN, ET AL.
15-7440 QUINTERO, JOSE A. V. JONES, JULIE L., SEC. FL DOC

15-7442 KECK, WILLIAM J. V. NEVADA
15-7445 SERNA, TONY V. ALLEN, RITA, ET AL.
15-7446 FRIES, TODD R. V. UNITED STATES
15-7447 HOLLOWAY, HAROLD B. V. KELLEY, DIR., AR DOC, ET AL.
15-7448 CONSTANT, JOSEPH V. UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP
15-7449 HARNAGE, JAMES A. V. SCHULMAN, SYDNEY T., ET AL.
15-7453 DOWDY, GREGORY L. V. CURRY, WARDEN, ET AL.
15-7456 JOHNSTON, RICHARD V. LEGRAND, WARDEN, ET AL.
15-7457 PATTERSON, HOLLY V. STEWART, WARDEN
15-7458 SIMPSON, ANTOINE V. CURTIN, WARDEN
15-7464 FISHER, GEORGE W. V. NELSON, BARRY, ET AL.
15-7465 ROBINSON, EDDIE V. NEW YORK
15-7466 COLLINGTON, WILLIAM H. V. OWENS, ALFRED A., ET AL.
15-7467 GOUCH-ONASSIS, DEBORAH E. V. CALIFORNIA
15-7469 GOMEZ, CESAR V. TEXAS
15-7470 HAMILTON, JAN B. V. SCHLOFFER, BRUNHILDE
15-7471 HOOD, RONALD K. V. WOODS, JEFFREY, ET AL.
15-7472 EPSHTEYN, YURIY S. V. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PA
15-7473 COLE, JOSH V. ILLINOIS
15-7474 DAVIES, ROBERT R. V. UNITED STATES
15-7478 RODRIGUEZ-MARTINEZ, JOSE V. UNITED STATES
15-7480 LITSCHESKI, RICHARD V. DOOLEY, WARDEN, ET AL.
15-7484 MOCCO, STEPHEN J. V. ARIZONA
15-7487 MEEKS, JOHN M. V. UNITED STATES
15-7488 BLAGG, GARY D. V. TEXAS
15-7489 ABDILLAHI, HASSAN M. V. MINNESOTA
15-7492 WASHINGTON, ELVIS Q. V. VIRGINIA
15-7493 BARKSDALE, RANDOLPH V. MAHALLY, SUPT., DALLAS, ET AL.

15-7494 BAILEY, GARY A. V. LOUISIANA
15-7495 HERNANDEZ, AGUSTIN C. V. UNITED STATES
15-7497 LYTTLE, MELVIN R. V. UNITED STATES
15-7500 BENTLEY, BRYANT K. V. COLON, DOCTOR, ET AL.
15-7501 ROBINSON, STEPHEN, ET AL. V. SUPERIOR COURT OF CA, ET AL.
15-7504 STURGIS, DONALD V. WILLIS, TIMOTHY, ET AL.
15-7505 WESTLEY, JAMES V. LAZAROFF, WARDEN
15-7507 CROCKETT, CAMERON P. V. VIRGINIA
15-7508 SPAULDING, MICHAEL D. V. UNITED STATES
15-7509 JOHNSON, LUMORD V. CALIFORNIA
15-7510 VAUGHAN, DARREN E. V. NOOTH, SUPT., SNAKE RIVER
15-7512 DeVORCE, LaMONT V. PHILLIPS, SUPT., GREEN HAVEN
15-7513 DULCIE, NANNETTE V. GUARDIAN TRANSFER STORAGE CO.
15-7514 COX, SEDRIC M. V. STALLINGS, MISTY K.
15-7515 McQUEEN, DARREN V. UNITED STATES
15-7516 TYLER, AVERY V. NEBRASKA
15-7518 WORKU, KEFELEGNE A. V. UNITED STATES
15-7519 SMITH, KEVIN E. V. NEAL, SUPT., IN
15-7520 DOWNS, MARK A. V. ILLINOIS
15-7521 MATTHEWS, JOSHUA L. V. ILLINOIS
15-7522 SHELEY, NICHOLAS T. V. ILLINOIS
15-7523 BARRETT, RICKY V. KENTUCKY
15-7524 VELEZ, KELVIN M. V. UNITED STATES
15-7525 BALL, FROLLY M. V. UNITED STATES
15-7526 ALLEN, DEIDRA V. CALIFORNIA
15-7527 ANDERSON, PAULINE V. UNITED STATES
15-7529 CHINO-TELLEZ, JUAN V. UNITED STATES
15-7530 CARDENAS, JESUS A. V. UNITED STATES

15-7531 COOPER, TERESA W. V. COPELAND, JOHN D.
15-7533 AVERY, WILLIAM A. V. MISSISSIPPI
15-7534 AUSTIN, LARRY K. V. FLORIDA
15-7535 ADAMS-GATES, SHIRRON M. V. BUSH, GEORGE W., ET AL.
15-7536 DARDEN, VIRGINIA, ET AL. V. CROWLEY, SCOTT, ET AL.
15-7537 ALLEN, EDWARD V. FALK, WARDEN
15-7538 WISMER, JUDITH V. SARASOTA HOUSING AUTHORITY
15-7541 JOHN, TYDEL V. VIRGIN ISLANDS
15-7542 WIGGINS, ANTHONY W. V. UNITED STATES
15-7543 TYERMAN, BRANDON R. V. UNITED STATES
15-7544 BURNEY, MARCUS T. V. UNITED STATES
15-7545 THOMAS, JERRELL A. V. UNITED STATES
15-7547 SMITH, PATRICK M. V. CALIFORNIA
15-7548 SCHOFIELD, NICHOLAS W. V. UNITED STATES
15-7549 RANKIN, ALVIN V. BYRNE, WARDEN, ET AL.
15-7551 LOLES, GREGORY V. UNITED STATES
15-7555 FRIDAY, THOMAS C. V. NORTH CAROLINA
15-7557 WATSON, TREVOR A. V. UNITED STATES
15-7559 TATE, MARK A. V. ILLINOIS
15-7560 IRIAS, MARIO A. V. UNITED STATES
15-7562 GORRELL, ROBERT K. V. UNITED STATES
15-7564 GREEN, BENJAMIN V. UNITED STATES
15-7565 ISAAC, PRINCE V. UNITED STATES
15-7567 COOK, DARRYL L. V. UNITED STATES
15-7568 CONANT, RENDY V. UNITED STATES
15-7572 BRANDWEIN, ANDREW D. V. UNITED STATES
15-7573 DENSON, TONY E. V. UNITED STATES
15-7575 MARTINEZ, CHRISTINA F. V. UNITED STATES

15-7576 TYLER, LAWRENCE T. V. UNITED STATES
15-7579 GRIFFIN, GREGORY B. V. UNITED STATES
15-7580 BROWN, YUSEF V. KERESTES, SUPT., MAHANAY, ET AL.
15-7582 GRIGSBY, PHILIP A. V. LEMUZ, JESSE J.
15-7583 SATTERFIELD, WILLIAM R. V. FOREMOST INSURANCE CO.
15-7584 HUGHES, TIFFANY S. V. DEPT. OF HOMELAND SECURITY
15-7586 GRAHAM, EDWARD V. PFISTER, WARDEN
15-7594 KNIEST, GEORGE M. V. CASSADY, WARDEN
15-7599 ABELL, JOHN V. UNITED STATES
15-7600 BATCHELOR, KEITH V. FLORIDA
15-7604 GROOMS, BILLY L. V. TENNESSEE
15-7606 MILLER, JOSEPH B. V. UNITED STATES
15-7607 MOSES, KEON V. UNITED STATES
15-7608 OKUN, EDWARD H. V. UNITED STATES
15-7609 JONES, THURMAN L. V. UNITED STATES
15-7622 POURYAN, ALWAR V. UNITED STATES
15-7623 MOSELEY, WARREN D. V. UNITED STATES
15-7625 WILFONG, NEIL J. V. UNITED STATES
15-7629 TAHAH, CHRISTOPHER V. KANSAS
15-7630 TORRES-MARTINEZ, JOSE L. V. UNITED STATES
15-7633 RUST, CLARK V. MYRICK, SUPT. TWO RIVERS
15-7637 JONES, MACK V. UNITED STATES
15-7640 BRITO, JOSE A. V. UNITED STATES
15-7642 BOWALD, BRIAN V. ILLINOIS
15-7643 MEDINA-NAVEJAR, FELIPE V. UNITED STATES
15-7644 PREACHER, LUKE V. UNITED STATES
15-7647 MARTINEZ, BOBBY V. UNITED STATES
15-7649 JOHNSON, ANTOINE D. V. UNITED STATES

15-7653 MANNING, RECO D. V. UNITED STATES
15-7654 SANTIAGO, JOSE V. OVERMYER, SUPT., FOREST, ET AL.
15-7656 VENTURA, GERMAN DE JESUS V. UNITED STATES
15-7660 RHONE, DWIGHT, ET AL. V. UNITED STATES
15-7664 SPRUEL, MICHELLE V. WA DEPT. OF SOCIAL & HEALTH
15-7668 JOLIVETTE, JOY A. V. COLVIN, ACTING COMM'R OF SOCIAL
15-7670 PARKER, CLIFTON V. KERESTES, SUPT., MAHANAY, ET AL.
15-7672 REYES, SANTOS E. V. LYNCH, ATT'Y GEN.
15-7673 RIVAS, GREGORY R. V. COLORADO
15-7674 RASHID, AMIN A. V. UNITED STATES
15-7675 CASAS-GIL, ISRAEL V. UNITED STATES
15-7677 JAMES, RAY V. JONES, SEC., FL DOC, ET AL.
15-7678 MATRAJT, DIEGO T. V. UNITED STATES
15-7679 WILSON, CORNELIUS B. V. UNITED STATES
15-7680 BRUMFIELD, MICHAEL D. V. UNITED STATES
15-7681 RODRIGUEZ, RICARDO V. UNITED STATES
15-7682 WHITE, GARY V. UNITED STATES
15-7684 FORTONEL-OCAMPO, RAMIRO V. UNITED STATES
15-7685 GALLEGOS-CARMONA, JESUS A. V. UNITED STATES
15-7686 GRIMALDO, EFRAIN V. UNITED STATES
15-7690 PAZ-ALVAREZ, ANGEL V. UNITED STATES
15-7692 PERRETTA, MARIO V. UNITED STATES
15-7696 SNOWDEN, IVAN J. V. ALASKA
15-7699 TANIGUCHI, JAY K. V. BUTLER, WARDEN
15-7700 SLANE, CATHERINE V. UNITED STATES
15-7701 LeROY, GEORGE T. V. PREMO, SUPT., OR
15-7702 LEACH, ERIC C. V. CALIFORNIA
15-7706 SCOTT, LAUREN E. V. UNITED STATES

15-7709 BRADLEY, ANTONIO V. UNITED STATES
15-7712 CHRISTOPHER, JOSHUA L. V. UNITED STATES
15-7716 WILLIAMS, JERMAINE V. MAHALLY, SUPT., DALLAS, ET AL.
15-7718 MARRERO-MARRERO, LUIS V. UNITED STATES
15-7721 RAFAEL, JOSE M. V. JONES, SEC., FL DOC, ET AL.
15-7722 PAUL, WILLIAM V. UNITED STATES
15-7723 ORTIZ-MIRANDA, RAUL V. UNITED STATES
15-7724 POULIN, DANIEL V. UNITED STATES
15-7726 SPRIGGS, CHARLES R. V. UNITED STATES
15-7727 STEWART, GLEN A. V. UNITED STATES
15-7728 NORRIS, ERIC D. V. BROOKS, MARILYN, ET AL.
15-7732 DAUGHTIE, JAMES T. V. UNITED STATES
15-7735 WALBEY, HAROLD B. V. UNITED STATES
15-7740 WING, JOSEPH V. UNITED STATES
15-7751 SWANK, ROBERT T. V. UNITED STATES
15-7752 BALLESTAS, JAVIER E. V. UNITED STATES
15-7754 GAFFNEY, GEOFFREY S. V. UNITED STATES
15-7755 GRIGSBY, PHILIP A. V. UNITED STATES
15-7758 WHITE, ADAM V. UNITED STATES
15-7760 LOPEZ-DIAZ, JOSE V. UNITED STATES
15-7763 BALLEZA, RUBEN T. V. UNITED STATES
15-7764 COLE, JOSHUA J. V. UNITED STATES
15-7770 MULLINS, KENNETH V. UNITED STATES
15-7771 MARTINEZ, EMMANUEL, ET AL. V. UNITED STATES
15-7772 KOWALCZYK, ANDREW F. V. UNITED STATES
15-7773 MACK, JEREMY A. V. UNITED STATES
15-7783 ROBINSON, NATHANIEL V. OHIO
15-7789 TONSING, WARREN F. V. UNITED STATES

15-7795 BARRERA-LOPEZ, JOSE V. UNITED STATES
15-7797 AL-DIN, MUSTAFA A. V. UNITED STATES
15-7800 RAMIREZ-RODRIGUEZ, CARLOS D. V. UNITED STATES
15-7801 GARCIA-DE LA CRUZ, MISAEL V. UNITED STATES
15-7809 BUTLER, CLEVELAND V. TRITT, SUPT., FRACKVILLE, ET AL.
15-7819 JIMENEZ-ORTIZ, JOSE A. V. UNITED STATES
15-7821 CONANT, BRUCE V. UNITED STATES
15-7822 BOBADILLA-CHUCARI, SEGUNDO V. UNITED STATES
15-7823 BENTLEY, LARRY V. UNITED STATES
15-7825 TOPETE, RAUL V. UNITED STATES
15-7827 VAZQUEZ, MAURICIO A. V. UNITED STATES
15-7829 HERNANDEZ-AMAYA, ANGEL R. V. UNITED STATES
15-7830 GIBSON, TREVIN M., ET AL. V. UNITED STATES
15-7831 GARCIA-CONTRERAS, MANUEL A. V. UNITED STATES
15-7833 GONZALEZ-FLORES, HUMBERTO V. UNITED STATES
15-7835 MAYA-OSORIO, JORGE V. UNITED STATES
15-7836 JORDAN, ADAM J. V. UNITED STATES
15-7838 CAMPA-BARRERA, GUILLERMO V. UNITED STATES
15-7841 HUPP, DWAYNE E. V. UNITED STATES
15-7845 PAGAN, WILSON V. UNITED STATES
15-7847 MENDEZ-SOLIS, HOMERO V. UNITED STATES
15-7858 MULLINS, EUGENE V. UNITED STATES
15-7863 DAVIS, RUSSELL V. UNITED STATES
15-7865 BALBOA, MICHAEL V. UNITED STATES
15-7876 SOTO-MATEO, LENNY F. V. UNITED STATES
15-7879 NAVARRETTE-JIZCANO, ALFREDO J. V. UNITED STATES
15-7881 MERLOS, JONATHAN A. V. UNITED STATES
15-7883 MELVIN, JAMES V. UNITED STATES

15-7889 VALLE-MENDIVIL, CHRISTIAN V. UNITED STATES
15-7894 JACKSON, RONNIE V. UNITED STATES
15-7901 RUIZ, ROSEMARY V. UNITED STATES
15-7904 MOHSSEN, AHMED V. UNITED STATES
15-7905 PALMER, WENDEL V. UNITED STATES

The petitions for writs of certiorari are denied.

15-302 NJ EDUCATION ASSOC., ET AL. V. NEW JERSEY, ET AL.

The motion of New Jersey Public Employees' Retirement System, et al. for leave to file a brief as *amici curiae* is granted. The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

15-324 GENTRY, WARDEN, ET AL. V. RUDIN, MARGARET

The motion of respondent for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* is granted. The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

15-547 NEAL, SUPT., IN V. PRUITT, TOMMY R.

The motion of respondent for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* is granted. The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

15-588) JOHNSON, DANIEL, ET AL. V. UNITED STATES

)
15-6755) CAROZZA, JOSEPH V. UNITED STATES

The petitions for writs of certiorari are denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions.

15-622 HOTZE, STEVEN F., ET AL. V. BURWELL, SEC. OF H&HS, ET AL.

The motion of Foundation for Moral Law for leave to file a brief as *amicus curiae* is granted. The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

15-666 BELL, TAYLOR V. ITAWAMBA COUNTY SCH. BD., ET AL.

The motion of The Student Press Law Center, et al. for leave to file a brief as *amici curiae* is granted. The motion of Massachusetts Citizens for Children for leave to file a brief as *amicus curiae* is granted. The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

15-693 PNC BANK V. BRIAN W., ET AL.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.

15-704 GIRARDI KEESE LAW FIRM V. ADVISORY COMMITTEE, ET AL.

The motion of Vicente Ruiz, et al. for leave to file a brief as *amici curiae* is granted. The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

15-722 DAVIS, WARDEN V. BEMORE, TERRY D.

The motion of respondent for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* is granted. The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

15-754 ADKINS, JANET K. V. ADKINS, JAMES S.

The motion of Safe Kids International, et al. for leave to file a brief as *amici curiae* is granted. The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

15-772 NEW JERSEY V. MALTESE, MICHAEL A.

The motion of respondent for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* is granted. The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

15-773 BREADIY, EMAD, ET UX. V. PNC MORTGAGE COMPANY

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of this

petition.

15-801 GRIFFITH, WARDEN V. GABAREE, CLIFTON A.

The motion of respondent for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* is granted. The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

15-820 GGNSC GETTYSBURG, ET AL. V. WERT, EVONNE K.

The motion of American Health Care Association, et al. for leave to file a brief as *amici curiae* is granted. The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

15-912 SZAFRANSKI, JACOB V. DUNSTON, KARLA

The motion of American Association of Pro-Life Obstetricians and Gynecologists for leave to file a brief as *amicus curiae* is granted. The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

15-6330 VINSON, WAYNE V. MAIORANA, COMPLEX WARDEN

15-6679 MITCHELL, RUBEN V. UNITED STATES

The petitions for writs of certiorari are denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions.

15-7143 FONTANEZ, FERNANDO V. TIME WARNER CABLE

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.

15-7307 MOORE, TEDDY V. GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE

15-7364 WILLIAMS, CHAUNCEY A. V. JAMES, A. D., ET AL.

15-7400 LeBLANC, JEFFREY R. V. SCHUETTE, BILL

15-7401 LeBLANC, JEFFREY R. V. DUGGAN, PATRICK, ET AL.

15-7402 LeBLANC, JEFFREY R. V. ROBERT G. COTTON CORR. FACILITY

15-7403 LeBLANC, JEFFREY R. V. UNITED PETROLEUM EQUIPMENT

15-7404 LeBLANC, JEFFREY R. V. LIGHTVOET, PAMELA

The motions of petitioners for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* are denied, and the petitions for writs of certiorari are dismissed. See Rule 39.8. As the petitioners have repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioners unless the docketing fees required by Rule 38(a) are paid and the petitions are submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See *Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals*, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (*per curiam*).

15-7461 GREENE, CEDRIC V. CHAPMAN, ROBBIE

The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* is denied, and the petition for a writ of certiorari is dismissed. See Rule 39.8.

15-7481 LeBLANC, JEFFREY R. V. FOLEY, BRENDA K.

15-7482 LeBLANC, JEFFREY R. V. SHAW, JIM

15-7483 LeBLANC, JEFFREY R. V. SPARROW, WILLIAM

The motions of petitioner for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* are denied, and the petitions for writs of certiorari are dismissed. See Rule 39.8. As the petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless the docketing fees required by Rule 38(a) are paid and the petitions are submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See *Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals*, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (*per curiam*).

15-7506 WATSON, CURTIS L. V. O'BRIEN, WARDEN

The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed *in forma*

pauperis is denied, and the petition for a writ of certiorari is dismissed. See Rule 39.8.

15-7558 WEAVER, RONALD V. UNITED STATES

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.

15-7601 KARKENNY, PAUL V. UNITED STATES

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. Justice Sotomayor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.

15-7667 MADURA, ANDRZEJ, ET UX. V. BAC HOME LOANS SERVICING, ET AL.

The motion of petitioners for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* is denied, and the petition for a writ of certiorari is dismissed. See Rule 39.8.

15-7707 RODRIGUEZ-ZAMO, NOLGIE V. UNITED STATES

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.

15-7778 BOLDS, RODERICK H. V. UNITED STATES

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.

15-7824 BARIAN, ZACHARY V. UNITED STATES

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.

HABEAS CORPUS DENIED

15-7756 IN RE JOSPEH DRAGO
15-7852 IN RE RONALD SUTTON
15-7886 IN RE WILLIAM SIM SPENCER
15-7933 IN RE DERRICK HILLS
15-8003 IN RE LEONARD W. GIDDENS
15-8018 IN RE GARVESTER BRACKEN
15-8059 IN RE GARFIELD NEVILLE COATES
15-8076 IN RE DAVID MOLESKI

The petitions for writs of habeas corpus are denied.

MANDAMUS DENIED

15-731 IN RE CIE SHARP
15-745 IN RE JOAN FARR
15-7164 IN RE ADEM ALBRA
15-7210 IN RE RAFAEL A. JOSEPH
15-7275 IN RE RAYMOND P. VINNIE
15-7460 IN RE SABRINA D. DAVIS
15-7757 IN RE AUSTIN RAY

The petitions for writs of mandamus are denied.

15-744 IN RE CAROLYN J. FLORIMONTE
15-770 IN RE JASON PARIS BARTHOLOMEW
15-7697 IN RE MARCUS TUNSTALL

The petitions for writs of mandamus and/or prohibition are denied.

PROHIBITION DENIED

15-7391 IN RE BRUCE MURRAY

The petition for a writ of prohibition is denied.

REHEARINGS DENIED

14-5566 CLARK, SEAN V. COMM'R, HUMAN RESOURCE ADMIN.
14-5568 CLARK, SEAN A. V. HUMAN RESOURCES ADMIN.
14-5858 CLARK, SEAN A. V. CITY OF NEW YORK HUMAN RESOURCES
14-9299 MARSHALL, ANDREW V. BUREAU OF PRISONS
14-9686 ROBINSON, RENDELL V. VALDAMUDI, KRISHNA, ET AL.
14-9794 FERRY, HUBERT E. V. VIRGINIA
14-9962 BURNETT, ALAN L. V. BURNETT, CAREN C.
15-464 GROEBER, YI J. V. FRIEDMAN AND SCHUMAN
15-498 IN RE CHERYL A. WOLF, ET AL.
15-504 D'ANTIGNAC, VERONICA B. V. DEERE & COMPANY
15-516 PHUONG, LOAN V. THOMPSON, JASON E., ET AL.
15-531 DOAL, JEANETTE V. CIA, ET AL.
15-535 KOFFLEY, PATRICK V. FOGEL, JO B.
15-582 THAT, DINH TON V. ALDERS MAINTENANCE ASS'N
15-603 MENCHU, MILGE H. V. LYNCH, ATT'Y GEN.
15-643 ARPAIO, SHERIFF V. OBAMA, PRESIDENT OF U.S., ET AL.
15-5222 NORRIS, JAMES E. V. FOXX, SEC. OF TRANSPORTATION
15-5756 TUOMI, DANA E. V. UNITED STATES
15-6068 SALAHUDDIN, AMNA V. ZONING HEARING BOARD, ET AL.
15-6141 DILLON, KIM W. V. DOOLEY, WARDEN, ET AL.
15-6183 GARVIN, JOHN D. V. WRIGHT, CHUCK, ET AL.
15-6238 IN RE DARREN C. BLUEMEL
15-6263 NURSE, RONALD A. V. SHERATON ATLANTA HOTEL, ET AL.
15-6329 WASHINGTON, MARCUS I. V. WILLIAM MORRIS ENDEAVOR, ET AL.
15-6395 DAVIS, DERRICK D. V. PAT THOMAS, ET AL.
15-6426 THOMAS, FORREST V. OUTLAW, WARDEN
15-6427 LASCHKEWITSCH, JOHN B. V. RELIASTAR LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY

15-6432 MILLER, JAMES L. V. KASHANI, AMIR, ET AL.
15-6449 GACHE, PETER D. V. HILL REALTY ASSOCIATES, ET AL.
15-6493 LAN, TOM V. COMCAST CORPORATION, LLC
15-6511 CLUM, DAVID V. UNITED STATES
15-6518 RANTEESI, SIMON F. V. ARNOLD, WARDEN
15-6579 ZAVALIDROGA, TOMAS, ET AL. V. ONEIDA SHERIFF'S DEPT., ET AL.
15-6589 TAYLOR, VERSIAH M. V. USDC ND FL
15-6683 JOHNSON, OMAR V. MARYLAND
15-6898 RAMIREZ, MARICELA V. PARKER, MELANIE, ET AL.
15-6930 POUYEH, BOZORGMEHR V. BD. OF TRUSTEES, ET AL.
15-7011 IN RE JUSTIN WELLS
15-7078 IN RE VINCENT A. WILLIAMS
15-7148 WILSON, JAKIEM L. V. NORTH CAROLINA
15-7171 WEBB, JAMES T. V. UNITED STATES
15-7267 IN RE JESUS DELRIO, AKA JESSE
15-7327 IN RE RONALD SPANGLER

The petitions for rehearing are denied.

15-6055 DOUGLAS, HOUSTON V. WRIGHT, LESTER N., ET AL.

The motion for leave to file a petition for rehearing is denied.

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE

D-2864 IN THE MATTER OF DISBARMENT OF DONALD P. ROSEN

Donald P. Rosen, of Carpentersville, Illinois, having been suspended from the practice of law in this Court by order of December 7, 2015; and a rule having been issued and served upon him requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred; and a response having been filed;

It is ordered that Donald P. Rosen is disbarred from the

practice of law in this Court.

D-2869 IN THE MATTER OF DISCIPLINE OF CHRISTOPHER W. O'BRIEN

Christopher W. O'Brien, of Wichita, Kansas, is suspended from the practice of law in this Court and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.

D-2870 IN THE MATTER OF DISCIPLINE OF RONALD JOHN DENICOLA

Ronald John Denicola, of Cincinnati, Ohio, is suspended from the practice of law in this Court and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.

D-2871 IN THE MATTER OF DISCIPLINE OF KRISTI ANN FREDERICKS

Kristi Ann Fredericks, of Downingtown, Pennsylvania, is suspended from the practice of law in this Court and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring her to show cause why she should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.

D-2872 IN THE MATTER OF DISCIPLINE OF RICHARD J. KWASNY

Richard J. Kwasny, of Yardley, Pennsylvania, is suspended from the practice of law in this Court and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.

D-2873 IN THE MATTER OF DISCIPLINE OF PAUL MICHAEL KAUFMAN

Paul Michael Kaufman, of Cleveland, Ohio, is suspended from the practice of law in this Court and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.

D-2874 IN THE MATTER OF DISCIPLINE OF DAVID M. COHEN

David M. Cohen, of Stoughton, Massachusetts, is suspended from the practice of law in this Court and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.

D-2875 IN THE MATTER OF DISCIPLINE OF PAUL JAY KONIGSBERG

Paul Jay Konigsberg, of Palm Beach Gardens, Florida, is suspended from the practice of law in this Court and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.

D-2876 IN THE MATTER OF DISCIPLINE OF RAYMOND G. LAVALLEE

Raymond G. Lavallee, of Hauppauge, New York, is suspended from the practice of law in this Court and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.

D-2877 IN THE MATTER OF DISCIPLINE OF STUART A. SCHLESINGER

Stuart A. Schlesinger, of New York, New York, is suspended from the practice of law in this Court and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.

D-2878 IN THE MATTER OF DISCIPLINE OF JOHN EDWARD FASCIANA

John Edward Fasciana, of Bedford Hills, New York, is suspended from the practice of law in this Court and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.

D-2879 IN THE MATTER OF DISCIPLINE OF ALLAN G. GALLIMORE

Allan G. Gallimore, of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, is

suspended from the practice of law in this Court and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.

D-2880

IN THE MATTER OF DISCIPLINE OF EDWIN L. LONDON

Edwin L. London, of Langhorne, Pennsylvania, is suspended from the practice of law in this Court and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.

ALITO, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

CHRIS LUSBY TAYLOR, ET AL. *v.* BETTY YEE,
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS STATE
CONTROLLER OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 15–169. Decided February 29, 2016

The motion of Shareholder Services Association and The Securities Transfer Association for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae is granted. The motion of Unclaimed Property Professionals Organization for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae is granted. The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.

JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins, concurring in the denial of certiorari.

California’s Unclaimed Property Law, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. §1510 *et seq.* (West 2007 and Cum. Supp. 2016), permits the State to confiscate forgotten security deposits, uncashed money orders, unused insurance benefits, idle shares of stock, and even the undisturbed contents of safe-deposit boxes and bank accounts if those assets lie dormant for the statutorily required time period (in this case, three years). Unless the forgotten property’s rightful owner can be located, the State uses the funds in these accounts for its own benefit.

The petition in this case asks us to decide whether the California law provides property owners with constitutionally sufficient notice before escheating their financial assets. The Due Process Clause requires States to give adequate notice before seizing private property. *Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.*, 339 U. S. 306, 313 (1950) (Although “[m]any controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process Clause,” that provision undoubtedly requires that, before seizing

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private property, the government must give “notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case”). When a State is required to give notice, it must do so through processes “reasonably calculated” to reach the interested party—here, the property owner. See *id.*, at 318. Because the seizure of private property is no small thing, notification procedures may not be empty rituals: “[P]rocess which is a mere gesture is not due process.” *Id.*, at 315. Whether the means and methods employed by a State to notify owners of a pending escheat meet the constitutional floor is an important question.

In recent years, States have shortened the periods during which property must lie dormant before being labeled abandoned and subject to seizure. See Bower, Note, *Inequitable Escheat?: Reflecting on Unclaimed Property Law and the Supreme Court’s Interstate Escheat Framework*, 74 *Ohio St. L. J.* 515, 529, n. 81 (2013) (noting that New York, Michigan, Indiana, New Jersey, and Arizona all recently shortened their dormancy periods from as long as 15 years to merely 3). And some States still rely on decidedly old-fashioned methods that are unlikely to be effective. See, e.g., Del. Code, Tit. 12, §1172 (2007 and Cum. Supp. 2014) (relying only on blanket newspaper notification).

This trend—combining shortened escheat periods with minimal notification procedures—raises important due process concerns. As advances in technology make it easier and easier to identify and locate property owners, many States appear to be doing less and less to meet their constitutional obligation to provide adequate notice before escheating private property. Cash-strapped States undoubtedly have a real interest in taking advantage of truly abandoned property to shore up state budgets. But they also have an obligation to return property when its owner can be located. To do that, States must employ notification procedures designed to provide the pre-escheat notice

ALITO, J., concurring

the Constitution requires.

The convoluted history of this case makes it a poor vehicle for reviewing the important question it presents, and therefore I concur in the denial of review. But the constitutionality of current state escheat laws is a question that may merit review in a future case.

THOMAS, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

CALIFORNIA BUILDING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION *v.*
CITY OF SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME
COURT OF CALIFORNIA

No. 15–330. Decided February 29, 2016

The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.

JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in the denial of certiorari.

This case implicates an important and unsettled issue under the Takings Clause. The city of San Jose, California, enacted a housing ordinance that compels all developers of new residential development projects with 20 or more units to reserve a minimum of 15 percent of for-sale units for low-income buyers. See San Jose Municipal Ordinance No. 28689, §§5.08.250(A), 5.08.400(A)(a) (2010). Those units, moreover, must be sold to these buyers at an “affordable housing cost”—a below-market price that cannot exceed 30 percent of these buyers’ median income. §§5.08.105, 5.08.400(A)(a); see Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§50052.5(b)(1)–(4) (West 2014). The ordinance requires these restrictions to remain in effect for 45 years. San Jose Municipal Ordinance No. 28689, §5.08.600(B); Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. §33413(C). Petitioner, the California Building Industry Association, sued to enjoin the ordinance. A California state trial court enjoined the ordinance, but the Court of Appeal reversed, and the Supreme Court of California affirmed that decision. 61 Cal. 4th 435, 351 P. 3d 974 (2015).

Our precedents in *Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n*, 483 U. S. 825 (1987), and *Dolan v. City of Tigard*, 512 U. S. 374 (1994), would have governed San Jose’s actions had it imposed those conditions through administrative action. In those cases, which both involved challenges to administrative conditions on land use, we recognized that

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governments “may not condition the approval of a land-use permit on the owner’s relinquishment of a portion of his property unless there is a ‘nexus’ and ‘rough proportionality’ between the government’s demand and the effects of the proposed land use.” *Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management Dist.*, 570 U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 1) (describing *Nollan/Dolan* framework).

For at least two decades, however, lower courts have divided over whether the *Nollan/Dolan* test applies in cases where the alleged taking arises from a legislatively imposed condition rather than an administrative one. See *Parking Assn. of Georgia, Inc. v. Atlanta*, 515 U. S. 1116, 1117 (1995) (THOMAS, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). That division shows no signs of abating. The decision below, for example, reiterated the California Supreme Court’s position that a legislative land-use measure is not a taking and survives a constitutional challenge so long as the measure bears “a reasonable relationship to the public welfare.” 61 Cal. 4th, at 456–459, and n. 11, 351 P. 3d, at 987–990, n. 11; compare *ibid.* with, e.g., *Home Builders Assn. of Dayton and Miami Valley v. Beavercreek*, 89 Ohio St. 3d 121, 128, 729 N. E. 2d 349, 356 (2000) (applying the *Nollan/Dolan* test to legislative exaction).

I continue to doubt that “the existence of a taking should turn on the type of governmental entity responsible for the taking.” *Parking Assn. of Georgia, supra*, at 1117–1118. Until we decide this issue, property owners and local governments are left uncertain about what legal standard governs legislative ordinances and whether cities can legislatively impose exactions that would not pass muster if done administratively. These factors present compelling reasons for resolving this conflict at the earliest practicable opportunity.

Yet this case does not present an opportunity to resolve the conflict. The City raises threshold questions about the timeliness of the petition for certiorari that might preclude

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us from reaching the Takings Clause question. Moreover, petitioner disclaimed any reliance on *Nollan* and *Dolan* in the proceedings below. Nor did the California Supreme Court's decision rest on the distinction (if any) between takings effectuated through administrative versus legislative action. See 61 Cal. 4th, at 461–462, 351 P. 3d, at 991–992. Given these considerations, I concur in the Court's denial of certiorari.

ALITO, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

ISRAEL BEN-LEVI, AKA DANNY L. LOREN *v.*
BETTY BROWN

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14–10186 Decided February 29, 2016

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

JUSTICE ALITO, dissenting from the denial of certiorari.

Petitioner Israel Ben-Levi, a North Carolina inmate, filed a *pro se* petition challenging a prison policy that prevented him and other Jewish inmates from praying and studying the Torah together. The North Carolina Department of Public Safety (NCDPS) imposed stringent restrictions on Jewish group meetings that it did not apply to other religious groups. Because Ben-Levi has provided ample evidence that these restrictions substantially burdened his religious exercise, and because respondent has not identified a legitimate penological interest in treating Jewish inmates more strictly than inmates of other religions, I would grant Ben-Levi’s petition for certiorari and summarily reverse the judgment below.

I

Petitioner Ben-Levi is a practicing Jew in the custody of NCDPS. Respondent Betty Brown is NCDPS’s Director of Chaplaincy Services. Because this case arises in a summary judgment posture, I view the facts in the light most favorable to Ben-Levi, the nonmoving party. See, *e.g.*, *City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan*, 575 U. S. ____, __ (2015) (slip op., at 1).

In 2012, while housed in NCDPS’s Hoke Correctional Institute (Hoke), Ben-Levi requested permission to meet in a quiet room to pray and study the Torah with two other

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Jewish prisoners. Doc. No. 1–1; Doc. No. 33, pp. 1–2.¹ After Hoke officials denied his request, Ben-Levi sent a letter to respondent asking if she had “the authority to let the superintendent [at Hoke] approve a quiet place . . . to have a Jewish Bible Study.” Doc. No. 1–1, at 4. Ben-Levi later clarified that he was seeking to meet with his fellow Jewish believers for an hour per week. Doc. No. 29, p. 6.

Respondent denied Ben-Levi’s request in a July 10, 2012 letter. See Doc. No. 24–1. The letter asserted that a Jewish study group requires a quorum of 10 adult Jews (also referred to as a minyan). *Ibid.* Ben-Levi’s proposed group, however, had only three members. Doc. No. 33, at 1–2. Respondent further explained that the minyan requirement “may be waived in a prison setting only when the service is led by a Rabbi.” Doc. No. 24–1. But because “no orthodox Rabbi” was available “to supervise a study group,” respondent continued, “no formal authorization can be given even though you say that requirements are relaxed for an orthodox Jewish bible study.” *Ibid.* Respondent warned Ben-Levi that his proposed study group was prohibited and stated that “[n]o further action will be taken on this issue.” *Ibid.*

Respondent based her denial of Ben-Levi’s request on established NCDPS policy, which requires either a minyan or the presence of a qualified leader (such as a rabbi) in order for a Jewish study group to take place. Brief in Opposition 11; see Doc. No. 42–2, pp. 5–7. NCDPS instituted this policy after “Respondent Brown personally exchanged emails” with a rabbi and “he advised her regarding the ‘requirements for Torah and Talmud study sessions.’” Brief in Opposition 10 (citing Doc. No. 42–2, at 9). “Based on the information provided by [the rabbi], Respondent Brown was of the opinion at all relevant times that NCDPS’s require-

¹Documents filed with the District Court are designated by their docket entry number, denoted as “Doc. No. ___.”

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ment of a quorum, Rabbi, or other qualified community volunteer to lead Jewish bible study was in conformity with the ‘requirements, practices and tenets of Judaism.’” Brief in Opposition 11 (citing Doc. No. 42–2, at 9).

Because NCDPS’s policy rests on its understanding of Jewish doctrine, the policy does not apply to other religions. In fact, NCDPS intentionally treats different religions differently based on its perception of the importance of their various tenets. Doc. No. 42–2, at 5. As explained by respondent, “[s]ome faith practices are required of an adherent, while others are not, such that different accommodations are made for dissimilar groups.” *Ibid.* Thus, although other religious groups were allowed to meet without a quorum or an outside volunteer, Jewish groups were not. See Doc. No. 29, at 1; Doc. No. 32, p. 3; Doc. No. 49, p. 2; Doc. No. 54, p. 2.²

The hurdles imposed on Jewish group meetings are heightened by the paucity of Jews at Hoke and in the surrounding community. “[B]ecause the numbe[r] of declared Judaism followers is small,” Doc. No. 42–2, at 10, Ben-Levi could not assemble a quorum of 10 Jews. And because respondent was unable to find a rabbi or other qualified leader to serve the Jewish prisoners at Hoke, see 2014 WL 7239858, *3, n. 2 (EDNC, Dec. 18, 2014), Ben-Levi could not take advantage of the exception to the minyan requirement. As a result, Ben-Levi was completely deprived of the ability to pray or study with other Jewish inmates. Doc. No. 32, at 3.

After respondent denied the request for group Torah

²Respondent does not dispute this conclusion. See, e.g., Brief in Opposition 20 (“While Petitioner argues that other faith groups have been allowed to participate in study groups, Petitioner has not presented any evidence that members of his faith group or similar faith groups (i.e., where the tenets of the faith require a minyan or the presence of a qualified teacher) were allowed to meet without a quorum or qualified community volunteer”).

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study, Ben-Levi filed a *pro se* complaint under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. Ben-Levi alleged that the denial of his request violated his free exercise rights under the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 114 Stat. 803, 42 U. S. C. §2000cc *et seq.*

On March 19, 2014, the District Court granted respondent's motion for summary judgment as to Ben-Levi's RLUIPA claim and his requests for declaratory and injunctive relief, finding them mooted by Ben-Levi's transfer from Hoke to another facility. Doc. No. 33. After further filings, the court granted respondent summary judgment on Ben-Levi's remaining free exercise claim for monetary damages. 2014 WL 7239858, at *1. The court first concluded that respondent had not substantially burdened Ben-Levi's religious exercise. *Id.*, at *4. Pursuant to NCDPS policy, the court noted, "a Jewish Bible Study generally requires a quorum of ten adult Jews," although "[t]his requirement may be waived when the study is led by a volunteer Rabbi." *Id.*, at *3. Because respondent was merely enforcing this policy, the court reasoned, and because Ben-Levi was allowed to engage in private worship, his religious exercise was not substantially burdened. *Id.*, at *4.

The court further held that, even if Ben-Levi had demonstrated a burden on his religious exercise, summary judgment was appropriate because respondent's actions were reasonably related to legitimate penological interests in (1) maintaining order, security, and safety; (2) balancing inmate relationships; and (3) conserving personnel resources. *Id.*, at *3–*4. The court observed that extremist groups in the past have used religious gatherings to "mask their gang activity." *Ibid.*

Ben-Levi appealed, and the Fourth Circuit summarily affirmed "for the reasons stated by the district court." 600 Fed. Appx. 899, 900 (CA4 2015) (*per curiam*). Ben-Levi

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then filed a *pro se* petition for a writ of certiorari.³

II

Petitioner argues that NCDPS’s refusal to allow him to meet with other Jewish inmates to study the Torah violated his rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.⁴ “[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” *Turner v. Safley*, 482 U. S. 78, 89 (1987); see *O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz*, 482 U. S. 342, 349–350 (1987). When this test is applied to the current record, it is clear that summary judgment on Ben-Levi’s free exercise claim was improper.

A

First, the courts below erred in concluding as a matter of law that respondent did not substantially burden Ben-Levi’s religious exercise. The record clearly shows that Ben-Levi, like many religious people, views group prayer and study as an important part of his “religious observance.” Doc. No. 32, at 2. And Ben-Levi repeatedly asserts that NCDPS’s policy denied him “a reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith.” Doc. No. 29, at 2; see Doc. No. 32, at 5.

Respondent and the District Court have “not question[ed] the sincerity of Petitioner’s beliefs.” Brief in Opposition 16, n. 5; see 2014 WL 7239858, at *2, *4. Instead, their primary argument is that Ben-Levi’s religious exercise was not burdened because respondent was merely enforcing

³Ben-Levi subsequently obtained counsel, who—more than 8 months after Ben-Levi filed his *pro se* petition—submitted a reply brief.

⁴Because I would reverse the decision below on free exercise grounds, I have no occasion to consider whether Ben-Levi, proceeding *pro se*, adequately preserved an objection based on RLUIPA, which provides broader protection than the First Amendment. I would leave it to the lower courts on remand to address that question, if necessary.

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NCDPS's requirements for Torah studies. See, *e.g.*, Brief in Opposition 17–18; 2014 WL 7239858, at *4 (“Defendant did not forbid Plaintiff from participating in a Jewish Bible Study. Rather, she enforced DPS policy requiring that a study with fewer than ten participants be led by a Rabbi”).

“Petitioner’s request for a Jewish bible study was not denied per se,” respondent explains. Brief in Opposition 17. “Instead, based upon research by Respondent Brown and the Religious Practices Committee, Petitioner was informed that a quorum (minyan) or presence of a qualified clergy volunteer was required before the group could meet.” *Ibid.* “NCDPS’s position was based upon its understanding of the basic tenets of the Jewish faith which it obtained through consultations with an established leader of that faith who confirmed that a minyan or qualified Rabbi is required for ‘Torah and Talmud study.’” *Ibid.* Respondent faults Ben-Levi for failing to provide “documentation from reliable sources or authorities on the Jewish faith disputing NCDPS’s understanding that the Jewish religion itself, and not just institutional concerns, requires a quorum or the presence of a qualified teacher for worship or religious study.” *Id.*, at 18. As a result of this failure, respondent argues, “the Record establishes as a matter of law that Respondent Brown’s denial of Petitioner’s request did not substantially burden his ability to practice the Jewish faith but, rather, was in line with the tenets of that faith.” *Ibid.*

In essence, respondent’s argument—which was accepted by the courts below—is that Ben-Levi’s religious exercise was not burdened because he misunderstands his own religion.⁵ If Ben-Levi truly understood Judaism, respond-

⁵See, *e.g.*, Brief in Opposition 17–18 (“Petitioner attempts to create an issue of fact by arguing that there is a difference between worship and study. According to [the rabbi that respondent consulted], however, the minyan or qualified teacher requirements apply to Torah and Talmud study”); Doc. No. 42–2, p. 6 (“It should be noted that, the language (Jewish Bible Study) the Plaintiff uses in his complaint exhibits that he

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ent implies, he would recognize that his proposed study group was not consistent with Jewish practice and that respondent's refusal to authorize the group "was in line with the tenets of that faith." *Ibid.*; see also 2014 WL 7239858, at *4 (noting that "the requirement of a quorum of ten adult Jews or the presence of a Rabbi" "ensures the purity of the doctrinal message and teaching").

The argument that a plaintiff's own interpretation of his or her religion must yield to the government's interpretation is foreclosed by our precedents. This Court has consistently refused to "question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants' interpretations of those creeds." *Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith*, 494 U. S. 872, 887 (1990). "Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have warned that courts must not presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility of a religious claim." *Ibid.*; see also *Presbyterian Church in U. S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church*, 393 U. S. 440, 450 (1969) (holding that "the First Amendment forbids civil courts from" interpreting "particular church doctrines" and determining "the importance of those doctrines to the religion").

Just last Term, we emphasized that the government cannot define the scope of personal religious beliefs. See *Holt v. Hobbs*, 574 U. S. ____ (2015). In *Holt*, we held that a prison policy preventing a Sunni Muslim inmate from growing a ½-inch beard substantially burdened his religious exercise. *Id.*, at ____ (slip op., at 1). In so holding, we explicitly rejected the argument that there was no burden because "not all Muslims believe that men must grow beards," reaffirming that "the guarantee of the Free Exer-

is not knowledgeable to teach or guide others in the Jewish faith. What Plaintiff incorrectly identifies as a Jewish Bible study is really called the Torah/or Talmud study").

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cise Clause . . . is ‘not limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the members of a religious sect.’” *Id.*, at ___ (slip op., at 8) (quoting *Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div.*, 450 U. S. 707, 715–716 (1981)).

As this discussion makes clear, respondent’s focus on the correctness of Ben-Levi’s understanding of Judaism is inconsistent with our case law. Even assuming that respondent accurately identified the requirements for a group Torah study under Jewish doctrine—and that is not at all clear—federal courts have no warrant to evaluate “the validity of [Ben-Levi’s] interpretations.” *Smith, supra*, at 887. Instead, the courts below should have considered whether the NCDPS policy imposed a substantial burden on Ben-Levi’s ability to exercise *his* religious beliefs, as *he* understands them. Ben-Levi believes that relaxing the minyan requirement promotes his faith more than sacrificing group Torah study altogether.⁶ By ignoring Ben-Levi’s actual beliefs and focusing solely on NCDPS’s understanding of Judaism, respondent and the courts below considered the wrong question.

Perhaps Ben-Levi—who proceeded *pro se* below and in filing this petition—could have more clearly explained why he believes group study is more important than adherence to the minyan requirement. See Brief in Opposition 17–18. But “[c]ourts should not undertake to dissect religious beliefs . . . because [the] beliefs are not articulated with the

⁶ Respondent notes that “in one of the few documents filed by Petitioner in this case, the author states that [i]t is best to pray in a synagogue with a Minyan (a congregation of at least ten adult men).” Brief in Opposition 18. Even assuming that Ben-Levi agrees with that statement, respondent is not permitted to dictate the appropriate religious response to Ben-Levi’s inability to muster a minyan. The prisoner in *Holt* believed that “his faith requires him not to trim his beard at all,” but he preferred a ½-inch beard to no beard. *Holt v. Hobbs*, 574 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (slip op., at 4). Likewise, Ben-Levi believes that a study group with fewer than 10 Jewish participants is preferable to no study group at all. Respondent has no business questioning the validity of this belief.

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clarity and precision that a more sophisticated person might employ.” *Thomas*, 450 U. S., at 715. Ben-Levi has unmistakably indicated that he prefers group study without a minyan to no group study at all, and “it is not for us to say that the line he drew was an unreasonable one.” *Ibid.*

Nor can I conclude that Ben-Levi’s ability to engage in “private worship” shows that his religious exercise was not burdened. See 2014 WL 7239858, at *3–*4; Brief in Opposition 9. If the opportunity to pray and study privately were sufficient to satisfy the First Amendment, then prisons could justify any restriction on religious exercise short of depriving an inmate of his religious texts. Many prisoners, Ben-Levi included, consider it important to congregate with other practitioners of their faith for prayer and discussion. Preventing them from doing so burdens their religious exercise, even if they are allowed to study and pray alone in a cell. Ben-Levi has presented ample evidence that group study, even absent a minyan, is important to his faith. The courts below thus erred in holding that his religious exercise was not substantially burdened as a matter of law.⁷

⁷Respondent argues that Ben-Levi’s claims are “moot” because “the NCDPS Policy at issue in this case was amended and now allows approved inmates to lead worship and religious study groups when outside clergy volunteers are not available.” Brief in Opposition 13. This argument provides no basis for denying certiorari here. “The voluntary cessation of challenged conduct does not ordinarily render a case moot because a dismissal for mootness would permit a resumption of the challenged conduct as soon as the case is dismissed.” *Knox v. Service Employees*, 567 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2012) (slip op., at 6–7).

Even if respondent could overcome that obstacle, the new policy does nothing to alleviate the burden on Ben-Levi’s religious exercise. The “amended” policy allows an inmate to lead a study group only if a “community volunteer is not available . . . and there is sufficient offender interest (10 or more designated faith group members).” App. to Brief in Opposition, Exh. A, p. 6. Jewish prisoners thus need either a qualified volunteer or a quorum of 10 Jews in order to hold a study group—just as they did under the previous policy.

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B

Moreover, contrary to the conclusions of the courts below, respondent has not demonstrated that the burden on Ben-Levi's religious exercise was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Respondent contends that several government interests justify NCDPS's policy, including (1) maintaining order, security, and safety; (2) balancing inmate relationships; and (3) conserving personnel resources. 2014 WL 7239858, at *3–*4; Brief in Opposition 18–19. I do not question the importance of these interests. See, e.g., *Holt*, 574 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 10) (“Prison officials are experts in running prisons and evaluating the likely effects of altering prison rules, and courts should respect that expertise”). But respondent's invocation of these interests is insufficient to justify NCDPS's policy toward Jewish inmates. The problem with these asserted justifications is that they seem to apply equally to inmates of other religions, who were nevertheless allowed to meet in groups of fewer than 10 without an outside leader. For instance, respondent has given no reason to believe that Jewish prisoners are more inclined than pris-

If anything, this change aggravates the religious liberty problem. There are strong reasons to believe that NCDPS made this change for the specific purpose of defeating Jewish prisoners' claims. (Where else did the 10-inmate requirement come from?) In other words, there is strong reason to believe that Jewish inmates but not Christian inmates would have trouble satisfying this requirement. And if NCDPS previously did not think that penological concerns necessitated such a requirement for non-Jewish groups, what justification is there for imposing such a categorical rule now?

Finally, even if NCDPS had meaningfully changed its policy, such a change could not moot Ben-Levi's backward-looking damages claim. “Untold numbers of cases illustrate the rule that a claim for money damages is not moot, no matter how clear it is that the claim arises from events that have completely concluded without any prospect of recurrence.” 13C C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, *Federal Practice and Procedure* §3533.3, p. 6 (3d ed. 2008); see, e.g., *Board of Pardons v. Allen*, 482 U. S. 369, 370–371, n. 1 (1987).

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oners of other religions to “us[e] faith practice to mask their gang activity.” 2014 WL 7239858, at *4. Nor is there any indication that a Jewish study group is more likely than a Christian or Muslim group to impede order, compromise inmate relationships, or absorb personnel resources. The State has no apparent reason for discriminating against Jewish inmates in this way. The District Court erred in holding otherwise, and the Fourth Circuit erred in affirming.⁸ I would thus grant certiorari, summarily reverse the judgment below, and remand for further proceedings.

Needless to say, the Court’s refusal to grant review in this case does not signify approval of the decision below. But the Court’s indifference to this discriminatory infringement of religious liberty is disappointing.

⁸The courts below also erred in concluding as a matter of law that respondent did not intentionally violate Ben-Levi’s free exercise rights. See 2014 WL 7239858, *4 (EDNC, Dec. 18, 2014). Respondent explicitly rejected Ben-Levi’s request for a group Torah study, knowing full well that this decision would completely prevent him from praying or studying with other Jewish inmates. See Doc. No. 32, p. 3; Doc. No. 42–2, at 5–6. There is thus a genuine issue of material fact as to whether respondent acted intentionally.